Borders play important roles in the so-called Westphalian system where sovereign-nation states divide global space and co-exist. Borders determine to what geographical extent the political power, economic regulations, language and social relations influence on the people and activities. Concurrently, when national borders are established, a modern capitalist market economy becomes the dominant economic system. The capitalist system was developed under the sovereign state system because each state needed to develop its own economy mainly through mercantilist policies. Thus, for a long time, borders functioned as a political, legal and economic barrier to the outside world.
However, globalization changed the concept of border. Increasing transaction of money, goods, migration and information seem to undermine the function of borders. However, this article argues that this massive cross-border transaction happens because of the separation of political, legal and economic spheres. Money, goods and people move because they seek preferential exchange rates, interest rates, wages and purchasing power. These differences stem from differences in political, legal and economic systems, and it can only be possible if borders divide a geographical sphere. In other words, “borderless” or cross-border activities happen only in a “borderful” world. This article addresses the case of European integration and scrutinizes the role and meaning of borders in Europe, where market integration is more advanced, but still there are various national systems have remained to control the market.
In this analysis of political economy of borders, it employs two different analytical concepts of borders. The first is the ontological border: the physical existence at the edge of a geographical territory. The second is the institutional border: legal and conceptual borders that do not necessarily require physical existence, such as cyber space control or extraterritorial taxation.
Although the role and meaning of border has changed due to globalization, it only happened at the ontological border, and the institutional border remains unchanged. Even in the EU, states maintain a certain level of control because they are responsible for internal affairs (particularly security and employment) and refuse outside intervention. There is a clear distinction between ontological and institutional borders: the integration of Europe certainly transformed the nature of borders from physical barriers to a geographical line, but EU member states maintain their legal and political jurisdiction to use institutional borders for protecting their society. These findings suggest that it is necessary to distinguish the concept of border by its functions, and researchers need to take into account changes in the roles and meanings of border.

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The EU is on the verge of revising, or at least making flexible the guiding principle of its unified currency. They are making, I'm afraid, a fatal error of judgement. The remarkable success, so far, of the euro was entirely due to the shift of macro-economic principles, from demand management to monetary targeting.
The guiding principle of the single currency, of which the most important is to contain budget deficit within 3% of the GDP, was certainly a kind of straight-jacket to many of the participating countries to the euro. The majority of the 12 participants, including such laggards as Ireland and Greece, managed to endure inflationary and other pressures, inflicted by the “one-size-fits-for-all” measures demanded by the stability and growth pact.
Ironically, it is Germany, France and Italy, the 3 largest and central countries of the euro zone, that are now crying for help. It is especially paradoxical that Germany, which has been demanding the strict application of the SGP principles, has now excessive budgetary deficit and is calling for flexibility in their applications.
As of the beginning of March, 2003, it is not decided yet whether the SGP should be revised or not, but judging from the report the Commission presented to the Ecofin Council, they are sure to make “flexible interpretations”, if not revisions to the SGP. Are they right? I thnk not.
Ms. Kathleen McNamara, Assistant Professor at Princeton, produed a remarkable book on the euro, called “The Currency of Ideas” (1998). Based on the analysis of the world monetary history after the war, including the Bretton Woods system, she concluded that European monetary systems made a great success, because their guiding principles were shifted from Keynesian to Neoliberal theories. In European context, this meant that all the euro participants had virtually abandoned Keynesian demand management policies and converted to the monetarist approach, which the German Bundesbank had pursued since the end of the World War II.
World monetary authorities are now facing unprecedented pressures of world-wide deflation. It is understandable that European financial authorities are demanding flexibility in applying the SGP. But we must remind ourselves that in the colossalised economies, demand stimulus rarely works, as is shown by Japanese policies. Euro financial ministers should be patient.
Fortunately for the majority of euro-participants, the March Ecofin Council only produced a very short statement on the SPG that it “provides a robust and flexible framework within which any additional strains on public finances will be addressed”. It was reported that Gordon Brown, British Chancellor of Exchequer, had tried to present a plan to make a flexible interpretation to the SGP, but Belgium, Spain, Italy and other small countries prevented the proposal, made in collaboration with France and Germany. The EU might have to endure some period of uncertainty over the euro. But it may turn out to be beneficial to the single currency after all.

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This paper focuses on the following five problems regarding the governance of the European Union: Firstly, the continual revisions of the EU's founding Treaties and their impact on the political structure of the European governance, hence being the cause of Dutch European law professor, Matijsen's “continual” frustration; secondly, the traps in the arguments of the so-called “sharing of sovereignty”; thirdly, the supremacy of the High Authority in the ECSC; fourthly, the prevailing trend of the European Parlimament over the European Commission; and lastly, the future structure of the European Governance-presidential system or parliamentary system?
Ironically enough, the “democratic deficit” has intensified in accordance with the success of European integration. This affects the long established relationship between the European Commission and the European Parliament. My analysis of the present European integration is that by the continual revisions of the EU's founding Treaties, European integration is now requesting massive surrender of the sovereign rights from their member states, in spite of the remarks by the political leaders and researchers proclaiming “sharing of sovereignty.” The European Union is leaning toward a federal entity in essence, far beyond the Japanese translated phrase of “Oushu Rengo” which has been used to indicate the EU by the Commission delegation to Tokyo, meaning “a mere association or at most confederation”. However, that translated phrase had been asked to suspend its use and to use “Oushu Domei” through the official written question (E-0138/96) by Glyn Ford (PSE), who was in charge of the relationship with Japan in 1996 by the reasons of its inadequacy and faults.
In my conclusion, the original elitism in the way of promoting European integration shown in the Monnet Method has substantially shifted towards a much more parliamentary controlled style. The question on the future European governance will solely depend on how the European people see the way of reducing the “democratic deficit”. There seems to be two alternatives. One is by the shift towards much more parliamentary controlled administration. The other is with a more independent European Commisson which is directly or indirectly elected by the European citizens as was shown in the Benelux Memorandum.
As indicated by the present scandals of the Commission and the resignation of the Santer's Commission in March 1999, the recent trends between the European Parliament and the Commission in European governance seemingly show us that a parliamentary oriented system at the sacrifice of the roles of the European Commission could prevail in the coming future.

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　This is a forward to this annual volume, which celebrates EUSA Japan’s forty years’ anniversary. The paper first contrasts the economic, political and institutional contexts of the European Communities in the 1980s with those of the European Union in the 2020s. Radical changes have happened during the forty years. The Cold War is gone, European single market is realised with a single currency Euro, the European Parliament is now a co-legislator alongside with the Council for most of the European matters, EU-Japan relations have improved from conflict to partnership. The paper then argues that these changes have generated some new challenges to pursue further integration at the European level. Those include the need to develop a better way of enhancing democratic legitimacy in EU governance; the need of more sensitive balancing of interests by the Court of Justice, such as the European interest to further integration and the national interest to maintain national identities of the member states; the need of addressing to social side-effects of market integration （widening income gap between EU citizens and between the member states）; the enhanced role of the EU in making global rules and standards. The paper concludes that it is possible that new modus operandi may emerge even under the same old EU structure to address to those challenges, since the formal amendment procedure of the basic treaties is now quite unwieldy among twenty-seven member states.

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The French General Election of March 1993 replaced the Socialists-led minority by a large majority of the Center-Right coalition in the National Assembly and opened a new period of Cohabitation.
An analysis of the results shows plainly the victory of the Center-Right coalition owed much more to the collapse of electoral support for the Socialists Party and the distorive nature of the electoral system than any massive increase in the popularity of the Center-Right coalition.
The election of march 1993 also saw the realinement in French Politics. There are four noticed tendencies.
(1) The voting patterns are less certain than are. The voter's attachment to their patterns are less definitely.
(2) The simple model of a bipolar quadrille in French party systems no longer works since the explosion of the Front National and the Ecologists.
(3) The Left is at a historic low. The Lefts' electors have moved to abstention, the Ecologists, the Right and to the FN.
(4) It is clear that the era of the Mitterrand is the end. Mitterrand's strategy has failed particurally at the Regional Election of March 1992 and at the Referendum of September 1992.

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This article discusses the political role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in setting food policies and its limits. To play an active role, it must form a coalition with the European Commission, which monopolizes the ability to make propositions.
This role has two aspects. The first is to present suggestions through judgment. Interpreting this judgment, the Commission makes proposals for legislation. This process is observed in the ‘mutual recognition principle’ introduced in the Cassis de Dijon Case (1979), or the ‘precautionary principle’ introduced in the BSE Case (1998). The second is to introduce principles that serve as a basis for case law, which put pressure on and constrain other institutions or Member States to agreement.
However, this political role of the ECJ has limits. Firstly, the ECJ can neither make a judgment nor present a suggestion unless a suit is filed. Secondly, any judgment presented by the ECJ has no political power if the European Commission does not support it, as seen in the ‘Food labeling case’. Additionally, the organization of the European Food Safety Authority and the network surrounding it, responsible for forming food policies, has further excluded and diminished the influence of the ECJ.
To investigate and maintain the political role of the ECJ, it is necessary to focus on its interdependence and coalition with other organizations.

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