The aim of this paper is to examine the characteristics of Hungarian foreign policy under the Kádár-Regime. Especially the author thinks that analyses of the Czechoslovak situation in 1968 and the Polish situation in 1980-1981 are of great importance in Hungarian foreign policy after the Soviet military intervention in 1956. Hungarian leaders repeatedly placed emphasis on “Hungary’s experience” of 1956 on the occasion of the crises. In addition, the author regards ‘two front struggle,’ which was the basic principle of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HSWP) after 1956 as important. In this paper, he focuses on how Hungary coped with the Czechoslovak crisis and the Polish crisis.
János Kádár, the First Secretary of the HSWP, grasped power after the Soviet military invasion in 1956. Kádár and his colleagues strengthened the leadership of the Central Committee of the HSWP, and began to consolidate the socialist system by taking a hard line. In spite of cracking down on the opposing forces, his regime started to relax its domestic control and to introduce economic reform within the frame of the one-party rule in the mid-1960s.
During what was called the Prague Spring in 1968, Hungarian leaders expected Alexander Dudček, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to make a moderate reform without political liberalization, as they had done since the mid-1960s. But Czechoslovak leaders could not keep the Prague Spring under their control. Kádár supported the Soviet leaders and agreed on the military intervention in Czechoslovakia as a last resort.
However, Hungarian leaders were skeptical about the effects of the military intervention. They were anxious that the military intervention would have a harmful influence on Hungary’s reform. So Kádár tried to mediate between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. But his mediation ended in a rupture, because Dubček refused to make a concession to the Soviet Union. Finally, he made a decision to participate in the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Hungary’s participation in the military intervention was to follow the principle of international socialism.
Kádár expected the Polish leaders to find a way out of the difficulties by themselves in 1980-1981. Hungarian leaders were skeptical about the effects of the military intervention in Poland, although they regarded Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” as an enemy of socialism. He advised Polish leaders to restore the order by using internal forces without the intervention from outside.
Kádár thought that Wojciech Jalzelski, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and his comrades had to carry out consolidation of the socialist system, just as he had done after 1956. When Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law, Hungary supported him.

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