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  • 井頭 昌彦
    科学哲学
    2009年 42 巻 2 号 2_59-2_73
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2010/02/15
    ジャーナル フリー
        Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question “What there is?” In this paper, I begin with Quine's “indispensability argument,” and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.
  • 伊藤 春樹
    哲学
    2012年 2012 巻 63 号 97-113_L6
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2012/10/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Libertarianism, as a theory of free will and voluntary action, presupposes the existence of free will and the possibility of agent causation, which is essentially different from event causation. Many contemporary physicalist-minded philosophers believe that agent causation is the most serious difficulty for the project of naturalizing libertarianism. From their point of view, the only possible causality is event causation, and the concept of agent causality is no less mysterious and incoherent than the concept of an agent. But this opinion arises through ignorance of the difference between causation and the physical processes which realize causal powers. As we can suppose that all mental abilities supervene upon brain processes, any kind of causation should be seen as supervening on some physical process.
    There remains one more difficult problem. In the libertarian tradition the agent is thought to be a kind of “unmoved mover” or a special kind of cause, i.e. “causa sui (cause of itself)”. How is it possible to naturalize this mysterious cause ? To this hard problem I propose a solution: when physical systems (neural networks) are selfformed by an agent, they can realize that special kind of cause. Consequently it is possible to introduce the agent causality into the materialist framework without presupposing the existence of mysterious entities.
  • 佐金 武
    科学基礎論研究
    2013年 41 巻 1 号 37-61
    発行日: 2013/11/30
    公開日: 2017/08/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    Presentism is the thesis that everything is present, which implies that there are no past (or future) things or events. It is sometimes said to be imcompatible with the claim that every truth must have some ground on being. In this paper, I will examine the efficacy of such an argument in favor of presentism. In my view, however, how to respond to the grounding objection depends on what kinds of past truths we deal with: (i) truths about how present things were, (ii) general truths about things that no longer eixst, and (iii) singular truths about wholly past things. Before discussing this, I will also give an overview of the grounding project.

  • 源河 亨
    科学哲学
    2016年 49 巻 1 号 37-48
    発行日: 2016/07/31
    公開日: 2016/11/10
    ジャーナル フリー

        In our daily lives, we assign some value to various things. For example, we say, ‘this picture is dynamic', ‘his clothes are unfashionable' and ‘she is brave'. In these cases, we experience the value of these things. In this study, I examine the nature of such value experiences. I argue that some value experiences are cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences and that what penetrates into them is emotion. In other words, owing to the evaluative component of emotion, which affects perceptual systems, perceptual experiences can represent things as having some value to us. Furthermore, I propose that this cognitive penetration model of value experience supports the particularistic view of evaluative judgement.

  • 前田 高弘
    科学哲学
    2005年 38 巻 2 号 123-138
    発行日: 2005/12/25
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    The essence of representationalism as a theory concerning phenomenal character of experience is the thesis that there is no phenomenal difference without a difference in representational content. So, the obvious threat to representationalism is a counterexample which shows that there is a phenomenal difference without a difference in representational content. Indeed, in so far as experiences are treated as representations on a par with pictures or letters or even beliefs etc., such counterexamples seem rife. But, in so far as experiences are treated that way, the phenomenal difference in question can't be explained representationalistically nor anti-representationalistically. The aim of this paper is to show why this is so, and then make a proposal about how experiences should be treated ontologically in order to account for the phenomenal difference in question.
  • 前田 高弘
    科学基礎論研究
    2009年 37 巻 1 号 29-38
    発行日: 2009/11/25
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It is often thought a difficult task to find a place for qualia in the physical world. The reason for this may be that qualia seem to be essentially intrinsic qualities so they cannot be captured entirely in terms of their causal-functional roles. This is the typical way in which qualia are thought to be physicalistically problematic. In this paper I rethink that very problem of qualia by means of metaphysical considerations concerning properties in general. The relevant question in the metaphysics of properties is whether properties have essences which determine their identities independently of their dispositional aspects. (Such essences are called 'quiddities'.) Indeed, the problem of qualia would take a different shape depending on the answer to that metaphysical question. I show this with reference to three main views on that question, namely, quidditism, the causal theory, and the identity theory. In closing, I make a brief remark about what these considerations imply for the relationship between physicalism and qualia.
  • 小山 虎
    科学基礎論研究
    2007年 34 巻 2 号 49-59
    発行日: 2007/03/25
    公開日: 2010/02/03
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I try to defend Presentism. First of all, I explore how Presentism diverges to its versions and show that none of them, which include the currently standard Presentism that invokes tense logic, are tenable. Next, I point out that some philosophers argue that by replacing the Quinean criterion of existence with the Truthmaker Principle, another version of Presentism, which invokes tensed properties, can emerges. However, this version has a highly implausible conclusion. Finally, I argue that it can be avoided by taking the evidences of the past or future truths to be typical truthmakers of them.
  • 柴田 正良
    哲学
    2000年 2000 巻 51 号 1-16
    発行日: 2000/05/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    The crisis of Davidson's anomalous monism means a turning point for theories of actions because it is supposed to show that we have a strong incompatibility when we insist both the causal efficacy of mental properties and the anomalism of the mental. Therefore it seems that we can take only one of the following two ways ; (a) a causal theory of actions in view of reduction of rationality to causality or (b) interpretivism of rationalization of actions at the cost of giving up belief/desire action explanations as causal ones.
    This paper tries to show that the two elements irreducibly reside in our folk psychology, which have to be treated as a kind of data by philosophy and science of actions. In order to secure a space for both causality and rationality in action explanations, I rebut Nobuhara's comprehensive rationalization thesis as a new brand of radically anti-causalist theory.
    On the other hand, the usual causalist strategy to appeal to supervenience (following Kim), which aims to endow mental properties with the causal power, is hopeless because, as Baker pointed out, the supervenience relation is neither sufficient nor necessary to the causal efficacy of the mental. I suggest that we should dismiss the idea of reducing every kinds of explanation to the ultimate physical one and find a proper account of causal explanation as our everyday practice if we want to have a deeper understanding of human actions and action explanations.
  • 笠木 雅史
    科学哲学
    2012年 45 巻 2 号 83-98
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2016/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    The generality problem is usually taken to arise only for externalist theories of knowledge or justification. In this paper, first, I argue that even internalist theories run afoul of a variant of the generality problem. This is because S may have multiple pieces of evidence concerning the reliability of the token process by which S forms the belief in question, and they determine the degree of Sʼs internalist justification differently. Second, I offer a solution to the generality problem for internalist theories: Sʼs practical reason rather than epistemic reason picks out a piece of evidence concerning reliability as relevant.
  • 戸田山 和久
    人間環境学研究
    2003年 1 巻 1 号 1_5-1_10
    発行日: 2003年
    公開日: 2009/06/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    Philosophical naturalism is made up of two basic claims as follows. (1) Ontological claim (physicalism); Only 'physical entities and phenomena' and what supervene upon them really exist. (2) Epistemological claim; There is no 'first philosophy', that is, every method of investigation including philosophy itself must consist of the methods which are regarded as legitimate in empirical sciences. One consequence of the latter claim is called 'naturalization of philosophy of science' which has grown to be a powerful alternative to the traditional philosophy of science such as logical positivism or Bayesianism. The main concern of this paper resides in the question whether a philosophical naturalist could believe in these two claims at the same time. For, if naturalized philosophy of science found, in empirical data from the real history of science, the fact that the ultimate aim of scientific investigation is not to reach the literally true description of the world but to attain some other epistemic values (e.g. to control the nature or to make better predictions), it might undermine the realistic reading of the ontological claim of philosophical naturalism. This possibility is overlooked by virtually all the naturalists, but might pose a serious difficulty on their philosophic research program. In the last section of this paper, I tired to propose a way-out from this predicament for a philosophical naturalist like myself. The proposal consists of these two measures. (1) to adopt a Hackingean operationist criterion concerning what exists and what not, (2) to reinterpret scientific theories not as sets of theoreteical sentences but as semantic models.
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