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  • 柴田 正良
    哲学
    2000年 2000 巻 51 号 1-16
    発行日: 2000/05/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    The crisis of Davidson's anomalous monism means a turning point for theories of actions because it is supposed to show that we have a strong incompatibility when we insist both the causal efficacy of mental properties and the anomalism of the mental. Therefore it seems that we can take only one of the following two ways ; (a) a causal theory of actions in view of reduction of rationality to causality or (b) interpretivism of rationalization of actions at the cost of giving up belief/desire action explanations as causal ones.
    This paper tries to show that the two elements irreducibly reside in our folk psychology, which have to be treated as a kind of data by philosophy and science of actions. In order to secure a space for both causality and rationality in action explanations, I rebut Nobuhara's comprehensive rationalization thesis as a new brand of radically anti-causalist theory.
    On the other hand, the usual causalist strategy to appeal to supervenience (following Kim), which aims to endow mental properties with the causal power, is hopeless because, as Baker pointed out, the supervenience relation is neither sufficient nor necessary to the causal efficacy of the mental. I suggest that we should dismiss the idea of reducing every kinds of explanation to the ultimate physical one and find a proper account of causal explanation as our everyday practice if we want to have a deeper understanding of human actions and action explanations.
  • 前田 高弘
    科学基礎論研究
    2009年 37 巻 1 号 29-38
    発行日: 2009/11/25
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It is often thought a difficult task to find a place for qualia in the physical world. The reason for this may be that qualia seem to be essentially intrinsic qualities so they cannot be captured entirely in terms of their causal-functional roles. This is the typical way in which qualia are thought to be physicalistically problematic. In this paper I rethink that very problem of qualia by means of metaphysical considerations concerning properties in general. The relevant question in the metaphysics of properties is whether properties have essences which determine their identities independently of their dispositional aspects. (Such essences are called 'quiddities'.) Indeed, the problem of qualia would take a different shape depending on the answer to that metaphysical question. I show this with reference to three main views on that question, namely, quidditism, the causal theory, and the identity theory. In closing, I make a brief remark about what these considerations imply for the relationship between physicalism and qualia.
  • 水本 正晴
    科学哲学
    2006年 39 巻 1 号 63-77
    発行日: 2006/06/25
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    David Chalmers presented a zombie argument, from which the falsity of physicalism allegedly follows. Although many authors who criticize this argument attack the derivation of the metaphysical possibility of zombies from the logical possibility of zombies, in this paper I will argue against the very first premise of the argument: the logical possibility of zombies. I will show the a priori impossibility of zombies, through what I call the Blinking Qualia argument.
  • 太田 雅子
    科学哲学
    1999年 32 巻 1 号 45-54
    発行日: 1999/05/15
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    Higher-level (mental, sociological and biological, etc.) entities are said to be supervenient on more basic, lower-level (physical, micro-level) entities, and there is a view that lower-level theories can completely and sufficiently explain higher-level events. But Harold Kincaid criticizes such a view. He does not deny that lower-level theories do explain something, but argues that they are only partial and incomplete, because they cannot refer to higher-level kinds which supervene on the relevant lower-level entities and answer important questions about causal laws. I will argue that the completeness or sufficiency of explanation is often evaluated interest-relatively, and, against Kincaid, that higher-level explanation cannot be sufficient without mentioning lower-level causal mechanism.
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