What makes "The General Theory" revolutionary? Is it because it gave the method to control investment by means of rate of interest and public finance in order to avoid unemployment? But we can go back to the time as early as 1924 when Keynes gave a lecture, title of which was 'The End of Laissez-Faire' to find his propositions in favor of such policies. We thought these propositions for such policies belong to continuous factors in the forming of "The General Theory". It was with regard to theoretical frameworks that changed. This paper shows that the change came not from the multiplier theory as Klein insisted, but from the change of the concept of 'investment' and that of 'equilibrium'. The former means the change from 'capital' to 'asset'. The latter means the change from 'static' to 'shifting'. This former change became the main theoretical weapon for construction of 'cross-check system' in national income statistics. And the latter change made government officials confident of 'Stability' of economic system. That is why "The General Theory" made it possible to put Keynes's propositions into practice and made them revolutionary in true sense.

抄録全体を表示

Although we can not tell whether Keynesian Revolution occurred to economic policy as well as to economic theory in the strict sense of the word, it is certain that many governments of industrialized countries adopted so-called Keynesian Policy after WWII. This Paper tries to confirm that the steps towards performing 'Keynesian Policy' had been taken in 1930s Britain. We should pay attention to Leaving Gold in 1931 at first. That event suggested that it was not the gold standard itself but the balance of international payments that restricted domestic economic policies within narrow limits and that 'Keynesian Policy' could not be made by only abolition of the gold standard. In fact, little deficit spending was observed and the issue of the Bank of England notes did not expand after Leaving Gold. In 1930s, however, there were some attempts to release domestic policies from the limits imposed by the balance of international payments. For example, Exchange Equalisation Account, which was intended to insulate the domestic credit mechanism from international flow of capital, was founded. Moreover several inter-central bank cooperations and the Tripartite Agreement were observed. But international cooperation in adjustment of the exchange rate ended with few results. Therefore the problem of correcting the imbalance in the exchange rate or the balance of international payments had to become one of the important subjects at Bretton Woods. Proposals for an International Clearing Union (Keynes Plan) aimed at constructing the framework which would make 'Keynesian Policy' possible through elastic international credit and flexible adjustment of the exchange rate. Of course, it did not become a reality, but IMF had character originated from Keynes Plan a little. It is necessary to examine how IMF contributed to the success of 'Keynesian Policy' after WWII or how IMF restricted 'Keynesian Policy' as a result of stepping back from Keynes's suggestion.

抄録全体を表示

This paper will discuss on the planning process of the postwar international monetary system, especially on the role of Harry Dexter White (1892-1948) who served as a high official in the Division of Monetary Research of the Treasury Department under Henry Morgenthau, Jr. during the New Deal period. The 1920s saw a considerable decline of European economies, and the United States kept pouring much capital there. The American gold stock increased at an ever-accelerating speed, so that it seemed necessary for the United States to extend the credit and create additional domestic purchasing power to make up for the economic contraction of gold deficit countries. But Benjamin Strong, the first Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during 1914-1928 took cautious stand because the free exchange of gold worldwide did not materialize during his term. John Maynard Keynes whose main target was to improve the massive unemployment insisted on the recovery of private investment through debt readjustment including global as well as domestic procedures during the Great Depression. He advocated the necessity of raising price levels. Harry White approached the same issue with rather different perspectives. He was completely in line with the early New Deal's inflationary monetary policies leading to the depreciation of the dollar. He supported domestic public works program through deficit financing. Further he insisted that it would be necessary to establish international organization that could find ways to redistribute the world gold supply. The original White plan intended to resume world trade and supply capital for that purpose through the Stabilization Fund (later IMF) and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The bank was supposed to issue non-interest bank notes (later to be called Unitas). But these "bold" features diminished as the plan sought support both from the American Congress and British cabinet.

抄録全体を表示

To avoid a repetition of the international currency and trade collapse, United States policy makers at Bretton Woods created the International Monetary Fund to operate a system of pegged but adjustable exchange rates. Most importantly, the Bretton Woods monetary system recognized the importance of multilateral trade and payments due to global aspects of the postwar system. The way to liberalization appeared infinitely longer, slower, and harder, requiring "transition period" clauses in the Fund, huge financial aid like the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, and a subsidiary organization like the European Payments Union. In this paper, we analyze the discussions at the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, and we confirm the strategy and limits of the American foreign policy, and its influences on the integration of the European economy. The Fund descended into a serious functional disorder after the war, because quantitative restrictions on trade and bilateralism among the European countries were caused principally by their shortage of means of payment with which to settle their various international accounts. To survive these temporary difficulties, American foreign policy included the political and economic integration of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan. Active American participation in originating and establishing the EPU and the trade liberalization program of 1949 meant that the United States supported the formation and indefinite continuation of the Bretton Woods insistence on a universal approach. At the National Advisory Council the officials of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System severely criticized the EPU, since it would create a permanent closed soft currency area. Because the United Kingdom and the sterling area participated in the regional clearing union, however, the Council recognized the EPU as long as it was a transitional organization to achieve the ultimate objective of the Fund. Over the eight and a half years, the EPU and the OEEC exerted a significant influence on member's domestic currency and financial policies. The European Monetary Agreement designed to ensure the maintenance of monetary cooperation between the OEEC members, came into force upon the termination of the EPU at the close of business in 1958.

抄録全体を表示

After World War II, the European integration has developed by means of formation of the European communities, European Steal and Coal Community (ECSC), EEC, EURATOM, EC and EU. Based on the federalism, European countries participating in these communties, have aimed at forming the United States of Europe. According to federalists, the sovereignities of states should be removed to international organization in order to compose their common development policy. So international organization should administer the countries which will construct it, and national goverments should become local goverments. In fact, some parts of national sovereignities have been transfered to the organizations of the communities. But the High Authority of ECSC, given administrative power on the coal and steal industries in six countries by Paris Treaty, could not control them well. During the first five years (1953-57), it could neither govern commercial transactions nor investments of enterprises in these industries. In parallel with the action of ECSC, the negociation to creat new economic communities has started in 1955 after the failure in the establishement of the European Defence Community. In that negociation, the delegates of Germany and Benelux states laid stress on the liberalization of trade, instead of the federalization of six countries. French finaly accepting the proposion, the Rome Treaty which established EEC and EURATOM was signed in 1957. In the result, two commissions of EEC and EURATOM had less administrative authority than High Authority of ECSC. In other word, Councils of Ministers which represented national governments had relatively much power in EEC and EURATOM. In this way, six countries modified the federal principle of European integration at the begining of EEC.

抄録全体を表示

In this monograph we have investigated the Asian case under the theme "Economic Restoration and Integration after II World War-Europe and Asia". The economic integration in Western Europe has influenced Asia though its process, and it has shown the possibility that Asia could expand the commerce in the area. At the same time it has stimulated efforts to improve the system of financial trasactions. However, the Asian economic integration has been limited because the foreign trade of countries in this area was not complementary to economic development of each country, and because their economic dependency on their European colonial power was decisive. The movement for the integration, on the contrary, consolidated bilateral economic reletions with their old suzerain states or United States. As such bilateral economic relations were established, and due to different levels of economic development, the Asian countries were prevented from receiving the external financial aid such as the Marshal Plan, and from establishing organizations like Asian Payment Union, both of which were indispensable to an economic integration. Though the Japanese industrial power was highly desired by the Asian nations, the strong anti-Japanese feeling and mistrust of Japan by European powers prevented Japan's participation. United States assumed that if the old suzerain states were integrated under the global economic system, the previous Asian colonies could be easily controlled by the system. The American policy of Japanese occupation aimed to connect the Japanese economic restoration with the development of the other Asian countries, but no concrete scheme was realized. Little consideration was given as to how the old colonies and occupied areas could be part of the global economic system. The integration of Asian countries into the post-war global economic system required new systems of intergovernmental cooperation and controls, which were beyond the level of European experience.

抄録全体を表示

This comment on the three reports in the second section also refers to the agricultural integration of the EU which will be discussed as a supplementary remark to them. The report by I. Sudo analyses the process of transition from the universal financial and monetary system supported by the IMF to the regional system of the EPU. This institutional analysis approach seems to be successful and persuasive. Largely analysing the structure, function and performance of the ECSC, the report by Y. Ishiyama explicates a significance of the European Integration in the course of 1950s which passed from the failure of some essays at the construction of the United States of Europe, then to the ECSC and finally to the EEC. It is notable that this report critically examines the meaning of supranationality of the European integration. With an analysis of the external relation of some East Asian coutries, the report by H. Nishikawa presents a certain possibility of regional integration in the East Asia. Their economic development in recent years was the fastest in the world and they have great potential of human and physical resources also. The type of regional integration in this area seems to be so different from the one of the EU that this report would contribute to some further comparative studies between these two areas. In the second part, we would like to consider the indispensable role of the agricultural integration in the construction of the Europe. The agricultural expenditure accounts for more than half of the general budget of the EU. This fact shows us the preponderance of the agriculture in all of the activities of the EU. We could not imagine the EU without the common agricultural market. The achievement of the agricultural integration was attributable to the similarity of the agricultural protective policies in the member states where food supply was so insufficient that they were obliged to import food too much to keep the balance of payment. On the other hand, there were many differences between member states in terms of the production, farm structure and external trade. For that reason, negociation for the construction of a common agricultural market became very difficult. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Common Agricultural Policy has been an important factor in binding the member states since the establishment of the EEC.

抄録全体を表示