As the United States fought the War with Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush, there emerged a heated discussion on the nature of the American presidency. Some even speak of the arrival of “the new imperial presidency.” Yet the nature of the American presidency, especially its powers concerning foreign policy, is still unclear.

This essay delineates the contours of presidential foreign policy concentrating on the first successive administrations, i.e., those from George Washington to John Quincy Adams, because their foreign policy can be construed as an archetype. In doing so, this writer attempts to demonstrate the framework under which the modern presidents of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have pursued their foreign policy.

On the subject of the first successive administrations, Ralph Ketcham’s Presidents above Party is a penetrating intellectual history. Although acknowledging his interpretations of the presidency as a whole, this essay focuses on foreign policy under the first six presidents.

First, the origins of the foreign policy powers of the American president and how the Federalist administrations of George Washington and John Adams actually confronted international issues are discussed. In the young republic, the partisan battles between Federalists and Republicans were closely connected with the Anglo-French rivalry. All in all, however, Washington and Adams contributed to the establishment of an independent executive by forging bipartisanship in foreign policy.

Second, this essay deals with the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The Jefferson administration provides the first example of how the presidency can display strong leadership. Following the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Jefferson’s power was at its zenith. The subsequent Madison administration fought the War of 1812, the first foreign war since the founding of the United States. In starting the war with England, Madison cooperated with Congress, holder of the power to declare war. But by the end of his term, he barely retained the leadership role he had inherited from his predecessor because predicaments from “Mr. Madison’s War,” such as the burning of Washington, were humiliating to the nation’s honor.

Third, the relationship between the President and Congress under the administrations of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams is discussed. During this period, Congress increased its power under the leadership of Speaker of the House Henry Clay. Thus Congress was able to influence the Monroe administration’s recognition policy toward the new Latin American republics. After the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, Congress also influenced the course of foreign policy under the Adams administration.

In conclusion, the bipartisanship in foreign policy, the strength of presidential leadership, and the rise of Congressional power seen under the first presidencies were the harbingers of the foreign policy role of the modern presidency. The bipartisan Vandenberg resolution of 1948, Woodrow Wilson’s leadership in the United States’ entry into World War I, and the resurgence of Congress after Watergate all testify to it. In this sense, the foreign policy of the first successive administrations was the archetype for that of the American presidency.

本論文は、日本における「メロドラマ」の概念を探求する。「メロドラマ」は、“melodrama”の旧来からの翻訳語であるが、フィルム・スタディーズにおけるメロドラマ概念の浸透によって、現在その意味は曖昧になっている。そもそも“melodrama”がいつ日本語文脈に受容されたのかは明らかになっていない。メロドラマ映画にかんする先行研究を踏まえつつ、この「メロドラマ」の実態を明らかにすることが本論文の目的である。

“melodrama”の日本語文脈への導入は、1870年代の翻訳辞典に始まり、当初はしばしば「歌舞伎」と訳されていた。1880年代には洋行者たちが「メロドラマ」の観劇体験を報告するようになり、1910年代にその知識は演劇関連の学術書に応用された。1920年代、メロドラマの言説は、映画にかんするものに集中していき、この言葉の意味は地域言語的なものへと変容していく。1930年代には、「メロドラマ」は通俗的、感傷的な劇を指す言葉となり、女性映画を含む日本映画のジャンルの一つとしても理解されていった。

主な論点は以下の二点である。

1. メロドラマと日本文化との出会いは、19世紀後半に位置する。

2. 日本における「メロドラマ」はその固有性ばかりでなく、メロドラマ概念の普遍性を実証する。