This article answers the question of whether the Harold Wilson government actually intended to maintain the British “independent” nuclear deterrent in the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) concept. During analysis, three main factors—Wilson, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence—were observed.
Wilson had found no military value to the British “independent” nuclear deterrent because he considered a solitary British nuclear war against the Soviet Union as unreal. Thus, he decided to propose the nuclear force concept which abandoned “independence”. In addition, he intended to not only prevent the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) concept proposed by the US government but also rebuild NATO’s nuclear defence posture. The Draft Working Party, which consisted of bureaucrats from the Cabinet Office, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence was formed on Wilson’s directions, and the ANF draft was drawn up.
In the beginning, the opinion that it was essential to abandon “independence” was dominant in the Party in order to allow allied countries to accept the proposal. However the Ministry of Defence claimed that maintenance of “independence” is indispensable because it is the last resort for ensuring national security and interests. To maintain minimum “independence”, they devised various plans and worked with other government agencies, and insisted that the British “independent” nuclear deterrent should be deployed in the East of Suez to provide with a nuclear guarantee British Asian allies or friendly nations which came to bear a threat to nuclear armed China. Gradually, this insistence was accepted by the government.
Therefore, the Wilson government decided to propose the ANF concept by committing a part of its strategic nuclear forces unconditionally to the ANF for employing a western nuclear deterrent within NATO’s framework, but retaining the rest under national control, in order to deploy to the East of Suez. Since minimum “independence” was maintained in the East of Suez, the Ministry of Defence finally accepted the concept. However, Wilson intended to abandon “independence” in the future to employ the British nuclear deterrent within an alliance in the East of Suez.
The Harold Wilson government had actually intended to abandon the British “independent” nuclear deterrent in the ANF concept. Wilson had aimed at gaining not only the solution of NATO’s nuclear issue advantageous to Britain, but also the maintenance of her defence role in the East of Suez.
Although the ANF concept was proposed seriously, it was given up because of many complications. Thus, the Wilson government followed the policy of the Conservative government by maintaining the British “independent” nuclear deterrent.

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In the Westminster parliamentary system, shadow ministers in the official opposition, which is the largest opposition party, sit across the floor from the frontbenchers and face the governing party. They can form the next government at any time if the government falls. In a respective portfolio, a shadow minister finds fault with what his or her counterpart does. They rarely miss any opportunity to jump on the government’s shortcomings such as policy failures or behavioural misconducts. In election campaigns, opposition parties try to present their own sets of policy proposals to differentiate themselves from the government. Once they are in after capturing the majority of the seats in Parliament, they are in an enviable position to carry out many of their proposals. Do they remain faithful to their promised goals? Upon a closer examination, small as it is, parties do make more than a little difference in domestic policy. However, in foreign policy in general, in immigration policy in particular, it is concluded that no matter which party comes into power, little if any changes in policy output occur. The Brian Mulroney Progressive Conservative government put Canada on a trajectory to expand its immigration levels despite the high unemployment rate. This radical policy style was not ad hoc but continued in subsequent administrations regardless of party affiliations. It could have been the Liberal government that conceived what the P.C. government invented. The Tony Blair Labour government initiated the economically driven immigration scheme with the point system to take in more of advanced human capitals. The radical change of British immigration policy was realized by Labour in the international competition for rich human resources. Naturally, the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition government maintains the path tailored out by the predecessor. Several reasons are suggested for continuity in immigration policy. First, senior immigration officials have formidable expertise in the area, which immigration ministers can never match. Second, the nature of the capitalist system coerces immigration-making into a particular pattern, in which business interests can never be overlooked by government. Third, the policy community into which the state and the relevant segment of civil society are intertwined does not give instantly appointed government policy-makers a free hand. Fourth, the international immigration market exists independently of governmental policies. It is finally pointed out that the state in the Westminster system is not at the whim of interest groups, but it is a nation-building state pursuing continuously its distinctive interests.

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During the 1960s the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute deepened and spread to include territorial issues, culminating in 1969 in bloody armed clashes along the border. The Sino-Soviet split was a critical topic for a British government establishing diplomatic relations with both the USSR and PRC. In December 1960, the British cabinet first recognized the Sino-Soviet split based on the information of the November meeting of 81 communist parties in Moscow. In the early 1960’s, only a few diplomats and MI-6 members gave the matter much attention, but by the middle of the 60’s, the degree of attention granted the issue increased year by year within the British government. The reason was the worsening diplomatic relations with the USSR and PRC. Leftist riots began in May 1967 in Hong Kong and were pro-communist labor disputes sympathetic to the Cultural Revolution on the mainland and against British rule. In August 1967, mobs of Chinese Red Guards broke into the British embassy compound and started huge fires. As a result, China-UK relations reached their lowest point since the Second World War. Meanwhile, the ‘Prague Spring’ in 1968, ended by Soviet military intervention, broke the detente between the USSR and UK. The UK was facing a diplomatic crisis with the two communist giants at the same time.
However, the situation changed drastically due to the border clash between the USSR and PRC in 1969. On March 2, a group of Chinese troops ambushed Soviet border guards on Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island in Russian) on the Ussuri River. During the Sino-Soviet military clashes along the border in 1969, the British government maintained its neutrality even though the USSR sought to gain her support. Based on its own intelligence and discussions with many countries, British diplomats and the Foreign Office concluded that this conflict would not lead to full scale war. In addition, they did not attempt to mediate between the parties because they thought that it was in the UK’s interests to preserve its neutrality, especially as the UK had ‘a particular reason for this because of its responsibility for Hong Kong’. In the event, their prognosis was correct and the Sino-Soviet split did not descend into nuclear war. In addition, the USSR and PRC tried to promote their relationship with the UK in order to gain a sympathetic hearing. The British Foreign Office promoted this foreign policy based on its level-headed analysis and its position of neutrality between the USSR and PRC finally gained success as the Sino-Soviet split became fierce towards the end of the 1960’s.

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　 After Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, Japanese STS is questioned whether it retains critical function against science and technology. The author starts his argument with his experience which exemplifies that it failed to give critical perspective to experts. Then he moves on to the retrospect of 25 year history of Japanese STS from the establishment of STS Network Japan in 1990 to that of the Japanese Society for the Science and Technology Studies. He concludes that Japanese STS has been shaped under the strong influence of the social establishment of Japan, and it is destined to lose its critical role. He suggests that, in order to retrieve its relevant function, Japanese STSers should pay much more attention not to ‘Kuhnified’ main line studies but to the achievements of non-mainstream scholars.

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At the beginning of the post-World War II atomic era, technological advancement came to be seen as a clear expression of national power. As such, the significance of technology development in the Wilson government's relations with the EEC countries is relevant to the British Government's search for a ‘world role’ in the late 1960s. This article explores technology cooperation between Britain and the EEC countries, and in particular examines the European Technological Community (ETC) that was proposed by the Wilson government in 1967.
In the mid to late 1960s, and particularly around the time of the election of the Labour government, Britain was experiencing a period of profound stagnation in both her economic and foreign policy. One of the approaches that the government took to resolve this malaise was the promotion of technology development as a stimulus for economic recovery. At the same time, however, the government cancelled or scaled down existing large-scale technology development projects with EEC countries. While initially such decisions appear inconsistent, they signalled a change in the character of Britain's economic and foreign policy from the maintenance of national prestige to ensuring economic wellbeing, and demonstrated the British government's preference for cooperation with the United States as a partner for technology development.
Despite this shift in focus, the idea for an ETC emerged within the British Government and was then brought up as a potential bargaining chip for use in discussions concerning the British application for membership of the EEC. The details of how the ETC would work in practice were never decided. The main reasons for this failure were that, rather than with Europe, Britain preferred to cooperate with the United States on technology projects, while at the same time expecting to exercise leadership in European technology cooperation projects which the EEC countries would not accept. The failure of the ETC planning process was thus symptomatic of the British Government's attitude towards the European Community at that time.
The idea of the ETC, intended to formalise technology cooperation between Britain and the EEC countries, was in the end abandoned. This example highlights the difficulty of establishing technology cooperation between Britain and the other European countries, and failed principally because Britain was not prepared to be sufficiently accommodating in her relations with the EEC countries, and was hesitant to establish strong multilateral ties with the rest of Europe. As a result of this experience, technology cooperation between European countries, and in particular aerospace and largescale technology development programmes, came to be advanced outside the framework of the EC.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the structure of conflict and cooperation in international political economy theoretically.
In international politics, we have witnessed the debate between realism and idealism ever since the beginning of the discipline: realism focuses on the conflictual aspects of interstate relations; and idealism assumes the basic harmony of interests among nations. A similar contrast between realism and idealism can also be seen in international political economy.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the “traditional” interdependence theory which was based on the assumption that the basic relations among states are harmonious in nature a la the Ricardian theory of comparative advantages had been developed and elaborated. And, it was contrasted against the classical theory of international politics which was based on the conflictual nature in interstate relations. However, in the 1980s, what is called the theory of strategic trade policy was “invented” which reveals at least theoretically partial zero-sum aspects in international trade relations. And that theory seemed to have accelerated the conflictual nature of international economic relations. Furthermore, since the late 1980s, the reise of the relative gain hypothesis has radically shifted the theories of international political economy still further into the realist side of the spectrum. However, those theories which are based on cooperative aspects of international economic relations and which advocate multilateralism and intenational regimes have been still influnetial. And, the international economic relations in the real world exhibit both cooperative and conflictual behavior. Politics of international economic relations is indeed a mixed motive game and thus we have to develop a theory which includes both conflict and cooperation and which is able to guide us to control conflicts more effectively and to advance international cooperation so that the global, as well as national, economic welfare is to be enhanced.

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This article aims to analyse changes in Britain's policy towards the EEC between January 1963, when the first British application for EEC membership was turned down, and March 1966, when Harold Wilson's Labour government won the general election for the second term and began seriously to contemplate the possibility of second application.
There have been a number of studies on the failure of the first UK application, and in recent years, several studies have been published on the Labour government's decision for the second application. However, no substantial historical account has been published yet on the attitudes of the Conservative governments of Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home towards the EEC between January 1963 and October 1964, the period between General de Gaulle's veto and the British general election. It seems as if there were a vacuum of policy towards the EEC within the British government in this period. We do not know precisely how the British government reacted to the failure of the first application, how they reformulated their policy towards the EEC, and how this process of policy re-examination under the Conservative governments affected the Labour government's policy towards the EEC in their first term in the office.
In this article, the following points will be shown by examining archival materials in the National Archives, UK;
Soon after the breakdown of the negotiation for EEC membership, the Macmillan government came to the conclusion that in the long term there was no alternative other than seeking eventual EEC membership. They also concluded that there was no hope of a second try in the short term as long as General de Gaulle remained in power. The immediate objective for Britain became establishing and maintaining a link between the EEC through such existing devices as ministerial meetings of the WEU. After October 1963 when Douglas-Home became the Prime Minister, this policy remained largely unchanged and a serious study began at an official level of the long-term implication of EEC membership for Britain's future. This study was completed shortly before October 1964, reaffirming the desirability and inevitability of EEC membership.
Policy re-examination carried out under the Conservative governments thus set the tone of opinion among key officials in key departments of the Whitehall in favour of EEC membership. This official attitude was part at least of the reason why the Wilson government, after an initial period of hesitation over the issue of EEC membership when they toyed with ideas like reinvigorating the Commonwealth or a bridge-building between the EFTA and the EEC, came to the same conclusion as the previous governments and began serious consideration about how to achieve the long-term objective of EEC membership.

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本稿では20世紀前半のイギリス映画政策、すなわち映画関連の各種法制・政府施策・公的組織の成立過程と機能、その変遷の過程をサーヴェイする。イギリス映画政策の歴史は、産業面および文化面の両方でハリウッドに対抗しうる映画振興の試みの歴史であった。イギリスにおける映画産業の構造と映画政策のあり方は1980年代以降変貌したと言われているが、イギリス映画政策の直面するこの基本課題は、今日もなお当時と変わっていない。

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