土地制度史学
Online ISSN : 2423-9070
Print ISSN : 0493-3567
31 巻, 4 号
選択された号の論文の5件中1~5を表示しています
  • 原稿種別: 表紙
    1989 年 31 巻 4 号 p. Cover2-
    発行日: 1989/07/20
    公開日: 2017/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 吉岡 昭彦
    原稿種別: 本文
    1989 年 31 巻 4 号 p. 1-20
    発行日: 1989/07/20
    公開日: 2017/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Before World War I, the Great Britain rivaled with European Powers in the construction of fleet, and this resulted in the rapid growth of navy expenditure. In this article I have attempted to clarify three problems, i.e., (1) methods to finance growing expenditure, (2) procedures to make up Navy Estimate and changes of "votes" in Estimates, (3) parliamentary debates on navy expenditure between 1889-1914. The conclusions are as follows. (1) At first, the growth of navy expenditure depended partly upon the "fixedcharge" = "Naval Defence Account" (1889-1893), then, upon the "borrowing" = "capital expenditure" for naval works (1895-1905), and at last, completely upon the great increase of Estimate itself. (2) The making-up of the Navy Estimate was not the work of Treasury but of Admiralty, and especially "vote 8, Shipbuilding" was decided by Board of Admiralty, depriving Treasury of its controlling power. Thus, under the "Two-Power Standard", trends of navy expenditure was characterized as follows, (1) 1889-94, a higher level, (2) 1895-1904, rapid growth, (3) 1905-08, downward, (4) 1909-14, increasing speed. (3) By Naval Defence Act (1889) and Hamilton's Programme, Conservative Party struck the parliamentary control, but Liberals abolished that Act. After Spencer's Programme was made up (1894), the expenditure increased again, and at the end of Boer War, Liberals, Irish Nationalist and even a part of Unionist criticized the enormous expenditure because of the heavy burdens on taxpayers. In 1905, naval policy turned adversely in the atmosphere of peace. But because of the failure of Haag Peace Conference, Board of Admiralty demanded 8 warships of Dreadnought type in 1909 against German plan, and succeeded to get the money opposing to Cabinet decision. This affair weakened the civilian and parliamentary control of Navy Estimate and accelerated its growth. British Navalism was the centre of Britain's entry into World War I.
  • 石原 俊時
    原稿種別: 本文
    1989 年 31 巻 4 号 p. 21-40
    発行日: 1989/07/20
    公開日: 2017/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the early 1880's, trade unions in Stockholm developped themselves with the close relation to various liberalist movements led by urban middle class. Stockholms traarbetareforening (The Stockholm woodworkers' Union) presents a typical example of these trade unions to us. It is important to understand that both the liberalists and the trade unionists shared some common ideology which underlay their personal and organizational relationships with each other. They wished orderly development of the society, self-disciplined and rational behaviour among workers, and the citizenship and suffrage to be entitled to workers so as to get the equal status with the other classes. But the middle class liberalists aimed at unifying the awkward working class into the modern capitalist society, while the trade unionists intended to emancipate themselves from employers' despotism. So clear differences appeared gradually between the liberal reformers and the trade unionists. The latter came to be attracted to social democracy instead. Social democratic movement led by Hjarmar Branting, which won the the support of the trade unionists in the late 1880's, was not revolutionary but parliamentalistic and revisionistic one. Branting insisted on the peaceful way to socialism. In order to know why such social democracy attracted trade unions, we should consider the close relationship between trade unions and various liberalist movements in the early 1880's.
  • 木村 晴壽
    原稿種別: 本文
    1989 年 31 巻 4 号 p. 41-58
    発行日: 1989/07/20
    公開日: 2017/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study attempts to describe actually, by examinig the currency of imported cotton yarn (abridged "yarn" for the rest) in Ashikaga-Kiryu weaving area, how the weaving industry of Japan coped with the inflow of cotton products at the early Meiji era, therefore, how it was reformed at that time. The trade of yarn in Yokohama was leaded, with a certain replacement of members, by some main foreign traders, and some Japanese receiving-merchants whose business was supported monetarily through a credit system by the yarn-dealers in the weaving area. As for the domestic bargain, on sending yarn to the dealers of the weaving area, those Japanese merchants who transacted business in spot cash with foreign traders drew, at some cloth-brokers' offices in Tokyo, bills for collection which the cloth-brokers took up instantly, so that they could obtain a round sum of money for their business. In this case it was the cloth-brokers that played a basal role in the credit system and made it work, since they not only supplied the receiving-merchants money by taking up the bills but kept the bills till they became due. From the viewpoint that the advanced foreign economies could not penetrate into Japan after all, we, by all means, ought to emphasize the resources of the cloth-brokers in the weaving area as well as in Tokyo which were accumulated in the feudal system. Yarn-dealers in the weaving area, on the other hand, also made full use of the credit system in order to meet the weavers' demand for yarn. Being concerned in cloth currency some yarn-dealers of the weaving area, from receiving-merchants (some in Tokyo, others in Yokohama), bought cotton yarn the charge of which the cloth-brokers of Tokyo took over in exchange for cloths they would buy or had bought. In this sense we may be able to regard the credit system mentioned above as based on cloth currency. Speaking of the aspect of the yarn currency within the weaving area, we must note beforehand that as regards cloth business, cloth brokers in a basic form issued to weavers promissory notes which usually had approximately thirty days to run when buying cloths. Weavers who, for lack of money, could not but dispose of the notes before the due date appropriated them for purchase of yarn, so that they could obtain yarn at the same time as. the sale of cloths. Thus, such currency of notes, undoubtedly, contributed to the penetration of yarn into the weaving area. What did the yarn-deslers do with the notes they accepted, then? Some kept the notes till the due date, which points out that the dealers' resources played an indispensable role in the currency of notes, and others appropriated the notes for their own stock of yarn, which means that the currency of notes themselves was of great use to rapid introduction of yarn into the area in such a way as well. However, the currency of notes was considerably ristricted, before banks were set up in this region. For that reason, business in cash between weavers and cloth-brokers was inevitable to some extent. Thereby, the weavers could obtain yarn on selling cloths when no bank was set up yet in this region. From these facts we reasonably extract the conclusion that the extensive consumption of yarn was led by the credit system for yarn and cloth which the cloth brokers and the yarn-dealres supported.
  • 源川 真希
    原稿種別: 本文
    1989 年 31 巻 4 号 p. 59-72
    発行日: 1989/07/20
    公開日: 2017/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
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