On July 1943, the British Government proposed to the American and Soviet Governments the “principles which would govern the conclusion of hostilities with the European members of the Axis.” Those principles were the joint system of occupation control and the equal position of the three Allied Governments. By this “memorandum of July 1st”, the British Government intended to prevent a Soviet separate armistice with Germany and Soviet exclusive control on the satellites of Germany.
However, the first axis state to surrender was Italy in September. Then, at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October, the British Government proposed a new system on control machinery for the occupation of Italy, namely, the Allied Control Commission composed of Anglo-American representatives with exclusive authority to administer the occupation. There was only one Soviet representative with observer status and a merely advisory role. This exclusive occupation control system was generally called the “Italian Formula”.
This Formula was applied next to Rumania. In this case, the Soviet representative had exclusive authority and Anglo-American representatives were only observers. The “Italian Formula” was also applied to Bulgaria and Hungary, and in the case of Germany it was applied to each separate zone. In the end, the Japanese occupation was also controled substantially with this Formula.
As mentioned above, the “Italian Formula” was applied to all the Axis powers and under this Formula the United States and the Soviet Union carried out occupation policies. Their policies embodied “Unconditional Surrender” aimed at the reorganization of the entire state structure of the defeated Axis. Within the exclusive systems, this reorganization was basically exercised on the principles of the American and Soviet social systems. Thus, the exclusive occupation control systems prepared the division of the ex-Axis powers in Europe and Asia into American-Soviet spheres of interest and formed the basic structure of the Cold War.

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Termination of war is a “bridge” between war and peace. However, comparing with other research topics of the International Relations (IR) discipline, the subject of the end of war remains highly understudied in both qualitative and quantities terms. In fact “restoration” of interstate relationship presupposes “collapse” of them. War termination phenomena deserves more scholarly attentions if understanding the transition process from the collapse to restoration of interstate relations goes at the heart of the entire IR discipline.

This paper purports to answer the question of how wars end. It presents the concept of “the dilemmas between the compromised peace and the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict” and argues that costs, future risks, and relative importance of them are an independent variable that shape the equilibrium point to solve these dilemmas. These are often malleable as an outcome of interactive processes among the belligerents. In order to advance this argument, the paper takes the following steps.

First, in reviewing the existing theoretical literature on war termination, this paper categorizes them into four approaches as: power politics; rational choice; domestic politics; and cognitive psychology, and reviews them systematically.

Second, it claims that the analytical frameworks of war termination as power politics and rational choice approach offer more useful analytical leverage than domestic politics and cognitive psychology approach. As such this article focuses on the relations between compromise and fundamental elimination of cause of conflict, on the top of power. Although the winning belligerent can eliminate fundamental cause of conflict in order to eradicate the root of future trouble by imposing unconditional surrender on its hostiles, entailed costs will increase. On the other hand, if it chooses the compromised peace to avoid increasing its warfighting costs, there would be a problem that it only postpones the rise of an unavoidable battle in the future. So this article presents the following hypotheses: (1) in the case that the level of warfighting cost is high and future risk will be low for winning side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the compromised peace; (2) in the case of the level of costs is low and future risk will be high for prevailing side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict; (3) in the case of the level of costs and future risk in ascendant side are balanced, the form of war termination would be indeterminate and strategic interactions among the belligerents would decide the equilibrium point to overcome this dilemmas.

Third, this article provides the illustration of the above hypotheses through actual historical case studies such as termination of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Pacific War in 1945.

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Japan held very sensitive relations with Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The Japanese concluded a military alliance with the Germans, and maintained neutrality with the Soviets. The Japanese aimed not only at the maintenance of neutrality with the Soviets but peace between the Germans and the Soviets.
However, the Germans pursued their own ideological and racial aims on the war against the Soviet Union, so from these points of view, there were no possibilities of peace with the Soviets. Thus, there were great gaps between the Japanese and the Germans around the measures against the Soviet Union. Here is a problem how these gaps worked upon their war conduct in each nation. But, there have been few studies about this subject except some works based only on Japanese materials.
Therefore, we would like to rearrange the negotiations and consider the meanings of the gaps between both countries with new materials.
In this study, we would like to deal with the period from June 1941, the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, to September 1943 when the Japanese failed to dispatch a special envoy to the Soviet Union.

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When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August 1945, the latter was almost exhausted after over three years of the Pacific War. Ironically enough, at that moment Japan was trying in vain to find a way out of the war by means of the good offices of the Soviet Union. Because of such circumstances, the people in the Soviet Union seemed to be apathetic at best to another round of war after the deadly fighting with Nazi Germany. Thus, to justify the war with Japan, Stalin felt it even necessary to cite the old humiliation due to the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 to 1905.
Until August 1945, a major concern of Stalin was how to adroitly find an opportune moment to enter into the war against Japan. After the Japanese surrender, he was very resolute in trying to ensure the Soviets a proper place as a great victorious power. The present paper intends to show what Soviet Russia attained and how, through joining her allies in defeating Japan.
Though Stalin wished to expand the Soviet security zone as far as possible, he also recognized that such an advancement of Soviet power would be possible only in areas subdued by Soviet armed forces. In this sense, his foreign policy reflects his trust in strength. General V. Chuikov, designated a military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Chungking in autumn 1940, records an interesting statement suggestive of Stalin's future policy in Asia after the war. Stalin told Chuikov then that as long as Chinese communists were less able than the Kuomingtang to resist Japanese aggression, the USSR could not help but bolster Chinese nationalists despite her ideological sympathy for the communists, because any Chinese prolonged resistance would lessen the Japanese threat to Soviet far eastern borders (V. I. Chuikov, Missiya v Kitae, 1983).
Such a view about the importance of strength in foreign policy may be considered an ingredient of a general belief system rather than a circumstantial perception. Consequently, this “operational code” probably convinced Stalin, after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union should be cautious in conducting her occupation policy in Japan. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept U. S. predominance in Japan provided that Soviet basic security requirements would be satisfied. Besides this precondition, all Stalin wished for was an apparent equality with the U. S. in controlling Japan.
The Soviet Union and the United States had heated arguments over the allied control machinery regarding Japan. The United States was in a much more advantageous position because of the sheer fact of the existence of American armies in Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union also had a lever for influencing the U. S. policy in Japan. This lever was her dominant status in Eastern Europe. If the United States wanted to gain some concessions in Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, the former was obliged to make concessions regarding Japan. Thus both countries could, before the end of 1945, come to a compromise to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. Afterwards, with the advent of the Cold War, the Soviet Union became more and more antagonistic towards U. S. conduct in Japan. But that is another story.

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