Presentism is the thesis that everything is present, which implies that there are no past (or future) things or events. It is sometimes said to be imcompatible with the claim that every truth must have some ground on being. In this paper, I will examine the efficacy of such an argument in favor of presentism. In my view, however, how to respond to the grounding objection depends on what kinds of past truths we deal with: (i) truths about how present things were, (ii) general truths about things that no longer eixst, and (iii) singular truths about wholly past things. Before discussing this, I will also give an overview of the grounding project.
In our daily lives, we assign some value to various things. For example, we say, ‘this picture is dynamic', ‘his clothes are unfashionable' and ‘she is brave'. In these cases, we experience the value of these things. In this study, I examine the nature of such value experiences. I argue that some value experiences are cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences and that what penetrates into them is emotion. In other words, owing to the evaluative component of emotion, which affects perceptual systems, perceptual experiences can represent things as having some value to us. Furthermore, I propose that this cognitive penetration model of value experience supports the particularistic view of evaluative judgement.