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  • 杉浦 敏廣
    ロシア・ユーラシアの社会
    2021年 2021 巻 1058 号 2-41
    発行日: 2021年
    公開日: 2023/03/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高井 卓朗
    石油技術協会誌
    2008年 73 巻 2 号 152-157
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2008/11/14
    ジャーナル フリー
    The BTC crude oil pipeline runs 1,768 km from the Sangachal Terminal near Baku in Azerbaijan, via Tbilisi in Georgia, through to the Ceyhan Marine Terminal on Turkish Mediterranean coast. The pipeline has started its operation on June 2006 and exported around 220 million barrels as of the end of September 2007.
    This presentation introduces the outline of drag reducing agent (DRA) which is currently evaluated for the purpose of increasing the pipeline capacity, and the sophisticated leak detection system (LDS) installed in the system.
  • ―アゼルバイジャンのパイプライン・プロジェクトを事例として―
    安部 雅人
    国際開発研究
    2015年 24 巻 1 号 135-149
    発行日: 2015/06/15
    公開日: 2019/09/27
    ジャーナル フリー

    The Caspian Sea has the geographical characteristics of the world's largest inland lake. After cold war came to an end, neighboring countries in the Caspian Sea achieved independence with collapse of the former Soviet Union. They appeared in global oil and natural gas markets as new export countries of oil and natural gas. However, neighboring countries in the Caspian Sea were only to use oil pipeline and natural gas pipeline which were constructed in the time of the Soviet Union for purpose of exporting oil and natural gas to global oil and natural gas markets. As the result of those neighboring countries in the Caspian Sea conflicted with Russia in the interest related to oil and natural gas exporting, they have actively promoted oil and the natural gas pipeline project through non-Russian territory. Azerbaijan is one of those countries which have a positive significance for oil and the natural gas pipeline project through non-Russian territory.

    The other countries, major trading company and international organizations (hereinafter called “Development Factors”) have the primary concern for making enormous profits by newly constructing oil and natural gas pipeline for large-scale transportation through non-Russian territory. The strategy of exporting oil and natural gas of Azerbaijan mainly promoted oil and natural gas exporting to European market by constructing oil and natural gas pipeline through non-Russian territory.

    In the sight of European countries, they are not only willing to reduce dependency of oil and natural gas import from Russia, but also acquire new oil and natural gas import from Azerbaijan and other countries.

    However, the amount of oil and natural gas for reserve is small in Azerbaijan. This means exporting oil and natural gas sustainably in Azerbaijan is limited. Therefore it is necessary for Azerbaijan to tackle the transportation of oil and natural gas to Development Factors in order to make oil and natural gas pipeline work stably.

    On the other hand, oil and natural gas revenue has a tremendous influence on the national economic activity. In fact the production and export of oil and natural gas are mainly carried out by state-owned enterprises. The benefits obtained from oil and natural gas exports would be directly brought into public treasury of Azerbaijan government. In result of that their income is enormous; Azerbaijan government can carry out any policy for public service without relying on tax revenue from citizens.

    In other words, Azerbaijan becomes a rentier state whose natural gas and oil revenue has been taken as the main element of rent revenue.

    The percentage of rent revenue of Azerbaijan in 2012 is about 63%. The numerical value is extremely high percentage of rent revenue. Such high percentage of rent revenue not only contributes to provide public service to citizens of the state by Azerbaijan government, but also reduces the job opportunity for them due to strengthening worship to Ilham Aliyev who is President of Azerbaijan.

    But this will has hindered development of domestic industry of Azerbaijan.

  • 酒井 明司
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2007年 2007 巻 36 号 84-97
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    We can find easily dozens of media and academic articles over the past 1-2 years that foretell and warn of Russia's aggressive foreign policies to her neighbours by means of her energy-exporting power in oil and gas. Many of them are the products of the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in the early 2006, which also reminds some authors of Russia's oil cut-off of the Baltic countries in the early 90's. In their arguments they seem to share a common understanding that Russia has firm intentions and aims in her foreign policies—to decelerate, if not to exclude fully, democratization of her FSU neighbours and to extract maximum diplomatic concessions from them and the EU members, concluding that her oil and gas resources are political instruments these purposes.
    After having a look at each oil/gas pipeline project of Russia, however, we feel this conclusion may not match reality. In this article the current main oil and gas pipeline projects of Russia (to Europe—BTS, Burgas-Alexandropoulis, Nord Stream, and South Stream; and to Asian countries—East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (VSTO) and Altaj) are briefly reviewed, and it is hard to see her aggressive diplomatic intentions in them. The main motive of new pipeline construction by Russia to Europe is to bypass as many transit countries as possible or to avoid transportation bottlenecks. They are of a commercial character rather than a political one, though the current transit countries which may lose their position by newly routed pipelines of Russia fear the theoretical worst that they will be under a full energy supply control by Russia. The construction plans of eastbound pipelines to Asian countries and the Pacific Ocean have a primary task to develop the areas of East Siberia and the Far East of Russia, accompanied by again commercial tactics in avoiding transit countries and a single destination route of the energy export.
    We have to pay more attention to the fact that Russia's energy export policy is hardly reliable in the world energy market, not because of her politicized aggressive stance to consumers but because it only plays a passive role against what the world market expects to one of the main oil and gas exporters. Though Russia reacts to given conditions like transit countries, she does not seem yet to involve herself into market coordination and adjustment of demand/supply balances in cooperation with other producers and consumers.
  • アダナ県低平地地域を事例として
    丸 健, 草処 基
    農業経済研究
    2016年 87 巻 4 号 406-411
    発行日: 2016/03/25
    公開日: 2017/07/06
    ジャーナル フリー

    The objective of this study is to understand formation of consciousness about social customs regarding female labor in rural Turkey. The main outcomes are as follows. First, a village survey indicated that uniformity of members and the establishment process of villages are the main factors for difference in the closed nature of villages that shows the degree of resistance of social customs to external stimuli. Second, a household survey shows that the personal background of the household head and social customs affected consciousness about female labor participation, and that the effects of economic factors on the consciousness was different according to the level of the closed nature.

  • 中央アジア・カフカス
    輪島 実樹
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 138 号 72-99,L10
    発行日: 2004/09/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The development of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Sea area inevitably takes on “geopolitical character”, for the exploitation of transportation routes is indispensable for furthering development, and coordination of interests of many countries concerned is required to realize the new export pipelines. Furthermore, the problem concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which emerged with the dissolution of USSR, becomes an additional geopolitical obstacle for energy development and transportation in this area.
    In real construction of the energy transportation way from the Caspian Sea, the routes via Russia preceded the non-Russian routes, mainly because of 1) a gradual change of Russian policy on the Caspian energy development & transportation from an oppressive one to cooperative, and 2) the relatively small construction cost of Russian routes. On the other hand, unreliability of resource bases for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), a symbolic non-Russian route, delayed its realization in spite of the strong back up of the U. S. government. It was in September, 2002, when at last BTC's construction started, helped by some supportive factors like the discovery of huge hydrocarbon reserves at the Kashagan field in the Kazakh offshore area, etc.
    The operation of BTC will put “a primary period” on the past geopolitical disputes concerning the Caspian Sea resources. Emergence of the non-Russian route with the transportation capacity equal to the Russian routes will realize “diversification of energy export routes”, the long-cherished wish of the Caspian oil producing countries and the foreign investors concerned.
    In addition, demarcation of the Caspian seabed with subsoil resources was completed in the northern area by the protocol signed in May, 2003, by three coastal countries including Russia. This means the principle to use the Caspian subsoil resources is determined in the way of division to the national sectors, therefore it is not too much to say that the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea will not be able to have any further real influence upon the subsoil development, even though this problem is not to be “finally” solved until the comprehensive five-national convention is materialized.
    Thus the gravity of geopolitical dynamics is fading in the Caspian energy development issues under current circumstances, a substantial raise of the oil production projection caused by discovery of Kashagan, however, increased possibility of the China route's construction, which would add a new geopolitical factor to the context.
  • 村上 雅博
    水文・水資源学会誌
    1995年 8 巻 4 号 419-426
    発行日: 1995/07/05
    公開日: 2009/10/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • -国際河川紛争解決要件に関する-考察 -
    田中 幸夫, 中山 幹康
    水文・水資源学会誌
    2010年 23 巻 2 号 144-156
    発行日: 2010/03/05
    公開日: 2010/04/08
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿では,中東に位置するティグリス・ユーフラテス川流域を事例に国際河川紛争の解決要因の検討を行う.同流域では主にトルコ・シリア・イラクによる水争いが20世紀後半以降顕在化し,流域国間での合意形成が幾度にもわたって試みられたが,いずれも不調に終わり,現在に至っている.このような膠着状態を脱却する要件として,本稿では「イシューのパッケージ化」に着目した.特定の争点の妥協を誘引するためにその他の争点を交渉に導入する(イシューをパッケージ化する)という手法は意識的または無意識的に様々な資源交渉もしくは国際交渉の場で行われている(本稿では米国とメキシコの間のコロラド川水質汚染問題におけるイシューのパッケージ化を例示した).ティグリス・ユーフラテス川の事例においても,流域国間でトレードオフが可能な争点としてエネルギー,国境貿易および経済開発,民族(クルド人)問題などが挙げられた.これらを水資源配分の問題と合わせて流域国間交渉に導入することにより,流域国の協調が達成可能となることが期待される.
  • 大河内 美香, 逸見 真, 黒川 久幸, 竹本 孝弘
    日本航海学会論文集
    2016年 134 巻 27-35
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2016/07/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this study is to analyze the causes of dispute concerning oil exploitation on the continental shelves. Since the sovereign rights to exploit natural resources on the continental shelves belong to coastal states, delineation of continental shelves is a critical problem for them. Previous research has been limited to specialized areas, such as geology, geopolitics, or nationalization of natural resources, etc. This study aims to augment the extant literature by considering oil concession agreements, international treaties, and maritime transportation systems. In conclusion, disputes are caused by unestablished criteria for delineation and resource distribution. The effective methods to prevent these disputes are the moratorium on exploration, unitization of transboundary deposits, and dispute settlement clauses.
  • チェチェン・マスハドフ政権の「外交」政策(一九九七―九九)
    富樫 耕介
    国際政治
    2011年 2011 巻 165 号 165_141-155
    発行日: 2011/07/25
    公開日: 2013/08/05
    ジャーナル フリー
    Effective peacebuilding in a post-conflict region is one of the important themes in modern international politics. There is consensus that the support for post-conflict regions is indispensable in international society, and in some cases it is even considered their responsibility.
    However, in this paper, a contrasting situation is presented where obtaining such international support for peacebuilding is difficult in post-conflict regions. The focus of this paper is on “unrecognized quasi-states,” which are political groups with an independent territory, a government, residents, and desire to be an independent state; however, they are not recognized by most states. If a post-conflict region to face such situation, obtaining bilateral and multilateral diplomatic support would be difficult, because of the ambiguity related to their legal status.
    Not many arguments have been made regarding peacebuilding for unrecognized quasi-states. This paper suggests reasons for this by explaining the features of unrecognized quasi-states, limitations of diplomacy, and support from “patron states.” Then, how can understand the case of such a state that is not supported by patron states, but has made diplomatic efforts toward Western countries in the post-conflict period? Such a case is presented here in terms of the Maskhadov regime of the Chechen Republic, and by using this example, this paper reveals why problems can occur if a post-conflict region has unrecognized quasi-states in the peacebuilding period.
    The paper is organized as follows. First the concept, origins, and survival factors of unrecognized quasi-states are summarized. Second, this paper answers why peacebuilding studies do not deal with unrecognized quasi-states. Third, the case of Chechnya is considered, and it is revealed how the Maskhadov regime attempted to diplomacy and why it failed.
    The following conclusions are presented in this paper. First, the case of Chechnya designates that if post-conflict regions transform into unrecognized quasi-states, like the Maskhadov regime, peacebuilding process becomes very difficult. In this case, armed conflict recurred. Thus, this case indicates the problem how international society should react to unrecognized quasi-states during the period of peacebuilding.
    Second, the case of Chechnya indicates that international involvement in peacebuilding has an arbitrary aspect similar to the support of patron states. J. Hughes, the British comparative political scientist, notes that a double standard exists in the policies of Western countries toward Chechnya and Kosovo. From the perspective of this paper, such a standard depends on the power balance between the central government and external actors.
    Third, S. Pegg, one of the well-known researchers of unrecognized quasi-states, considers Chechnya a successful case that will become an independent state. However, today Chechnya's case is far from successful. Thus, Chechnya would be the indicator for understanding the future of the existing unrecognized quasi-states.
  • 中央アジア・カフカス
    廣瀬 陽子
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 138 号 117-141,L11
    発行日: 2004/09/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze the theory and the movements of the politics in Azerbaijan, still in the midst of upheaval, and to offer a key to penetrate the future developments of the authoritarian system of the former Soviet Union.
    Many of the post-Soviet republics established authoritarian regimes after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the negative aspects of the authoritarian regimes are emphasized, they are often positively accepted as a necessary process for the former Soviet Union. However, there are different types of authoritarian regimes, thus should not be generalized.
    Ayaz Mutaribov, the last communist leader, took the presidency of Azerbaijan, but he resigned due to the mismanagement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Abulfez Elchibei, then leader of the Popular Front, was elected President. Though, Elchibei was an idealist who believed in democracy, his idealism was far removed from the realities of Azerbaijan, which caused military losses, bringing chaos to the economy and to the society. Elchbei fell from power by a coup d'etat only a year after inauguration, generating skepticism over democracy among the people.
    What people needed was Heydar Alyiev's return to power. Alyiev, a former elite politician of the Soviet era, became President in 1993. He established a firm authoritarianism by tightening domestic policies and keeping diplomatic balance. He established a cease-fire to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1994, which he utilized for domestic affairs. The first half of the Alyiev's administration is regarded as “war-time authoritarianism.”
    However, as the cease-fire and 1 million refugees and IDPs' in the country were taken for granted, and as the changing situation exposed the limits of the Soviet-style politics, the vulnerability of “war-time authoritarianism” was revealed. Moreover, since 1999, Alyiev suffered health problems and he gradually shifted his regime to what one may call “presidential monarchy”. Alyiev maintained monarchic rule gaining both domestic and international confidence by disguised democracy, with hereditary transfer of power to his son in mind.
    He revised the constitution in August 2002 so as to appoint his son, Ilkham Alyiev, as his successor. Alyiev was running for the third term in October 2003 presidential election, but his health conditions failed him. He withdrew from the race in the last minute. Ilkham Alyiev won an overwhelming victory. It was the first hereditary transfer of power in the post-Soviet era.
    Now that the “war-time authoritarianism” is no longer accepted, and Heydar Aliev, a symbol for the unification, lost, Ilkham Alyiev is exploring ways to rule his country. There are signs of democracy such as the release of political prisoners. Yet, his political power remains unknown.
    The authoritarian system of Azerbaijan, now in the hands of the son of the first authoritarian by heredity, is transforming under the changing situation of the country. The experience of Azerbaijan, organizational changes and hereditary fiefdom, will be an example for other post-Soviet republics.
  • 供給源・ルート多元化をめぐる戦い
    藤森 信吉
    比較経済研究
    2006年 43 巻 2 号 51-60,92
    発行日: 2006/08/01
    公開日: 2009/07/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    ウクライナの「オデッサ・ブロディ」原油パイプラインは,原油供給源および輸入ルート面でのロシア依存解消を目的として建設された。しかし,供給源のロシア依存解消は主要な国内製油所がロシア資本傘下に入ることにより意味を失い,さらにロシア以外の原油供給源が確保できなかったため完工後も稼働に至らなかった。同パイプラインは,2004年,原油輸出の追加ルートを求めていたロシアが原油を供給することにより輸送を開始したが,結果的に当初の目的を果たしたとはいえず,ウクライナはロシア依存を一層深めることになった。
  • 正路 徹也
    資源地質
    2004年 54 巻 1 号 101-113
    発行日: 2004/05/20
    公開日: 2009/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 正路 徹也
    資源地質
    2003年 53 巻 1 号 95-107
    発行日: 2003/05/20
    公開日: 2009/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 正路 徹也
    資源地質
    1998年 48 巻 1 号 45-60
    発行日: 1998/05/15
    公開日: 2009/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―国内資源費用アプローチによる分析―
    丸 健
    農林業問題研究
    2012年 48 巻 2 号 216-225
    発行日: 2012/09/25
    公開日: 2014/03/14
    ジャーナル フリー
    According to the advancement of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU, the need for comprehending the effect of accession on Turkish agriculture is growing.In this article, first, the international competitiveness of agriculture in the Mediterranean region of Turkey is estimated using the Domestic Resource Cost approach.Second, the intra-EU competitiveness of agriculture in the Mediterranean region of Turkey is simulated, focusing on the effect of direct payment scheme. The results Obtained are as follows: (1) All products except for milk in irrigatedareas, especially commercial crops such as maize, orangeand sunflower, have international competitiveness with the current price and technical levels; (2) in the case of accession without direct payment, the price levels will change and therefore the intra-EU competitiveness of basic crops such as wheat and milk will diminish; (3) however, that of wheat will recover with direct payment.The results indicate that there is a high possibility that agriculture in the Mediterranean region of Turkey, with direct payment, will sustain its competitiveness even if Turkey’s accession to the EU is done.
  • 石井 彰
    石油技術協会誌
    2004年 69 巻 1 号 29-37
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2008/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
    If general political situation in Iraq is improved explicitly, there will be good possibility its oil production will be over 6 million B/D in 5 years time. But to materialize this, economically rational political decision by the future legitimate Iraqi government for huge scale introduction of IOC must overcome naive nationalism and vested interests of NOC technocrats that can be seen very often in other major oil producing countries. At present, despite hope of the White House and the interim government, IOC's are very reluctant to longterm investments in Iraq because of serious political instability and strong possibility of severe contractual conditions, which are very common in the Arabian Gulf area. Based on these situations, there will be certain business chances for Japanese oil industry, but in order to make these chances really meaningful profits, Japanese companies should consider various factors and alternatives cautiously.
  • 角田 安正
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2002年 2002 巻 31 号 20-37
    発行日: 2002年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Maskhadov regime relied on Islam to resolve feuds among major leaders in Chechnya after the first Chechen war ended in 1996. Taking advantage of the situation, the Wahhabi expanded their influence in the republic. The Wahhabi were comprised mainly of Arabic political Islamists, who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and come to Chechnya to participate in the first Chechen war.
    In the summer of 1998, Osama Bin Laden, a new sponsor of the Wahhabi in Chechnya, began to establish a close relationship with anti-Maskhadov leaders (field commanders) attracting them by his abundant funds and his idea of establishing a unified Islamic republic in the north Caucasus. Encouraged by Bin Laden, Chechen armed forces attempted to invade the Russian republic of Dagestan in August 1999.
    As Moscow lost no time in launching a counter attack, another Chechen war commenced. The Chechen conflict posed a threat to Russia in that it might not have only undermined Russia's territorial integrity, but could have also become a pretext for western countries, including the United States, to meddle in Russia's domestic affairs. Russia tried in vain to persuade Washington that Chechen separatists were disguised international terrorists and that Russia suffered from the same terrorism as the U.S. had during 1998 with American embassy attacks in Africa. The United States continued to attach importance to the human-rights aspects of the Chechen issue. President Vladimir Putin, taking office in 2000, was not able to make the U.S. change its attitude toward the Chechen problem as his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had likewise found impossible.
    In Russia, moreover, some forces, especially the military elite, were opposed to cooperation with the United States. They alleged that none other than the U.S. had played a role in stirring up the situation in the north Caucasus. Thus, there would be no cooperation between the two countries for an anti-terrorist struggle.
    The situation abruptly changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. U.S.-Russian relations as concerned terrorism seemed to take a 180 degree turnabout. Close analysis of the relationship, however, would show that Russia gave way more in the U.S. direction than vice versa. President Putin allowed Central Asian countries to accept U.S. military presence two weeks after the terrorist attacks, with the Republic of Georgia to follow suit during the spring of 2002 in defiance of the resistance of the political and military elite in Russia. He expected to ease their frustrations by successfully suppressing Chechen armed forces as a result of promoting cooperation between Russia and the United States. He also expected that Washington would admit Russia's war in Chechnya to be a war on terrorism. Such expectations, however, were not met.
    The political forces in Russia, therefore, having assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the U.S., grew more frustrated. President Putin was forced to take steps to soothe their feelings. When he implied that he was ready to dispatch Russian troops to the Pankisskoye Gorge in the Republic of Georgia to eradicate Chechen fighters during September 2002, he intended to assuage the political and military elite which had not welcomed the U.S. military presence in Georgia from its inception.
  • 正路 徹也
    資源地質
    2005年 55 巻 1 号 87-98
    発行日: 2005/05/20
    公開日: 2009/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 冷戦後世界とアメリカ外交
    斎藤 元秀
    国際政治
    2007年 2007 巻 150 号 135-149,L14
    発行日: 2007/11/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The main purpose of this paper is to analyze U. S. policy toward Russia and the post-Soviet region along with Russia's response from the September 11, 2001 attacks through the July 2007 U. S. -Russian summit talks. First of all, I will illustrate the key features of President George W. Bush's foreign policy toward Russia, and then will argue the evolving US-Russian relationship in three phrases.
    The first phase, characterized as the period of President Vladimir Putin's “one-sided love, ” covers the period from the advent of the Bush administration in January 2001 to May of the same year. The second phase, “the period of the U. S. -Russo honeymoon, ” extends from May 2001 through 9/11 of the same year to around the outbreak of the Iraq War in March of 2003. Contrary to the prevailing view, Washington's relationship with Moscow had begun to improve prior to 9/11 after President Bush's May 2001 at the War College. It was against this backdrop that the 9/11 attacks took place and the two nations closely cooperated with the Islamic radicalism as their common adversary. The third phase, i. e., “the period of the Cold Peace, ” started in the fall, 2003 after the end of the Iraq War. In 2006, the bilateral relationship deteriorated sharply after the rise of Russia's clout and the implementation of Moscow's high-handed diplomacy, particularly in its neighboring states. The United States has been apprehensive of Russia steadfastly tilting toward an authoritarian regime. Interestingly, President Bush's stance vis-à-vis Russia appears to be not as tough as the U. S. Congress wants.
    U. S. policy toward the Baltic States, Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia's response after 9/11 will also be discussed in details. A special reference is made to illustrate the U. S. efforts to enhance its influence in Central Asia after the 2005 Andijan uprising in Uzbekistan; since then, Washington has tried to enhance its influence in Central Asia without pressing hard for the democratization of the existing regimes.
    Since the disintegration of the USSR, the United States has been pursuing a policy to consolidate the independence of the states in the post-Soviet space. In contrast, the Russian side continuously regards it as its own sphere of influence. Russia contends that the United States has been trying to secure its own hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Although the Cold War is over, mutual suspicion remains.
    There is no question that the U. S. -Russian relationship is at the lowest point in the past 20 years. Yet it is an exaggeration to insist that a new Cold War has arrived. For example, a selective partnership between the U. S. and Russia exists in the war on terrorism, the diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issue of Iran and North Korea as well as the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction.
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