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  • 神山 貞二
    鉱山地質
    1971年 21 巻 106 号 65-67
    発行日: 1971/05/01
    公開日: 2009/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 法律文化社 2002年 xvi+435+xiiiページ
    吉田 昌夫
    アジア経済
    2004年 45 巻 5 号 116-120
    発行日: 2004/05/15
    公開日: 2023/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 福田 邦夫
    アフリカ研究
    2013年 2013 巻 82 号 49-54
    発行日: 2013/05/31
    公開日: 2014/03/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • モザンビークおよびアンゴラからサン・トメへの移民を中心に
    網中 昭世
    アフリカ研究
    2013年 2013 巻 82 号 15-23
    発行日: 2013/05/31
    公開日: 2014/03/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    植民地期のモザンビークとアンゴラは,ともに宗主国ポルトガルの産業および国際市場に向けた一次産品を生産すると同時に,自国・他国問わず近隣植民地へ労働力を供給することで外貨を獲得し,ポルトガルの財政に資するという役割を担ってきた。本稿は,こうした植民地経済の構造の中で,第一次世界大戦前後にモザンビークおよびアンゴラからギニア湾上のポルトガル領サン・トメおよびプリンシペへ多数の「契約労働者」が送り出されていた事実に着目する。これらの送り出し地域はいずれも第一次世界大戦のアフリカ戦線となった地域である。第一次世界大戦期は住民による植民地支配への抵抗が活発化し,さらにはそれを封じる植民地軍の制圧も多数記録されている。本稿ではこの点を重視し,第一次世界大戦がポルトガル植民地の情勢と現地社会におよぼした影響を,この時期に増加した「契約労働者」の送り出しと関連付けて考察する。
  • 両大戦間期の国際関係史
    等松 春夫
    国際政治
    1999年 1999 巻 122 号 101-115,L12
    発行日: 1999/09/24
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    When Japan announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, it was assumed that Japan might lose its mandate over the former German Pacific islands. In the event, neither the League nor the Powers ever raised the question of Japan's right to retain the mandate, and Japan continued to hold the mandate after its definite departure from the League in 1935.
    From a pure interpretation of the League Covenant, the only condition of being a mandatory was that it must be a suitable advanced nation. While the legitimacy of Japanese military activities in Manchuria was doubtful, the mandated islands were developing constantly under Japanese rule. Then, the only possibility of depriving Japan of the mandate was the finding of violation of the terms of the mandate, which might lead the way to cancellation of the mandate. However, without a proper inspection system, alleged violation of the non-fortification provision could not be proved.
    Nevertheless, as the Japanese case touched on the basic principles of the mandate system, some quarters in the League felt that the Council should take official cognizance of a change in the legal situation of the mandate consequent on Japan's withdrawal: while the League confirmed Japan's retention of the mandated islands, it should re-assert the mandate principle and the authority of the League on the matter. However, this course was eventually abandoned due to the disapproval of the Powers. It was also feared that such a procedure would constitute a confirmation of the legal theory that a state withdrawing from the League had the right to maintain a mandate. Such a precedent might limit the action of the League in the future when the League might desire to cancel a mandate of a withdrawing state. By allowing the Japanese mandate to continue as if nothing had happened, there was the implication that Japan had the right to hold the mandate, but not necessarily an unqualified one.
    As regards the sovereignty over the mandated territory, many questioned whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (hereinafter PAAP) held the ultimate power to dispose of the mandate. Nevertheless, the PAAP sovereignty theory was a useful concept to accommodate the needs of the mandatory Powers. It helped to limit the jurisdiction of the League on their mandated territories and to weaken Germany's claim to its lost colonies. For this reason it was difficult for the mandatory Powers to criticise Japan's standpoint. Being a non-League member and not holding a mandate, the US showed a more critical attitude towards Japan. However, its position was weakened by the precedent that the League had offered the US a mandate for Armenia in 1920.
    It may therefore be argued that the League and the Powers' attitude towards the Japanese mandate reflected the concept of ‘enlightened colonial regime’ in the interwar period, embodied in the mandate system run by the League and the PAAP.
  • 奈良本 英佑
    日本中東学会年報
    1993年 8 巻 211-238
    発行日: 1993/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー

    It is well-known that the US government played a crucial role to help the Zionists establish Israel the Jewish state in Palestine during a certain period after the World War II. This American support was a fruit of American Zionists' persistent campaign in 1930s and 1940s to win over the government and public opinion of the United States to creation of their state there. Remarkable success of this campaign was, in a sence, a product of the unprecedent persecution and massacre of the Jewish people by the Nazi Germany. This article deals with American policies toward the Palestine question and refugee problems caused by that harsh oppression of Jews by the German authorities. The author forcuses on the process of decision making related to these policies by the President and government officials in the period from March 1938 to January 1939. Special attention is paid to the days beginning at 6 October '38 toward 20 January '39. The former markes the date when American Zionists started the most intensive campaign trying to influence the government foreign policies in favor of the Zionist cause. The latter is that when Hijamar Schacht the German negotiator on the refugee problem was dismissed. His dismissal meant, in fact, the end of talks betweem Germany and an international body, composed of the U.S., European and other countries, for ordery migration of the European Jews. It was the Americans who took the initiative in starting this collective negotiaion in order to solve the refugee problem. This intergovernmental body was established by a decision of an international confernece known as the "Evian Conference", which President Roosevelt had called for after the "Anschluss". This body, called the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), took the charge of dealing with the Germans. It was also the U.S. which played leading roles in the IGCR activities. The one hundred and ten days from October, '38 to January, '39 were the period when the parties could cherish the highest hopes that the negotiation might produce some positive result for solving the refugee problem. For, the Germans had been temporalily appeased by the "Munchen Decision", and were apparently willing to talk on the refugee question. At a certain stage, they appointed one of Nazimoderates, Schacht, as the negotiator. The Nazi-radicals like Libbentrop, however, soon gained the upper hand in their power struggle; this actually led to the end of the deal. During these days, the most intensive efforts were made to find heavens for the refugees in other areas than Europe by the IGCR. The U.S. government on behalf of the IGCR requested to many governments in Latin American countries and European ones which possesed oversea territories to receive these unfortunate people as immigrants. Most of these governments were unwilling to receive considerable number of the Jewish refugees, however. Thus, the negotiations on the immigration as a whole ended in failure, too. The Nazi persecution, causing mass immigration of European Jews into Palestine, aggravated the political tention in Palestine, which led to the great revolt by Palestine Arabs in 1936-1939. This change of the situation urged the British government to reconsider their policy toward Palestine Mandate. The Britishes began to think of restricting the number of immigrants into Palestine. Alarmed with some indications of changing attitudes of the British government, the Zionists decided to launch a vigorous campaign to affect the U.S. policy makers. The Zionists urgently requested the Americans to intervene so as to prevent the British from the revision of immigration policies in the Palestine Mandate. October 6th was the date when an American Zionist leader sent a telegram to Roosevelt asking for immediate intervention. They mobilized all of their resource available for affecting U.S. Palestine policies

    (View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

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