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  • 過ぎ去った自治と来るべき自治
    村田 優樹
    史学雑誌
    2021年 130 巻 7 号 1-39
    発行日: 2021年
    公開日: 2022/07/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿では、革命期ロシアで活動した二人の知識人、ミハイロ・フルシェフスキーとボリス・ノリデの学問的・政治的著作と実践政治の分析を通じ、当時の「ウクライナ問題」の展開を、「自治」という国制をめぐる論争という観点から分析した。特に、両者の活動のなかで、歴史研究、評論活動、実践政治が緊密に結びついていたことに注目した。
     第一章では、近世にウクライナの地に存在した
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    領自治についての二人の研究を扱った。両者は全く異なる問題関心から近世
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    領自治にアプローチしていたが、一六五四年の
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    領とモスクワ国家の合同のみならず、一八世紀の自治の廃止まで通時的に論じることで、その歴史学的研究の水準を大いに進展させた。
     第二章では、二人による同時代の国制論議を検討した。ウクライナ民族主義者のフルシェフスキーは、
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    領を民族の栄光の歴史の一部とみなし、同様の領域自治を、民族の自然権に依拠して達成することをめざした。他方、ノリデは
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    領自治の消滅の歴史を叙述することで、近代主権国家となったロシアの「単一と不可分」を擁護した。両者は専制についての相反する評価にもかかわらず、歴史的権利の原理への専制の非妥協的性格の認識において一致していた。
     1917年の二月革命後の時期を扱う第三章では、二人の政治家としてのウクライナ自治問題への関与を考察した。フルシェフスキーは民衆の動員の成功を演出し、臨時政府から自治への譲歩を引き出そうとした。他方、法制審議会の成員としてウクライナ問題を担当したノリデは、国家の単一性を依然として維持しようとした。こうして、ウクライナ自治の問題は、権力の正当性をめぐる対立として展開した。
    以上を踏まえ、本稿では、ウクライナ問題の国制論争としての側面を論証したのち、「多民族帝国」の民族問題について、それぞれの社会固有の言説空間がもつ術語や論理構造に注目することが重要であると結論した。
  • 村田 優樹
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2018年 2018 巻 47 号 17-34
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2019/10/08
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article revisit Ukrainian political history in 1918, a year of turmoil, when three different states arose one after another in Kiev: the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Ukrainian State, and the Directorate. In previous studies, this year is considered as an integral part of the history of the Ukrainian national movement, which struggled to defend the independence achieved by the fourth Universal (declaration) in January 1918 against foreign intervention. According to this national historical narrative, this effort ended in defeat when Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union. In contrast to those studies, the present article claims that the future political status of Ukraine was not yet decided in 1918; not only an independent state, but an autonomous part of the Russian (con-)federation remained one of the political aims of the Ukrainian activists even after the fourth Universal, and that the development of the idea of the future state system of Ukraine considerably depended on the interests of foreign actors. Lacking sufficient military strength, all the Ukrainian states that formed in 1918 needed outside assistance for their own survival. This paper examines the close interrelationship between the choice of the future political status of Ukraine (independence or federation) and the ongoing foreign policy.

    After the October Revolution in Petrograd, both belligerent powers in World War I came into contact with various local governments in the former Russian imperial territory, aiming to take advantage of them for their own war efforts. The Entente desired the restoration of the strong Russian state as an ally, demanding incorporation of Ukrainian territory into the future federative Russia. The Central Powers, on the other hand, planned to construct a chain of buffer states between Germany and Russia for the security of German and Austrian eastern borders. This geopolitical consideration led to support for an independent Ukrainian state, as one such buffer state.

    At first, the leaders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic advocated the formation of the democratic federative Russia. Offered more generous support by Germany, however, they declared independence and signed a treaty with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. This pro-German policy was inherited by the Ukrainian State, which replaced the People’s Republic in April 1918. In November, on the final defeat of the Central Powers, however, the Ukrainian State issued a statement that Ukraine should become an autonomous part of the restored federative Russia. The Directorate, the successor of the Ukrainian State, also adopted the pro-federation policy to gain support from the Allies, the winners of the Great War. Thus, the change of perspective on the state system accompanied the change of foreign policy.

    While the pro-Entente policy failed because of disagreements with Russian Whites, the flexible Ukrainians finally found a third power―the Bolsheviks. The oppositional socialist group in the Directorate received the status of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a de-jure sovereign polity within the Soviet Union. In this sense, the establishment of the Soviet Ukraine could not be seen only as a symbol of the defeat of the Ukrainian national movement; rather, it was more or less a product of the federative idea employed by the Ukrainian activists themselves in those revolutionary years.

  • 光吉 淑江
    ロシア史研究
    1994年 54 巻 22-39
    発行日: 1994/03/01
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高橋 清治
    社会経済史学
    1989年 55 巻 4 号 537-539
    発行日: 1989/10/30
    公開日: 2017/07/08
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • グローバリズム・リージョナリズム・ナショナリズム-21世紀における役割を模索するアジア-
    中井 和夫
    国際政治
    1997年 1997 巻 114 号 135-150,L13
    発行日: 1997/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The first Ukrainian state already has lasted five years. But it does not mean the end of long dreamed of statism, but the beginning of hard ways for building a nation.
    The border of Ukraine has a peculiar character. Almost all border lines were drawn by dividing regions, each of which comprised historically one region. This condition also makes the task of building a nation difficult.
    In the western part of Ukrainian border, such regions are Galitsia, Carpathian, Bukovina and Bessarabia. If you turn to the east, there are two divided regions, the Donbass and the Slobidska Ukraine.
    The Ukrainian border was made by dividing regions that caused difficulties in building the Ukrainian nation-state. Because of the dividing the regions automatically made Ukrainian Diaspora or irredenta outside Ukraine. In Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, Ukrainians have been living as a minority group. At the same time the opposite sides, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, consider the regions which were incorporated with Ukraine their irredenta. Between Ukraine and Russia there is another but major border dispute on the Crimean Peninsula.
    Ukraine herself is divided into two parts, Eastern and Western. The Western part of Ukraine, called Galicia, has some characteristics which are not seen in other parts of Ukraine.
    On the contrary to the Galicia, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine have different characteristics. The Donbass and Crimea belong to these regions. These regions have strong tles with Russia although they belong to Ukraine. The Crimea, now an autonomous republic in Ukraine, belonged to Russia until 1954. A part of the Donbass was belonged to Russia before the 1917 revolution as the Don Army District.
    The contrast between the West and the East in Ukraine can be seen on the map. There is an interesting piece of evidence to show the dichotomy between the West and the East. It shows the change of support for the first president Leonid Kravchuk and the second president Leonid Kuchma. In Ukraine we can hear a new Ukrainian proverb, saying, “Ukrainian Presidents born in the East will die in the West”. This proverb well explains the dichotomy between the East and the West in Ukraine.
    For Nation-building in Ukraine there are some obstacles in terms of integration of people into one consolidated group. Ukraine is divided not only by geography but also by culture and identity.
    Language problems may be the most visible problem in today's Ukraine. The second obstacle for the integration of the Ukrainian nation-state is religious splits among the people. Ukraine is, of course, a secularized state. But the history of the suppression of national churches such as the Uniate Church (Ukrainian Catholic Church) and Ukrainian Orthodox Church made these churches political factors.
    Ukrainians have failed to form a nation-state. Russians have also failed to form their own nation-state. Russians have always been a subject of a big empire, first the Russian Empire and next the Soviet Union. Above all things they carried out their mission to build and maintain an empire. Ukrainians, in contrast, are eager to build their own nation-state, not an empire. This is an identity difference between two nationalities. And this difference reflects the dichotomy in Ukraine between the East and the West.
    The geopolitical position of Ukraine in the International arena has been a factor of difficulties for the building a nation state. For Ukraine, located between the West and the East, between Germany and Russia, inevitably it has been geopolitically in either a buffer zone or a battleground. In the Northern War in 18th century, the Napoleonic War, Crimean War, World War I and World War II, Ukraine was one of the major battlefields. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the region which includes the territory of Ukraine became a battlefield between Europe and Russia b
  • 土屋 好古
    史学雑誌
    2008年 117 巻 5 号 993-999
    発行日: 2008/05/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 加藤 史朗
    ロシア史研究
    1997年 60 巻 83-87
    発行日: 1997/03/31
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 志田 恭子
    ロシア史研究
    2002年 71 巻 45-57
    発行日: 2002/10/18
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 早坂 真理
    ロシア史研究
    1996年 59 巻 104-109
    発行日: 1996/09/30
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 黒川 知文
    ロシア史研究
    1984年 40 巻 49-58
    発行日: 1984/11/03
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中井 和夫
    ロシア史研究
    1982年 36 巻 66-74
    発行日: 1982/11/05
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 白木 太一
    東欧史研究
    1998年 20 巻 65-85
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2018/12/01
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 柳沢 秀一
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2001年 2001 巻 30 号 146-169
    発行日: 2001年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    On September 17, 1939 the Soviet Red Army invaded Eastern Poland, following the German invasion of Western Poland some two weeks earlier. In the occupied territory, which contained Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia) and Western Byelorussia (Belarus), Poles were deported in the short period leading up to the German invasion of June 1941. It is estimated that from 250 thousand to 1.65 million Poles were subjected to deportation. This brought about a major transformation in the social and economic structure of the area.
    This article examines how the deportation of Poles influenced the transformation of social and economic structure in the Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia) . Considering this problem, we also actress Soviet rural policies - land reform and collectivization, then explore correlation between deportation and the two policies.
    After annexation the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine was elected to power. On October 28, 1939 the Assembly formally announced the confiscation of land belonging to great landowners, monasteries, and state officials. By the end of 1939, 2, 753, 000 hectares of land in Galicia and Volhynia had reportedly been confiscated representing 29.9% of the total land of two regions held by landowners and monasteries.
    Simultaneously, the first deportation of Poles began. A decree that was issued by the Soviet government declared that Polish military settlers (osadnikis), should be removed from Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. In February 139, 590 people were deported to Siberia, Ural and so on. The land reform and deportation of Poles led to the increase of Ukrainian landed farmers, including middle peasants (stratum-serednyak) .
    In January 1940, the Soviet authorities began formal collectivization, or kolkhz (collective farm) in these regions. By June 1, there were 2, 866 kolkhz in Galicia and Volhynia, representing 205, 137 peasant households, or 12.8% of the total number of households. These households had 796, 827 hectares of land in their possession, or 14.9% of the total land in the regions. As for Galicia and Volhynia, the Soviet authorities were preoccupied with the defense of the western borderlands from 1939 to 1941.
    On the eve of war there were the two waves of deportation that occurred. The first mass deportation which was completed on April 1940, including families of Polish official, gendarmes, landowners. 320 thousands people were deported from Galicia and Volhynia and Western Byelorussia. At this time, including Ukrainians, that were activists and opponents to collectivization. In the second mass deportation refugees consisted of Poles (41%) and Jews (59%) . The forced deportation of Poles removed the active elements of the Polish population from Galicia and Volhynia, and brought social and economic transformation in these areas. But this could not create a material base for the collectivization of two regions. In fact collectivization did not fully materialize and land reforms continued. On March 241941, on official land reform decree was issued.
    As a result, in Galicia and Volhynia, the deportation of Poles, especially active elements, such as osadniki created a material base for the increasing number of Ukrainian peasant arriving. This led to a major transformation in the social and economic structure, “depolonization”, of these regions.
  • 中井 和夫
    ロシア史研究
    1975年 24 巻 18-33
    発行日: 1975/11/08
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山田 朋子
    東欧史研究
    2013年 35 巻 79-91
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2019/06/15
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 阿部 三樹夫
    ロシア史研究
    1985年 41 巻 81,84-104
    発行日: 1985/11/05
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
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