The establishement in June 1945 of the United Nations, which was conceived as a major international organization for general security of the post-World War II world, was pursued separately from peace conferences and other post-War settlements. It was the second attempt to design an international order based on the principle of collective security, but this time it sought to incorporate all the lessons learned from the earlier failure of the Versailles system of 1919.
This paper takes up the genesis of the United Nations as an example of an international effort with special attention to the role of major powers. First, it reviews the parallel efforts for war and peace by the “Big Three”-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill and Joseph V. Stalin-and points out the nature of collaborative diplomacy which, despite different priorities, was only possible “before the Cold War.”
While stressing that the United Nations is as much a product of realistic calculation as the embodiment of idealistic principles, the paper then considers the prerequisites for post-War peace in general by using K. J. Holsti'study of past major peace efforts of 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919 and 1945 and appraises the current performance of the UN which has survived (with a blend of success and setbacks) the Cold War.
The study concludes that the role and responsibility of major powers (both the Permanent Five members and the ones formerly defeated but now enjoying inproved status) and their healthy “internationalism” have never diminished, though these are not necessarily the only factors, in managing international peace and security in the post-Cold War world.

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Czechoslovak foreign policy, led by Dr. Edvard Beneš during the interwar period, is characterized as “Western Oriented”. However, its policy toward Soviet Russia is crucial to understanding its diplomacy as a whole. This article aims to describe Czechoslovak policy toward Soviet Russia, 1920-1922, in the context of its relations with Western Powers, East Central European countries, and domestic politics.
While Beneš advocated the idea of collective security and the League of Nations, he admitted the existence of power politics. After World War I, Czechoslovakia endeavoured to promote friendship with the victorious Western Powers, and to maintain freedom of diplomatic action in East Central Europe Though Beneš's diplomacy was less affected by domestic politics, he had to preserve a delicate balance between the left and right wings in his contacts with Soviet Russia.
Negotiations between Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments started at the beginning of 1920. They agreed to exchange unofficial commercial missions in the summer of 1921. In August, 1920, Czechoslovakia proclaimed neutrality toward the Soviet-Polish war and began to create the Little Entente against French wishes to organize East Central Europe in cooperation with Poland and Hungary. Beneš's initiatives were appreciated by Soviet Russia and accelerated negotiations.
At the end of 1921, negotiations on the commercial treaty between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia became deadlocked. The Soviet government demanded a neutral clause and recognition as the only representative of Russia in the treaty, which Beneš refused. He observed that the Soviet system was in transition and adovocated “economic intervention” in Russia through the commercial relations. Soviet diplomats criticized this policy of Beneš toward Russia.
Beneš assumed the role of intermediary between France and Great Britain to clear the way for the Genoa Conference of April, 1922. In Genoa, Beneš tried to realize his economic intervention policy toward Russia as a compromise between France and Great Britain. After the conclusion of the Rapallo treaty, which made the agreement between France and Great Britain impossible, Beneš turned to the alternative of a separate agreement with the Soviet government. During the course of the Genoa Conference, he agreed with Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreion Affairs, on the provisional commercial treaties with Russia and the Ukraine, including a neutrality clause and recognition of single representation. With this treaty, Czechoslovakia recognized the Soviet Government de facto. However, Czechoslovakia could not recognize it de jure until 1934 because Beneš could not overcome opposition in the coalition cabinets and among the members of the Little Entente.

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The purpose of this article is to analyze how the Soviet Union resolved territorial problems among Eastern European countries and transformed its relations with them. After the Second World War the Soviets took the initiative in solving the issues of Eastern Europe's boundaries in the process of redrawing post-war territorial frontiers to secure the so-called security belt along its western frontiers, in which Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland played key roles. Considering this environment, in this article the author presents two case studies—the Romanian-Hungarian conflict over Transylvania and the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict over Teschen.
In Soviet leadership on 10th January, 1944, I. M. Maiskii, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to V. M. Molotov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, laying out the post-war Soviet foreign policy and its possible position in relation to the Eastern European countries. When it comes to the Romanian-Hungarian conflict over Transylvania, Maiskii proposed that this problem should be resolved in Romania's favor; that is, the northern parts of Transylvania, which Hungary annexed from Romania before the war, should be returned to the latter. On the Teschen problem, Maiskii emphasized that in his judgment Czechoslovakia should be reestablished along its previous borders that existed before the Munich conference, 1938, with the parts of Teschen Poland absorbed after Munich being returned to Czechoslovakia.
Based on this proposal of Maiskii, generally, the Soviet Union supported the Romanian and Czechoslovak positions on reestablishing national territory according to the pre-Munich and pre-war borders, but resolving territorial problems among these countries was subordinated to the Soviet foreign policy and was vulnerable to the situation in each country.
First, the Soviet Union supported Romania on recovering Transylvania as far as the latter would recognize the annexation by the former of Bessarabia. In Romania, P. Groza formed a government, receiving the support from the Soviet. The Groza government needed the recognition of its possession of the northern parts of Transylvania by the international community, especially by the United States and Great Britain, because Hungary would not give up its claim over Transylvania. Finally, on 7th May, 1946, at the Paris conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Union succeeded in having both the United States and the Britain recognize including the article that formulates the possession by Romania of Transylvania in the peace treaty between Romania and the United Nations.
Second, the Soviet Union generally favored Czechoslovak over Teschen, but it did not make its position clear. The Teschen problem was connected with the recognition of the Polish Communist government. The west would not recognize Communist Poland; only the Soviet Union and its allies did. In addition, the internal situation in Poland was instable. Considering this, the Soviet Union set about strengthening the political and social system of Poland and refrained from urgently resolving the Teschen problem. Both the Czechoslovaks and the Poles, however, demanded possession of Teschen; the former in particular proposed the recognition of the latter under the condition that the Poles made a compromise on the Teschen problem. After the Communists won the election on 19th January 1947, in Poland, the Soviet Union considered that the situation of Poland was stable and demanded that Czechoslovakia recognize the latter. Eventually, the Soviets decided to pend the Teschen problem.
In the process of resolving the territorial problems, the Soviet Union urged the parties concerned to improve their relations. These Soviet indications led the countries to become intimately related with each other and improved Romanian-Hungarian and the Polish-Czechoslovak relations. The Soviets tried to influence the Eastern Europe through its initiatives in

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In August 1945, the Korean Peninsula came under the partitional occupation by the U. S. and Soviet armies at the 38th pararell. However, Korea was not doomed to a fate of perpetual division as a result of partitional occupation itself, but rather, as a result of the postwar U. S. -Soviet confrontation. The U. S. postwar plan for Korea was to place it under an international trusteeship for a certain period at the time from its national liberation until the time of national independence. Although the U. S. needed to take prudent policies towards the Soviet Union in a situation where the northern half of Korea was occupied by the Soviet Union, the policies that the U. S. actually took in relation to the other critical problems were quite the contrary.
The Council of Foreign Ministers (London, September-October 1945), was broken off due to disagreements between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. During the conference, the Western nations and the Soviet Union recognized it impossible to adjust their mutual interests under the name of the Allies. This marked abandoning the ‘principle’ among the Allies. Immediately after the conference, Soviet foreign policies became uncompromizing, exerting notable influence on its occupation policies towards North Korea, as an example.
The only legitimate measures the U. S. could take was to promote a trusteeship plan. This, however, might have given the Soviet Union the opportunity not only to ‘Sovietize’ North Korea but also to place the whole of Korea under Soviet influence.
The Conference of Foreign Ministers (Moscow, December 1945) adopted with minor changes the Soviet proposal that Korea should be placed under an international trusteeship for a period of five years among the U. S., the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain. The distinctive feature of the Soviet proposal was that it entrusted the design of trusteeship to the U. S. and the Soviet Union, and actually excluded China and Great Britain. This marked recognizing ‘reality’.
The U. S. -Soviet Joint Commission, based upon the agreement at Moscow, started in March 1946, but failed at the outset due to the fact that the Soviet Union adhered to a policy excluding the prominent nationalists in South Korea, who opposed the agreement, from participating in the provisional government. The Soviet Union, judging this impossible, made a bold move to communize North Korea by hindering the implementation of the trusteeship. Although the U. S., which proposed the partitional occupation of Korea, made certain efforts to dissolve the division, the U. S. -Soviet relationship was not in a situation where the U. S. could demand the Soviet Union to diminish its influence on Korea any further.
The division of Korea could not help but be perpetualized when the Moscow agreement based upon the compromise between the U. S. and the Soviet Union could no longer be implemented.

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When World War 1 broke out, most of the nations in Eastern Europe identified themselves with the existing Empires. Poles were mobilized into the three Empires that divided them. They ran the risk of fighting against each other. Germans in the Russian Empire fought in the Russian army against Germany. As the war progressed, however, they became aware of their ethnic identity. They were discriminated against by the authorities or the populace of the ruling nationality. Or they were manipulated by the belligerent nations against the enemy.

A lot of new states came into being in Eastern Europe after the war in the name of national self-determination. Most of them, however, were not “ethnic states” in the proper sense of the word. They included many citizens of different ethnicity. On the other hand, as a result of the Russian Revolution a state based on the completely new principle came into being: the Soviet Union. It adopted ethnicity as the constituting principle of the state and formed a federation of ethnic republics. Ethnic republics were, however, just on paper. There were no institutional arrangements that would promote citizens’ allegiance to the given republic. The all-mighty Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the institution that should secure citizens’ allegiance to the federal center. So long as the ideological mobilization worked, they managed to succeed in resurrecting citizens’ civic loyalty to the state as a whole.

As the international tension mounted in the course of the 1930s, the Soviet leadership started to look with mistrust on national minorities on the periphery which resulted in the mass murder in Eastern Europe. The famine in 1932–33 in Ukraine was the first case. It was no natural, but man-made disaster to which 3.3 million people fell victim. It was caused by the excessive requisition of grain that the authorities forced through for the ambitious industrialization program. Ukraine had to pay a particularly heavy toll for it. Those who tried to resist were blamed for “Ukrainian nationalism” and “actions to serve the interests of the enemy”. Most of the victims of the so-called “Great Purge” in 1937–38 were citizens of national minorities in Eastern Europe. They were suspected to be spies for Japan in the case of the “Kulak operation” and for Poland in the case of the “Polish operation”. 625,000 people were incriminated and shot to death.

During World War 2 Germans and Soviets did ethnic cleansing in a huge scale in Eastern Europe. Germans considered Eastern Europe as nothing more than suppliers of raw materials, foods and labor forces, and were not interested in integrating peoples there. They starved to death about one million inhabitants of Leningrad and 3.1 million soldiers of the Red Army most of whom were conscripted from Eastern Europe. 5.4 million East European Jews fell victim to the German extermination policy after July 1941. Soviets, on the contrary, were interested in integrating peoples they captured. However, they shot to death most of the elite who cooperated with the previous regime and exiled “enemy nationalities” en masse to Central Asia or Siberia. Beneath the German-Soviet war another ethnic cleansing unfolded: Ukrainian nationalists killed about one hundred thousand Poles and Jews in Volynia.

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