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全文: "プーチン" ロシア
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  • 中村 裕
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2015年 2015 巻 44 号 128-131
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2017/08/18
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 上野 俊彦
    ロシア・東欧学会年報
    2000年 2000 巻 29 号 1-11
    発行日: 2000年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The author analyzes President Putin's career in the first chapter of this paper. The analysis shows that President Putin has two different backgrounds. One of them - that he was with the Soviet intelligence organ, KGB - is well known. The other is that he used to be part of the economic bureaucracy of St. Petersburg. These two disparate backgrounds are a sign ficant part of Putin's identity. Indeed, most of the executives in the President's office, as well as the Cabinet members andplenipotentiary representatives of federative regionsthat President Putin appointed, have careers similar to Putin's. This is a defining characteristic of the Putin administration.
    Furthermore, the author points out that one of the important features of Putin's political style is that he manipulates political, national and traditional symbols or images. One example is that at the time of the presidential election he emphasized his image of“a powerful leader”along the lines of Peter the Great, Alexander I, Stalin, and so on. Even after his inauguration as President this manipulation of symbols has continued. For example, he has enacted laws concerning the national flag, the national anthem and the national crest, which are legacies not only of the tradition of Imperial Russia but also of the Soviet Union. With such symbols, President Putin evokes nationalistic and patriotic enthusiasm among people and he has succeeded in mobilizing the support of the people.
    In the second chapter of the paper, President Putin's regional policy based on a revival of“a powerful state”is discussed. His regional policy is, in short, the strengthening of centralization or the vertical administrative system within the federal state. He demands that local legislation conform to the federal constitution and laws. Moreover, he has changed the procedures for forming the Upper House and has begun to weaken the authority of the Upper House. He has also tried to reduce the governors' authority. Moreover, plenipotentiary representatives of federative regionshave been sent out in order to strengthen central control over regions. President Putin is seeking to build a“strong Russia”through these regional policies.
  • 長谷川 雄之
    ロシア史研究
    2015年 96 巻 75-
    発行日: 2015/06/30
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 永綱 憲悟
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2004年 2004 巻 33 号 26-35
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper argues that Russian democracy has become a charade, like Potemkin villages, caused by Putin's personality and his method of leadership.
    We can discern four types of viewpoints about the Russian political system under Putin. The first is the “affirmation/optimism” type, as represented by Anatol Lieven's view. He asserts that Putin is a “convinced reformer, dedicated to modernizing Russia” Scleifer and Treisman make a similar argument, advocating that Russia has become a typical middle-income capitalist democracy and noting that the common flaws of such a democracy are not incompatible with future economic and political progress. Russian analyst Vyacheslav Kostikov takes the same view and points out that Putin promotes “a pragmatic democracy”, which differs from the western style of democracy.
    The second is the “affirmation/pessimism” type, as represented by Russian political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov. He has a pessimistic outlook for the future, while, to some extent, supporting the current Putin system. The third is the “negation/pessimism” type. American scholar Richard Pipes has a very negative opinion about the present, as well as the future, of the Russian political situation. He asserts that “Russia's democratic institutions have been muzzled” and “its cooperation with the international community far from assured.” Russian sociologist Olga Kyshtanovskaya, known for her elite studies, takes a similar pessimistic position.
    The fourth type, to which this paper adheres, is “negation/optimism”. Most Rus-sian liberal intellectuals maintain this point of view. Vladimir Ryzhkov, a member of the Lower House, believes that the Putin government is going to take “a modernization model of authoritarianism”: However, he adds that this model cannot overcome such problems as poverty and corruption in Russia. Therefore, in his view, opinions demanding big changes will increase around the time of the government elections, from 2007 to 2008. Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova takes a similar position and expects a growth of grass-roots democracy in Russia.
    We can verify concretely the deficiencies in Russian democracy by looking at the process of the national election campaign in 2003 and 2004. The OSCE election monitor group concluded that the election process for Parliament, as well as the President, did not reach the international standards of a democracy.
    Russian political journalist Elena Treguvova confirms that Putin's political outlook and behavior are not suited to politicians in a democratic country. She asserts, first, that Putin has no charisma as a public politician. Second, Putin is an expert who “mimics” the manner of the person to whom he is talking. Third, Putin often takes a strong attitude when someone points out problems in his work. Fourth, Putin used to be extremely faithful to an order from a superior official. Fifth, Putin is bluntly strengthening control over the media.
    Under such a president, we cannot expect Russian democracy to make progress. Putin's limits are not, however, the Russian nation's limits. It is, therefore, groundless to assume that Russia will never become a democratic country in the future.
  • 月出 皎司
    ロシア・東欧学会年報
    2000年 2000 巻 29 号 22-30
    発行日: 2000年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    Putin is supposed to become a dictator, at least a quasi-dictator. That is the wish of ordinary people of Russia, and is conceded by the elite. Historians assume that there is no other alternative for Russia at her current stage of historical evolution. As a matter of fact, Putin is already a half-dictator. In depth of Russian society, no attempt have ever been made for democratization since Gorbachev. That's all true. But may we ask just one more question: -Is Mr. Putin personally qualified to become one?
    A dictator who stays in his power more than a couple of months nearly always is a popular politician. That cruel dictator and despot Joseph Stalin was the most popular personality of his time among Russians. So why don't we ask if Mr. Putin is resourceful enough to become a popular politician in Russia.
    As the data source for the analysis of Putin's personal fitness as a popular dictator who presumably will pursue his goal of reviving a Great Russia and her modernization, the author utilizes the record of Putin's meeting with the relatives of tragic submarine Kursk's crew, the annual presidential message of year 2000, and some other platform documents of Putin's.
    The results of the analysis are somewhat not favorable to Mr.Putin. They revealed the figure of a politician who does not pay regard to people even as potential political resources in his fight for power. It has turned out that Putin has much to learn in order to become a real leader of Russia.
  • 下斗米 伸夫
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2005年 2005 巻 34 号 14-25
    発行日: 2005年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this essay is to investigate the political evolution of Putinism following the March 2004 presidential election and its aftermath. By 2003 Putin has evolved as unique political figure eliminating the remnants of Boris Yeltsin, by arresting a politicized oligarch, Boris Khodorkovskii and ousting Premier Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. His second tenure, however, turned out to be backlashed. The Beslan tragedy, orange revolution in Ukraine and others gave negative image of the second term Putin Presidency. By 2005, however, things seem to be normalized partly because of high energy prices. Property of oil and energy related company was redistributed among ‘Siloviki’ generals and the state. In Russia property was not totally independent from the power. In this political landscape, future of Putinism is discussed by the middle of 2005, whether he is going to change the game of presidential election, or he will appoint his successor.
  • 永綱 憲悟
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2016年 2016 巻 45 号 89-102
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2018/06/02
    ジャーナル フリー

    On February 19, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed that it would be worth considering “unified Russian history textbooks” that show “respect to all pages of our past.” This announcement has been interpreted as patriotic propaganda or an attempt at re-writing the past to justify authoritarianism in the present. To be sure, we cannot overlook the clear intensification of patriotism under the Putin regime. Also, we cannot deny that Russian citizens’ protests against election fraud during 2011–12 led to Putin’s countermeasures, such as the creation of quasi-social historical organizations, advocacy for unified textbooks, and so on. These measures are clear examples of Putin’s historical politics, by which he means to use history arbitrarily for political purposes.

    However, it is quite misleading to say that Putin has successfully ordered the history textbooks rewritten to strengthen his own rule. In fact, we see three types of undercurrent concerning the policy on unified history textbooks. First, a group of young politicians with patriotic views advocated the unification of textbooks in response to neighboring countries’ historical politics. Cultural Minister Vladimir Medinsky is a typical example of this group. Second, academic historians such as Aleksandr Chubaryan, director of the Institute of World History, sought to build a basic consensus on historical outlook among historians and people within Russia. Third, there were some liberal groups who opposed any kind of forced textbook unification by the government.

    Putin monitored these undercurrents, adapting his historical politics as necessary, and avoided dire conflicts between the government and any of these groups. In the end, the “historical-cultural standard” was created, which every textbook must follow. The standard, however, is very general and loose. Therefore, two history textbooks with somewhat different viewpoints were authorized by the education ministry.

    One characteristic of Putin’s method of governance is the adoption of halfway solutions to disputed issues. They often fail to solve conflicts between groups, and sometimes even preserve them. In this sense, conflicts over historical politics, including those regarding history textbooks, will continue in the future.

  • 西山 美久
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2010年 2010 巻 39 号 82-92
    発行日: 2010年
    公開日: 2012/06/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper traces the changing course of the patriotic policies of Putin’s government, and shows that the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyz had a great impact on the Russian political process.
    Post-communist Russia has suffered from serious political and economic disturbances, comparable with smuta in tsarist Russia. In the first period of the New Russia, while Yeltsin’s government adopted a series of western-oriented policies, the opposition put forward an alternative line based on Russian nationalism. As Russian citizens displayed anti-western sentiments, however, president Yeltsin also changed course and modified policies to take national feelings into consideration. As a result, almost all political forces in Russia became proponents of Russian patriotism. Therefore, we need to examine the real contents of the patriotism held by political forces, particularly in each administration.
    President Putin, who followed president Yeltsin in 2000, stressed the importance of patriotism in his policies. Valerie Sperling, who analyzed patriotic policies in post-Soviet Russia, argues that Putin practiced various policies based on ‘militarized patriotism’ toward Russian youth, because his government needed to foster their loyalty to the state and their interest in joining the Russian army. Although I agree with her claim that Putin pursued patriotic policies, Sperling appears not to have grasped a turning point in policy transformation under Putin, in particular the real meaning of the ‘color revolutions’ that took place in the former Soviet Republics in 2003–2005.
    This paper analyzes the two programs for promoting patriotism among Russians, each of which was adopted under Putin’s government in 2001 and 2005. The difference between both programs is that the first was directed at all social and age groups, while the second mainly targeted the younger generation. Why did the latter program focus on youths? This paper examines the political impact on Putin’s administration of the ‘color revolutions’ in the CIS countries in which the younger generation played a significant role, and clarifies Putin’s efforts to prevent these revolutions from spilling over into Russia, through organizing a new youth organization named ‘Nashi,’ publishing a new edition of the guidebook for teaching Russian history, and other efforts.
  • 竹村 豊
    国際教養大学 アジア地域研究連携機構研究紀要
    2015年 1 巻 97-105
    発行日: 2015/06/30
    公開日: 2018/04/27
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    第二次世界大戦終結70周年の年にウクライナ問題の先鋭化は欧州における戦後処理(ヤルタ体制)、東西冷戦、ベルリンの壁撤去、ソ連邦の崩壊、EU/NATOの拡大と続く個々の出来事に内包された諸問題に因って引き起こされたものである。ウクライナ・ポロシェンコ政権を支持する米国、EUと対立するプーチン政権は欧米のみならずオーストラリア、日本からも経済制裁を受け、日増しにロシアが世界経済から孤立しているにも関わらず、プーチン大統領の支持率は80%を超えている。元々、ソ連時代からロシアは政経一体型の経済運営であるが、クリミア・ウクライナ問題に絡む一連の高い代償を払いながら強引に自らの政策を進めようとするのは、プーチン大統領の経済政策のルーツがオリガルヒ(新興財閥)との戦いであり、この戦いを通じて今日「国家資本主義」と言われる経済運営が形成されたのである。今後のロシアの資源・エネルギーを中心とする対東アジア経済政策をみる上で経済原則に依らない政治的、戦略的な意図を見ておかなければならない。
  • 杉浦 史和
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2013年 2013 巻 42 号 134-139
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2015/05/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 兵頭 慎治
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2017年 2017 巻 46 号 132-134
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2019/02/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小泉 直美
    国際政治
    2011年 2011 巻 164 号 164_1-14
    発行日: 2011/02/20
    公開日: 2013/05/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article analyzes whether civilian control over the Russian military has been reestablished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civilian control had been firmly established under the communist regime by the Brezhnev era and functioned very well. It was a kind of division of labor based upon the common ideology, in which the Communist Party leadership decides the overall direction of foreign and security policy, while the General Staff with its exclusive military expertise provides option formation and implementation. The Party leadership gave the military everything they need and want, and the military in turn does not interfere into the politics.
    With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this controlling system also ceased to function. The political leadership can no longer look after the military's interests, while the military got fully politicized in and outside the Duma. Then the former President Putin tried to reestablish the control system, although it was not a democratic one, but the control by the president. Putin wanted to transform the military into a small but highly efficient and usable one in the local and regional conflicts. Although Putin's plan did not frame well, in 2007 with the new defense minister Anatolii Serdyukov appointed the situation began to change.
    This article examines the three aspects of Putin's (and Medvedev's) reform efforts, namely the reform of military bureaucracy, the fulfillment of the military's interests, and the change of the official threat perceptions. First, in terms of civilianization of the defense ministry and the subordination of the General Staff to the civilian defense ministry, much efforts has been made, but still not enough. Due to lack of civilian military experts, it will take some more time to overcome the General Staff's exclusive status and power inherited from the Soviet era. Second, the political leadership attaches a great emphasis to the modernization of military equipment and the improvement of material conditions for military service. Still, the lack of capital and an inefficient way of using it have impeded visible progress. Third, after long procrastination finally the new official strategic documents, the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, have been approved. They revised the official threat perception from a large scale attack from the West to local and regional conflicts along the borders. Nevertheless, we should notice that a deep distrust against the West, especially the U.S. and NATO, is rooted in the newly attained consensus.
    In sum, civilian control in Russia is working far better than in the 1990's, but is still incomplete. There is much room for the military's dissatisfaction or distrust against the U.S. to exert its influence to the political decisions.
  • 小泉 直美
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2001年 2001 巻 30 号 55-77
    発行日: 2001年
    公開日: 2010/10/27
    ジャーナル フリー
    During 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become a middle-class power, while the United States as the only superpower is increasingly inclined to behave on its own way in the international scene. How is Russia trying to cope with the US? This question is closely related to a broader issue, i.e. how Russia is making its adaptation during the system change of international relations.
    This article attempts to answer this question by addressing itself to the issue of strategic stability. Under the Cold War system the strategic stability between the US and the Soviet Union was attained by controlling offensive nuclear weapons with defensive nuclear weapons promised not to develop and deploy by both sides. But since the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation has become perceived bigger threats, which pushed the US to the development of the National Missile Defense (NMD) . Thus Russia wants to maintain the old strategic stability, while the US wants to develop the NMD. The negotiation started between the two.
    First we analyze Russian behavior in the nuclear arms negotiation and the intention of various actors with the specific emphasis on the arguments on the military reform. Then at the latter half of the article we examine Russian attitude toward the issue of non-proliferation problems. This time we focus on the situation of military industrial complex and its reconstruction process, and also the specialists' arguments on the matter. We will analyze them from the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001. The reason why we stop at September 11 is to show that Russia did not suddenly change on September 11.
    As conclusions we argue that first, Russia initially tried to maintain the old strategic stability but it turned out to be impossible to do so because of her financial constraints and the urgent need for military reform. President Putin slowly began to stop Russia's pretending a superpower by renouncing his previous goal to maintain the strategic parity with the US. Then, on September 11, 2001, he grasped at the chance and decided to become a big power in the new US-led international system.
    Second, when it comes to a new threat, nuclear proliferation, Russia was also slow to recognize its significance because its huge military industry needs to export military weapons in order to survive. And we find that while making efforts to secure the US non-proliferation commitments, Russia is also trying to sell more weapons to even the 'rouge nations' like Iran. But now the US can't stop those commitments for its Key words; strategic stability/START/NMD/nuclear non-proliferation/Iran
  • 袴田 茂樹
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2007年 2007 巻 36 号 3-16
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most serious problems for today's Russia is how to establish stability and identity as a nation.
    There are two reasons this problem is especially serious in Russia. First, because of historical, social psychological and other reasons, Russian society has trouble creating autonomous public order. The present writer calls this aspect of Russian society a ‘sand-society’, which means a society where stable order and a market economy are difficult to establish without some measure of authoritarianism. The high rate of support for President Putin reflects, not stability, but a public fear of instability. Second, Russia, in spite of the social characteristics mentioned above, is trying to keep up the appearance of an advanced G8 nation with a civil society based on the rule of law and democratic values. It was in order to cope with this dilemma and to justify his government that Vladislav Surkov set forth his ‘Sovereign-Democracy’ theory of Neo-Slavophilism.
    There is a strong distrust towards the Western world behind this theory, which insists on Russian individuality and is inimical to interventions or ‘exportation of democracy’ by the West, as in the cases of the collapse of governments in Georgia and Ukraine. This theory above all justifies the great power of the Russian State, emphasizes Russian individuality or peculiarity and affirms people's demands for order, stability, and especially a strong leader.
    This theory is based on the ideas of Ivan Il'in, who was a Russianist religious thinker condemned for being a reactionary and deported from Soviet Union in 1922. Il'in describes Russian culture as synthetic, intuitive, and organic, while characterizing Western culture as analytic, materialistic, and logical. Surkov's theory retains the basic tenets of Slavophilism, which set Plato above Aristotle and was closely related to German Romanticism and mysticism, while making no deeper interpretation of its roots.
    Surkov points out three features of Russian political culture—‘centralization’, ‘idealization’, and‘personification’.‘Centralization’ means that strong centralized power guarantees stability.‘Idealization’ means that the Russians feel uncomfortable without an ideal or a mission such as ‘the Third Rome’ or ‘the Third International’. ‘Personification’ means that, in Russia, a person (leader) is considered more important than institutions.
    The problem of establishing identity in Russia is the problem of stabilizing a ‘sand-society’. Considering these three features in relation to this problem, there are two requirements for stabilizing the ‘sand-society’. One is a ‘mold’ or a ‘framework’ to give sand a form, and the other is ‘cement’ to fix it. Of the three features in Surkov's ‘sovereign-democracy’ theory, ‘centralization’, and ‘personification’ are the ‘mold’ or ‘framework’, while ‘idealization’, and ‘personification’ make up the ‘cement’. Against this Neo-Slavophilism or ‘sovereign-democracy’, so-called modern, Westernizers, democrats, reformists and social democrats-are criticizing Surkov. Curiously, therefore, the controversy between Slavophiles and Westernizers that occurred 150 years ago is now repeating itself. One Russian political scientist describes this phenomenon as a déjã vu and says it means that the problems dating back to the middle of the 19th century have not yet been solved.
  • 角田 安正
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2002年 2002 巻 31 号 20-37
    発行日: 2002年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Maskhadov regime relied on Islam to resolve feuds among major leaders in Chechnya after the first Chechen war ended in 1996. Taking advantage of the situation, the Wahhabi expanded their influence in the republic. The Wahhabi were comprised mainly of Arabic political Islamists, who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and come to Chechnya to participate in the first Chechen war.
    In the summer of 1998, Osama Bin Laden, a new sponsor of the Wahhabi in Chechnya, began to establish a close relationship with anti-Maskhadov leaders (field commanders) attracting them by his abundant funds and his idea of establishing a unified Islamic republic in the north Caucasus. Encouraged by Bin Laden, Chechen armed forces attempted to invade the Russian republic of Dagestan in August 1999.
    As Moscow lost no time in launching a counter attack, another Chechen war commenced. The Chechen conflict posed a threat to Russia in that it might not have only undermined Russia's territorial integrity, but could have also become a pretext for western countries, including the United States, to meddle in Russia's domestic affairs. Russia tried in vain to persuade Washington that Chechen separatists were disguised international terrorists and that Russia suffered from the same terrorism as the U.S. had during 1998 with American embassy attacks in Africa. The United States continued to attach importance to the human-rights aspects of the Chechen issue. President Vladimir Putin, taking office in 2000, was not able to make the U.S. change its attitude toward the Chechen problem as his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had likewise found impossible.
    In Russia, moreover, some forces, especially the military elite, were opposed to cooperation with the United States. They alleged that none other than the U.S. had played a role in stirring up the situation in the north Caucasus. Thus, there would be no cooperation between the two countries for an anti-terrorist struggle.
    The situation abruptly changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. U.S.-Russian relations as concerned terrorism seemed to take a 180 degree turnabout. Close analysis of the relationship, however, would show that Russia gave way more in the U.S. direction than vice versa. President Putin allowed Central Asian countries to accept U.S. military presence two weeks after the terrorist attacks, with the Republic of Georgia to follow suit during the spring of 2002 in defiance of the resistance of the political and military elite in Russia. He expected to ease their frustrations by successfully suppressing Chechen armed forces as a result of promoting cooperation between Russia and the United States. He also expected that Washington would admit Russia's war in Chechnya to be a war on terrorism. Such expectations, however, were not met.
    The political forces in Russia, therefore, having assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the U.S., grew more frustrated. President Putin was forced to take steps to soothe their feelings. When he implied that he was ready to dispatch Russian troops to the Pankisskoye Gorge in the Republic of Georgia to eradicate Chechen fighters during September 2002, he intended to assuage the political and military elite which had not welcomed the U.S. military presence in Georgia from its inception.
  • 佐藤 雪野
    史学雑誌
    2001年 110 巻 5 号 1101-1106
    発行日: 2001/05/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小澤 治子
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2004年 2004 巻 33 号 36-46
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States has been increasingly inclined towards unilateral actions in international relations, while Russia, which has declined to the status of a middle class power, has become far more discreet in its foreign policy strategies. This was seen especially during the Boris Yeltsin period, when a mixture of cooperation and conflict in US-Russian relations could be seen. After Vladimir Putin took office in May 2000, Russia has begun to attempt the reorganization of its present international relations strategy into a multipolar system while also assuming the role of a world-class power. In the beginning days of President Putin's administration, conflict, rather than cooperation, defined the relations between the two countries. However, after the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, Russia has started to attach greater importance towards cooperation in the international war against terrorism. Russia opted to cooperate with Washington D.C: s plans for Central Asian Countries and the Republic of Georgia, which ultimately resulted in a US military presence in these countries.
    In March 2003, with the beginning of US attacks against Iraqi without a resolution from the UN Security Council, Russia with France and Germany criticized the US decision as a unilateral military action made with total disregard to international law. However, did the development of the Iraqi war actually damage US-Russian relations? Close analysis of events and policy decisions suggest that, despite severe criticism of the United States' actions, Russia has not changed its basic stance with dealing with America. Cooperation with the US continues to have a vital importance for Russia's national interests as well as its concerns about international terrorism.
    Will cooperative relations between the US and Russia last in the foreseeable future? Two major challenges exist for both countries. First, the US military presence will continue in post-Soviet regions, especially in Central Asian Countries and the Republic of Georgia regardless of any developments or breakthrough in international terrorism. The political forces in Russia have already assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the US because of this situation. Putin has been repeatedly criticized for allowing an agreement that is of greater advantage to the United States than Russia. Second, with the expansion of NATO in 1999, and again in 2004, with seven Eastern European countries and the three Baltic states joining NATO without considering Russian opinion, revives historic Russian fears about the security of its Western border. If NATO expands into CIS countries, the relationship between Russia and these former satellite states will be thrown in a period of significant crisis. In the event of this taking place, Russia would be forced shift not only its present attitude toward the US but also its entire foreign policy strategy. The result would be a return to growing conflict between the United States and Russia.
  • 斎藤 元秀
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2008年 2008 巻 37 号 3-16
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    As Russia seeks a resurgence of power under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev, its foreign policy reflects both internal and external influences, especially US and Chinese factors. The objectives of this paper are three-fold. The first is to illustrate key features of the Putin-Medvedev foreign policy, including a review of Richard Sakwa's remarks on Putin's “new realism.” The second is to trace how Russia's foreign policy has evolved in relation to the United States, Europe, Central Asia, China and Japan. The third is to assess Russia's diplomacy under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev.
    As to the external factors, the US factor plays a central role in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. Moscow tends to weigh the probable responses of Washington as it pursues its global foreign policy goals. Russia's policy towards an expanding Europe, including the eastward expansion of NATO, is no exception. Russia's policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, as well as in Central Asia, is increasingly influenced by the Chinese factor. In this regard, Moscow tries to maintain relations with Beijng on a good-neighborly basis, while trying to keep a rising China in check, making use of a combination of the Japanese, Indian, and US cards.
    According to Dmitry Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center, Russia saw itself as the Pluto of a Western solar system in the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR. Now, however, it has begun to create its own Moscow-centered system. Although Russia has not been successful in this attempt, the foreign policy of the Putin-Medvedev regime has resulted in several achievements: (1) the prevention of the early entry of Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO; (2) the alienation between Washington and its allies in the Old Europe; (3) the demonstration of a resurgent Russia in the Southern Caucasus through the realization of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia;
    (4) the closure of the US Manas Airbase in Kirgiz.
    Currently, Russia is facing significant challenges in dealing with the global economic crisis, ignited in the US. In this case, Russia appears to be attempting to mend fences with the US, while seeking, at the same time, to reduce US influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US and China factors, together with domestic concerns, are likely to continue to drive Russia's foreign policy under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev.
  • 菅沼 桂子
    比較経済研究
    2015年 52 巻 1 号 1_79-1_83
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2015/01/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 木村 汎
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2014年 2014 巻 43 号 156-159
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2016/09/09
    ジャーナル フリー
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