Policy responses to LTCM rescue in 1998 was that only extreme leverage was the causeof the trouble and appropriate leverage and speculation which utilize short selling andderivatives gives liquidity and efficiency to the market. Leverage should be dealt byprivate counterparty discipline．Securities Exchange Commission are concerned with thegrowth of hedge funds without basic information on them. They basically regard hedgefund as useful to investors and securities market and has come up with the idea ofregistration of hedge funds, which hardly disrupt their investment activities. Hedge fundsare very American in that they naively believe that speculation motivated by greed givesmarket liquidity and efficiency.
(1) After 1990', "financial glut" and/or "excess money capital" have emerged as the most remarkable phenomenon in the world economy where financial markets swing wildly real economy. The adjective 'excess' in this context implies the difficulty for money capital to discover desirable destinies where it can be invested with satisfactory return. In other word, in the contemporary global economy, money capital has been accumulated much faster than industrial and commercial capital with ensuing bottleneck of profitable investment outlet. Because of this aggravating bottleneck, the excess money capital piles up in the financial market and moves around as speculative capital. Thus far, major borrowers of bank loan have shifted from industrial sector to unproductive sector including LBOs, hedge funds, and household and/or consumers. In relation to this shift of borrowers, the increasing part of bank profit has been generated in the form of fees and commission for varieties of financial services rather than interest margin in the traditional commercial lending. The trend of banking being disconnected from industries and ever larger part of their profit being generated in activities such as M&A deals, asset securitizations, and consumer loans demonstrates the defunctness of the traditional commercial banking model and its transformation into a new originate-to-distribute (OTD) banking model. In reflection on these structural changes in contemporary capitalist economy and the transformation of banking model, we are required to reconsider the viability of the classical concept of "Finance Capital" advocated by Lenin and Hilferding in the early stage of 20th century. As well known, Lenin's definition of Finance Capital is "concentration of production and from which emerged monopoly, consolidation and/or adhesion of banks and industries-this is the rising history of finance capital and its concept" (Imperialism). In the same vein, Hilferding wrote "banks could not help but anchor increasing part of their capital in industries. Therefore banks more and more transformed themselves into industrial capitalists. I name the bank capital i.e. money capital which is virtually transformed into industrial capital a finance capital (Finance Capital). Are their conceptualizations of finance capital as 'consolidation and/or adhesion of banks and industries' or 'money capital which is virtually transformed into industrial capital' still applicable to contemporary capitalism? With regard to the striking phenomenon of excess liquidity and/or excess money capital in the modern capitalist economy, I prefer to thematize in this presentation the viability of the concept of 'Casino-Style Finance Capital' as an alternative for the classical concept of 'Finance Capital' (2) In thematizing the Casino-Style Finance Capital, my basic points of view are as followings. (1)Financial bubble denotes assets inflation uncoupled from real economy, therefore its eventual bursting is unavoidable. (2)Financial transactions in securities and real estate markets do not generate new economic value and/or value added. The economic function of financial markets resides only in the redistribution of existent economic value. (3)Derivative schemes and loan securitizations can transfer financial risk between market players but neither of them reduces financial risk much less extinguish it. (4)Every fees, commissions, and capital gains obtained by financial institutions from loan securitizations and any other mortgage related transactions come from repayments by mortgage borrowers. (5)In deciphering the macro-economic effects of financial bubble, we need to consider two conflicting effects generated by both asset inflation and asset deflation. (6)Even if the subprime loan-related financial crisis may be successfully contained
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