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  • 在韓米軍と正統性をめぐる攻防と協力
    李 東俊
    アジア研究
    2009年 55 巻 4 号 1-19
    発行日: 2009/10/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    Sino–American rapprochement in the early 1970s had a dramatic effect on the Korean Peninsula. Recently declassified US government documents shed new light on the importance of the ‘Korean question’ during secret talks held between the United States and China. This article contends that Sino–American rapprochement constituted a kind of ‘intermediate settlement’ of the Korean War and ultimately influenced the transformation of the ‘divided Korea system’.
    Two primary factors in the Korean question confronted the United States and China in their talks for rapprochement.
    (1) The role of the US Army in South Korea
    Mutual understanding regarding the role of the US armed forces in Korea (USFK) was a precondition for US–China reconciliation. The USFK acted as a ‘deterrent’ against an attack from Chinese/North Korean armed forces during and after the Korean War, whereas China regarded the US military presence as a‘ threat’ to its own security. Consequently, it was necessary for the United States to convince China that the USFK was not intended for action against China. The newly agreed role of the USFK was a ‘stabilizer’, which was expected to keep the balance of power in Northeastern Asia, in particular by checking the potential expansionism of the Soviet Union and Japan. With China’s understanding of the USFK’s role and its continued deployment, the Nixon administration abandoned the plan of extending the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea.
    (2) The presence of the United Nations in the Korean Peninsula
    The United States and the United Nations designated China and North Korea as‘ belligerent parties’ in the Korean War. Sino–American rapprochement and the admission of China to the UN (China–UN rapprochement), however, fundamentally changed this structure of confrontation. China demanded in particular the dissolution of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). Having been founded during the Korean War, UNCURK symbolized a claim that South Korea was the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. Washington and Beijing agreed to abolish the UNCURK ‘quietly’ in the UN General Assembly in 1973. This suggested that the international community, including the United States and China, recognized ‘two antagonistic legitimate governments’ on the Korean Peninsula.
    The driving force behind Sino–American co-operation for reframing the Korean question was the common interest in the stabilization of the divided Korea system. In retrospect, we can say that a new crisis management system emerged out of Sino–American rapprochement, which could be called the ‘Sino–American Concert of the Korean Peninsula’. From the point of view of the two Koreas, however, Sino–American joint engagement in the Korean question meant in effect the suspension of unification.
  • 赤木 昭夫
    情報管理
    1976年 19 巻 4 号 238-246
    発行日: 1976/07/01
    公開日: 2016/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 板山 真弓
    年報政治学
    2019年 70 巻 2 号 2_186-2_207
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2020/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー

    1978年の 「日米防衛協力のための指針」 策定は、従来、秘密裡になされていた共同計画策定が公式化された、日米安全保障関係史上、画期的な出来事だと位置づけられる。本論文では、この 「指針」 策定をもたらす契機となった米国側のイニシアチブ、すなわち公式化要請の背景には、従来見逃されてきた、米国の国内政治要因があったのではないかとの仮説を提示する。具体的には、米=タイ間の秘密裡の共同計画が米軍の越権により策定された等と議会で問題視されたことを受け、日本との同様のそれについても批判を受けるのではないかと危惧されたことが背景にあったとする。他方、 「指針」 策定作業においては、この米国側の要請を受けた日本側が 「指針」 の基礎となる文書を起草する等、イニシアチブを取ることとなった。これは、日本の国内政治上の理由より、共同計画策定が秘密裡に実施されるようになったとの歴史的経緯より、公式化を実現する上では、日本側が自らの問題を解決すること、すなわち、日本国内において共同計画策定に関する政治的なコンセンサスを形成することが最も重要な課題であったことに由来する。

  • ――米韓同盟と自主国防との狭間で――
    劉 仙姫
    国際政治
    2019年 2019 巻 196 号 196_81-196_96
    発行日: 2019/03/30
    公開日: 2020/04/16
    ジャーナル フリー

    The U.S. withdrew the troops from South Vietnam and the ROK on the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, implemented détente that supported relaxing international tension by U.S.-China reconciliation, and pursued peaceful coexistence on the premise of the status quo in Asia. This is the reason why I focus on the Vietnam War which had been the background that caused structural changes of the Cold War in East Asia. And, the Vietnam War was the first test case that the U.S. and South Korea cooperated in the actual combat since the formation of the alliance. The experience in Vietnam was the opportunity for the ROK government to know the possibility and the degree of the support from the U. S. in times of emergency.

    However, few previous studies have ever been done on the Vietnam War from South Korean viewpoints of the U.S.-ROK alliance. In that sense, the questions caused by the foreign policy of the U.S. must be demonstrated as follows; first, as a divided country like South Vietnam, what did the ROK government think about the U.S. support in combat? Secondly, while peace negotiations went on, what was considered necessary by the South Koreans? Thirdly, after Paris Peace Accords, what were South Korean views on it and how did the ROK government respond to the problem by its policy? Lastly, how did Koreans feel about the fall of Saigon and what was the difference between the U.S. and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula issues of post-Vietnam War?

    The purpose of this paper is to explore further into the Vietnam War, associated with the ROK and the U.S.-ROK alliance, based on the diplomatic archives. Especially, I would like to focus attention on the question of how the ROK government dealt with Vietnam’s situation in the process of US withdrawal and what happened to its way between self-defense and the alliance since then.

    Through the whole analysis, the following conclusions were obtained; the first is South Korea became aware of partnership from the patron-client relationship and the transferring of operational control of South Korean forces because of the Vietnam War. The second is unilateral US withdrawal plan and the end of the war by negotiations decreased reliability of US military commitment in ROK. Nevertheless, South Korea also reconfirmed that the alliance was indispensable to the national security. The third is the U. S. reduced the possibility of direct intervention in conflict on the Korean peninsula after the Vietnam War. One final point is the Vietnam War was a factor to accelerate self-defense policy in Seoul.

  • 関野 英夫
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1981年 1981 巻 10 号 60-75
    発行日: 1981年
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 田山 輝明
    法社会学
    1973年 1973 巻 26 号 82-86
    発行日: 1973/10/10
    公開日: 2009/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 榎本 信行
    法社会学
    1977年 1977 巻 29 号 154-159
    発行日: 1977/03/25
    公開日: 2009/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡地 勝二, 海老根 静江, 宇佐美 滋, 中川 徹子, 佐々木 毅, 森 孝一, 生駒 孝彰, 古屋 安雄, 宮里 政玄, 安場 保吉, 有賀 貞, 志村 正雄, 佐藤 良明, 近藤 大毅, 安保 哲夫, H.S. Goldberg, 太田 俊太郎, 阿部 斉, 有賀 夏紀, 佐藤 宏子, 藤倉 皓一郎, 奥出 直人, 青柳 清孝
    アメリカ研究
    1987年 1987 巻 21 号 197-213
    発行日: 1987/03/25
    公開日: 2010/10/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大畠 英樹
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 111 号 185-188
    発行日: 1996/02/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 酒井 英一
    法政論叢
    2004年 41 巻 1 号 270-282
    発行日: 2004/11/15
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study aims at revealing the ontological nature of the security alliance of the United States and Japan by examining its history in postwar period. This article here utilizes revised security community theory of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett that is combined with the Constructivism. According to this theory, the alliance passes three stages. Phase 1: Nascent is the first stage that multiple states seek alliance in the face of the current menace. And those allied states expand the cooperative relations in economy and politics that are derived from their strategic interests. Phase 2: Ascendant is the next stage that the allied states construct the web of institutional network in military operations and its arrangements. Meanwhile, the alliance sees lowered threat of common enemy and consolidates diplomatic partnerships. Phase 3: Mature is the final stage that bilateral alliance seek its transformation for multilateral alliance. Furthermore, the alliance recognizes the altered nature of common threat is altered and faces with necessity of redefining the threat. This study will examine history of U.S.-Japan security alliance divided into three periods: 1945-1970, 1971-1989, and 1989-present. In so doing, this article will examine whether the U.S.-Japan alliance fits into the model of the revised Decutch model. This means that this study will reveal the nature of evolved strategic relationships between the United States and Japan.
  • 冷戦変容期の国際政治
    高埜 健
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 107 号 97-114,L12
    発行日: 1994/09/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Association of South-East Asian Nations, known as ASEAN for short, came into being in the midst of the second Indochina war, a reflection of the Cold War of the 1960s in Asia on the one hand, and a struggle for national liberation on the part of the indigenous populations on the other. The five member states of ASEAN, ideologically non-socialist with basically capitalist economies, were also essentially attempting to build new nations, not unlike their counterparts in the adjacent Indochina peninsula, namely, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
    ASEAN was a product of the Vietnam war, not in the sense that the South-East Asia Treaty Organization was born in the mid-1950s, but that the member states had no alternative but to choose their strategies for survival and nation building, avoiding directly getting involved in the military conflicts with neighbouring countries and with each other. Thus Thailand and the Philippines joined with the United States in its anti-communism crusades in Indochina, more as a part of their survival strategies than from their ideological orientation, anticipating that the latter would provide them with a security shield and necessary resources for their nation building. Accordingly, as the balance of power in the region began to change, and as the U. S. intervention in the war waned, the America's two regional allies sought to re-orient their relationship vis-a-vis the Americans.
    It should be noted that while in Thailand there was a major domestic upheaval that ousted a long-standing military regime, almost at the same period in the Philippines a quasi-dictatorship emerged that abolished its traditional American-type democracy. The domestic factors in the both countries absolutely contributed to their foreign policy reorientations respectively. With regard to the relations with the United States, Thailand seemed to be more decisive and more independent, as the U. S. military personnel completely withdrew and all the U. S. military facilities inside the country were closed down. On the other hand, the Philippines' Marcos regime, strongly appearing to be independent of the former colonizer, finally accepted the continuing presence of the U. S. military facilities after the war in Vietnam ended.
    The America's two allies, however, came to find their interests converged with other members of their regional grouping in standing together politically. Soon after the collapse of the non-socialist regimes in Indochina, ASEAN for the first time convened its summit meeting in February 1976, adopting the epoch-making “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, ” which envisages the blueprint of peace and stability in the entire South-East Asia, based on their earlier, more idealistic demonstration of it: “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.”
    The author concludes that the success in the 1976 summit meeting resulted in allaying to some extent the frustration and dilemmas shared by the Thai and Filipino elites in handling relations with the Americans after the Vietnam war. At the same time, the author implies that the peace and stability formula presented by the “Treaty of Amity” dose not allow the U. S. to engage in direct military intervention in the region any longer, but rather welcomes the moderate presence and role of the U. S. in the post-Vietnam South-East Asia.
  • 冷戦変容期の国際政治
    村田 晃嗣
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 107 号 115-130,L13
    発行日: 1994/09/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In early 1977, U. S. President Jimmy Carter announced that U. S. ground combat forces would be carefully withdrawn from South Korea within a few years. His decision, however, was soon faced with strong resistance from the military and Congress. Officially because of a new intelligence estimate on North Korea's military capability, in June 1979, President Carter postponed immplementing his withdrawal plan till after the next presidential election in which he was severely defeated by Ronald Reagan.
    This failed attempt has been often regarded as a typical example of Carter's amateurish diplomacy. History tells us, however, that U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea has frequently fluctuated between the two extremes of intervention and withdrawal. This fluctuation seems to result from a dilemma in U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea: the United States has to provide enough credibility to maintain a favorable military balance in Northeast Asia without being too deeply involved in the defense of South Korea, which is not necessarily of vital interest for the United States.
    It is far from an easy task for Washington to escape from this dilemma. First of all, it is extremely hard to evaluate the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula in the context of U. S. global, regional and local strategies. Secondly, given the relatively decreasing U. S. economic capability and the diversified public opinion on foreign policy, a domestic consensus on a desirable degree of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea cannot be easily obtained. Thirdly, regardless of changes in international and domestic situations, due to their vested interest in maintaining the U. S. presence in South Korea, the Army and the State Department bureaucracies tend to be opposed to reducing the defense commitment.
    After briefly reviewing the history of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea, this paper intends to analyze how the Carter Administration tried to overcome the dilemma in U. S. defense commitment toward South Korea but was unsuccessful through the examination of the policy process of its withdrawal plan with available written materials and interviews with key participants.
  • 現代の軍縮問題
    佐藤 栄一
    国際政治
    1985年 1985 巻 80 号 31-46,L8
    発行日: 1985/10/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article attempts to examine the present situation of the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis starts with the SALT I agreement signed in May 1972, because it is this agreement that provided with the framework of the ongoing U. S. -Soviet arms race.
    First, section 1 examines the significance of the SALT I agreement, which fixed the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. In so doing, special attention will be given to how the agreement relates to the concept of “assured destruction.” Then, we look at the fact that the Soviet efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces by deploying MIRV-ed heavy missiles within the ceiling of SALT I led to the signing of the SALT II agreement; it was signed in July 1979 and set quantitative limits on MIRV-ed ICBM's.
    Next, section 2 analyzes the evolution of the U. S. strategic theories from Robert S. MacNamara's “flexible response strategy” to Richard Nixon's “realistic deterrence strategy”; each of them proposed the way to utilize MIRV-ed delivery systems in practice, the focal point of the U. S. -Soviet nuclear arms race in the 1970s. The close examination of each year's Report of the Secretary of Defense published during the 1970s will reveal how the United States gradually revised its strategic doctrine to adjust it to the new MIRV technology. First it introduced the concept of “strategic sufficiency, ” then “targeting system, ” and lastly completed its doctrinal revision by adopting “countervailing strategy.”
    Finally, section 3, taking up the concept of “damage limitation, ” another major element in SALT I, shows what ideas brought about the agreement restricting the deployment of ABM's. Based upon this analysis, we also discuss the implication of President Ronald Reagan's initiative, i. e., the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program.
  • 世界政治とマルクス主義
    畑田 重夫
    国際政治
    1973年 1973 巻 49 号 1-20
    発行日: 1973/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 五百旗頭 真
    年報政治学
    1997年 48 巻 iii-viii
    発行日: 1997/12/10
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 草間 秀三郎
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 74 号 167-171
    発行日: 1983/08/31
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐藤 栄一
    国際政治
    1980年 1980 巻 65 号 165-168
    発行日: 1980/11/05
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 石川 忠雄
    大学体育
    1983年 9 巻 3 号 4-10
    発行日: 1983/03/20
    公開日: 2017/07/03
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 児島 邦明, 佐藤 泰然, 森岡 研介, 松本 浩次, 須郷 広之, 藤澤 稔, 行方 浩二, 太田 秀二郎, 高森 繁, 深沢 正樹, 別府 倫兄, 二川 俊二
    順天堂医学
    2000年 45 巻 4 号 479-485
    発行日: 2000/03/22
    公開日: 2014/11/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    教室では1979年以来530例の肝細胞癌入院症例を経験し, 切除例は213例40%である. 肝癌切除後の残肝再発は, 肝硬変症例における多中心性発生例も含め高率であり, われわれの成績でも耐術例の5年累積生存率は51%であるが, 無再発生存率は27%と開きがある. 肝癌の治療法の選択に当たっては, できるだけ少ない侵襲で, できるだけ長期生存の得られる治療法が選択されることが望ましく, 肝予備能や腫瘍進展度に応じて, 肝切除, PEIT・MCT・TAEなどの使い分けが重要である. 手術リスクの少ない臨床病期Iのような肝機能良好例においては, 肝切除は確実な局所コントロールと長期予後が期待でき, その意義は大きいものと考える. しかし一方で, 臨床病期II・IIIの多くの肝硬変症例では, 長期生存の条件は治療法よりむしろ肝予備能や腫瘍進展度に大きく依存しており, QOLを考慮した治療法選択が重要である. 特に小肝癌の治療方針はControversyであり, 患者とその家族に十分なinformed consentを行い決定することが重要である.
  • ―対中・対韓政策との連関を中心に―
    野添 文彬
    国際政治
    2013年 2013 巻 172 号 172_1-172_14
    発行日: 2013/02/25
    公開日: 2015/03/05
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article aims to examine the US-Japan negotiation process over the reversion of Okinawa in the context of US strategy in East Asia.
    In November, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and US President Richard M. Nixon reached an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. This was a highly significant agreement because it settled a war-related issue between Japan and the United States, and thus contributed to the stabilization of the US-Japan alliance. The existing literature has focused on the US-Japan bilateral negotiation process and has tended to emphasize that the US government had achieved a greater level of burden-sharing with Japan thorough the negotiations. Recently, due to the declassification of numerous documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, researchers have begun to explore the policy-making process in the Government of Japan.
    The reversion of Okinawa was not only a US-Japan bilateral issue, but also had implications for the region due to the fact that the US bases in Okinawa have played important roles in both the defense of Japan and regional security in East Asia. Furthermore, during that period, the Nixon administration reviewed the global strategy of the United States due to various international difficulties such as the ongoing war in Vietnam, Soviet military expansion, and the rapid economic rise of Japan. Therefore, the Nixon administration sought the détente with the Soviet Union, the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the application of the Nixon Doctrine. Despite these facts suggesting the significance of paying attention to the international context, previous works have not analyzed how the process of the reversion of Okinawa was related to the US strategy in East Asia.
    This article reexamines the reversion of Okinawa by focusing on the US strategy in East Asia during the period from the Johnson administration to the Nixon administration, particularly the policies toward the PRC and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Analyzing documents on US policies toward PRC and ROK as well Japan, this article extends the scope of its analysis from the US-Japan bilateral relations to the international relations in East Asia.
    This article argues that the US government regarded the agreement of the reversion of Okinawa as an essential step toward reconstruction of her strategy in East Asia, such as the rapprochement with PRC and the reduction of the US military presence in ROK. The US government sought to readjust the US-Japan alliance by settling the reversion of Okinawa since the US placed great value on the US-Japan alliance and also wanted to prevent Japan from pursuing more independent policies such as the development of her own nuclear weapon and to promote Japan’s burden-sharing. In addition to that, the US government succeeded in maintaining her credibility toward her allies by preserving bases in Okinawa. In other words, for the US government, maintaining the US-Japan alliance and preserving bases in Okinawa was an essential prerequisite for her strategy in East Asia. Therefore, the reversion of Okinawa not only settled a war-related issue among the US and Japan, but can also be interpreted as the beginning of the transformation of the international order in East Asia initiated by the US government.
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