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全文: "ソ連空軍"
18件中 1-18の結果を表示しています
  • 石井 明
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 113 号 186-188
    発行日: 1996/12/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高木 昇
    日本信頼性技術協会誌
    1984年 5 巻 4 号 1-2
    発行日: 1984年
    公開日: 2010/09/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 日本航空学会誌
    1961年 9 巻 95 号 419-420_2
    発行日: 1961年
    公開日: 2009/05/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ――ソ連による日米安保の「受容」――
    岡田 美保
    国際政治
    2020年 2020 巻 200 号 200_84-200_100
    発行日: 2020/03/31
    公開日: 2020/04/16
    ジャーナル 認証あり

    In the pre-negotiation stage, the most difficult obstacle to start the Japan-Soviet normalization negotiation turned out to be the issue of the Japan-US Security Treaty. While Japan regarded it as the most fundamental framework to realize its security, the Soviet Union did not change its position that the Treaty was an obstacle to start Japan-Soviet negotiations. This article investigates what kinds of discussions were held within the political leadership of the Soviet Union on the positioning of the Japan-US Security Treaty in the process of normalization with Japan. An analysis of declassified Soviet archival documents reveals the following five points. First, the Korean War changed the Soviet Union’s perception of the threat posed by the US forces stationed in Japan, and the role of the Kuril Islands in their defense policy changed accordingly. Second, as for the issue of peace with Japan, the division in the Soviet Union’s political leadership after Stalin’s death was most evident in the question of whether or not to accept the Japan-US Security Treaty. Third, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with differences in opinion on this point. Fourth, after the start of negotiations, the political leadership of the Soviet Union, headed by Khrushchev, overturned Foreign Minister Molotov’s negotiating stance of not accepting the Japan-US Security Treaty, and made a decision to “accept” it under certain conditions. Fifth, the Soviets’ proposal on transferring Habomais and Shikotan islands to Japan was closely related with their decision to “accept” the Japan-US Security Treaty.

  • 加藤 幸広
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1990年 1990 巻 19 号 60-69
    発行日: 1990年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 青木 健一, 五十嵐 尤二, 伊藤 克美, 遠藤 理佳, 小沼 通二, 登谷 美穂子
    素粒子論研究
    2006年 113 巻 5 号 109-125
    発行日: 2006/08/20
    公開日: 2017/10/02
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 長谷 良裕
    映像情報メディア学会技術報告
    2001年 25.34 巻 ROFT2001-57
    発行日: 2001/05/25
    公開日: 2017/06/23
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
    高度20km程度の成層圏に長期間無人で滞空する飛翔体である成層圏プラットフォームを無線中継基地として使えば, 1機で数百kmものエリアをカバーできる.地上系システムよりも伝搬損失が小さくてマルチパスの影響も少なく, 衛星系よりも低送信電力ではるかに大容量の通信が可能となる, 理想的な無線通信システムが構築できる.最近の材料技術や燃料電池技術等の進歩により, この夢のシステムの実現性が高まってきた.本稿では, 成層圏プラットフォーム実現への取り組み状況と, それを使った無線システムの優れた特徴や相定例について述べる.また, 周波数の分配に関する話題にも言及する.
  • 渡辺 克義
    東欧史研究
    1991年 14 巻 142-162
    発行日: 1991年
    公開日: 2018/12/01
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • ソ連アジア外交の展開のなかで
    崔 鍾起
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1985年 1985 巻 14 号 29-39
    発行日: 1985年
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 本邦洋紙発展期に活躍した学校出の技術者達 (I)
    西 済, 米谷 稔
    紙パ技協誌
    1976年 30 巻 4 号 173-182
    発行日: 1976/04/01
    公開日: 2009/11/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 横山 昭市
    新地理
    1960年 8 巻 3 号 188-199
    発行日: 1960/03/31
    公開日: 2010/02/26
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―キューバ・ミサイル危機から中米危機への軌跡―
    小林 誠
    年報政治学
    2013年 64 巻 2 号 2_162-2_180
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2017/02/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Cuban Missile Crisis, which happened in December, 1962, is generally regarded to have been avoided successfully. However, new information has come to light today, as a result of new fact finding missions and historical inspections, which shows that the Cuban Crisis was not resolved but prolonged and incorporated into the structure of global politics. That is to say, the crisis was not averted and the threat of conflict continues to exist even after the Cold War. Especially in Cuba, the crisis became embedded in the core of the political regime, and political transition has been blocked as a result of tensions with the US. After the Cuban Crisis, the US promised Cuba not to invade Cuba, but Cuba has faced severe provocation, as the US has continued to carry out military interventions (Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama) and covert actions (Cuba and Guatemala) in Central America and the Caribbean. In addition to Cuba, the Nicaraguan Revolution serves as another example of how crisis was not avoided but incorporated into the structure of global politics. The US had a hostile policy against Sandinista Revolution and intervened indirectly to reverse the revolutionary process. Ultimately, a conservative group assumed power in Nicaragua and the socialist revolution came to an end.
  • 横山 滋
    マス・コミュニケーション研究
    2000年 57 巻 65-77,214
    発行日: 2000/07/31
    公開日: 2017/10/06
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the search for possibilities of substantial criticism of the Mass Media, the author points to some basic social changes as the bases for the advancement in media literacy of the Japanese public, namely, diffusion of public education, and growth and diversification of information by mass media. But, in his view, it is not possible for the masses to make substantial criticism of the mass media because of the lack of technical knowledge about the media themselves and the background of their behaviour. The author hopes that the masses would play the role of showing their"desire"and those who are in charge of media studies should build the masses'"desire"into positive"opinion", as Auguste Comte suggested in one of his early essays.
  • 木内 正人
    日本印刷学会誌
    2017年 54 巻 4 号 239-246
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2017/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    Today, information dissemination using Web media is common. The information I personally sent was approved as a UNESCO "Memory of the World" on October 10, 2015. Personal information diffused through new media called web media and integrated with existing media such as print media and broadcasting media was uniquely developed based on the keyword "empathy."
  • 国際政治のなかの沖縄
    ヤコフ ジンベルグ
    国際政治
    1999年 1999 巻 120 号 90-108,L10
    発行日: 1999/02/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The article attempts to treat both the ‘Okinawa problem’, implying its pending territorial status until the Ryukyus reversion, and the ongoing Russo-Japanese dispute over the ‘Northern territories’ as interdependent political issues. Entertaining no doubts about the term ‘residual’ as it was commonly a pplied to the issue of Okinawa's ‘sovereignty’, this article suggests to interpret the ‘Okinawa problem’ as a ‘residual’ territorial dispute. A ‘territorial dispute’ is seen as occurring, according to Paul Huth's definition, when “both governments seek control of and sovereign rights over the same territory”.
    Both territorial issues are rooted in the post-World war II rivalry of two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for the control of geopolitical space. The two issues are unique, however, since they represent territorial disputes, actual and potential, respectively, between both superpowers and a single foreign power, Japan. Moreover, their very existence as the disputes was largely sustained by the continuous rivalry of the superpowers, thus forming a peculiar ‘balance of power’. Hence, in view of a broad range of the research subject and its so far unexplored quality, the primary goal of the article is to pose a scholarly problem rather than draw any immediate conclusions.
    Emphasizing their differences from the legal standpoint, the two territorial issues were dealt with in separate Articles, namely 2 (c) and 3, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to the treaty's principal author, John Foster Dulles, Article 26 provided for the possibility of the United States' gaining “full sovereignty over the Ryukyus”, in case “Japan recognized that the Soviet Union was entitled to full sovereignty over the Kuriles”.
    It is this particular interpretation, personally given by Dulles to Japan's Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru in August 1956, which makes it possible to regard the ‘Okinawa issue’ as a residual territorial dispute. Conveyed inn the course of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks, this statement served to intensify the interdependence of both territorial issues and to confirm the US position of a concerned ‘third power’. The subsequent application of the ‘Okinawa-Kuriles’ linkage by both the Japanese and the Soviet negotiators, namely Mono Ichiro and Nikita Khruschev, in October 1956 testify to the political uses of international law on their part.
    The article's concluding section draws critical attention to post-Cold war efforts to employ the ‘Okinawa reversion’ model for the purpose of resolving the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute in a way presumably identical to the Cold war approach. The Appendix contains a unique document which was found in the US National Archives. Dated August 8, 1967, it is a ‘secret memorandum’ written by Legal Advisor Mark Feldman to Richard Sneider, the US Department of State country director for Japan. This document, in particular, addressed the issue of possible Ryukyus reversion “by executive agreement without formal congressional action”. As such, it is presumed to be directly applicable in terms of modeling the ‘Kuriles issue’ resolution on the ‘Okinawa reversion’ in the context of foreign policy prerogatives of the President and the Diet in post-Soviet Russia.
  • 第二次大戦前夜-1939年夏の国際関係-
    渡邊 啓貴
    国際政治
    1982年 1982 巻 72 号 40-54,L8
    発行日: 1982/10/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article, in which you can find the developments of French diplomacy, especially in 1939, is intended to make clear the policy for the European stabillity of Daladier's government.
    After Munich, it was only by the détente among the Four Powers that France and Britain could have re-established the European security system so as to prevent Germany and Italy from attacking them. And with the Franco-German declation of December 1938, France tried to carry out a policy of which the aim might be to pursue the collaboration with the Reich and to look for a means of settling troubles with Italy, through the intermediation of Germany.
    The German Occupation of Prague on 15 March 1939, however, introduced a New Diplomatic Policy of embarking on the negotiations with the Poles and the Soviet Union, but in vain. Indeed, this fiasco was due to the French recognition of them, which might be based on the notion of maintaining the West-European system by the Four Powers. From this point of view, naturally, Anglo-French relations had always been made much of by French leaders, even if it was Britain to have much more influence and there had been discords between the two democratic powers. But, after all, the absence of Anglo-French collaboration took the Europeans to the bankruptcy.
    In addition, it was remarkable that there had been differences among the French leaders, but they seemed to share the idea that the détente among the Four Powers would be the sine qua non for the maintenance of world-wide stability.
  • 共産圏の研究
    林 三郎
    国際政治
    1963年 1963 巻 21 号 113-125,L7
    発行日: 1963/04/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Khrushchev's military policy aims at preventing war. Therefore it places importance on efforts to weaken capitalism. Concerning arms, it focuses on how to prepare for a nuclear surprise attack. However, it is not so serious as that of the United States regarding preparation for retaliative attack. He gives great efforts toward making a show of stronger military force than actual by his propaganda and secrecy. He also emphasizes common type of armed forces as well as those of rockets and nuclear weapons, believing in importance of a combination of various types of forces. Countermeasures toward the big loss of young men in the Soviet-German war is the present basis of his military policy.
    After the incident of the U2 aircraft, he began to reinforce the armed forces in earnest and to make an effort for a collective defence organization of socialist countries. But Khrushchev's military policy is vacilating at present and the military authorities seem to be dragged around by his capricious ideas.
  • 宇宙兵器と国際政治
    林 三郎
    国際政治
    1958年 1958 巻 5 号 30-39
    発行日: 1958/06/15
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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