The purpose of this paper is to present a historical and geographic macroperspective on the changes in global politics and economics being brought about by communications networks. The Internet is playing a major role in this revolution. We are in the midst of an momentous age, in which two cultures, which began in ancient Egypt about 6, 600 years ago and spread around the globe, are meeting again in the Asia-Pacific region, which includes Japan. The information revolution is making this possible.
We can use the Venetian civilization as the dividing line between the Middle Ages and the modern industrial world. Since then, the phases of global prosperity were punctuated by the industrial, manufacturing, and commercial revolutions made possible by the development of the steam engine, and later the internal combustion engine. The fourth phase of global prosperity began when the American-invented transistor was reborn as the microprocessor.
A key aspect of the information revolution is the migration of publishing onto online services, and making those resources available in real time. This is being made possible by the microprocessor. In turn, this provides us with the ability to use communications networks to improve dialogue among nations, access to education and health care, and solutions for the planet's ecology.
The roots of this information revolution lie in the US's attempt to deal with such problems as its budget deficit, trade deficit, and increasing difficulties with its systems of education and health care. But as the US makes the transition from a National Information Infrastructure to a Global Information Infrastructure, this information revolution also offers opportunities for solving East-West and North-South problems. Communications networks are now linking not only the world's major economic powers, but also post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the Asian-Pacific region, South America, and Africa. From the standpoint of this information revolution, the major power in the twenty-first century—in terms of human resources, language, economic strength, military ability, and communications technology—will not be China or India, it will be the US. The US is the only nation with sufficient resources to leverage communications networks as a means toward peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century. The US can use the information revolution to extend its dominance and prosperity for another hundred years. Rather than compete against the US, Japan should choose to support the cause of world peace by contributing to the expansion of information networks.

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The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was formalized with the Euratom Treaty, signed by six countries in March 1957; this, along with the establishment of the European Economic Community, is considered a watershed event in the European integration process.
Thus far, existing studies on French diplomacy toward Euratom have not focused on the French position on the issue of bringing its overseas territories within the framework of Euratom. However, inclusion of overseas territories was a strategic matter, considering that Eurafrica was promoted by Gaston Defferre, the then Minister of Overseas France, and was later adopted by Guy Mollet, the then French Prime Minister. Euratom was conceived as a part of France's vision of Eurafrica, which aimed to struggle for ground in a bipolar world, based on Africa's abundant resources. With inputs from various archival sources, especially in France and Brussels, this article illustrates how Euratom, based on Eurafrica, evolved as well as how France took a decision between alternatives, including both civil and military programs. By doing this, the negative views of Euratom can be reconsidered.
What were the consequences of Euratom for France? Militarily, Euratom was “ambiguous” because it neither assured exclusively peaceful use of atomic energy nor served any unique military purpose. Considering the pronuclear French stand, it is deducible that France was never keen on Euratom.
However, from a strategic viewpoint, Euratom was important to France with regard to the overseas territories of Euratom's member states, and concurred well with the French response to the decolonization process. In the midst of the decolonization wave, the European integration process, relaunched after the Messina Conference in June 1955, was pursued by Defferre with the eventual goal of a Eurafrica, and aimed at a new mutually beneficial long-term relationship between the member states and their colonies. Further, when Euratom was signed, the member states' colonies were also integrated, albeit with some exceptions. This was seen as a step toward the creation of Eurafrica, which would serve as a means of response to the decolonization process. Moreover, Euratom also functioned as an insurance for the realization of Eurafrica for Mollet, as it came very close to concretizing into a Eurafrica after the Suez debacle; this was the case when the other French vision of Eurafrica, based on common market principles, was far from being realized due to member disagreements.

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This article examines how, in multilateral security alliances, the third party perceives and reacts to the diplomatic disputes between the other two allies through an investigation of Australia’s approach to the ANZUS crisis (1984-1985). The ANZUS crisis was a disagreement between New Zealand and the United States as a result of Wellington’s decision to ban nuclear-armed ships and aircrafts from New Zealand territories. In July 1984, David Lange, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, announced his plan to ban the entry of nuclear-armed ships and aircrafts from any country into New Zealand’s territory. The United States requested New Zealand to withdraw the plan as it was concerned about the negative impacts on its global nuclear strategy, Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND). Subsequently, both countries initiated negotiations to find a compromise. Nevertheless, these attempts failed since both failed to come to a consensus. Consequently, Washington lost hope for future cooperation with Wellington and withdrew its security commitments to New Zealand as stipulated by the ANZUS treaty.

The analytical focus of this article is, although, not on New Zealand and the United States, but on Australia which was watching the unfolding of the ANZUS crisis as the third ally of the treaty. Previous studies claim that Australia avoided involvement in the Crisis and did not intervene in the dispute. Through an investigation of newly opened primary documents and secondary sources, this article argues, however, that Australia worked below the surface and involved itself in the Crisis. Canberra was concerned that the aggravation of the Crisis might trigger off dilemma that an intricate choice had to be made between maintaining relations with New Zealand or the United States. Canberra also envisioned that New Zealand’s reactions to the United States would harden if the United States coerced the former. Thus, it urged Washington to restrain pressure against Wellington through diplomatic channels.

Finally, the article implies Australia’s approach had impact on the dynamics of the Crisis. It puts forward the hypothesis that Australia’s involvement was a cause of the complicated negotiations between New Zealand and the United States. New Zealand feared punishments from the United States as a result of its banning of ports visits by nuclear-armed ships. Therefore, it could be said that New Zealand would have withdrawn the plan of banning such ships if the United States had issued threats or implemented retaliations. Because of this, it can be concluded that Australia’s urging of the United States to restrain coercions against New Zealand indirectly aggravated the crisis.

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Damage caused by the earthquake is now widespread,having been compounded two-, and then three-fold, by additional events. The health effects of radioactive materials released in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant disaster and consumed through food have become one of the biggest social issues to arise from the disaster. Using the risk communication paradigm, we will assess the researcher’s role for the public in confronting sociallydevastating circumstances, as well as consider how scientific information and opinions can be exchanged to attain an public understanding of the situation.
Firstly, we provide a description of the public psychological state confronting the effects of radiation contamination of food on health. Next, we will discuss the current state of risk communication and propose a interactive model. Then we will outline the public knowledge and risk perception for effects of radiation contamination of food on health at pre-/post- communication, and validate the evidence of the situations in the focus group communication, especially scrutiny process in discussions of scientific information presented.

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