A blockchain is a distributed ledger that allows users to exchange information without a centralized authority. This technology enables users to send and receive tokens among other applications, such as transactions, product management, and elections. It is possible to send data and tokens inside a single blockchain, but a method to efficiently share the data and tokens among different blockchains has not yet been constructed. Cross-chain communication, the focal point of several recent research efforts, is a scheme for sending data or tokens among different blockchains. In existing studies, a trusted third party (TTP) is used to ensure fair rates of token exchange among different blockchains. However, because blockchains are originally designed with a policy that does not incorporate the use of TTPs, the fair exchange rate should not be determined by TTPs, but rather by the market price of tokens among users. When exchange rates are determined from quotes among users, the preferred scheme is to determine the exchange rate offered by many users as an auction. Here, some existing cross-chain communication systems use smart contracts that automatically execute arbitrary processes on the blockchain. However, such schemes require a gas fee each time a smart contract is executed. Thus, implementing an auction scheme that determines the fair exchange rate among different blockchains would necessitate each user to pay a fee for each new token offered, which would result in high gas fees. In this study, we propose a scheme to determine exchange rates from quotes among users with a relatively low gas fee. Using a first-price sealed-bid auction and commitment scheme, the user with the highest token value can be identified without revealing the other users’ token offer values. In our scheme, the largest token value among users is determined as the exchange rate using an external Smart Contract (SC) instead of a TTP. We further modify the existing insert key-value commitment scheme to aggregate the commitment values of token offers. Our scheme is based on the generalized RSA assumption. By proving that it satisfies the key-binding property, we prove that the token sender cannot act maliciously. We further implement the proposed scheme and demonstrate that the gas fees and data space required to implement the proposed scheme are practically feasible.
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