Some of recent media studies pointed out the increasing of media effect in politics and public opinion. In what meaning, why and how has the media effect increased? The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the time-varying effect of media coverage on the cabinet approval rate by analyzing aggregate time-series data. I examine two hypotheses about factors that increased the media effect on the cabinet support rate in Japan. Hypotheses I; the growth of floating voter, what is called on "mutouha", who are sensitive to political information made the media effect increase. Hypotheses II; Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi who used media for getting support of electorate make the media effect increase, what we call "the Koizumi effect". In examining the relation between the media coverage and the change of the cabinet support rate, I introduced "the sentence-final modality" model as the new method of the contents analysis. The method is used for specifying positive/negative information about prime minister or cabinet in editorials of newspapers and converting its information into positive/negative score. In addition, I adopt the recursive regression method for analyzing time-varying effect of media. I can acquire three findings. First, the positive/negative evaluations in media coverage make a clear effect on the cabinet support rate. Second, the media effect has been significant after 1993 when floating voter grew rapidly. Third, "the Koizumi effect" is not able to confirm in this analysis.

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The coup backed by the CIA which toppled the Mussadiq's government in 1953 and the failure of the popular uprising led by Khumeini initiated and developed the anti-US feeling in Iran. This fact can be proved because Khumeini's “struggle” against “American imperialism” led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the successive US hostage incident in Iran (November 1979-January 1981).
After the uprising in 1963, the U. S. government gradually got on closer terms with the Shah's regime. Such U. S. support for the corrupt and repressive government of the Shah had close connections with important American industries, such as munitions production, electric power generation and communication industry. In addition, the clash of interests and competition of these industries in Iran were carried out by bribes and a huge commission system. Furthermore, in 1977, about 70% of the national budget was spent on military affairs, so it was evident to many Iranians that the Iranian policies were determined by the interest of these American enterprises.
After the 1963 uprising was quelled, Khumeini formed strong attachments with the purpose of overthrowing the Shah's regime. He believed that the Shah was selling the spirit of Iran to the U. S. and propagating corruption, immorality and repression. In addition, Khumeini blamed the U. S. for making the Shah carry out the “White Revolution”, so it was responsible for the tragedy that occurred in that uprising. Khumeini also declared that the U. S. government compelled the “Puppet Shah” to give Americans extraterritorial rights. Up until the revolution in 1979, he had condemned the Shah and admired the people who were engaged in the anti-establishment movement, and he denounced the U. S. government for supporting the corrupt and repressive Shah's government. Thus, Khumeini and his followers became the background of anti-US ideology of the Iran-Islam government which has endured till the present.
This paper traces the formation and development of anti-American feeling in Iran. This anti-US feeling has formed the basis of diplomatic policies of the Iranian government since the revolution. Needless to say, Iranians have various feelings about the U. S. In fact, while freedom and democracy have been questioned in Iran since the revolution, some Iranians have discovered the merits of American democracy. This influence of democracy had penetrated the public as well as the private sector, because it is known that some Iranian government officials secretly negotiated with the U. S. government in the Iran-Contra incident. Furthermore, Rafsanjani's more realistic government might change its policies against the U. S.; however, it is certain that the Iranian government will follow Khumeini's line for the present. Needless to say, the U. S. learned a great lesson about its relations with the Third World from Iran-a lesson that should be remembered when dealing with these countries in the future.

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This paper aims to consider the state control of the Iranian Shi’ite Islamic jurisprudence academia under Kamenei’s leadership based on a survey of literature and fieldwork from September 1, 2008 to October 29, 2008. Specifically, I will focus on the process of administrative reform in the madrasa complex of Qom (Ḥowze-ye ‘Elmīye-ye Qom) under his leadership and the recent condition of monthly stipend for students in the madrasa complex of Qom. On June 4, 1989, the Assembly of Experts held a meeting and decided to elect Khamenei, who had been president, as the new supreme leader. But Khamenei was a middle-ranking Islamic jurist, Ḥujja al-Islam wa-l-Muslimīn, unlike former supreme leader Khomeynī. This was not accordance that Article of the constitution of 1979, that the supreme leader must be a marja‘-e taqlīd (source of emulation; the title of a highly educated jurisconsult who has his followers) recognized by a large majority of the citizens. This contradiction of Khamenei’s appointment with the constitution was solved by revising the constitution that Khomeini had ordered before his death. In addition, the state encouraged Khomeini’s followers to obey two marāja‘-e taqlīd (pl. of marja‘-e taqlīd) who were recommended by the state. This meant the ruling structure was divided into two spheres: a political sphere and a religious sphere. At the same time, direct control by the state was limited to the former sphere. Thus it was a solution for only one side of the dualistic ruling structure that the state promoted Khamenei for a marja‘-e taqlīd. In 1994, Khamenei was nominated one of the recommended marāja‘-e taqlīd by two ruling support groups. Some researchers pointed out that repressive measures such as house arrest were taken against some high ranking Islamic jurists and their relatives. In other words, the violation by the state was a way of control over the jurisprudence academia. On the other hand, some researchers referred to Khamenei’s leadership in the administrative reform in the madrasa complex of Qom. In addition, they also referred to Khamenei’s financial support there. If their indication was correct, the solution was not only based on the violation. However they did not give enough explanation about not only the administrative reform but also the monthly stipend. Therefore, I attempted to refine their discussion and analyze the way of the state controlling the jurisprudence academia. As a result, I found out the control of the ruling body through an institution based on the above two topics. First, the administrative reform in early 1990s provided institutional connection between the state and new administrative body of the mardasa complex of Qom. Second, there were two types of the monthly stipend system. One was “informal,” the other was “formal.” In the “informal” system, insolvent marāja‘-e taqlīd paid students personally. On the other hand, in the “formal” system, the center for monthly stipend under the new administrative body collected money from each solvent marāja‘-e taqlīd and distributed this to students. At the same time, Khamenei absorbed more than thirty percent of total amount in the “formal” system. Then, these results meant a way of the state controlling the jurisprudence academia based on institution.

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