The Homestead Act is one of the most important laws in American history, but the evaluation of this law is still fluctuating. In order to understand the significance of the Homestead Act, we have to know more about the actual operation of the law and the condition of homesteaders. The achievement of the Homestead Act should be measured not only by the amount of public land acquired under this law but also by its effects upon the life of pioneer, farmers. Though the Homestead Act gave a free land, raw land did not constitute a farm. There was no provision in the act which enabled homsteaders to start farm-making. This was a serious drawback for poor settlers. At the sametime, however, we know that some homesteaders had no intention to complete the title. Horace Greeley and Albert Richardson already noticed the existence of settler-speculators. Thomas LeDuc recently suggested that public land policies retarded the development of the west by allowing small settler-speculators to control a large amount of idle acreage. Did homesteaders have enough money to start farm-making? Why did they engage in speculative activities? It is the the purpose of this paper to answer these questinos focussing attention on a Nebraska county.

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The main object of this paper is to condiser the influences of the historical development of the policy of "the Heavy Industrialization of Manchuria" in the 1930s on the economic structure of "Manchuria", (particularly) focussing on the "Five-Year Plan of Industrial Development of Manchuria" which had a great influence on the process of development, and stating and analyzing the motive of the planning, the contents of plan, process of execution of the policy, and the relation of the colonial economic structure including that of Korea and other Chinese enforced occupation areas. In analyzing the execution process, the author intends to state the characteristics of the process, dividing the Five-Year plan into two periods, the original plan and the rivised period, and at the same time focusing on the latter period, to point the inevitability of the failure of the revised plan, of its financial and labor situations as the axis, with their relation to the inmatured machine industry. (So to speak,) the lack of those factors, as one of the centering manifestations of the structural weakness of Japanese capitalism, had an inner inevitability of the Plan driven into failure.

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Marx said in his preface to the first edition of 'the Capital' Vol. I, published in 1867, "the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future". And he thought that in the less developed countries could be included not only Germany but the other civilized ones, such as France, America etc. Then, what imags had he about the future development of the uncivilized countries outside the Europe-America World? In this article I traced how he had altered his vision of future development of China and India, in the years from 1848, the time of his 'Manifesto of the communist party', to 1859. During the first half of 1850's, he held an optimistic view that the old-established industries in both countries would be easily destroyed by cheap prices of imported commodities from western capitalist countries, and consequently capitalism would be established and develop there. But he had gradually altered this view in the latter half of 1850's, and recognized that imported commodities from abroad were resisted stubbornly in both countries by the national economic structure based on the strong union of small agriculture and house industry, and village community. Thus he came to realize that the Asiatic mode of production has stubborn tendency of stagnation. He kept to this thought after then, and described it more systemtically in the Chapter 20 of 'the Capital' Vol. III. Then, which was dominant in his thoughts in the stage of 'the Capital', the 'Golden Age' of Free Trade, the image of China and India or that of Gernany, France and America? I think that in that stage the latter image had the principal position and the former had .only the subsidiary unitil the crisis of 1873.

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