In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was “welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage.” His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt “who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant.” It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, “the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism.”
The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled “The United States Looking Outward, ” published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that “the United States is woefully unready” and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire “a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America.” Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of “the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)” against the day when China “expand her barriers eastward” in “a wave of barbaric invasion.” Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and “your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific”. He instructed “much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man”. Then in September, he wrote article “A Twentieth Century Outlook”, in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the “Yellow Peril.” But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the “Yellow Peril” was not Japan but China.
However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the “Yellow Peril” changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote “The Problem of Asia.” In this article, he saw the most pressing “problem” as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four “Maritime States” of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that

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The EU is on the verge of revising, or at least making flexible the guiding principle of its unified currency. They are making, I'm afraid, a fatal error of judgement. The remarkable success, so far, of the euro was entirely due to the shift of macro-economic principles, from demand management to monetary targeting.
The guiding principle of the single currency, of which the most important is to contain budget deficit within 3% of the GDP, was certainly a kind of straight-jacket to many of the participating countries to the euro. The majority of the 12 participants, including such laggards as Ireland and Greece, managed to endure inflationary and other pressures, inflicted by the “one-size-fits-for-all” measures demanded by the stability and growth pact.
Ironically, it is Germany, France and Italy, the 3 largest and central countries of the euro zone, that are now crying for help. It is especially paradoxical that Germany, which has been demanding the strict application of the SGP principles, has now excessive budgetary deficit and is calling for flexibility in their applications.
As of the beginning of March, 2003, it is not decided yet whether the SGP should be revised or not, but judging from the report the Commission presented to the Ecofin Council, they are sure to make “flexible interpretations”, if not revisions to the SGP. Are they right? I thnk not.
Ms. Kathleen McNamara, Assistant Professor at Princeton, produed a remarkable book on the euro, called “The Currency of Ideas” (1998). Based on the analysis of the world monetary history after the war, including the Bretton Woods system, she concluded that European monetary systems made a great success, because their guiding principles were shifted from Keynesian to Neoliberal theories. In European context, this meant that all the euro participants had virtually abandoned Keynesian demand management policies and converted to the monetarist approach, which the German Bundesbank had pursued since the end of the World War II.
World monetary authorities are now facing unprecedented pressures of world-wide deflation. It is understandable that European financial authorities are demanding flexibility in applying the SGP. But we must remind ourselves that in the colossalised economies, demand stimulus rarely works, as is shown by Japanese policies. Euro financial ministers should be patient.
Fortunately for the majority of euro-participants, the March Ecofin Council only produced a very short statement on the SPG that it “provides a robust and flexible framework within which any additional strains on public finances will be addressed”. It was reported that Gordon Brown, British Chancellor of Exchequer, had tried to present a plan to make a flexible interpretation to the SGP, but Belgium, Spain, Italy and other small countries prevented the proposal, made in collaboration with France and Germany. The EU might have to endure some period of uncertainty over the euro. But it may turn out to be beneficial to the single currency after all.

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