Shaku Sōen (1860–1919), who is famous for introducing Zen to the West along with his disciple D.T. Suzuki, arrived in Galle, Ceylon, in April 1887, where he was ordained as Samanera and learned the Pali language from Kodagoda Pannasekhara under the patronage of Edmund Rowland J. Gooneratne (1845–1914).
Disenchanted with Buddhism in the Western colonies, Sōen turned to the “genuine Buddhism” of independent Siam, where the king was a patron of Buddhism, especially the Dhammayut Order.
In July 1889, he came to Bangkok from Ceylon, almost penniless, to be ordained fully as Bhikkhu in the Dhammayut Order. However Prince Vajirananavarorasa (Wachirayana Warorot, 1860–1921), the Vice President of the Dhammayut Order dismissed Sōen coldly. He did not give Sōen the opportunity to be ordained in the Dhammayut Order.
Why did Sōen want to choose the Dhammayut Order in Siam? Where did he get the knowledge of the Dhammayut? Sōen himself did not say anything about these points.
In fact, his aspiration to the Dhammayut Order was based on his teachers, Kodagoda Pannasekhara (พระปัญญาเสขร) and Bulatgama Sumana (Bulatgama Sumanatissa, พระศิริสุมนะติสสะ).
Bulatgama Sumana, a close friend of King Mongkut (Founder of Dhammayut Order) was the central leader of the Buddhist revival movement in Ceylon in the mid-19th century. Bulatgama Sumana and Kodagoda Pannasekhara visited Siam in May–June 1886 with the far-reaching intention of reforming and reviving Buddhism in order to unify the divided Ceylonese Buddhist community by introducing the Dhammayut Order under the patronage of the King of Siam.
Bulatgama Sumana was ordained as a monk of the Dhammayut Order in a boat on the Chao Phraya River on the night of June 5, 1886.
They received a promise of support from the King Chulalongkorn, and was also authorized to be the sole contact persons for the introduction of the Dhammayut Order in Ceylon. Vajirananavarorasa, the Vice President of the the Dhammayut Order agreed that all those who wished to enter the Siamese Dhammayut Order from Ceylon must have a letter of introduction from Bulatgama Sumana or Kodagoda Pannasekhara.
In accordance with the agreement, Sōen came to Thailand with a letter of introduction of Kodagoda Pannasekhara. Therefore His visit to Siam should have been welcomed and not expected to be treated unkindly.
This paper is the first to make the agreement in 1886 between Bulatgama Sumana, Kodagoda Pannasekhara as one party and King Chulalongkorn, Vajirananavarorasa as other party reveal on the basis of Thai materials; The Journal of the Fifth King’s Royal Events, Part 21 published in 1946 and the unpublished diary of Prince Sommot.
In Anne M. Blackburn’s Locations of Buddhism: colonialism and modernity in Sri Lanka(University of Chicago Press, 2010), she examines the modern interactions between Ceylon and the Theravada Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia with the cooperation of Craig Reynolds, an expert in the history of modern Thai Buddhism, but she has completely overlooked these facts.
Bulatgama Sumana is generally believed to have been born in 1795, but according to Thai sources he was 74 years old and the period of ordination was 53 years (Buddhist Lent) in June 1886.
This article aims to examine the origins of the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula from a historical perspective. For that purpose, the long process of confrontation between North Korea and the United States during the hot and the cold war in the peninsular is reviewed, with a focus on the role of the nuclear weapons both in the military and political context. The juxtaposition of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and the North-South competition is also given particular attention as a systemic factor that facilitated the nuclear proliferation in the peninsula, first as “atoms for peace” and then for military purpose.
North Korean nuclear program was launched with the assistance from the Soviet Union. But soon it became an independent and indigenous project, refusing foreign, even Soviet, interference, causing concerns over its secrecy. Even with its advanced intelligence capabilities, such as spy satellites, the U.S. had difficulties in finding out what was happening in Yongbyon. When North Korea seemed to get closer to the weapons program, the Reagan Administration began to take the “modest initiative” offering diplomatic contact as “carrots” for engagement. On the other hand, the following Bush Administration put more emphasis on “sticks” by demanding IAEA inspection as preconditions for bilateral meetings. American “two-track strategy” was met with North Korea’s own “two-track strategy” of multi-directional diplomacy and accelerated nuclearization. The collision of the two dual strategies, exacerbated by mutual distrust and misunderstanding, led to the outbreak of the crisis in the early 1990s.
This article examined 1F decommissioning policy from a viewpoint of the social science and from a history of the governance of TMI-2 Cleanup Program in U.S.A. This article performed comparative analysis with partnership type decommissioning governance of TMI-2 based on the GEND agreement and the central government-led model decommissioning governance of 1F. The author got the following 3 important conclusions. Firstly, the improvement and innovation of the 1F decommissioning governance, based upon scientific examination and the discussion by a variety of people concerned are necessary. The second is importance of the formation of “Ba (place) of Dialogue” with the local communities. By the decision of the expert committee which lacked in “Ba of Dialogue” with the local communities, it cannot breed the social acceptance and social understanding. The third is importance of the recognition of the problem of Trans-Scientific Questions. There are not the measures without the recognition of the question.
This article discusses that it is important that the issue of the climate change should be defined as one of trans-scientific questions. American famous nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg who participated in Manhattan Project, wrote trans-scientific questions as “questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science” in “Science and Trans-Science” in Minerva in 1972. The characteristics of climate change risk include comprehensiveness, complexity, and ambiguous nature. As for such risk properties, climate change issues are the typical example of the problem of trans-scientific questions. For the solution to a problem of trans-scientific questions, “places (ba) of talks” by science (expert), politics (administration) and the collaboration with the society (citizen) are necessary. If the formation of “the place (ba) of talks” advances, it leads to brew the social acceptance and social understanding for the climate change policy.
In the previous papers of this Journal no. 22 (March 2014), no. 31 (March 2018), and no. 41 (March 2021), the author discussed the development of bilateral relations between Japan and Vietnam from 2002 to 2013, from 2014 to 2015, and from 2016 to 2017 respectively.
Following them, the First Section of this paper describes the major events in 2018, including President Tran Dai Quang’s state visit to Japan as well as various events commemorating the 45th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In the Second Section, the author describes the major events in 2019, including PM Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s visit to Japan to attend the G20 Osaka Summit. In the Third Section, the author describes various contacts between the two nations during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the territorial disputes of the East and South China Seas, the scattered islands and reefs are said to be “historically unique territories” for countries claiming territorial rights. A solution to this has been sought by international law. Several scholarly books have already been published, and the Arbitration Tribunal decided on the South China Sea in 2016. However, it is not going to be solved. The reason is that international law has many ambiguities based on customary law and is not binding on judgment. On the other hand, it is not clear how the countries claiming territorial rights have customarily used the sea.
The purpose of this article is to consider how the East and South China Seas have been used as fishery resources through the monthly journal Kaiyo Gyogyo (Sea Fisheries) published in 1936–43.
Japan invested capital for the development of phosphorus ore from the latter half of the 1910s in the Spratly Islands, the South China Sea, which was further expected to be a prelude to the southward fishing industry. On March 30, 1939 it was incorporated into Kaohsiung City, Taiwan called “Shin-nan-gunto” as a territory of the Empire of Japan.
Migrants without legal resident statuses were a major source of foreign labor in Japan throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. After Japanese government launched campaigns against ‘illegal aliens’ in 2004, their number was drastically reduced. However, ‘illegal aliens’ have increased again since 2015 despite the government control. Moreover, although the number of such ‘illegal’ migrants in Japan is relatively small, almost all of them enter the country legally. This study focuses on this phenomenon of migrant ‘illegalization’ by investigating the institutional mechanisms that have produced and perpetuated unauthorized migrants in Japan. Drawing on data from the authors’ fieldwork in the early 2000s and again in the late 2010s, the paper points out that illegalization of migrants in Japan first results from the government’s lack of political will to address the needs for labor immigration. Second, migrants’ illegal status is produced and perpetuated by the changing political priorities of the people making and in charge of the law. It is often said that the economic system needs unauthorized migrants while the political system does not. However, in Japan, we argue that the political system not only needs unauthorized migrants but also creates it. The unauthorized migrants are useful as ‘unimported’ immigrant labor and as political scapegoats.