This paper tries to summarize what we have come to know about the development mechanism of Southeast Asia since the mid 1960s (when I first became involved in development studies). We now know the following: The country’s economic growth is correlated with 1) the investment ratio, 2) export growth, and 3) monetary (as well as exchange) stability. The first two factors are known to be also relevant for Northeast Asia, though the third is not necessary so.
 One bottleneck in raising the explanatory power of quantitative development economics is the difficulty in measuring human capital formation. Even in the case of physical capital formation (which comprises the numerator of the investment ratio), what is really needed is the rate of increase of physical capital stock. But physical capital is rarely measured because many theoretical and practical difficulties are involved. To measure human capital is theoretically even more difficult, which in turn makes the measurement of human capital formation problematic. As a result, we do not know its quantitative significance as a factor of economic growth.
 Even if economic growth is explained in terms of capital formation (or export performance), why it has differed is left unexplained. The quantitative economists might say that it can be explained by difference in other economic variables, but to explain one variable in terms of another has limits, for the way in which economic variables are related, or the way in which parameters determine the relations, has to be explained as well. The factors which affect the parameters are institutions and culture.
 As to institutions in Southeast Asia, what we now know is that: 1) the better the protection of private property, and 2) the freer the economic activity, the higher the rate of capital formation (and thus the rate of economic growth). The second factor seems to be less valid in Northeast Asia where government intervention was effective up to a certain point in time, but in Southeast Asia, where the level of government corruption has been higher, the tendency has been that the higher the level of government intervention, the poorer the economic performance.
 Why then have nations differed in institutional development? By way of explanation, neo-institutionalists may invoke such concepts as the path dependency, but these concepts are not very useful unless they are contextualized. But this is difficult for neo-institutionalists because they are generalists and do not want to get involved in a particular context. This is where area specialists can come in. In fact, they are in a better position to understand the national context of institutional change.
 The institutional approach is a big step toward understanding the mechanism of economic development, but institutions alone are not enough for explaining the national difference of parameters. Culture has to be introduced as another factor. The economists accept individual difference in utility functions, but they, as well as social scientists in general, are reluctant to accept national difference in culture as a factor. But in Southeast Asia, there is some correlation between growth rate and the percentage of Chinese in the total population, which probably arises because the Chinese are, on average, more work-oriented, interested in education, frugal and risk-taking than the indigenous. In East Asia as a whole, the better economic performance of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea and the rapid rise of China in recent years seem to have something to do with their cultural characteristics.
 Studies on economic development will continue to be conducted on two fronts. In one, the quantification of variables affecting economic growth will be improved and the explanatory power of the quantitative approach be expanded. In the other,...

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This article discusses the government’s road improvement policy in the era of the People’s Party government. Because of the rebellion of H. R. H. Prince Boworadet, the government keenly recognized the importance of road improvement for national security. At the same time, James M. Andrews, an American scholar who conducted Thailand’s rural economic survey, recommended road improvement from the point of economic development. The government, therefore, laid out an ambitious road construction program that aimed to complete a 15,000 kilometer road network within 18 years. This was the first nationwide road construction program in Thailand.
 Though the government intended to construct one nationwide road network within Thai territory, there were still many provinces where neither railway nor road had reached. The first five-year program, therefore, aimed to construct feeder roads for railways that would serve these provinces. Thereafter, the government established many provincial highways all over the territory to ease the dissatisfaction of assembly men and inhabitants whose province was not benefited by the first five-year program. However, as the world situation worsened, the government increased the construction of military roads, which had not been included in the first program, while leaving most provincial highways unimproved.
 The People’s Party government had to institute road policy from both a macro-and micropoint of view. It had to materialize the macro-intention of completing a nationwide road network for national security on the one hand, but it also had to respond to micro-demands for local roads in every area. Therefore, it pretended to respond to micro-requests by establishing the first five-year program and the provincial highway program. This apparent egalitarianism was the most peculiar phenomenon of road improvement during the era of the People’s Party government.

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This article examines the construction of the colonial security apparatus in Burma, within the broader British colonial project in eastern Asia. During the colonial period, the state in Burma was built by default, as no one in London or India ever mapped out a strategy for establishing governance in this outpost. Instead of sending in legal, commercial or police experts to establish law and order—the preconditions of the all-important commerce—Britain sent the Indian Army, which faced an intensity and landscape of guerilla resistance never anticipated. Early forays into the establishment of law and order increasingly became based on conceptions of the population as enemies to be pacified, rather than subjects to be incorporated into or even ignored by the newly defined political entity. The character of armed administration in colonial Burma had a disproportionate impact on how that population came to be regarded, treated, legalized and made into subjects of the Raj. Administrative simplifications along territorial and racial lines resulted in political, economic, and social boundaries that continue to divide the country today. Bureaucratic and security mechanisms politicized violence along territorial and racial lines, creating “two Burmas” in the administrative and security arms of the state. Despite the “laissez-faire” proclamations of colonial state officials in Burma, this geographically and functionally limited state nonetheless established durable administrative structures that precluded any significant integration throughout the territory for a century to come.

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The paper seeks to explain three episodes of political violence in post-war Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines. It argues that in the tense and pointed post-war competition between state actors and social challengers, a strategic calculus governed relationships among different political authorities, and between different authorities and social forces. The state and its challengers examine the particular currency of power and advance to assess who poses threats, and in what ways, to their various plans for political advance. To validate this argument, the paper examines the social foundations of colonial rule and nationalism, the different modes of transition to independence, and the various engines of upward political mobility after independence.

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This essay examines the independence constitutions of Asia and Africa in the twentieth century through a macro-comparative lens. The examination focuses upon the intra-imperial isomorphic thesis which proposes that newly independent countries, in formulating their constitutions, merely imitated the constitutional form of their former mother country. I find that while independent constitutions indeed imitated the constitutions of their former mother country, this mimicry was neither universal nor whole scale. It occurred foremost in terms of the constitutional provisions for governmental system. Conversely, at least half of the independence constitutions in Asia and Africa had provisions for religion, rights, and/or political parties that ran counter to the constitutional model of the former mother country. These countervailing tendencies to the logic of intra-imperial isomorphism reveal crucial trans-imperial influences on the making of modern postcolonial constitutions.

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Standard theories of insurgency hold that marginalization from centers of power provide insurgents with social space to develop coherent organizational and ideological challenges to authority. Insurgents in recent cases of state collapse, however, do not develop ideological or organizational alternatives. This is due to the particular nature of state collapse, especially where rulers had used informal institutional networks to control populations. As formal bureaucratic institutions collapse, remnants of patronage networks coopt would-be ideological fighters. Strongmen use armed fighters to control fragments of the old patronage economy. This empowers enterprising fighters interested in personal wealth at the expense of ideologues. This dynamic is illustrated with reference to vigilante groups in Nigeria, especially the Bakassi Boys of Anambra State, which initially develop as anti-corruption and antiregime fighters, then become incorporated into the strategies of the politicians whom they fight. The course of internal warfare in Sierra Leone and former Yugoslavia provide further illustration of this process.

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This paper examines the themes developed by the colonial bureaucrat-scholar Joseph Ralston Hayden in his book The Philippines: A Study in National Development (1942), the first comprehensive academic study of Philippine political development under American rule. It argues that the book is suggestive of how American officials tried to extricate themselves out of the dilemma of conceiving of a colonial state modelled after the United States but finding themselves confronted by a mutated version dominated by Filipino leaders. In seeking an academic explanation out of this problem, Hayden’s book also gives readers an insight into why the United States remains extremely popular during the late colonial and throughout most of the post-colonial periods.

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