詳細検索結果
以下の条件での結果を表示する: 検索条件を変更
クエリ検索: "ヨルダン内戦"
15件中 1-15の結果を表示しています
  • ――キプロス主権基地領域を巡る議論を中心に、1968-74年
    伊藤 頌文
    国際安全保障
    2017年 44 巻 4 号 74-92
    発行日: 2017/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 浦野 起央
    日本中東学会年報
    1986年 1 巻 332-338
    発行日: 1986/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 非国家的行為体と国際関係
    浦野 起央
    国際政治
    1978年 1978 巻 59 号 40-64,L5
    発行日: 1978/08/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) which head the palestinian national liberation struggle is a movement-formation body consisting of Palestinians and has the characteristics of being transnational and having a modern state approach. It is a struggle by Palestinians for the setting up a homeland, however, having lost their soil and they are propagandist Fedayeen of an armed struggle with the slogan of freedom and liberation.
    In the arab contexist during the All-Arab Palestine Conference and the General Syrian Congress of 1910, the Palestinian nationalism was rised. However, as a result of the Palestine War in 1948, the palestinians were scattered as the “refugees” and were used as tools by Arab nations for their foreign policies. After, the Palestinian national liberation movement has gone through the following stages.
    The 1st Period-In 1951 the Arab National Movement was formed and an awakening and consiousness was born. In 1955 the resistance movement was begun and from 1965 it has been escalating year by year.
    The 2nd Period-In September 1963 the Council of Arab League decided that the Arab Nations would take the responsiblity of liberating the Palestinians. In June 1964, during the first Palestine National Council the PLO was established.
    The 3rd Period-After the 3rd Arab-Israeli War the Palestinian Fedayeen become the vangard against Israel. In July 1968, the fourth Palestine National Council decided the Guerrilla Warfar of the Peoples' Revolution Strategy. Thus its began the International Internal War.
    The 4th Period-Though the conflict in the Arab Nations and their subsequent dealings with these nations, they began to demand the total liberation of the soil of Palestine, their homeland. In the 1971 PLO Constitution, Political Programe for the Conduct of the Palestine Revolution, and the formation of an democratic Palestinian state liberated from Zionist imperialism was taken up.
    The 5th Period-In July 1975 the Islam Congress declares its endorsment of opening up offices for PLO, and in January 1977 Egypt and Jordan agreed to coordinate among both countries for the formation of a Palestinian state.
    The leading role played by the PLO in International Internal War helped it to confirm its identity and this made the Arab Nations demand the formation of a Palestinian state as a condition for Middle East pease. The PLO is not a state but a movement-formation body, however of late as a transnational actor it has developed a new state within the existing state system. This state would not be the so-called “Establishment” but would rather be based on a community life-style, and with the union of the respective autonomics social and economic interchange would take place, such as a safe community among Jordan, Israel and others. Although this is called a state, it is a completely new kind of state and conditions necessary for making the foundation of this state possible is what I call the third situation. That is the UN should come to grips with the problem of the Palestinian guerrilla and demand a solution throught the state system. On the other hand, the popular movement in Israel should come in contact with the PLO and this solution should be demanded of the Israel Government by transformation and this would bring about overlapping of external and internal dimentions leading to international relations while it make no distinction between peace and war.
  • ―イスラーム的NGOの分析を通じて―
    佐藤 麻理絵
    アジア・アフリカ地域研究
    2018年 18 巻 1 号 1-19
    発行日: 2018/09/30
    公開日: 2018/10/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    The current refugee problem facing international society has its roots in the Middle East. The impact of refugees is high in this region of numerous conflicts and continuous political instability. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the gently welcoming host countries that provides a refuge for people from adjacent areas. In protecting refugees, Jordan’s non-state sector plays an important role alongside the state and international regime Previous studies of Jordan’s refugee protection policy and international relations, however, have not addressed the NGO sector, although it has been mentioned in analyses of the Muslim Brotherhood, and in reference to Islamic Activism. In this context, NGOs are mostly treated as a threat to the state’s legitimacy.

    This paper examines the development of Jordan’s refugee relief in the protection process and actor relations, especially among the state, international organizations, and non-state actors. It was found that Jordan’s NGO sector has grown since the country’s political liberalization; Islamic NGOs, in particular, play an important role in refugee protection in the urban sphere. The government of Jordan, by tightening the regulation of NGOs, has restricted their political activities and encouraged them to throw themselves into protection activities. The Jordanian refugee policy aims to attract international support, without becoming dependent upon international organizations, by organizing royal NGOs and using traditional Islamic channels to encourage the resilience of the whole community. In this way, Jordan strengthens he state’s legitimacy by contributing to state development and maintaining the stability of Islamic power.

  • 御茶の水書房 2003年 v+305+14ページ
    泉 淳
    アジア経済
    2004年 45 巻 4 号 79-83
    発行日: 2004/04/15
    公開日: 2023/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中東:1970年代の政治変動
    岡倉 徹志
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 73 号 28-43,L8
    発行日: 1983/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to present a brief account of the political changes in Syria since the Baa'th first came into power in 1963 and the development of inner-politics from the beginning period of the Baa'th regime to the present. It is also designed to offer an interpretation of these developments to help explain the kaleidoscopic character of the changing relationships among power-centers.
    In particular, this paper attempts to elucidate the following points: Firstly, in a major intra-party split that took place in February 1966, the moderate wing of the Baa'th party was purged by radicals; this political coup signaled the party's further turn to the Left in policy. These changes only further alienated conservative and pious Islamic opinion. However, the regime's mounting clashes with the West and Israel have temporarily disoriented Muslim opinion.
    Secondly, after General Hafiz al Asad's rise to power in 1971, the question arises as to how he managed to revise Syria's domestic and foreign policies. By late 1976, however, the regime's policies were faltering and domestic grievances were accumulating; relations between the Baa'th and urban centers of opposition again began to sour, a disaffection that gradually built up into the anti-regime explosions of 1970-80.
    The regime's intervention in Lebanon—in paticular, its drive against the Palestinians and the Sunni Left—required it to suppress domestic opposition, thus weakening its own support base, and antagonizing segments of Sunni opinion, which viewed it as an Alawite suppression of Sunnis in favor of Christians. Most dangerous of all, the intervention seriously exacerbated sectarian cleavages in the army. By the late 1970s, the regime's foreign policy increasingly appeared to have reached a dead end.
    Finally, the political Islam, the main alternative. to the Baa'th, is now trying to undermine the regime led by the Alawites. If a realignment of political forces, pitting the whole Sunni community on the basis of sectarian solidarity, in alliance with all other disaffected elements, against the numerically much inferior Alawites entrenched in the regime can be attained, the Syrian political scene will change completely its impact affecting the politics of the Fertile Crescent. But this would require breaking the cross-sectarian coalition at the center of the Baa'th state; destroying military discipline and party solidarity; and detaching the peasant, worker, and employee elements at the Baa'th base.
  • 中東:1970年代の政治変動
    丸山 直起
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 73 号 1-8,L5
    発行日: 1983/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This special issue is devoted to the study of not only political changes in the Middle East but also to the implications of these changes in regard to the global international system of the 1970s. We can observe that through the 1970s, there developed a growing interdependence between the Middle East, the global system as a whole and other regional systems. This interdependence has had far-reaching effects on other regions. In retrospect, the Third Arab-Israeli War of 1967 caused the following political changes in the Middle East in the 1970s:
    (1) The change of power in the Arab World
    As a result of the War, the power balance of the Arab World changed radically in favour of the conservative and oil producing regimes which came to aid the defeated hardliners. Nasser's Pan-Arabism disappeared from the Arad political scene. Each Arab state chose her foreign policy based on her geopolitical position and the national interest. This has split the Arab World and led to multipolarization.
    (2) The re-emergence of the Palestinian liberation movement
    In the aftermath of the Six Day War, the Palestinians started their armed struggle against the Israeli forces. The PLO was reborn with Arafat as its chairman. The Palestine question has come to international recognition as a fundamental element in the Middle East conflict.
    (3) The politicization of oil
    The oil producing states enhanced their position vis-à-vis the international oil companies and the consuming states in the 1970s. Arab states exploited their oil resources as a political weapon for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of their cause in 1973.
    (4) The activation of Islam as a political force
    In August 1969 arson caused damage to the al-Aqsa mosque, Islam's holy place in Jerusalem under Israeli occupation. This matter was taken up in the first Islamic Summit the following month. Furthermore, the psychological impact upon the Muslims caused by Israeli liberation of Jerusalem and the socio-cultural impact resulting from the rapid modernization of the oil producing states have made domestic politics more fluid, to the extent that a crisis of identity has occurred.
    (5) Israel as a regional power
    Israel's survival is no more in jeopardy. With security unchallenged and nationalistic sentiments heightened, Israel has been more concerned about the internal developments of neighbouring Arab states. This can be seen, for example, by Israel's strong reaction to Jordan's crisis of 1970, Lebanon's civil war after 1975, and the arms build-up of Arab neighbours.
    In the global international system, both the United States and the Soviet Union, which began putting the Middle East under their control after World War II, are steadily on the decline. In the late 1960s, when both powers reached an impasse in their military-economic positions, the global international system was transformed in the direction of multipolarization as a consequence of the loosening of ties in their own camps. The above-mentioned phenomena of the Middle East from 1967 onwards, created a major impact in the global system.
    The October War of 1973 is an example. During the War the Arab oil producing countries imposed the “oil weapon” on the industrial countries urging pro-Arab policy statements. This accelerated the multipolarization of the global system. The Western countries, which depended increasingly on Arab oil, differed sharply on how to formulate policies on such issues as oil and Palestine in the face of Arab blackmail. The United States could no longer dictate to the EC and Japan concerning Middle East issues. Moreover, in the early 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union respectively lost military prestige in Iran and Afghanistan. In Iran angry Iranians took the American Embassy staff hostage. But the United States could do nothing for more than a year with the exception of one attempted rescue operation.
  • 国際紛争の研究
    丸山 直起
    国際政治
    1976年 1976 巻 55 号 1-26,L1
    発行日: 1976/07/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The fourth round of the Arab-Israeli War was started on 6 October 1973 by the Arabs. Before the War, the Arabs deliberately prepared their military build-up. Israeli intelligence noted these preparations along the ceasefire lines. But the military elite misinterpreted the intentions of the Arab leaders, believing that the Arabs would never renew the fighting because of their poor military capabilities and the opposing Israeli superiority in the military balance. Should the Arabs intend to surprise Israel, Israeli early-warning systems would founction, a standing army would hold the enemy forces, and the rapid mobilization would be carried out.
    In the early morning of 6 October, the decisive information that the war would break out that evening reached the military elite. Chief of Staff Elazar took the necessary steps immediately. He met the Defence Minister and proposed a pre-emptive strike and general mobilization of reserves. The political elite, such as the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Vice Prime Minister, however, turned down the former proposal, but concerning the latter one they authorized Gen. Elazar to mobilize 100, 000 men. These two decisions were based on a political consideration. The factors which induced the political elite to adopt these decisions were mainly their image of the external environment and the political decision-making system itself. The Israeli political elite had viewed their environment as follows: (1) regionally, Israeli military supremacy and the maintenance of the ceasefire in the border areas ruled out any possibility of warfare; but (2) globally, her political position in the international area was symbolized by her isolation. Especially in 1973, two dramatic incidents, the downing of a Libyan airplane by Israeli warplanes in February and the hijacking of an Iraqi jet liner in August, deepened the isolation. In the latter case, the US Government condemned the Israeli action. The decisions not to pre-empt and not to call up all the reserves are explained by Israel's deteriorating pnlitical environment. Moreover there was no machinery in the decision-making organization to check the evaluations presented by the military intelligence.
  • ジュネにおける個人的な体験とパレスチナ革命の結合をめぐって
    田村 哲也
    フランス語フランス文学研究
    2017年 111 巻 207-221
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2017/11/02
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 千葉 悠志
    マス・コミュニケーション研究
    2012年 80 巻 113-132
    発行日: 2012/01/31
    公開日: 2017/10/06
    ジャーナル フリー
    The New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) is a movement dedicated to bridging the information divide between the northern and southern hemispheres. This movement was led by the non-aligned countries, who stimulated vigorous debates in UNESCO meetings, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Arab countries, which have historically imported large amounts of Western media content, also participated these debates and attempted to bridge the information divide between themselves and Western countries. For example, Mustafa Masmoudi, an ex-minister of information of Tunisia and a member of the MacBride committee, contributed immensely to the issuing of the Mass Media Declaration that was finally adopted in the 20th General Meeting of UNESCO in 1978. In this paper, through an analysis of news agencies, of information organizations and of the expansion of national broadcasting capabilities, I reveal how Arab countries collectively attempted to modify the established information structures in accordance with the rise of NIICO. Additionally, I reveal how a series of collaborative attempts made by Arab countries became ineffective when many Arab states prioritized the strengthening of their national informational capabilities over these attempts.
  • 佐藤 雅哉
    アメリカ研究
    2019年 53 巻 191-212
    発行日: 2019/04/25
    公開日: 2021/09/17
    ジャーナル フリー

    This study examines the ways in which the Middle East and the Israeli question were placed in debates over US Cold War foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This period constituted a critical moment when alternatives to the Cold War seemed possible. A broad Cold War consensus, which had been dominant in American political culture for decades, began facing severe criticism because of the US quagmire in Vietnam, and Congressional activism grew in response to the war. Anti-Vietnam War Congressmen and women claimed that the war was not exceptional but a logical consequence of a Cold War foreign policy that supported any Third World ally including right-wing dictatorships that could contain Communist inroads in Third World regions. Reformist representatives in both houses designed a way to judge the legitimacy of foreign assistance on the grounds of the extent of the recipients’ democracy so that problematic governments that were unconcerned with the welfare of their people would not receive US aid. But they urged the Executive Branch to provide Israel with substantial military and economic aid. This congressional pressure played a major role in cultivating the tight US-Israeli relationship that grew dramatically after the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. This article investigates how these two, seemingly contradictory, moves—supporting both the increase of financial and military aid to Israel and the reduction of similar aid to the South Vietnamese government and several other US allies in the Third World—went together, by focusing senators and representatives who were dovish on Vietnam but hawkish in the Middle East.

    Investigating this wing of lawmakers sheds new light on the significant impact that the events in the Middle East had on the political culture of 1970s America. Previous studies have shown that New Right intellectuals and politicians and military specialists mobilized militarized images of Israel, which were strengthened by Israel’s military strength and uncompromising anti-terrorist measures, in their effort to recover a “strong America,” using these images as a model for the United States to overcome a sense of public aversion to military interventionism. These studies, however, ignore that liberal critics of US Cold War foreign policy also referred to Israel to depict what they believed America should stand for. Reformist Congressmen and women depicted Israel as a modern and democratic nation deserving US military and economic aid to differentiate Israel from other Third World allies, counterposing “democracy” with “dictatorship.” This article demonstrates that for Cold War reformers in Congress, providing military and economic aid to Israel complemented their effort to recover US moral authority that they believed the US involvement of the war in Vietnam had undermined. It concludes that the mobilization of the binary world view and repetitive mentions of Communist-backed aggression in the Middle East for supporting Israel led to the discursive survival of the Cold War even among many anti-Cold War lawmakers at a time when shattering that consensus seemed possible.

  • 中東:1970年代の政治変動
    浦野 起央
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 73 号 64-85,L11
    発行日: 1983/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The independence of Trans-Jordan, which was formerly a part of the Britishruled Palestine Mandate, paved the way for the League of Nations resolution on the division of Palestinian land, which, by a United Nations resolution, gave birth to the State of Israel. The Arabs rejected the resolution pointing to the contradictions behind the Palestine Mandate. The Palestinian War then became inevitable. The breakthrough in the battle became evident when the Arab Legion of Trans-Jordan moved into the West Bank. “The Unity” between the East and West Banks of the Jordan river was instigated by this, following the Palestine Conference and Jerrico Conference on November 1 and December 1, 1948 under King Abdullah's leadership. “The Unity” in turn put an end to the hegemony that traditional Mufti Amin al-Husaini had enjoyed in the West Bank. The negotiations over the mutual non-aggression pact between Israel and Jordan broke down. Nonetheless, the de facto occupation of the West Bank by Jordan occurred. With the West Bank in the hands of Jordanians, Palestinian Arabs came to pledge political loyality to the Amman regime under the civilian order of Jordan, a loyality which reflects no less than the ambivalent sentiments of Palestinans. The Palestinian leaders in the West Bank, however, found themselves subjugated to the Nashashibis of Abdullah while maintaning support for the cause of Palestinians within and without Jordan. Palestinian refugees, on the other hand, pledged loyality to Abudullah in November 1948 at the Palestine National Conference. Their pledge was betrayed, however, as their, political came to be suppressed from 1959 onward.
    “Palestinian identity” as a slogan for political action emerged in 1962, but the cause never flourished. In fact, the dominance of the Amman regime, with the execption of the period of Sulayman an-Nabulsi's regime between 1956-57, has prevailed throughout the country. Furthemore, the PLO itself has failed to gain public support for its status as the unifying voice of the Palestinians, having suffered from internal feuds between the moderates and the radicals. All these combined events precipitated the conditional legitimacy of the royal regime of Jordan and the Palestinian Right.
    With Israeli's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the issue of the status and the prospect of the above regimes came to the attention of international public opinion. The status of Israel, on the one hand, was ‘Lawful belligerent Occupant’ responsible for occupation and on the other hand, the legal status of Jordan was that of ‘Trust Occupant’. Jordan was also in a position to promote the political development of Palestinians. Moreover, under UN resolution 242 (1967) Jordan was entitled to ‘the right of return’ of the West Bank to her, although Palestinians in the West Bank did not always desire to see this happen. Alternative solutions to the Palestinian problem lay either in holding a direct referendum, which would clarify the political will of the locals, or in accepting the PLO as their negotiator against Israel. Israel on her part has rejected negotiations with the PLO, which Israel considers a terrorist organisation. In addition, the Palestinians have not desired to continue to support ‘the return to Jordan’ proposal, for it implies denying their rights of self-determination.
    At present discussions with respect to the so-called “Jordan Option” over the West Bank are under way. The PLO claims to be the legitimate position governing body in the West Bank. The Arabs in Israel appear to endorse this position. To be sure, following the formation of the PLF (the Palestine Liberation Front) in August 1973, the PLO came to be confirmed as the legitimate body of the Palestinians at the National Congress which took place in Jerusalem, October 1978.
  • 池端 蕗子
    日本中東学会年報
    2017年 33 巻 1 号 39-69
    発行日: 2017/07/15
    公開日: 2018/08/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the sectarian conflicts in the modern Middle East as the ideological conflicts of ternary rivalry; Shiite Revolutionalism, Sunni Conservatism and Sunni Salafi-Jihadism. And also this paper clarifies how Jordan formulates its religious strategies in such situation. Jordan, as the representation of Sunni Conservatism, is attacked by both of Shiite ideology and Sunni Salafi-Jihadi ideology. Therefore, Jordan is under pressure of necessity to redefine its Sunni ideology. The Amman Message issued in 2004 shows representatively the religious strategy of Jordan. The message has significance to redefine Jordan’s Sunni ideology based on the modern situation and to revive the Sunni moderate thought. Because this Sunni ideology is supported by sacredness of the Jordan Hashemite Royal Family, descendent of Prophet Muhammad, this ideology is very characteristic compared with the other Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia. It means that there is also rivalry within Sunni Conservatism. The Amman Message is designed not only to advocate the need for peaceful unity but also to very aggressively seize the initiative in the Islamic world in religious way. Naming this aggressive act as the Religious-Rapprochement Strategy, this paper investigates the Sunni moderate thought of Jordan in the 21st century.
  • 鈴木 啓之
    日本中東学会年報
    2016年 32 巻 1 号 37-70
    発行日: 2016/07/15
    公開日: 2018/06/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article analyzes the process of the alliance between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan from 1982 to 1987, and its effect on the occupied Palestinian territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). PLO leaders, like Khaled al-Hassan, sought to become allied with Jordan for two reasons: to balance the power against opponent groups that had ties to Syria, and to prepare for possible peace negotiations hosted by the U.S. However, their alliance only lasted for a few years, until 1987. The PLO leadership realized the alliance with Jordan could not achieve political status for the PLO and even caused more severe inter-factional disputes among Palestinian groups. PLO leaders sought reconciliation among factions, but then decided to cancel the Amman Agreement. Even with the Amman Agreement’s retraction, the short alliance between the PLO and Jordan introduced a direct connection between the PLO and the Occupied Territories. The PLO’s leadership, especially Abu-Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), played an important role in establishing PLO-affiliated organizations inside the territories. These circumstances led to pro-PLO political activities in the territories, and led the way to the first Intifada in 1987.
  • 鈴木 啓之
    日本中東学会年報
    2014年 30 巻 1 号 61-94
    発行日: 2014/07/15
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article seeks to answer the question: why did Palestinians in the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) develop political activities that differed from those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but at the same time maintain strong support toward the PLO? Primary documents collected in al-Wathā’iq al-Filasṭīnīya al-‘Arabīya (The Documents of Arab Palestine) can help illuminate the dynamic politics inside and outside the territories. Following analysis of historical developments using these primary documents, this article concludes that strict control by Israeli authorities inside the territories and Palestinians’ fear of the appearance of an alternative leadership brought their own political program to support the PLO within a relationship of co-existence. Inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was very difficult to insist on the full liberation of Palestine (which the PLO did), because of the stringent Israeli control, but Palestinians inside the territories needed the PLO to prevent another leadership from forming that might collaborate with Israel or Jordan. However, changing international politics led to cooperation between the PLO and Jordan: the very country that intended to create an alternative leadership inside the territories. The paper shows how the dynamics of international politics created an ironic situation inside the territories.
feedback
Top