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  • マン
    スハルト
    W.
    地学雑誌
    1986年 95 巻 1 号 66-68
    発行日: 1986/02/25
    公開日: 2010/04/23
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 東ジャワ州スラバヤにおける環境NGOの事例から
    *吉田 航太
    日本文化人類学会研究大会発表要旨集
    2018年 2018 巻 G11
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2018/05/22
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
    本発表ではインドネシア東ジャワ州スラバヤにおける環境NGOの事例から、1998年以降のポスト
    スハルト
    体制期における環境運動について議論する。
    スハルト
    体制の崩壊によって自由な活動が可能となったアクティビストは人々に寄り添うという理念のもと、都市の環境問題に取り組んだ。反開発主義的な理念を持つ彼らの活動や言説、および現在直面している困難から、
    スハルト
    体制期との類似性そして「改革の時代」の終わりを論じる。
  • 複数の対抗的な「ブトン王国史」
    山口 裕子
    日本文化人類学会研究大会発表要旨集
    2011年 2011 巻 I12
    発行日: 2011年
    公開日: 2011/05/20
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
    インドネシア東南スラウェシ州の旧ブトン王国領に位置する、位階の異なる二つの村落社会における歴史語りを、浜本の「言説空間」論、ハイムズの言語人類学を援用しながら、異なる他者を「聞き手」に想定した「歴史語りの対話空間」の創造過程として分析する。その言説の効果をオランダ植民地期以降の民族間関係や、
    スハルト
    期の国民統合政策、ポスト・
    スハルト
    期の地方社会の慣習復興を視野にいれながら、明らかにしていく。
  • 京都大学学術出版会 2020年 539ページ
    宮本 謙介
    アジア経済
    2021年 62 巻 3 号 106-109
    発行日: 2021/09/15
    公開日: 2021/09/28
    ジャーナル フリー HTML
  • スハルト新秩序体制下における公務員と地域社会
    小林 和夫
    年報社会学論集
    2005年 2005 巻 18 号 65-76
    発行日: 2005/08/05
    公開日: 2010/04/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the relationship between civil servants and community in the New Order in Indonesia. Civil servants in Indonesia increased rapidly in numbers and political power after the 1970s to support the ruling political party Golkar.
    On the other hand, civil servants pushed Pacasila as a national ideology. Consequently, Indonesia's civil servant came to manifest a particular habitus that mediated the observance of rules and regulations. Civil servants manifesting this particular habitus demonstrated their particular “administrative skills” through the neighborhood associations, RT/RW.
  • 井澤 友美
    観光学評論
    2014年 2 巻 2 号 143-154
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2020/01/13
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    バリは、インドネシアを代表する国際観光地に発展した。しかし、その開発は、長年バリ島外部勢力が主導するものであり、地域住人の意向は反映されてこなかった。特に
    スハルト
    権威主義体制時代(1966-1998)における国際観光開発は、観光収益の島外への流出、地方行政府間における観光収入の格差、治安の悪化、環境の劣化などの弊害を伴った。1998年に
    スハルト
    政権が崩壊すると、インドネシアでは権威主義体制から民主化へ、中央集権から地方分権への移行が急速に進められた。では、民主化・地方分権化を経て、バリの観光開発はどのように変化したのか。また、観光による弊害の現状はどのようなものか。本稿では、これまで問題の原因の多くを外部の責任とみなしつつ議論されてきた観光開発とそれに伴う社会問題に対して、ポスト・
    スハルト
    時代に発言権を増した地元アクターに焦点を当てつつその実態を明らかにする。すなわち、体制移行を経てバリ社会は、地元アクター間における観光利潤の獲得競争という新時代に入ったのであり、それに伴って
    スハルト
    時代に顕著となった社会問題がますます悪化せざるを得ないという皮肉な現状を議論する。
  • 小黒 啓一
    アジア研究
    2011年 57 巻 4 号 79-81
    発行日: 2011/10/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 福岡 侑希
    アジア研究
    2011年 57 巻 3 号 55-59
    発行日: 2011/07/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡本 正明
    アジア研究
    2006年 52 巻 4 号 111-115
    発行日: 2006/10/31
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 対インドネシア関係と民族自決原則の狭間で
    木村 友彦
    オーストラリア研究
    2017年 30 巻 1-16
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2018/05/08
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study examines Australian foreign policymaking under the Fraser government towards In- donesia’s military invasion of East Timor (Portuguese Timor), which turned outright and massive after 7 December 1975. It involves the period from 11 November 1975, when the Fraser government was established, to 15 December 1978, when its intention to accept East Timor de jure as a part of Indonesia was publicised. Finally, the Indonesians, who declared East Timor as the country’s 27th province on 17 July 1976, controlled the territory for more than two decades until 1999. Under Indonesia’s occupational rule, particularly during the second half of the 1970s, more than a hundred thousand Timorese were reportedly killed because of starvation, disease and war. Did the Fraser government not have any other choice but to condone Indonesia’s actions and accept East Timor as part of Indonesia? If not, why was it so? This study argues that it was difficult for Prime Minister Fraser to have Indonesian President Suharto withdraw his country’s armed forces from the territory of East Timor after the full-scale attack on Dili in December 1975. While there might have been a slight chance for Fraser to dissuade Suharto from intervening in such a massive way, immediately after he assumed power as caretaker Prime Minister of Australia on 11 November 1975, such a policy, if introduced, could have caused a serious setback for Australia’s relations with Indonesia. Thousands of Indonesian soldiers were already deployed to East Timor. Further, Australia, a middle power, was unable to exert effective pressure on Indonesia to disengage its forces without diplomatic backing from the United States and other Western powers, which had actually adopted a rather cooperative attitude towards Indonesia. Being constantly pressed by the Suharto government, the Fraser government finally relaxed its diplomatic protest against the Indonesian invasion despite its public support for an appropriate act of self-determination by the Timorese, which was expressed by the Foreign Minister, Peacock, many times during December 1975 and July 1976. The Fraser government’s stepwise decisions to recognise East Timor de facto and de jure as a part of Indonesia in 1978 were apparently unavoidable. However, despite the international community, including the Japanese government and its people, choosing to turn a blind eye to this issue, we should not forget what happened in East Timor.
  • 今村 祥子
    アジア研究
    2019年 65 巻 3 号 20-36
    発行日: 2019/07/31
    公開日: 2019/09/10
    ジャーナル フリー

    In the early 1980s, Indonesia witnessed the extrajudicial killings of thousands of hoodlums by security forces. The victims’ bodies were left at prominent public places. Because the authorities did not admit to any involvement, the Indonesian media termed the killings “Petrus,” which means “mysterious shootings.” This thesis aims to analyze the ruling style of Suharto’s regime by considering the mass killings.

    From the beginning, the Suharto regime regarded Indonesian society as a legitimate target for intelligence activities and machinations, as symbolized by the existence of Operasi Khusus (Opsus); this was initially a team set up for the army’s intelligence work in Malaysia, but later became institutionalized to rule over Indonesian society. Applying intelligence and machinations to maintain domestic rule may be considered a rational step for the authorities. Given that other strong political ideologies still had deep roots in society, it was extremely difficult to create the Golkar system based on the state-sponsored Pancasila ideology by means of repression alone. Thus, the government had to rely on intelligence operations, such as machinations, provocations, and propaganda that justified the repression of potential enemies.

    This thesis, based on interviews, seeks to show that many victims of Petrus were hoodlums who had been recruited as agents for covert operations. They were organized under Ali Moertopo, the head of Opsus and Suharto’s right-hand man in the early days of the regime. Though there has long been a speculation that the real target of Petrus was Moertopo’s network, the rumors have not been substantiated.

    My argument is as follows. The Suharto regime, in its effort to build up the Golkar system, often used intelligence machinations toward members of its own society to eliminate or weaken potential enemies. This ruling style naturally alienated a specific societal group and created social divisions. The target of Petrus (or in any case, one of the main targets) were the hoodlums who had been used as a tool for such machinations. After their mission was over, the hoodlums came to be seen as unnecessary and dangerous; they were eliminated themselves through another huge machination—Petrus. In this context, Petrus symbolized a fundamental contradiction in the Suharto regime, which sought the thorough permeation of “harmonious” Pancasila ideology, but, in reality, could not rule the country without dividing society.

  • ――インドネシアとマレーシアにおける民主化運動と体制の転換・非転換――
    増原 綾子, 鈴木 絢女
    日本比較政治学会年報
    2014年 16 巻 207-231
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2020/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 津田 浩司
    日本文化人類学会研究大会発表要旨集
    2015年 2015 巻
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2015/05/13
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
    2009年、インドネシアの国家英雄の殿堂にジョン・リーなる華人系の人物が加えられた。彼の推戴運動には、
    スハルト
    体制期に抑圧されてきた華人の地位回復を象徴的に目指そうとする華人団体のみならず、同体制期に定式化された国史記述を見直そうとする歴史家も深く関与していた。諸個人の営為をナショナルな枠組みに回収し顕彰する制度としてあった国家英雄制度は、今や歴史記述見直しの手段としても活用されている面がある。
  • 木村 友彦
    アジア研究
    2018年 64 巻 2 号 21-38
    発行日: 2018/04/30
    公開日: 2018/05/15
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper examines Australia’s foreign policy towards Indonesia’s invasion of Timor-Leste (then called, Portuguese Timor); more specifically, it focuses on Don Willesee’s foreign policy towards Timor-Leste. Willesee was the Whitlam government’s Foreign Minister between 05 November, 1973 and 11 November, 1975. This study also focuses on Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, whose influence over foreign policymaking was more than Willesee’s. Whitlam nurtured a close relationship with Indonesian President Suharto. Therefore, to make policy recommendations, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, which was led by its Secretary Alan Renouf, had to take into account the views of the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, which were not always harmonious. This study deals with the period between 25 April, 1974, when the Portuguese Revolution and the decolonization of Timor-Leste began, and 11 November, 1975, when the Whitlam government stepped down in less than a month before Indonesia’s full-scale attack against Dili on 07 December, 1975. The military occupation lasted for over two decades and led to the killings of a large number of people in Timor-Leste.

    Willesee’s policy towards Timor-Leste deserves close attention for the following reasons. First, Willesee earnestly sought to resolve this crisis through the principle of self-determination. To this end, he considered the possibility of Timor-Leste’s independence and aimed to dissuade Indonesia from forcefully taking over Timor-Leste. On the other hand, Whitlam called for Timor-Leste’s integration with Indonesia, a view he repeatedly shared with President Suharto during their two informal summit talks in September 1974 and April 1975. Despite Willesee’s failure to persuade Whitlam and the Indonesian government, his ethical stance remains laudable. Second, through a speech delivered at the Senate on 30 October 1975, Willesee succeeded in persuading the Australian government to espouse “the view that the people of Portuguese Timor should be allowed to determine their own future.” Third, Willesee’s policy towards Timor-Leste has not received much scholarly attention. Fourth, it is possible to analyse Willesee’s policy by examining (i) documents created by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and (ii) other materials, including Willesee’s personal recollections.

    In sum, this study argues that Willesee’s emphasis on self-determination could be a more viable strategy than Prime Minister Whitlam’s call for Timor-Leste’s integration with Indonesia. The study also argues that Indonesia’s invasion and forceful annexation of Timor-Leste might not have occurred if President Suharto had been persuaded by Willesee’s opinions. This is all the more important as President Suharto was initially hesitant to use military force to address Indonesia’s situation with Timor-Leste.

  • ASEAN全体像の検証
    山田 満
    国際政治
    1997年 1997 巻 116 号 46-63,L8
    発行日: 1997/10/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    ASEAN will be composed of ten countries in the near future. The forms of government in the ASEAN countries is conceptualized as authoritarian regime for development. Authoritarian regimes in ASEAN take many forms such as military regime, single-party dictatorships, the ruling coalition, personalist autocracies, and absolute monarchies. They refuse the concept of Western democracy claiming that it does not bring stability and development for developing countries. The authoritarian characteristics of the Indonesian government and the Malaysian goverment are analyzed in this paper.
    The Suharto government is called the “New Order”. Suharto controlled the army, the bureaucracy, and the business community. He is supported by Golkar, which is a corporatist group that includes the entire bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business sector. Golkar has won six elections overwhelmingly since the advent of the New Order. He promotes the economy for development in Indonesia based on the authoritarian system which is supported by the army, technocrats, and Golkar.
    The Mahathir government is supported by an UMNO-led coalition of parties representing the three ethic groups. The Malaysian government has promoted the New Economic Policy which eradicates poverty and channels more of the nation's wealth to the Malays during 1971-1990. Mahathir attempts to complete his developmental policies through some visions such as “Look East policy, ” “Malaysia Incorporated, ” and “Vision 2020.” The purpose of his authoritarian regime for development regime is to realize the ethic balance after the disturbance of 1969. His popularity becomes higher and higher because of his leaderships. This was seen in the overwhelming victory of the 1995 election.
    Finally, the middle class is growing in ASEAN. Do they contribute to democratization in their own countries? In the case of both countries, they are conservative generally because their consumptive lives depend on the developmental government. However, I conclude that the degree of democratization between the two becomes greater and greater because of the size of population, the characteristics of leaderships, the rise of the middle class, and the distribution of economic development.
  • ―インドネシアのダーワ・カンプスと正義党
    見市 建
    日本比較政治学会年報
    2002年 4 巻 97-129
    発行日: 2002/06/25
    公開日: 2010/12/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川村 晃一
    アジア研究
    2009年 55 巻 1 号 105-109
    発行日: 2009/01/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―インドネシア・ロック音楽産業の持続的発展とその陰影―
    金 悠進
    アジア・アフリカ地域研究
    2021年 21 巻 1 号 83-103
    発行日: 2021/09/30
    公開日: 2021/11/02
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article explores the cultural and political context of the development of the rock music industry in Indonesia. With a focus on live performance, it shows how the political and economic power of Chinese Indonesian business and the military have played an important role in underpinning the sustainable development of the country’s rock music industry.

    Indonesian rock music has continuously evolved from the mid-1980s, under the Soeharto authoritarian regime, through the country’s democratization to the present day. The industry developed during the Soeharto era through rock festivals (Festival Rock Se-Indonesia) sponsored by ethnic Chinese businesses, and since the fall of the Soeharto regime, the industry has continued to grow with the support of the Indonesian armed forces.

    Chinese Indonesian businessmen have been sponsoring rock festivals to boost show business by attracting large crowds and contributing to the popularization and industrialization of Indonesian rock music. The increase in capacity and expansion of venues for live performances has contributed to the sustained development of the rock music industry, with the armed forces providing large military sites for music events following the democratization of the country. However, such mass mobilization, sponsored by Chinese companies increases the risk of rioting in these venues. Therefore, the military acts as a security mechanism to violently suppress riots and maintain order.

  • 本名 純
    アジア研究
    2015年 61 巻 4 号 22-41
    発行日: 2015/10/31
    公開日: 2015/11/10
    ジャーナル フリー
    Indonesia’s post-Suharto governments have conducted democratic elections every five years since 1999 for both parliaments and presidency. The latest elections in 2014 showed a heated battle between two presidential contenders, namely Joko Widodo (popularly called Jokowi)—the Governor of Jakarta—and Prabowo Subianto who led his right-wing political party, Gerindra. The victory of Jokowi in the presidential election has widely been seen as a success story of ordinary man with no elite background to enjoy strong grass-roots support. Jokowi’s rise to Indonesia’s seventh president is therefore evaluated both domestically and internationally as a critical step towards the country’s democratic consolidation.
    However, the fact that Prabowo—who was Suharto’s son-in-law and a top army general during the authoritarian days—gained 47% of total votes and performed a close contest with Jokowi should not be ignored to understand the nature of electoral democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia. Why could Prabowo, a legacy of the authoritarian heyday, gain such a large number of votes and become a serious threat to Jokowi? It was antiforeign nationalism and Suharto-era romanticism that characterized Prabowo’s electoral appeal. On the one hand, he clamored for the return to good old days in facing today’s ‘excessive’ democracy heavily influenced by the West. On the other hand, he openly criticized that foreign companies operating in Indonesia are predators who exploit the country’s economic resources, insisting on the need for propelling protectionism in various sectors in the name of saving the country. If he were the winner of the 2014 presidential election, Indonesia’s democratic outlook would be very different.
    This article examines the dynamics of Prabowo’s electoral challenge and reveals socio-economic structures that contributed to his vote mobilization. I argue that Prabowo’s challenge has been discussed mostly in the context of his personal political ambition, but it actually goes beyond that and resonates with socio-economic cleavages that have been deepened under the previous government led by President Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Thus, the article concludes, it is possible that a similar challenge will recur even without Prabowo in the future, and, to understand such a threat to democratic consolidation, it is important for us to ‘de-personalize’ Prabowo’s challenge and examine the socio-economic vulnerability that creates wider political space for right-wing conservative elitism to maneuver in the age of globalization.
  • 西 芳実
    地域研究
    2013年 13 巻 2 号 304-312
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2020/10/28
    ジャーナル フリー
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