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  • 高橋 和夫
    国際政治
    1987年 1987 巻 86 号 68-82,L9
    発行日: 1987/10/24
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Calling the Kurds a minority is a misnomer, for they constitute the overwhelming majority in Kurdistan. Their tragedy is that the borders of five countries crisscross Kurdistan making them a minority in all of these states, namely, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and the Soviet Union.
    From the nineteenth century onwards, the Kurds have been struggling for autonomy in the process of which they have tasted moments of exhilaration as well as despair. Shortly after the Second World War, in January 1946, the Kurds in Iran proclaimed the establishment of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan only to see its demise before the year was out. Later, the focus of their struggle shifted to Iraqi-Kurdistan. The charismatic leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, led a series of heroic struggles against Baghdad before, during and well after the Second World War. After his final defeat in 1975, Kurdistan experienced an uneasy period of peace.
    The revolution in Iran, however, opened up the opportunity for the Kurds to assert their autonomy for the third time since the end of the Second World War. Taking advantage of a brief decline in the authority of the central government, the Iranian Kurds began to demand autonomy. But the revolutionary government has not complied, for it is apprehensive about the possibility of other minorities following suit, which it fears could lead to Iran's dismemberment. Ever since 1979 a civil war has been fought in Kurdistan.
    The start of the all-out war between Iraq and Iran strengthened the Kurdish resolve for autonomy, for Iraq openly supported the Iranian Kurds. Iran countered by aiding the Iraqi-Kurds against Baghdad. As the fortunes of war shifted on the southern front from Iraq to Iran, so did the situation in the north. By the summer of 1983, after regaining control over its part of Kurdistan, Tehran, aided by the Iraqi Kurds, sent its army into Iraqi Kurdistan.
    With the concentration of the Iraqi forces on the southern and central fronts, and with the support of both Iran and Syria, the Iraqi-Kurds have steadily expanded their control over substantial parts of Iraqi-Kurdistan. They are already in a position to threaten the pipe-lines and the highway that run through Kurdistan, linking Turkey and Iraq. They also provide sanctuary for the Turkish Kurds who in 1984 started a wide spread guerilla campaign against targets inside Turkey. Thus, Kurdish agitation has spilled over into Turkey. Ankara retaliated first by bombing targets inside Iraq and later increasingly by sending troops across the border into Iraq, straining its relations with Iran and Syria. Also Turkey's intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan has fueled speculation that Turkey might occupy Iraqi-Kurdistan, should the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad show signs of imminent collapse. It seems that under the darkening shadow of the Gulf War, “the third wave” of the Kurdish struggle for autonmy has been building up momentum towards an explosive climax over the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan.
  • 若松 大樹
    日本中東学会年報
    2008年 24 巻 2 号 29-59
    発行日: 2009/02/25
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nevruz is a spring festival celebrated the world over and particularly in Eastern Muslim countries, including Iran and Turkey. It was for a long time commemorated by Ottoman society as a regular cultural festival, but the practice gradually changed since the late 1980s, when Kurdish nationalist movements arose. To put it briefly, the Nevruz festival, which was a normal cultural festival until then, was now transformed into a battlefield of ethnic self-assertion in Turkey. In this article I intend discussing the practical aspects of Nevruz in contemporary Turkey by utilizing primary sources like daily newspapers, by the observation of the Nevruz practices, and through interviews that I conducted during my field research
  • 田中 幸夫, 中山 幹康
    水文・水資源学会誌
    2010年 23 巻 2 号 144-156
    発行日: 2010/03/05
    公開日: 2010/04/08
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿では,中東に位置するティグリス・ユーフラテス川流域を事例に国際河川紛争の解決要因の検討を行う.同流域では主にトルコ・シリア・イラクによる水争いが20世紀後半以降顕在化し,流域国間での合意形成が幾度にもわたって試みられたが,いずれも不調に終わり,現在に至っている.このような膠着状態を脱却する要件として,本稿では「イシューのパッケージ化」に着目した.特定の争点の妥協を誘引するためにその他の争点を交渉に導入する(イシューをパッケージ化する)という手法は意識的または無意識的に様々な資源交渉もしくは国際交渉の場で行われている(本稿では米国とメキシコの間のコロラド川水質汚染問題におけるイシューのパッケージ化を例示した).ティグリス・ユーフラテス川の事例においても,流域国間でトレードオフが可能な争点としてエネルギー,国境貿易および経済開発,民族(クルド人)問題などが挙げられた.これらを水資源配分の問題と合わせて流域国間交渉に導入することにより,流域国の協調が達成可能となることが期待される.
  • 小澤 一郎
    日本中東学会年報
    2016年 32 巻 1 号 119-148
    発行日: 2016/07/15
    公開日: 2018/06/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this article, the author studies the arming of the Ottoman-Iranian Borderland after the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-78), as an attempt to clarify the significance of the “modern age” in the history of firearms. The Russo-Ottoman War gave rise to the diffusion of Martini-Peabody rifle in the Borderland, the impact of which can be discerned from Sheikh ‘Obeyd allāh’s revolt in 1880 and the destabilization of the regional security in the 1880s and 1890s. On the other hand, the Qajar irregular forces armed with those rifles displayed their own importance, and the Qajar dynasty attempted to utilize “modern” arms spread in the region by mobilizing these irregulars. This attitude seems to have been related to the general military policy of the Qajar dynasty in the age. Reacting to the arming of the Borderland, indigenous gunsmiths attempted to produce the imitations or to reuse metal cartridges locally, showing the indigenous technological level of arms production. Finally, the author suggests that these developments prepared the ground for the later historical developments including the Constitutional Revolution and the conflicts between various ethnic groups in the region in the WWI period.
  • 藤原 帰一
    日本比較政治学会年報
    2001年 3 巻 i-vi
    発行日: 2001/06/20
    公開日: 2010/09/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鈴木 董
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 73 号 44-63,L9
    発行日: 1983/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    I.
    The Cyprus problem was one of the important international conflicts in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. It was essentially an ethnic conflict between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, which developed into an international conflict. It was one of the fierce outbreaks of ethnic conflicts which are characteristic of the contemporary Middle East.
    II.
    In the modern age, the Western impact destroyed the traditional world system implying a self-sufficient Middle Eastern Islamic World and in the following process of “modernization”, the nature of its basic political units, the structure of identity and the style of co-existence among the ethnic groups, changed greatly.
    Before the coming of the Western impact, the Middle East was one of the relatively self-sufficient traditional world systems. In the Middle Eastern Islamic World, the idea of the unity of the Islamic World prevailed. There were, in fact, political units called “dawla.” Notwithstanding, the identity of the Middle Eastern peoples who belonged to dawlas was not based on ascription to political units but on religion.
    The various ethnic groups, which were the components of the mosaic-like societies in the Middle East, formed communities according to religions. And there existed a traditional style of co-existence among them. This traditional style of co-existence in the Middle Eastern Islamic world was not based on the principle of the equality of each ethnic group, but on the principle of the supremacy of the Muslims over the non-Muslims.
    Non-Muslims were thus second class citizens in Islamic political society. Notwithstanding, considering the limited range of political participation and the structure of the identity of the people of the time, the traditional Middle Eastern style of co-existence, which was institutionalized as a “dhimmi” institution in the classical period and completed in the form of a “millet” institution in the Ottoman Empire, functioned rather well in the complicated mosaic-like societies of the Middle East. Only under the influence of modern nationalism did it begin to dissolve and ethnic conflicts begin to surface. The Cyprus problem is one of these ethnic conflicts of the modern Midddle East.
    III.
    Because of its strategic position, Cyprus was occupied by one nation after another. The ethnic composition of Cypriot society also became complicated. When the Ottomans conquered Cyprus in 1571, the largest ethnic group was the Greeks together with some other minor ethnic groups. After the Ottoman conquest, the Turkish soldiers and peasants emmigrated and became at least the second large ethnic group. The millet system, the Ottoman form of the traditional Middle Eastern style of co-existence, was applied to these ethnic groups. The millet system functioned and the fierce outbreak of ethnic conflicts were rarely seen.
    The beginning of ethnic conflicts came with the impact of the West. Especially, the rise of nationalism and the independence of Greece affected the situation in Cyprus. And the idea of enosis, namely the reunion of Cyprus with Greece, emerged in Greece. Greek nationalism gradually penetrated Cyprus. Because of the rise of the nationalism of non-Muslim subjects, there was an attempt to reform the principle of inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims. In this period, the traditional style of co-existence of ethnic groups was also changing. However, the relationship of co-existence among ethnic groups continued.
    IV.
    At the end of this period, in 1878, Cyprus came under British rule. Under British rule, the nationalism of the Greek ethnic group and the Turkish ethnic group developed. The separated educational system of each ethnic group under British rule contributed much to this development. The development of the nationalism of the Greek Cypriots oriented to enosis was especially outstanding. Because of
  • 今井 宏平
    国際政治
    2007年 2007 巻 150 号 186-202,L18
    発行日: 2007/11/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to explore how Turkey contributes to American foreign policy during the Post-Cold War era, especially Middle Eastern dimension.
    The discussion has three parts. Firstly, this deals with American foreign policy toward the Middle East during Post-Cold War era and demonstrates American failure. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, international order started to change and the United States intensified its hegemonic power. But America failed to manage Iraq War, and Middle East region is becoming disorder and nest of terrorism. Furthermore, Anti-Americanism is spreading rapidly in this region. The United States is coming to reach a deadlock.
    Secondly, Turkey will be situated “Transmission Middle Power” after Iraq War. Since the word of “Middle Power” is ambiguous, it has to be conceptualized at first. In this paper, “Middle Power” is classified as “Classical Middle Power”, “Functional Middle Power” and “Transmission Middle Power”. Historically, Turkey has been described as “Middle Power”. However, its role and quality of power have been changed by relationship of Great Power and international structure. Now, Turkey pioneers “Transmission Middle Power” by using historical and cultural factors.
    Thirdly, this focuses on American-Turkish relations. Since both states faced the Soviet threat during the Cold War period, Turkey contributed American containment policy. The end of bipolar system, however, changed their relationships. During the Gulf War, Turkey assisted the United States through economic sanction against Iraq and offered the multinational force to military bases. Turkey acted as “Classical Middle power” in the Cold War era. But after the Gulf War, both countries disagreed with OPC (Operation Provide Comfort) and OPCII in Northern Iraq. In Iraq War, Turkey did not offer to military bases. This was watershed of American-Turkish relations. After this decision, Turkey seeks to contribute to Middle Eastern stability as “Transmission Middle Power”. In particular, the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) is a good deliberative place among Middle Eastern countries to prevail democracy. Turkey is one of chair countries in Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), which is a component of BMENA..
    In conclusion, Turkey is “Middle Power” so it has to keep good relationships with the United States to spread its influence toward International politics in the Post-Cold War era. However, the forms of cooperation have changed all the time by international affairs and structure. Now, “Transmission Middle Power” is the best form both America and Turkey.
  • 新井 春美
    MACRO REVIEW
    2011年 23 巻 2 号 2_33-2_39
    発行日: 2011年
    公開日: 2011/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    今日、水は危機的な状況にあり、水をめぐる戦争が中東、とくにトルコとシリア間で起きると予測されてきた。実際にトルコは水問題を他の外交問題と関係づけ、水問題の解決を遅らせてきた。しかしトルコ•シリア間の外交関係の改善によって、水問題に関するETICという多国籍の枠組みが形成されることになった。これによって両国間の水問題解決への展望に期待が持てるようになってきた。
  • 廣瀬 陽子
    日本比較政治学会年報
    2001年 3 巻 123-157
    発行日: 2001/06/20
    公開日: 2010/12/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 村上 雅博
    水文・水資源学会誌
    1995年 8 巻 4 号 419-426
    発行日: 1995/07/05
    公開日: 2009/10/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 八谷 まち子
    国際政治
    2005年 2005 巻 142 号 79-94,L11
    発行日: 2005/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Brussels European Council in December 2004 finally concluded to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkey submitted its accession application in 1987 preceding all of the ten new member states of the year 2004. Why has it taken so long for Turkey? What is the basic agenda for Turkey to realize its EU membership? To find answers to these questions, the concept of “focal point” might be useful.
    Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point” that [most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. … Any potential outcome is one that either party could have improved by insisting, yet each knows that the other would rather concede than do without agreement. … These reflexive expectations somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.] Garett and Weingast elaborate the concept by referring to the “mutual recognition” introduced in a decision of “the Cassis de Dijon” by the European Court of Justice in 1979, and embedded in the European Single Act as a legal system for the single market project. That is, when a natural focal point does not exist, an institution may propose a constructed focal point for an enhancement of expectation towards a possible agreement of a negotiation.
    In the light of the above understanding of a focal point, there may have been, at least, two potential focal points between Turkey and the EU: the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The former was set out unilaterally by the EU as the conditionalities for the EU membership, therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria was meant to be a constructed focal point. But it was originally set out to facilitate and control the accession of the former socialist countries which were making efforts to transform their national regimes, while Turkey with its established nationalist idea and regime had tremendous difficulties in renovating the systems in accordance with the EU criteria. The constructed focal point, unlike the former socialist countries, failed to work automatically in Turkey, but started to function with an additional impetus of the promise to give a starting date of negotiation. Turkish domestic situation required an extra motivation for a constructed focal point to be useful.
    The latter seemed to have had more chance to become a natural focal point, but Turkey stuck to its national interest particularly with the view to sustaining its de-facto governing influence over Cyprus. Greece, securing the interest of Cyprus, also insisted on the national interest. Under such circumstances, there was no place for the “reciprocal expectations” to develop in order to identify a focal point. Thus, a potentially existed natural focal point was unable to function.
    It should be expected for the EU to set a focal point in view with the Turkish membership including a solution to the divided Cyprus. What may be critical for identifying a focal point is not the problems such as a mass movement of labour, or huge financial aids to suppress the EU budget, often sited by Turkish antagonists. But whether the EU would be able to convince the European citizens of the significance of the Turkish membership, and to the same importance, whether Turkey would be able to internalize the Copenhagen Criteria that would inevitably transform the principles that Turkey has been standing on since its foundation in 1923..
  • 新井 政美
    オリエント
    1985年 28 巻 1 号 1-23
    発行日: 1985/09/30
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    The development of Turkish nationalism was one of the prominent phenomena in the Young Turk Era (1908-1918). The Türk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) was a leading nationalist periodical in the era. Studies on this periodical carried out until now, however, show a serious deficiency; they cannot perceive the difference between the thoughts of two groups who co-operated in publishing the periodical: Ottoman Turks and immigrants from Russia. The latter directed nationalist movements to free themselves from czarist rule prior to their emigration to the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, Pan-Turkism was a dominant characteristic of their thought. Ottoman Turkish nationalists who issued the Genç Kalernler (Young Pens) and contributed to the Türk Dernegi (Turkish Association) before publishing the Türk Yurdu advocated, in these periodicals, political integration of the Ottoman state, which was denied by Yusuf Akçura, an immigrant, in his 1904 article “Üç Tarz-i Siyaset” (Three Ways of Policy). In this paper, I make a comparison among the articles of these groups.
    The Türk Yurdu was founded owing to the initiative of the immigrants and Turks under czarist rule. The management was taken by them as well, especially by Akçura. A half of the informations collected in Turkish Affairs (Türklük Süunu) columns of the periodical was concerned with Turks under Russian and Chinese rules. A half of the newspapers whose articles were reproduced in the Press (Matbuat) columns also was published in Russian Empire although numbers of immigrant contributors were not so high. They definitely advocated Pan-Turkism, or national integration of Turks, and rejected the compatibility of Turkish nationalism with Ottomanism.
    The most urgent problem for Ottoman Turkish nationalists was preserving the political integration of the Ottoman Empire even after the Balkan Wars. Consequently they supported the centralistic Ottomanism. Ziya Gökalp and Fuad Köprülü, for example, emphasized that Turkish nationalism was required for strengthening the integration of the Ottoman state. Moreover, Gökalp regarded Pan-Turkism as an aid for the Ottoman state (Osmanlilik).
  • 松里 公孝
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2007年 2007 巻 36 号 17-29
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no “clashes of civilizations” between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine.
    Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor.
    Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.
  • 吉岡 明子
    国際政治
    2013年 2013 巻 174 号 174_83-174_97
    発行日: 2013/09/15
    公開日: 2015/07/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Kurds, who fought for autonomy for many decades in northern Iraq, had never played a leading role in the Iraqi oil industry. However, since the Iraq War began in 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has launched its own oil industry.
    In 2007, the Iraqi Parliament began discussing a draft oil law that would have comprehensively controlled the nation’s upstream oil industry; however, the negotiations soon deadlocked. The federal government did not agree to allow the KRG to develop oil in the region without federal consent. On the other hand, the KRG was unwilling to give up the right to have the final say on the development of oil in that region.
    Following the breakdown of the negotiations, the KRG began building the oil industry unilaterally in that region. It drafted a regional oil law and accelerated oil development contracts with international oil companies (IOCs). The KRG claims that its policy is totally consistent with the new constitution, ratified in 2005. The constitution grants the KRG strong authority in the “Region,” a newly created administrative unit. However, international scholars are still debating on how to interpret the constitution.
    More than 40 IOCs have entered into oil development contracts with the KRG, partly because they are attracted by KRG’s more lucrative contract terms than those offered by the federal government. The KRG is willing to offer better terms not only to develop its economic base but also for its own security. Every country normally keeps close eye on its economic interests possessed by IOCs and KRG hopes that any of those countries will try to prevent the federal government from militarily jeopardizing the oil industry in the region or the region itself, when thing go wrong.
    In addition, the recent close relations with the neighboring energy-thirsty Turkey give hope to the KRG and the IOCs of direct oil exports, allowing them to eschew Iraqi pipelines controlled by the federal government. Turkey’s natural resources minister mentioned in May 2012 that the country was ready to import oil from the Kurdistan Region.
    In the 10 years since the regime change, the Iraqi oil industry has turned out to be divided between the Kurdistan Region and the rest of Iraq. The KRG has been able to pursue a unilateral oil policy not only because of the constitution, which authorizes decentralization internally, but also because it has attracted the IOCs and maintained close relations internationally with an oil-consuming neighbor. In other words, the direct connection between the local actor, the KRG, and the international actors, such as the IOCs and the neighboring country, has shaken the national framework of Iraq.
  • 遠藤 崇浩
    法政論叢
    2004年 41 巻 1 号 53-66
    発行日: 2004/11/15
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    "War of the next century will be over water." In 1995, a high-rank officer of the World Bank made this comment and many newspapers and magazines picked it up as news. Now, as a lot of people in many parts of the world face severe water scarcity, there is talk of conflict over international rivers, though it is hard to realize such a water problem in Japan where it has been said that "water and security are free." Fear of such a conflict is getting bigger and bigger as the major ways to use river have been changing from navigational uses to non-navigational ones (ex. dam, water diversion for a large irrigation system and so on.). It's because the latter does more harm with high probability than the former to water quantity and quality that reach downstream countries. Especially, when an upstream county develops river on the notion called the Harmon doctrine, conflict of interests between riparian countries tends to be acute. The Harmon doctrine means that each riparian country has exclusive sovereignty over the part of international river which exists in its territory. This notion implies that an upstream country have the right to do whatever it chooses with the water regardless of its effect on other riparian countries. So it is often called "the logic of upper riparian countries." But there are controversies over whether there have ever been practices of the doctrine. This paper is focused on Turkey's management policy of the Euphrates-river and shows the policy is based on the Harmon doctrine.
  • 田中 幸夫
    生産研究
    2010年 62 巻 5 号 537-542
    発行日: 2010/09/01
    公開日: 2011/04/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 澤江 史子
    日本中東学会年報
    2003年 19 巻 2 号 143-167
    発行日: 2004/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article explores how the secularist regime in Turkey has undergone significant changes in terms of strategy of national integration and policies related to Islam since the 1980 coup. Under the new conditions of post-Cold War geopolitics, the Ozal government pursued multi-regional foreign policy which intensified political and economic relations, for example, with the Middle East and Central Asia by appealing to the Turko and/or Islamic ties, on the one hand, and political and economic liberalization policies, which provided Islamists with wider space for activities in political and economic spheres, on the other. Secularist forces including the military could not help following the Qzal's policy. For the secularists, stressing the image of a pro-western, moderate Muslim country which functions as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world seems the most feasible option for Turkey to remain a geopolitically important a country for the West. Concomitant with these new developments in the internal and external politics, Turkey in the beginning of the 1990s had witnessed the leadership of civil politicians and the rise of liberals who criticized the authoritarian characteristics of the secularist regime, which had somewhat undermined the political legitimacy of the secularist regime and the military as its self-appointed guardian.
  • 古賀 正則
    経済地理学年報
    2006年 52 巻 1 号 55-56
    発行日: 2006/03/30
    公開日: 2017/05/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 今井 宏平
    国際政治
    2015年 2015 巻 182 号 182_44-182_57
    発行日: 2015/11/05
    公開日: 2016/08/04
    ジャーナル フリー

    In their monumental work Competitive Authoritarianism (2010), Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way insist that a high level of Western linkage guarantees democratization. However, according to recent research by Freedom House, the democratic conditions of several EU member countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Latvia, and the EU candidate country, Turkey, are backsliding. The aim of this article is to examine why these countries have experienced a deterioration of democracy in recent years, with specific focus on the case of Turkey.

    After being recognized as an EU candidate in 1999, Turkey implemented eight harmonization packages and two constitutional amendments. The Justice and Development Party (JDP), known as pro-Islamic party, is one of the main actors supporting Turkey’s accession to the EU. From 2002 to 2005, the JDP earnestly pursued democratic consolidation in line with the EU accession process, in order to establish its legitimacy in both internal and external politics. The EU accession process also benefited the development of civil society in Turkey, and guaranteed the country’s democratization. However, after 2005, when Turkey formally became an EU candidate country, the EU accession process stagnated because of harsh opposition from several EU member states, such as the Republic of Cyprus and France. In addition to such opposition, the JDP chose to enforce the accession process in the manner of civil-military relations or religious freedom;consequently, Turkey’s democratization has gradually slowed. The range of civil society activity has also diminished. This trend became more apparent after 2011, when the JDP won its third general election. The most symbolic manifestation of Turkey’s democratic backsliding was the Gezi protest in May and June of 2013. Initially the protesters aimed to protect a historical park from redevelopment, but harsh response from the police provoked them to change their focus to direct criticism of the JDP and then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Another impetus for this change was the frustration of secular civil society, including ordinary citizens, with the JDP’s domination of Turkey’s politics.

    The body of this article is divided into three parts. The first is a summary of the works of Levitsky and Way, and Jacob Tolstrup, who introduces the concept of the “gatekeeper” as an intervening variable of the relations between Western linkage and democratization. The second part is an explanation of how the JDP led the EU accession process, the EU’s internal opposition to Turkey’s accession, and the development of Turkey’s civil society. The third part covers Turkey’s democratic backsliding, especially the Gezi protest. Finally, this article clarifies that the JDP’s political speculation is a definitive factor in consolidating democracy in Turkey and suggests a revised analytical framework for external links and democratization.

  • 臼杵 陽
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 105 号 30-44,L7
    発行日: 1994/01/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this article is to explain the time-lag between two Jewish mass emigrations from Iraq and Egypt in the domestic and regional contexts of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the 1950s.
    The Jewish mass emigration from Iraq, on the one hand, suddenly began in consequence of the enactment in 1950 of the law depriving any Iraqi Jew who, of his own freen will and choice, desires to leave Iraq for good of his nationality. On the other hand, the majority of Jews of Egypt, who remained after the Palestine War of 1948, emigrated from Egypt after the Suez War of 1956.
    Both Iraq and Egypt dispatched their armies to Palestine after British retreat from the mandate, while Israel declared the new Jewish state of Palestine in May, 1948.
    Iraq and Egypt reacted differently to the repercussion of the 1948 War. Iraq suffered from serious economic difficulties after World War Two, which led to domestic political unrest. The Palestine War provided the Iraqi government with good opportunities to turn the general public's eyes to the Palestine question. After the War, Nûrî al-Sa'îd, the most influential politician in Iraq and advocator of the federation of the ‘Fertile Crescent’, utilized the Palestine cause in order to maintain his legitimacy in unstable domestic politics. Nûrî's parochial policy toward Palestine made it more difficult for Iraqi Jews to live in peace. Finally, about twelve hundred thousand Iraqi Jews were forced to emigrate from Iraq to Israel in 1950 and 1951. The oldest Jewish community in the world disappeared.
    In contrast to Iraq, Egypt did not implement any special policy against Jews of Egypt after the 1948 War. Two-thirds of Jewish population in Egypt did not hold Egyptian nationality. They immigrated to Egypt after the British occupation in 1882. They continued to be foreigners until the nationalization of foreign companies in Egypt after the Suez War. No Egyptian government followed discriminatory policies to the Jews even after the Free Officers' Revolution in 1952. On the contrary, the Officers pursued peace with Israel through secret negotiations after the Armistice Agreements according to recently published researches, which are based upon newly available British, American and Israeli official documents, on Egyptian-Israeli relations.
    The American policy of the Eisenhower administration influenced both Arab regional politics and secret peace negotiations between Arab states and Israel. The U. S. administration tried to attain a resolution between Egypt and Israel so as to secure a regional cooperation of the Arab states in the south of the ‘Northern Tier’ upon a concept of the containment of Communism.
    Nûrî, the Iraqi premier, pursued his old concept of the federation of the‘ Fertile Crescent’ in the framework of the Baghdad Pact under British patronage. British also intended to maintain Imperial hegemony over Middle East through the Baghdad Pact, while Americans considered the Pact as a grand strategy against Communism. This contradiction produced American-British inconsistency in terms of their interests in the area. This situation reflected upon Egyptian-Iraqi confrontatins concerning participation in the Pact and also upon peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel.
    Israel felt isolated in the above-mentioned regional circumstances. Israel expected the U. S. administration would agree with the supply of armaments. But U.S. were reluctant to supply their arms against Arab interests in their area strategy. Israel, therefore, sought other sources and turned her endeavors to reach an agreement with France.
    Egypt also sought her arms from the Eastern Bloc, which led U. S. change their Arab policy of supporting Egypt, and finally to the outbreak of the Suez War. After the war, ‘Abd al-Nâsir declared that enemies’ companies would be nationalized. He also deported British and French nationals includin
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