The Apophthegmata patrum is generally considered as one of the best witnesses about early monasticism in Egypt, especially about its spirituality. But it is equally well known that manuscript traditions of this document are extremely complicated, and one still does not know its primitive form nor the extent of the apophthegmata contained in that primitive form. Then, which elements that one finds in the extant form of the Apophthegmata patrum can be considered as deriving authentically from monks of the 4th century?
To answer this question, the present paper compares the Apophthegmata patrum with the writings of Evagrius, a productive monastic author in the last two decades of the 4th century, and this comparison gives following results:
-The image presented in the Apophthegmata patrum about the material (or physical) aspect of monastic life is more or less the same as Evagrius wrote in his writings, and this shows that the image presented in the Apophthegmata patrum is probably authentic on this point.
-On the other hand, the image drawn in the Apophthegmata patrum about the spiritual aspect of monastic life differs on certain points from that of Evagrius, and this is possibly connected with the existence of different spiritual currents in the Egyptian monastic milieu.
-The comparison in the present paper reveals also some criticism directed against Evagrius by the compiler (s) of the Apophthegmata patrum, and thus confirmed is the often suggested impression of the anti-Origenist tendency of the document.

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Norrbotten Handicap Sports Federation (NHIF) Budokai in Sweden holds their spring camp in May every year. This camp is unique in that both disabled and non-disabled people participate and practice karate-do together. In May 2005, Hamasaki from the US and Inoshita from Japan were invited to teach at the camp by Mr. Pontus Johansson, the chief staff of the NHIF Budokai. The training was scheduled in four sessions by five group categories: Group 1=Children, Group 2=Adults with assistance, Group 3=Adults with physical disability, Group 4=Those with concentration disorder disabilities, and Group 5=Adults. There was only one disabled in the children's group.Group 2 had five participants who were all mentally handicapped. Although the authors found it difficult to motivate this group, accomplishing this task proved most rewarding. Group 4, who practiced at the same time as Group 2, was instructed by Mr. Niklas Bremer from the NHIF Budokai and Mr. Dan Johansson from the Sweden Wado-kai. Group 3 and Group 5, who practiced together, had two people who had difficulties in walking. All of the participants in Group 3 and Group 5, regardless of whether they were disabled or not, cooperated with each other, practiced to their best, and achieved the goal set for this camp.
We observed how karate practice improves People's abilities and how disabled people live life in Sweden through karate-do; they fully enjoy their lives like any other human being. It was also impressive that all of the instructors, assistants, and parents understand the disabled people and help them not out of duty, but also with a sense of responsibility as a community member.
This report describes the 2005 Spring Camp with details about the training content, goals and result of each session and group.

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In 89 B C, the First Mithridatic War began in Asia Minor between Rome and Pontus It was difficult for either nation to gain a victory without the broad support of the Greek city-states and the native Asians This paper will elucidate the political attitudes of the city-states in Asia Minor to the Roman and Pontic soldiers Attention will be focused on the attitudinal trends of the populations of the cities, and, in particular, the social and political situations deciding these attitudes will be explained With the advance of Pontic army, cities and individuals were pressed to decide whether to support or oppose the anti-Roman uprising led by Mithridates, king of Pontus The widely held belief is that upper class citizens were inclined to support the Romans in order to maintain their privileges while the dominated and exploited lower classes were pro-Mithridatic It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that the entire upper and lower classes determined their respective attitudes by some unanimous consent Indeed, it was difficult for upper class leaders to choose between two great countries such as Rome and Pontus, or to know which would eventually be more favorable for their future prosperity Thus, the only way was to act flexibly in a real political situation An incident at Ephesus was a typical example The Ephesians who had initially supported Mithridates later accused him of being an aggressor when the war began to develop favorably for Rome, and they rose in a revolt against Pontus which then spread to many other cities On the other hand, when the upper class citizens recognized the overwhelming victory of Mithndates, some responded to the situation by becoming anti-Roman Still others watched the changing situation in silence Only the lower class might have been cosistently anti-Roman Mithridates was essentially a despotic monarch and indifferent to the tradition of liberty and autonomy of the Greek city-states He himself embodied a contradiction Had he not been a tyrant, he would not have been able to take command of a great war against Rome Yet, as a tyrant, he could not deny his exploitation of the cities and the Asian people Only when he pursued the cities' interest and covered up his essential despotic nature did both the upper and lower class citizens support him and rush into the anti-Roman movement And yet, when the situation changed again and Mithridates' true nature showed itself, these same cities were compelled to leave him In this way, the attitudes of the cities, representing the collective will of the upper and the lower classes, responded to his contradictory nature

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The object of this paper is to trace the parallels and climates found out in the old maps published in Europe in and after the opening years of modern times, to its origin.
First of all, the zone theory, divided the land surface into five parts by the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn and the polar circles, have been closely connected with the thoughts of the Pythagorean School. This zone theory was accomplished by Aristotle. The idea on the arctics of Aristotle, however, had been extremely variable. According to the spread of geographical knowledge among Greeks, the zone theory by Aristotle had to be revised. By setting the arid zones under the both tropics, Poseidonius urged to divised the land surface into seven regions. On the other hand, Polybius set forth a six division theory that there is an ecumene directly under the equator thoroughly. But the zone theory of Strabo adopted a classical form which was handed down the medieval ages.
Secondly, though climate had been primarily a word meaning ‘latitude’, according to Strabo it was becoming a word which designated specifically certain latitudes. The klimata of Hipparchus was only incompletely represented by Strabo, In contrast to Eratosthenes who divided the climate rather arbifranily, Hipparchus' lines of the klimata were drawn every 1/4 hour during the daytime in the summer solstice. As for Marinus and Ptolemy, they strictly distinguished the conception of parallels and that of klimata. And in view of the results so far achieved, at last they have taken a word of meaning; the former is a line, and the latter a zone.
At intervals of 1/4 hour, both Marinus and Ptolemy drew the parallels. The seven standard climates of Ptolemy had been distributed according to the line of parallels through Meroe, Syene, Alexandria, Rhodes, Hellespont, the middle of Pontus (Black Sea), the mouth of River Borysthenes. On the Geographice Hyphegesis of Ptolemy we cannot find out his thoughts concerning klimata, but his seven klimata system is found in the chapter 7. 8. 12 Vol.2, and chapter 11 Vol.6, of Almagest. And then the author presumes that klimata of Marinus must have been those that were drawn at every 1/4 hour as shown in chapter 15, Vol.1, of Ptolemy's Geography.

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This article considers the reasons behind the anti-Macedonian War started by Rhodes and Pergamum in 201 BCE. This was a direct trigger of the Second Macedonian War in the following year, in which the Roman advance to the East was a significant step for Rome to become superpower in the whole ancient Mediterranean World. However, this war in 201 BCE was originally caused by diplomatic dynamism in the Hellenistic states. Moreover, what should be noted is that the war was not merely a resistance to Macedonian expansion to the south, contrary to what some studies have argued. The genuine fears for Rhodes and Pergamum should have been the cooperation between Macedonia and Seleucid and the very fact that the two dynasties had begun to advance to the Aegean areas and Asia Minor simultaneously in those days. The last years in the third century BCE in the eastern world were the period in which the Ptolemaic dynasty declined rapidly, while Macedonia and Seleucid recovered their powers greatly. This was one of the largest reorganizations of strength after the Successor's War, and the impact reached Rhodes and Pergamum which had been growing, taking advantage of the conflicts among the dynasties. For these two states, it was inevitable to confront the expansion by the two powerful dynasties to the Aegean areas and Asia Minor, and it was so serious a threat that those two states decided to struggle jointly first against Macedonia, regardless of diplomatic isolation which had existed between them. In consideration to the war in 201 BCE and the central factor of the crisis, what have sometimes been discussed are the economic and political situations of Rhodes and Pergamum and the alleged secret pact between Macedonia and Seleucid to divide the Ptolemaic kingdom. However, the more important is that Rhodes and Pergamum believed and made much of the existence of the cooperation between the dynasties despite the lack of accurate information on the pact. Furthermore, the situation in 201 BCE was unexpectedly favorable for the two states to counter the axis of the powers because the main body of the Seleucid army with the king had briefly turned to Coele Syria from Asia Minor possibly by the birth of cooperation with Macedonia. Although Seleucid was a natural enemy for Pergamum, its attention was drawn towards the second largest threat, Macedonia, by Seleucid's temporary retreat, and in this very situation Pergamum could agree to ally with Rhodes. On the other hand, the first priority for Rhodes was to press back Macedonia and it was at least originally thought to be possible to realize sufficiently if the two states could battle jointly in the sea. The anti-Macedonian war in 201 BCE was a product of those chain reactions in the whole Hellenistic states, and it was the last and biggest competition in foreign affairs before the Roman advance.

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The philosophy as a background of the history of geography, especially that of the ancient times, has not been made sufficiently clear. In this article, which is an attempt at tracing the methodological history of geography, I have tried to discover the relationship between Strabo and the Stoic philosophy of the Greco-Roman Age.
Briefly, the Stoic elements in the geography of Strabo are:
(1) his orientation of geography in the system of philosophy: geography→gemoetry→astronomy→physics that is àρειη;
(2) the encyclopaedic character of his geography as related to his practical character;
(3) that this practical character also means ethical practice;
(4) that this practical character may also be found in his ideas of poetry, mythology, and history; especially in his interpretation of Homer from the viewpoint of practice;
(5) that his theory of geographical environment originates in his idea of προνοια;
(6) that his theory of environmental possibilism is influenced by the behaviourism of the middle Stoicism.
(7) his cosmopolitanism that the possession of virtue, and not the difference in race, is the criterion of Barbaroi;
(8) his admiration of the Pax Romana that he regards as tha establishment of Megalopolis.
As these characteristics of Strabo are also related with his methodology of geography, this article will serve as prolegomenon to a full study of Strabo's geography.

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An Athenian naval reform by Periandros in the middle of the fourth century B.C. changed drastically the former system of the trierarchy, when expenses were paid for a warship by one or two persons(trierarchs). The law of Periandros charged 1200 people who were members of 20 symmories, each consisting of 60 people with the payments for the trierarchy, and so divided the financial burden for a warship between many people. Recently, at least, this system itself has been studied by some scholars, especially with regard to possible identification with the system of the eisphora, but the historical background of this reform seems to have been scarcely studied as a main theme and in detail. Accordingly, the significance of it is here fully examined. The date of the reform has been regarded as 358/7 B.C. or 357/6 B.C. by common consent since this was argued by Boeckh. The evidence to prove the existence of Periandros' symmories in 357/6 B.C. is [Dem.]XLVII, but there is no evidence to prove its existence before then. For example, as we find no references to the trierarchic symmories in [Dem.]L which relates to an Athenian naval expedition in the late 360s B.C., it seems that the start of the law must be placed after that date. In that period, there were two important events in foreign relations which might have had such a direct impact that Athens was forced to carry out the drastic reform of the naval system. One was the Athenian expedition to Euboea in the summer of 357 B. C. and the other was the Social War which broke out soon after that. There is no evidence to elucidate directly the relative dates of the reform and the expedition to Euboea. Cawkwell does not entirely exclude the possibility that the fleet mentioned in [Dem.]XLVII may be identical with that in the expedition to Euboea, and he infers that in that case the expedition to Euboea might have been provided for by the law of Periandros. But while the fleet in that expedition was quickly dispatched and voluntary trierarchs participated in it in response to an appeal of the State, the fleet mentioned in [Dem.]XLVII could not set sail so quickly and such an appeal was not made at that time. Therefore these two fleets were different from each other. Seeing that the Athenians were forced to depend upon the trierarchic epidosis, firstly organized in Athens at that time, for the expedition to Euboea, it is more probable that the date of Periandros' reform is later than that of the expedition to Euboea as Boeckh thought. The next important matter is the relative dates of the reform and the Social War. There is a clue about it in the description of [Dem.]XLVII, 20 ff.. The above-mentioned fleet in [Dem.]XLVII can be thought to have been dispatched to cope with the revolt of the allies which led to the Social War. This is a possibility that Cawkwell regards as more probable and his arguments are convincing. Consequently, we can infer the chronology for the three events, that is, the expedition to Euboea → the reform of Periandros → the Social War. And we can suppose from [Dem.]XLVII, 21, etc. that his law was initiated before the outbreak of the Social War but the revolt of the allies broke out before it was completely carried out. This suggests that Periandros carried out the reform being conscious of the unquiet tendency of the allies and as a measure against them. Tod. No. 151 (=IG II^2 126) which records an alliance between Athens and three Thracian kings in 357/6 B.C seems to suggest this, though it does so indirectly. Lastly, it can be confirmed by IG I^I2 1611, etc. that Periandros and the other man performed their syntrierarchy using the state-owned ship's equipment and Periandros proposed the reform presumably sometime during their syntrierarchy. Taking notice of a regulation about recovering the unreturned state-owned ship's equipment in his law, we can infer that he himself, too, keenly realized a

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Herodotus says that king Xerxes led his unprecedentedly huge forces and invaded Europe in 480 B C The size of the expeditionary force, including troops from Europe and non-combatants, was more than five million persons Other ancient sources agree that the great king's forces were vast in scale, but differ as to their number The German empire mobilized seven armies, i e, one million, five hundred thousand soldiers, on the western front at the beginning of the First World War The German troops were supplied, via thirteen railways, five-hundred-fifty trains a day Nevertheless, they were distressed by shortage of provisions Could the Persian empire, which had only primitive transport, maintain such huge forces for a long time and in a far distant country? Her transportation capability was meager It seems impossible that she mobilized and continued to supply such huge forces Modern historians doubt the size of the Persian forces which Herodotus gives They try to reduce his number to reasonable levels For that purpose they use two methods One is the philological method, used by many historians They criticize the texts and make known the organization of Xerxes' forces and the commanders' names There were three infantry divisions, three cavalry brigades, the Immortals, the guard troops and the non-combatants But, if one doubts about Herodotus' number, the size of the forces remains unknown The other method used employs logistics Gen Maurice and Gen v Fischer used this method They heed that the volume of provisions carried by the transport corps determined the scale of the forces This necessitates the fixing of some variables the mean speed, the size of the files, the carrying capability of pack animals and the rate of consumption of provisions What was the Persians' speed? It must have been that which reached the maximum value of the rate of flow There are some models for inquiring into the relation between the mean speed and the rate of flow I use Greenschields' model The outcome of my computation is that six parasangs a day is best, five a day next best and seven a day third best According to Xenophon's Anabasis, the Persians frequently marched six or seven parasangs a day When they crossed a bridge or river, their speed slowed Five parasangs a day was the usual speed So, I think that Xerxes' forces crossed the Hellespontos at the rate of five parasangs a day The rate of flow of animals was 500 4 heads/h, the rate of flow of infantrymen 1,429 7 persons/h What was the size of the Persian files? Gen v Fischer thought four files to be the usual size of the infantiy and two files that of the cavalry and transport corps I follow his view As the transport corps continued to cross for 7 days and nights, the total number of pack animals is 168,134 The transport corps carried 33,626,800 Ibs, consumed 31,945,460 Ibs, and could offer 1,681,340 Ibs to the combatants Such volume of provisions can maintain 41,000 infantrymen and 4,000 cavalrymen The number of an infantry division was 10,000 men, the number of cavalry brigade 1,000 men Xerxes' forces numbered 45,000 men Many historians think that the Persian fleet was far superior to the Greek Some believe in Herodotus' number, some modify his number to 1,000 or 800 or 600 Before the battle of Salamis, all Persian ships anchored in Phaleron bay I use this fact as a clue to estimating their scale I divide the length of the seashore by the width a trireme occupies in action The outcome is 300 ships The original fleet probably numbered about 400 ships My conclusion is that the land forces numbered 45,000 persons and the fleet 400 ships

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Before the Second World War, the birth of coinage in Asia Minor was generally placed at the beginning or in the first half of the seventh century B.C. But in 1951, E.S.G. Robinson, by reconsidering the coins (together with dumps immediately preceding them) found at the Ephesian Artemisium in 1904-5, insisted that coinage can hardly have begun in Asia Minor much earlier than about 630 B.C. Since then many scholars have accepted his opinion. In 1959, however, N.G.L. Hammond criticized this 'recent opinion', and put the first appearance of coins in Asia Minor in c. 687-77 B.C. on the strength of several pieces of evidence. I. Archaeological evidence. A. The coins and dumps from the Artemisium at Ephesus must have been coeval with other finds from it (700-590 B.C.). B. Two vases from Khaniale Tekke in Crete contained gold and silver dumps along with other objects (c. 800-650 B.C.). C. At Perachora the supposed dedication of an iron drachma which was demonetized as the result of the introduction of coinage at Corinth is dated to a time before 650-40 B.C., being judged from the unearthed stone with the dedicatory inscription. II. Literary evidence. A. Hermodike, a wife of Midas, struck coins (Heraclides Ponticus 11, 3). B. The gold coins of Gyges were held in high repute (Pollux 3,87; 7, 98). C. The first coinage of the Greek mainland was struck at Aegina by Pheidon of Argos (Strabo 358, 376; Marmor Parium 30; Etymologicum Magnum 613), who is said to have been contemporary with Gyges. Upon these I remark as follows. I.A, II. A,B are easily refuted. In his more recent study of the vases of I.B, the excavator dates their contents to the seventh century B.C., not c. 800-650 B.C. The Perachora inscription of I.C. may belong to as late as the first half of the sixth century B.C. Moreover, concernig the exact character of the undiscovered 'drachma', nothing decisive can be said. The iron spits found at Argive Heraeum seem to confirm the tradition (Orionis Etymologicum 118), which reports the dedication of the obsolete spits to Hera of Argos by Pheidon. But those spits are not necessarily taken as the tradition goes. There is also some doubt about the credibility of informations on Pheidon's coinage of II. C. Accordingly, Hammond's contention is not strong enough to deny the appropriateness of Robinson's conclusion, which is based on precise numismatical and archaeological research.

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In dieser Abhandlung sammelte ich die Stellen über die caesarischen Armeen im Osten in den Jahren 48/47 vor Chr. Zwar hat man bisher Caesars Legionen ziemlich eingehend untersucht. Aber die Hilfstruppen wurden dabei weniger beachtet. Mich interessierten auch die Hilfstruppen, und zwar in dem Zusammenhang, den ich in der Historia, X, SS. 473 ff. dargelegt habe.

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