This paper considers the necessity and importance of establishing a learning community and higher education institutions in the reconstruction of Fukushima based on the fundamental question of what learning is. First, based on the research of cognitive scientist Imai, we confirm that “learning is a process of relentless inquiry, and is not simply the acquisition or accumulation of knowledge, but rather the discovery and creation of completely new knowledge from existing knowledge, which is the essence of learning.” However, Imai’s observations are based on the learning of a native language in infancy, and the “learning” = “inquiry” required for the construction and evolution of a “living knowledge system” needed in the growth process of citizens is far more complex than the learning of a native language as a survival strategy in infancy. To enable broad and deep “learning” = “inquiry” and to reform existing schemas (tacit knowledge), it is necessary to socialize and institutionalize “a place of dialogue” = “a learning community” in society.

This paper considers the importance and necessity of establishing higher education institutions (universities and colleges) in the Hamadori region of Fukushima Prefecture from the perspective of creating “places for dialogue” and “ a learning community” (1F Chiiki Juku and Fukushima Saisei Juku) for the recovery of Fukushima and the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which has been a focus of attention for 14 years since the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in March 2011. Specifically, I will discuss the situation and issues surrounding university education and “ a learning community” in Japan and then consider the Fukushima Innovation Coast Concept and the Fukushima Institute for Research, Education and Innovation (F-REI), which are being promoted as national policies for the reconstruction of Fukushima, from the perspectives of innovation research and “ a learning community” research.

In late July 1945, after US invasion forces destroyed the Japanese 32nd Army Headquarters on Okinawa Main Island, the Sakishima garrison in Okinawa’s southernmost Sakishima Islands remained intact. On Miyako Island, the occupying force numbered about 30,000. Headquartered on Miyako, the so-called Sakishima Group was led by Lieutenant General Toshiro Nomi, commander of the 28th “Toyo” Infantry Division. In March, the island had been cut off from outside supplies, and by the end of July, army field rations had been exhausted, and food scarcity became an urgent concern. On August 15, the Japanese government accepted the Allied surrender terms, but the only order issued by the Sakishima Group instructed its troops to engage in “food self-sufficiency operations.” The force surrendered after disarming in September, but until demobilization was completed in early February 1946, it continued its occupation of Miyako. I refer to this “postwar” interval as the “war against hunger.”

In the immediate aftermath of the Okinawan war, 90% of Japanese military casualties on Miyako were due to starvation or disease. Given that situation, the Sakishima Group approached “local self-support activities” (genchi-jikatsu) as it would a major tactical operation. In Part 1 of this study,* I analyzed military activity reports that traced the evolution of proposals for a food self-sufficiency campaign (jikatsu-sakusen) and noted that plans for the war on hunger had been drafted as early as July 26, 1945. The Sakishima command viewed this local self-support initiative as a military operation that would rely on the army’s previous combat training and fighting spirit. Officers would have to hone their tactical skills and technical knowledge, exercise firm leadership, and conduct periodic security inspections, just as in wartime. Complete food self-sufficiency would be achieved through the efforts of the military organization as a whole. The fact that the Sakishima Group’s Miyako force had been disarmed and was no longer combat-ready was an additional motivating factor. The command viewed food self-sufficiency activities as vital for maintaining military cohesiveness and discipline as it awaited repatriation to Japan proper.

From the late summer of 1945, the Sakishima Group began to conduct self-support campaigns in the belief that these might continue for as long as two years. Some 2,000 soldiers selected from the 3rd Regiment, Independent Artillery Corps and other units were demobilized and shipped to the Okinawan main island in October 1946, but by early February of that year, most troops had already been repatriated—much sooner than anticipated.

Between 1944 and February 1946, it is estimated that approximately 2,419 army and 150 navy personnel died from disease and starvation. According to demobilization records, 90% of these deaths were due to malaria, endemic diseases, and chronic malnutrition.

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This paper aims to shed light on several previously unknown aspects of Japan-Thailand relations during the period from November 11, 1935, when Mitsubishi Corporation (三菱商事) opened a branch in Bangkok, to 1943. It does so by utilizing documents related to Thailand—mostly drafts of reports, referred to in this paper as the “Nitta Documents”—and a diary, referred to as the “Nitta Diary,” which were in the possession of Yoshimi Nitta (March 24, 1894–November 6, 1992), who held the top position at Mitsubishi Corporation in Bangkok from 11 November 1935, when it opened its Bangkok branch, until 1943, excluding a two-year interruption.

Major Japanese diplomatic documents and official records of the Japanese military related to Japan-Thailand relations during this period were destroyed at the end of World War II in 1945. However, the Nitta Documents and Nitta Diary contains invaluable records of Japan-Thailand relations that cannot be found elsewhere. One such example is an entry from July 30, 1939, which records a conversation Nitta had with Jirō Saitō, the Japanese Army Attaché in Thailand:

“Saitō came to visit, and we had a meal at the Bangkok Hotel. There was talk of taking Luang Sinsongkhramchai [Sindhu Songgramjai,the head of the Thai Navy] to Japan for discussions on a military agreement.”

Yoshimi Nitta graduated from the University of Tokyo’s Department of Mechanical Engineering in 1920 and joined Mitsubishi Corporation. From 1924 until his assignment to Bangkok in 1935, he spent over a decade—continuously from the age of 30 to 41—working in the United States and Europe.

Nitta was a distinguished figure in the Japanese community in Bangkok. He was elected as the chairman of the Siamese Japanese Association Board of Directors for one term, from April 18, 1937, to April 5, 1938, during which the association’s president was Shinzo Mihara. He also served as the president of the Siam Japanese Chamber of Commerce, succeeding Namba Katsuji of Yokohama Specie Bank upon his return to Japan on December 5, 1938. He was re-elected for another term at the general meeting on April 3, 1939, but later transferred his position to Fukuda Junkichi of Yokohama Specie Bank on August 12, 1939, before returning to Japan.

In the mid-1930s, Thailand experienced an economic recovery, leading to increased capacity for new investments. At the same time, the People’s Party government entered a period of relative stability, initiating state-led development projects that intertwined politics and economics. During this period, Japan expanded its presence in Thailand by dispatching army and navy attachés and strengthening its legation functions. Major Japanese private enterprises also began full-scale expansion into the Thai market. Mitsubishi Corporation was among the companies that entered Thailand at this time, with one of its objectives being to promote its business to the new projects initiated by the People’s Party government.

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