The Harpalus affair was a crisis which involved many prominent Athenians and caused the exile of Demosthenes, in connection with money embezzled by Harpalus, Alexander's imperial treasurer, who sought refuge in Athens in 324 B. C. In previous studies, it has been generally assumed that the confrontation of political groups over policy toward Macedon was a fundamental element of Athenian politics during the reign of Alexander. Regarding the Harpalus affair, the arguments have centered upon a political confrontation between the radicals and the moderates among the anti-Macedonians. This paper attempts to analyze the Harpalus affair, focusing on an examination of the alleged political confrontation among the anti-Macedonians, in order to shed some light on Athenian politics during this period. It examines (1) the Athenian political situation surrounding the Harpalus affair, (2) the alleged political confrontation between Hypereides and Demosthenes, and (3) other prosecutors and defendants in the trials arising out of the affair. In conclusion, the author refutes the picture of political confrontation between the radicals and the moderates among the anti-Macedonians in the affair. The Harpalus affair, which involved various personal confrontations, is a good example to show unsoundness in grasping Athenian politics during this period within a simple scheme of political confrontation dominated by Macedonian issues. It would be possible to assume that within the context of the good state of relations between Macedon and Athens under the Pax Macedonica, personal confrontation among politicians often played a more important role than political confrontation over the Macedonian question and was a dominant factor in Athenian politics of this period.

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The word εκδοσι&b.sigmav;, used in relation to overseas trade, has generally been interpreted as 'sea loan' (ναυτικον δανειον)from the accounts of the lexicons such as Harpocration etc. The author here tries to investigate whether this interpretation of the word is right or not from contemporary literary sources. The author examines five sources(Lysias 32,6; Dem. 27,11; [Dem.] 35, 51; 52, 20; Hyper, c. Demosth. col. 17.) in which εκδοσι&b.sigmav; or its verbal form εκδιδωμι is used in overseas trade and reaches to the conclusion that there are no sources which prove that εκδοσι&b.sigmav; is identical with the sea loan, and that εκδοσι&b.sigmav; should be regarded as a form of investiment which is different from the sea loan. The following seems to be the contract called εκδοσι&b.sigmav;. The investor entrusts a sum of money to the trader with whom he makes a contract. The latter, with this money, sails abroad for commercial transaction and imports the merchandise into Athens. The investor receives the merchandise, sells it and gives a fee to the trader from the proceeds(or both of them divide the proceeds). "Εκδοσι&b.sigmav; was especially used by the wealthy merchant and the owner of the large εργαστηριον which was in need of the continuous supply of raw materials. Probably τραπεζιτη&b.sigmav; also made use of this contract to enlarge his fortunes. The maritime transaction by means of εκδοσι&b.sigmav; was older than the sea loan. While the investors largely consist of non-citizens in sea loan, in εκδοσι&b.sigmav; many of them are Athenian citizens. Most of the traders who were entrusted with the money were, in early times, poor citizens. Throughout the fifth century B. C, however, when many foreigners and metoikoi came into Athens, they have taken the place of those poor citizens.

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Because of the growing interest in Macedonia stimulated by recent archaeological discoveries, there have been a considerable number of studies on Macedonian history. Since the 1970s these studies have been concentrated on Philip II, whose reputation had previously been overshadowed by that of Alexander the Great. Recent major works on Philip II have one common feature: they criticize the Atheno-centric nature of traditional research on this historical figure and consider him instead from a Macedonian standpoint. Unfortunately, all of these studies fall into the trap of overemphasizing Philip's friendly attitude toward Athens. This tendency is most apparent in their interpretation of "the Peace of Philocrates" concluded between Philip and Athens in 346 B.C.. Most scholars exaggerate the importance of this peace and regard it as clear evidence of Philip's friendly attitude toward Athens. The purpose of this paper is to put the Peace of Philocrates in its proper perspective and to shed some light on Philip's overall strategy in 346 B.C.. The negotiations regarding the Peace of Philocrates coincided with two important events: Philip's Thracian campaign, and his intervention in the Third Sacred War. This paper attempts to analyze the Peace in the context of these two events. Within the framework of his Thracian campaign, the Peace can be regarded as a diplomatic expedient used by Philip to forestall Athens' offensive intervention in Thracian affairs and to conquer Thrace as smoothly as possible. On the other hand, when we look at his intervention in the Sacred War, which led to his emergence as the major power in Greek politics, we can see that Philip intended to strike a blow at Athens' ally, the Phocians, with Thebes' cooperation, in order to enter the mainstream of Greek politics. In short, we can affirm that Philip's policy of favouring Athens played no part at all in that process, and that his peace with Athens had no effect on his settlement of the Sacred War. Therefore, the Peace of Philocrates was only a diplomatic expedient for conquering Thrace smoothly, and it had almost nothing to do with Philip's intervention in the Sacred War, which, in 346 B.C., was a very important part of his strategy toward Greece. It follows from this conclusion that it is necessary to amend the recent studies which inflate the importance of the Peace of Philocrates in Philip's plan and which consequently imply that Philip's attitude toward Athens was friendly.

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In 344/3 B. C, Philip II sent Python of Byzantium to Athens with a proposal for the amendment(επανοθωσι&b.sigmav;)of the Peace of Philocrates, which had been concluded between Philip and Athens in 346. Recent Philippic studies tend to overemphasize Philip's friendlly attitude toward Athens and to exaggerate Athens' central role in his plan for conquering Greece. This tendency is apparent in their interpretation of the επανορθωσι&b.sigmav; negotiations of 344/3. In that year, the Persian King Artaxerxes III also sent embassies to Athens and other major Greek cities requesting that they join the Persians in the imminent campaign against the Egyptians. Most studies which emphasize Philip's friendly attitude toward Athens, interpret these events as follows : in 344/3, the simultaneous arrival of the Macedonian and Persian embassies confronted Athens with a clear-cut choice between alignment with one or the other of these two major powers ; Athens, where public opinion had been predominantly pro-Macedonian due to Philip's friendly attitude, clearly rejected the Persian appeal and entered into negotiations with Philip on the amendment of the peace. In this paper, I reexamine this common view, focusing on three main sources : Didymus 8.7-32, Hypoth. Dem.6, and[Dem]. 7.18-32. 1 conclude that there is no justification for arguing that Athens was confronted with a clear-cut choice between Macedonia and Persia in 344/3, that the Athenian answer to Persia shows the friendly relations between Philip and Athens, that in this period Philip behaved in a friendly way toward Athens, or that pro-Macedonian sentiment was predominant in Athens. Therefore, it is necessary to amend the common view which tends to emphasize Philip's friendly attitude in the επανορθωσι&b.sigmav; negotiations of 344/3. Philip's proposal in 344/3 was not an attempt to show his own friendly feelings toward Athens ; rather it may have been merely one of the many tactics he employed to smoothly carry out his program to conquer Greece, which was under way simultaneously in many parts of Greece, such as Thessaly, Thrace, and the Peloponnese. I believe that this conclusion of this paper provides a basis for amendment of the previous historical interpretations of this period, which are intrinsically Atheno-centric.

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After the Social War, Eubulus took the leadership in Athenian Politics from the late 350s to the mid-340s. He was a member of the Theoric Commission, which distributed the theorica, and succeeded in reconstructing Athenian public finance. The purpose of this paper is to explain the relation between Eubulus' activities and Athenian democracy from the point of view of the political process. The Theoric Fund created by Eubulus consisted of the annual ration and the surplus money in the state treasury. Eubulus, in order to establish this Fund, got two decrees passed, one which prohibited the transfer of this money to the military fund under the fear of the death penalty, and the other which ordered that all of the surplus money should be the theorica. Then he supplied various public projects with surplus money, which increased as the Athenian treasury recovered ; and at the same time supervised the main financial officials. As a result, as Aeschines and Dinarchus say, the Theoric Commission in effect presided over almost the whole administration of the state. This brought to the Athenian financial system a unity and concentration which went beyond the framework of the polis. What influence did these policies have upon the Athenian democracy? M.H.Hansen presents an interesting model, in which he divides the political process of Athens into the three stages of Initiative, Decision and Implementation. Applying this model here, we can understand that the politicians before Eubulus were concerned only with the first two stages, whereas the Theoric Commission was involved in all stages in succession. It was such a political process that gave to Eubulus his decisive superiority over other politicians. In conclusion, we can situate Eubulus and Lycurgus, his successor, within an epoch characterized by the transformation from the polis to the hellenistic state. Furthermore, considering that this process was based on the theorica, which embodied the principle of community among the Athenian citizenry, we may here present the following hypothesis. To wit, the polis, in one aspect, proceeded to the hellenistic state through the principle of community.

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An Athenian naval reform by Periandros in the middle of the fourth century B.C. changed drastically the former system of the trierarchy, when expenses were paid for a warship by one or two persons(trierarchs). The law of Periandros charged 1200 people who were members of 20 symmories, each consisting of 60 people with the payments for the trierarchy, and so divided the financial burden for a warship between many people. Recently, at least, this system itself has been studied by some scholars, especially with regard to possible identification with the system of the eisphora, but the historical background of this reform seems to have been scarcely studied as a main theme and in detail. Accordingly, the significance of it is here fully examined. The date of the reform has been regarded as 358/7 B.C. or 357/6 B.C. by common consent since this was argued by Boeckh. The evidence to prove the existence of Periandros' symmories in 357/6 B.C. is [Dem.]XLVII, but there is no evidence to prove its existence before then. For example, as we find no references to the trierarchic symmories in [Dem.]L which relates to an Athenian naval expedition in the late 360s B.C., it seems that the start of the law must be placed after that date. In that period, there were two important events in foreign relations which might have had such a direct impact that Athens was forced to carry out the drastic reform of the naval system. One was the Athenian expedition to Euboea in the summer of 357 B. C. and the other was the Social War which broke out soon after that. There is no evidence to elucidate directly the relative dates of the reform and the expedition to Euboea. Cawkwell does not entirely exclude the possibility that the fleet mentioned in [Dem.]XLVII may be identical with that in the expedition to Euboea, and he infers that in that case the expedition to Euboea might have been provided for by the law of Periandros. But while the fleet in that expedition was quickly dispatched and voluntary trierarchs participated in it in response to an appeal of the State, the fleet mentioned in [Dem.]XLVII could not set sail so quickly and such an appeal was not made at that time. Therefore these two fleets were different from each other. Seeing that the Athenians were forced to depend upon the trierarchic epidosis, firstly organized in Athens at that time, for the expedition to Euboea, it is more probable that the date of Periandros' reform is later than that of the expedition to Euboea as Boeckh thought. The next important matter is the relative dates of the reform and the Social War. There is a clue about it in the description of [Dem.]XLVII, 20 ff.. The above-mentioned fleet in [Dem.]XLVII can be thought to have been dispatched to cope with the revolt of the allies which led to the Social War. This is a possibility that Cawkwell regards as more probable and his arguments are convincing. Consequently, we can infer the chronology for the three events, that is, the expedition to Euboea → the reform of Periandros → the Social War. And we can suppose from [Dem.]XLVII, 21, etc. that his law was initiated before the outbreak of the Social War but the revolt of the allies broke out before it was completely carried out. This suggests that Periandros carried out the reform being conscious of the unquiet tendency of the allies and as a measure against them. Tod. No. 151 (=IG II^2 126) which records an alliance between Athens and three Thracian kings in 357/6 B.C seems to suggest this, though it does so indirectly. Lastly, it can be confirmed by IG I^I2 1611, etc. that Periandros and the other man performed their syntrierarchy using the state-owned ship's equipment and Periandros proposed the reform presumably sometime during their syntrierarchy. Taking notice of a regulation about recovering the unreturned state-owned ship's equipment in his law, we can infer that he himself, too, keenly realized a

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