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全文: "スーパーヴィーニエンス"
12件中 1-12の結果を表示しています
  • 科学哲学
    2010年 43 巻 2 号 2_124-2_126
    発行日: 2010年
    公開日: 2011/04/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 科学哲学
    2011年 44 巻 2 号 2_149-2_152
    発行日: 2011年
    公開日: 2012/06/06
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中村 隆文
    科学基礎論研究
    2008年 35 巻 2 号 47-55
    発行日: 2008/03/30
    公開日: 2010/02/03
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are many problems about causality and identity in Humeanism. Especially, a problem that “Humean Supervenience” allowing many possibilities of various external laws encounters is concerned with the difficulty whether such laws can be coherent with the intrinsic properties of causation. This problem is related to another one whether “Humean Supervenience” is compatible with objectivism in accordance with Hume's original intention. Struggling with a disharmony between Hume's pragmatic epistemology and his realistic ontology, many philosophers have tried to dissolve such a complicated problem. But I think their efforts wouldn't be successful and the disharmony doesn't need to be settled, because the prospective collapses of their efforts wouldn't reduce the meaning of Humeanism. In this paper, I conclude that the seeming incoherence should be retained, because it suggests a moderate scientific attitude to be placed between dogmatism and skepticism. I demonstrate it by emphasizing the significance of some parts included in Hume's Treatise.
  • 井頭 昌彦
    科学哲学
    2009年 42 巻 2 号 2_59-2_73
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2010/02/15
    ジャーナル フリー
        Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question “What there is?” In this paper, I begin with Quine's “indispensability argument,” and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.
  • 青山 拓央
    科学基礎論研究
    2005年 33 巻 1 号 25-29
    発行日: 2005/10/25
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    心身相関の同時性はどのように確保されるのだろうか.あるいは現象的経験における「現在」の存在を認めるとき, 私と他者との現在は共有されているのだろうか.スーパーヴィーニエンスの概念やトークン同一性に訴える議論は, 物的一元論と調和する反面, これらの問いに答えてはいない (循環に陥る危険性が高い).他方, 心身の相互作用を認める素朴な二元論は, 意外にもこれらの問いに明確な返答を可能とする.本稿の議論が妥当であるなら, 素朴な心身二元論はむしろ, 心身や自他の時間的な一元化をうながすといえるだろう.
  • 柴田 正良
    哲学
    2000年 2000 巻 51 号 1-16
    発行日: 2000/05/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    The crisis of Davidson's anomalous monism means a turning point for theories of actions because it is supposed to show that we have a strong incompatibility when we insist both the causal efficacy of mental properties and the anomalism of the mental. Therefore it seems that we can take only one of the following two ways ; (a) a causal theory of actions in view of reduction of rationality to causality or (b) interpretivism of rationalization of actions at the cost of giving up belief/desire action explanations as causal ones.
    This paper tries to show that the two elements irreducibly reside in our folk psychology, which have to be treated as a kind of data by philosophy and science of actions. In order to secure a space for both causality and rationality in action explanations, I rebut Nobuhara's comprehensive rationalization thesis as a new brand of radically anti-causalist theory.
    On the other hand, the usual causalist strategy to appeal to supervenience (following Kim), which aims to endow mental properties with the causal power, is hopeless because, as Baker pointed out, the supervenience relation is neither sufficient nor necessary to the causal efficacy of the mental. I suggest that we should dismiss the idea of reducing every kinds of explanation to the ultimate physical one and find a proper account of causal explanation as our everyday practice if we want to have a deeper understanding of human actions and action explanations.
  • 伊藤 邦武
    科学哲学
    2012年 45 巻 2 号 153-156
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2016/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐金武 梶本尚敏
    科学哲学
    2012年 45 巻 2 号 131-134
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2016/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 前田 高弘
    科学基礎論研究
    2009年 37 巻 1 号 29-38
    発行日: 2009/11/25
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It is often thought a difficult task to find a place for qualia in the physical world. The reason for this may be that qualia seem to be essentially intrinsic qualities so they cannot be captured entirely in terms of their causal-functional roles. This is the typical way in which qualia are thought to be physicalistically problematic. In this paper I rethink that very problem of qualia by means of metaphysical considerations concerning properties in general. The relevant question in the metaphysics of properties is whether properties have essences which determine their identities independently of their dispositional aspects. (Such essences are called 'quiddities'.) Indeed, the problem of qualia would take a different shape depending on the answer to that metaphysical question. I show this with reference to three main views on that question, namely, quidditism, the causal theory, and the identity theory. In closing, I make a brief remark about what these considerations imply for the relationship between physicalism and qualia.
  • 佐金 武
    科学基礎論研究
    2013年 41 巻 1 号 37-61
    発行日: 2013/11/30
    公開日: 2017/08/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    Presentism is the thesis that everything is present, which implies that there are no past (or future) things or events. It is sometimes said to be imcompatible with the claim that every truth must have some ground on being. In this paper, I will examine the efficacy of such an argument in favor of presentism. In my view, however, how to respond to the grounding objection depends on what kinds of past truths we deal with: (i) truths about how present things were, (ii) general truths about things that no longer eixst, and (iii) singular truths about wholly past things. Before discussing this, I will also give an overview of the grounding project.

  • 武田 一博
    哲学
    2008年 2008 巻 59 号 77-95,L12
    発行日: 2008/04/01
    公開日: 2010/07/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    During recent decades, brain physiology or neuroscience have progressed tremendously, hand in hand with computer science and artificial intelligence, providing much more knowledge than ever before about how the human brain works. Depending on this scientific background, a new philosophy of mind called neurophilosophy has emerged.
    Neurophilosophy holds that the mind is identical with the brain. But this assertion is different from the mind-brain identity theories of the 1960s or earlier forms of materialism about the mind which simply identified a mental type with a brain type, urging for example that pain is (identical with) C-fiber activation. Neurophilosophy, as a new form of materialism about the mind, asserts that a mental state is (identical with) such and such an activation vector state of a neural network in the brain, described by a mathematical function (matrix) in vector space. On this view, identity/similarity/difference between mental states can be interpreted holistically in terms of the isomorphism/proximity/distance between the neural activation states in the vector state space.
    Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland are currently the leading philosopers of this neurophilosophy. They especially emphasize that folk psychology (the view of the mind implied in common sense and first-person language based on introspection) cannot be correlated exactly and precisely with states of the brain. So they insist that folk psychology should be eliminated and that an exact and scientific account derived from brain science will be preferable. In my paper I introduce the Churchlands' neurophilosophy and examine some of its problems. My conclusion is that their form of materialism about the mind can be supported and accepted as valid. Indeed, I think it will surely contribute to the defeat of narrow rationalism and idealism and to the spread of a scientifically based philosophical perspective on mind and language.
  • 科学哲学
    2011年 44 巻 2 号 2_135-2_148
    発行日: 2011年
    公開日: 2012/06/06
    ジャーナル フリー
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