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  • 第3報 生糸の剛性率に対する柔軟剤の影響
    高木 春郎
    繊維学会誌
    1960年 16 巻 1 号 25-30
    発行日: 1960/01/10
    公開日: 2008/11/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    The ratio of the rigidity of raw silk which had been treated with the solution of some softeners to that of untreated one (relative rigidity) was directly measured, and the following results were obtained.
    1) The rigidity of raw silk is generally lowered by the treatment with the solution of softeners.
    2) The weight of raw silk is gradually increased and its rigidity is lowered with increased concentration of the softeners used. The rigidity of the raw silk treated with a comparatively higher concentration of some anionic softeners is lowered to about one-half of that of untreated raw silk.
    3) Although it is not clear whether the decrease of the rigidity of the treated raw silk is due, to the water contained in the softeners or to the softener molecules themselves, it seems that molecules play some role.
    4) The weight of raw silk is generally increased by lengthning the time of treatment.
    5) As a whole, the influence of the temperature of the treatment (10_??_42°C) upon the rigidity is not large.
  • 村上 隆
    比較経済体制学会会報
    1997年 34 巻 1 号 49-57
    発行日: 1997/02/20
    公開日: 2009/07/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中澤 孝之
    ロシア・東欧学会年報
    2000年 2000 巻 29 号 12-21
    発行日: 2000年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    This report was written with the intention which tried to clarify the realities of the oligarchies (the financial cliques)in Russia.
    The Russian economic oligarchy research has just started in Japan. Even in Russia, so far it seems to be insufficient. A real research is the future task.
    It can be said that economic oligarchy exactly symbolizes the Yeltsin age by the phenomenon which appears by the process of conversion to capitalism in Russia during about past ten years.
    The Russian oligarchies skillfully accumulated the capital in the first stage of Russian capitalism with economic confusion and incompleteness of the law. That is, the monopoly (oligopoly) of wealth in Russia of the present age was achieved by small number of oligarchies. The numbers of the groups were from 7 to 10 only.
    Privatization of government-owned properties was the splendid chance for the oligarchies. They approached the senior officials of the Yeltsin regime and build a special intimate relation with a Yeltsin family (“semiya” in Russian) to win by the public bidding for privatization. It was adhesion with the regime, by which the oligarchies have increased the property. On of the model is Berezovsky's case. The tycoon was often called even the safe keeper of the “semiya”.
    First of all, I look back to the time when small number of Russian financial capitalists gained power and enumerate the groups concretely. In addition, I point out their shady relationships with the regime while introducing the examples of their action behind the scene of the process of the war between banks and privatization of the government-run oil companies.
    Secondly, I verify when Russian words “oligarxhy” or “oligarxhiya” came to appear to the mass communication in Russia.
    Thirdly, I enumerate names of the oligarchies' groups and each representative's names, and classify them into some categories according to some current reports. Moreover, I elucidate the reason why they became rich after the Soviet Union was dismantled.
    Finally, I somewhat refer the movement of the old and new oligarchies in the Putin's regime.
  • 齋藤 洋昭
    日本水産学会誌
    2000年 66 巻 1 号 137-138
    発行日: 2000/01/15
    公開日: 2008/02/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 月出 皎司
    比較経済研究
    2007年 44 巻 2 号 55-58
    発行日: 2007/06/02
    公開日: 2009/07/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―アクター,政策,制度分析からの接近―
    山脇 大
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2014年 2014 巻 43 号 89-104
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2016/09/09
    ジャーナル フリー

    Regulations on the flaring and utilisation of associated petroleum gas (APG) have been in place since the early 1980s. Their purpose is environmental conservation and the effective use of limited natural resources. The formation on international frameworks, such as the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction, which was launched in the 2000s, and the raising of environmental awareness in emerging and developing countries have also decreased the amount of APG flaring around the world. In Russia, however, the situation on APG utilization and flaring is entirely different. Here, the utilisation of APG has not improved since the 1990s. Even now, Russia remains the world’s largest APG-flaring country. This means that it is now explicitly confronted with problems on APG flaring and utilisation, while it struggles to adapt to global environmental protection trends and to modernise its economy.

    President Putin regards this problem as one of Russia’s most urgent tasks. On the 26 April 2007, at the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, he ordered his government to design solutions to achieve a more than 95% effective APG-usage level (less than 5 % flaring). In addition, the 7th government decision was selected, a policy that can enforce a fine for flaring over 5% of all APG and also for the use of infrastructure in oil fields that does not meet standards of approval. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this fine policy remains limited. This situation suggests that the APG-flaring-and-utilisation problem in Russia has its own specificity and that it should not only be analysed from the current situation, but from the perspective of the continuity or incoherence of the Soviet Union actors, policies and institutions surrounding it, during this country’s transition to a market economy.

    As mentioned above, the APG utilisation and flaring in Russia is one of the most urgent environmental and economic problems among this country’s hydrocarbon industries. This study attempts to give some explanation on this situation. First, it analyses long-term APG-utilisation trends in Russia. Then, actors, policies and institutions involved in Russia’s APG utilization and flaring are traced. Finally, through the above-mentioned analysis, this paper tries to explain the situation and factors of Russia currently being the largest flaring country.

    JEL classification codes: L71, P28, Q35, Q40

  • 橋本 悟, 栗原 浩司, 佐藤 芳代, 田川 正人, 田村 幸吉, 池田 孝夫
    日本化粧品技術者会誌
    1998年 32 巻 2 号 178-185
    発行日: 1998/06/20
    公開日: 2010/08/06
    ジャーナル フリー
    化粧料用油相成分として有用な, 月見草油, ククイナッツオイル等の高度不飽和油を, 安定に化粧料に配合することを目的として, 抗酸化力を有する植物抽出物を抗酸化成分に選定し, O/Wエマルジョン中で有効な, 抗酸化剤及び抗酸化システムの探索を行なった。リノール酸メチルを含むO/Wエマルジョンを評価系とした本報告において, 著者らは, O/Wエマルジョン系での植物抽出物系抗酸化剤の抗酸化力とそれらの分配挙動が密接な関係にあることを明らかにして, 更に, 親油性のポリグリセリン脂肪酸エステルが, O/Wエマルジョン中で, 抗酸化剤を, 効率良く, O/W界面に配向させることを見いだし, 結果として, 植物抽出物のO/Wエマルジョン中での抗酸化力を増大させることを確認した。
  • 内村 泰三
    日本エネルギー学会誌
    2004年 83 巻 8 号 603-605
    発行日: 2004/08/20
    公開日: 2017/07/11
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 下斗米 伸夫
    ロシア・東欧学会年報
    1997年 1997 巻 26 号 1-9
    発行日: 1997年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 杉浦 史和
    比較経済体制学会年報
    2005年 42 巻 2 号 72-76
    発行日: 2005/06/04
    公開日: 2009/07/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山脇 大
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2020年 2020 巻 49 号 126-143
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2021/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー

    Climate change has been recognised as an important policy issue that affects nature and socio-economic systems of all continents and oceans over the last few decades. In order to achieve the ambitious goal of ‘keeping a global temperature rise to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels’ by the Paris Agreement agreed at COP 21 in 2015, formulation and implementation of climate change policies, especially mitigation ones to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been recently advanced all over the world.

    Russia, as one of the largest energy-resource rich countries and GHG emitters, has been also in the process of modernisation towards a low-carbon society, especially after the occurrence of global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Under this circumstance, the formulation and implementation of climate change policies have recently begun in earnest in Russia through its signature on and ratification of the Paris Agreement effective in 2016. These policies in Russia, however, often end in failure.

    In this context, this present paper firstly clarifies the current situation of climate change and its causes such as GHG and air pollutants emissions in Russia, followed by the critical consideration of previous studies on this global thematic issue. By revisiting the formulation and implementation process of Russian climate change policies with a special focus on its multi-stakeholders, this paper tries to explain why these policies are not materialised in Russia, that is, factors influencing on its policy failure.

    Throughout a series of analysis, it becomes clear in this paper that Russian environmental administration has been weakened whilst the government spending with environmental purposes on a downward trend in Russia after starting market transition in the 1990s. This paper also derives that institutional arrangements in the governmental committees enable Russian oil and gas companies to do lobbying for reflecting their interests on relevant policies. Besides, it becomes unveiled that residents and civil society organisations (CSOs), as one of representative protesters demanding policy reforms through social movements, have an insignificant influence on climate change policies in the case of Russia.

    This paper then concludes that these factors are crucial propositions given to Russian climate change policies to materialise its transition towards a low-carbon society as well as big challenges to be overcome for its future sustainable growth.

  • 溝端 佐登史
    季刊経済理論
    2015年 52 巻 2 号 16-30
    発行日: 2015/07/20
    公開日: 2017/07/03
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper analyses state capitalism in Russia from the viewpoint of state capital and state functions. As far as the Russia's government size (number of public servants and financial expenditures of the public sector) equals to those in developed countries, it cannot be applied as a precise indicator to characterize state capitalism. On the other side, both the state capital as a market player and the state functions can be regarded as qualitative characteristics of the Russian capitalism. As for the state capital, both privatization and state intervention have coexisted, and have simultaneously functioned for "controlling the highlands (the mainstay of state)". Moreover, the 2008 global economic crisis authorized state intervention. In order to maintain global competitiveness, the government has established strategic enterprises and has implemented preferential measures. Even though the state sector in the economy has decreased, it has enhanced its intervention into the private sector of the economy. The state has a strong influence on the economy via holding shares and regulations. Particularly, state-owned enterprises have changed their enterprise type from state corporations and unitary enterprises to joint-stock companies. In addition, "the exchange system of interests (state capture and business capture)" has been established and the state capital has openly showed its new "internationalization" behavior. The state capital has close ties with the global financial flows and it has stipulated the emergence of Russia's multinationals that are deeply connected with tax havens. Despite the offshore problem, the state sector is deeply linked with the global network and, therefore, state capitalism cannot exist without linkages with the global market. With regards to authoritarian political regime, concentration of powers, and existence of oil and gas rents, Russia is none other than state capitalism. However, functions and quality (good governance) of the state capitalism are far behind other developed countries. The Russian state is inferior in terms of state functions and state quality; the state as a coordinator of interests by grabbing hands may not be regarded as a strong one. Thus, Russia (Putin's regime) cannot be referred as "a normal middle income democratic country". Finally, low quality and authoritarian regime are mutually complementary in Russia, and the legacy inherited from the past also aff ected institutionalization of low quality state and institutional complementarities. State capitalism has also balanced interests among players. Why has state capitalism spread into the emerging and transition economies? The state sector has become a tool to correct the distorted markets. The basis of the Russian state capitalism is its global linkages with global markets (WTO accession), low-quality state coordination of oligarchs' behavior, and premature financial markets. This state intervention is old style, but it is a new phenomenon from the viewpoint of global adaptation. Global trends are common among other transition economies. However, the Russian case is based on its own historical and social thought. Thus, being both "old" and "new," Russian state capitalism seems resilient.
  • 吉井 昌彦
    比較経済研究
    2009年 46 巻 1 号 1_130-1_134
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2011/01/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 石原 智男, 古屋 七郎, 森 恒
    日本機械学會論文集
    1967年 33 巻 254 号 1640-1652
    発行日: 1967/10/25
    公開日: 2008/03/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 坂口 安紀
    ラテンアメリカ・レポート
    2022年 38 巻 2 号 48-60
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2022/01/31
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー HTML

    ベネズエラでは、ニコラス・マドゥロ(チャベス派)、フアン・グアイド(反チャベス派)のふたりが、自らが正統な大統領であると主張して対峙する状況になって約3年が経過した。国際社会も、マドゥロを支持する中国・ロシアなどの国々と、グアイドを支持する米国、EU、南米のリマグループなどに分かれている。米国の経済制裁や中国・ロシアによるマドゥロ支援、またノルウェーなど両者の対話を求める国々、国内の食料・医薬品不足や難民問題などで支援を拡大する国連の機関など、国際社会の関与は、内政にも影響を与える。本稿では、両勢力を支持する大国である米国および中国・ロシアが、ベネズエラに対してどのような政策対応をとってきたのかについて、それぞれの国や政権ごとの特徴に焦点を当てて考察する。

  • 石井 彰
    石油技術協会誌
    2004年 69 巻 1 号 29-37
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2008/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
    If general political situation in Iraq is improved explicitly, there will be good possibility its oil production will be over 6 million B/D in 5 years time. But to materialize this, economically rational political decision by the future legitimate Iraqi government for huge scale introduction of IOC must overcome naive nationalism and vested interests of NOC technocrats that can be seen very often in other major oil producing countries. At present, despite hope of the White House and the interim government, IOC's are very reluctant to longterm investments in Iraq because of serious political instability and strong possibility of severe contractual conditions, which are very common in the Arabian Gulf area. Based on these situations, there will be certain business chances for Japanese oil industry, but in order to make these chances really meaningful profits, Japanese companies should consider various factors and alternatives cautiously.
  • ―経済的側面を主として―
    吉田 進
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2007年 2007 巻 36 号 30-47
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, firstly, I have shed light on Russia's economic revival, and the rise in the standard of living of the general public, the political stability and the energy diplomacy, etc., which it has brought about.
    In particular, I have expounded in detail on the “Federal Target Program for the Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Zabaikal Region”—the development program for the Russian Far East and East Siberia, with their profound relationships with the Northeast Asian region—and the redevelopment in Vladivostok for the 2012 APEC summit.
    Then I have touched upon the perception of Russia as seen from East Asia, a comparison of the economies of each of the countries concerned, and the trends for trade vis-à-vis Russia for the countries of Northeast Asia. Additionally I have analyzed the history of economic interchange between Russia and the nations of Northeast Asia, the current state of affairs and problem areas.
    Next I have covered the mutual interdependence of Russia and the Northeast Asian region for the following; mutual cooperation through international organizations cooperating internationally, such as, the Greater Tumen Initiative Consultative Commission, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the six-party talks on the DPRK's problems, plus the cooperative relationships in the areas of energy, environmental protection, transportation corridors, investment and trade, and finance.
    Within such a format I have comprehensively discussed the economic relationships between Russia and Northeast Asia, and have endeavored to illuminate the future path of the Northeast Asia Economic Subregion.
    This is a lecture of 20 October 2007, with additions and amendments.
  • -原油供給価格交渉をめぐって-
    劉 旭
    比較経済研究
    2008年 45 巻 2 号 2_19-2_29
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2011/01/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    中ロ原油パイプライン建設をめぐる交渉は価格問題などにより行き詰まっている。その原因は,鉄道輸送による現在の原油供給価格に対してロシア側が不満をもっていること,また,東シベリア~太平洋原油パイプライン建設の第1段階における運賃政策が未確定であることなどに求められる。本稿では,この第1段階において双方が受け入れ可能な価格水準についてシミュレーションを行い,原油供給価格をめぐる問題の本質解明を試みた。
  • 冷戦後世界とアメリカ外交
    斎藤 元秀
    国際政治
    2007年 2007 巻 150 号 135-149,L14
    発行日: 2007/11/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The main purpose of this paper is to analyze U. S. policy toward Russia and the post-Soviet region along with Russia's response from the September 11, 2001 attacks through the July 2007 U. S. -Russian summit talks. First of all, I will illustrate the key features of President George W. Bush's foreign policy toward Russia, and then will argue the evolving US-Russian relationship in three phrases.
    The first phase, characterized as the period of President Vladimir Putin's “one-sided love, ” covers the period from the advent of the Bush administration in January 2001 to May of the same year. The second phase, “the period of the U. S. -Russo honeymoon, ” extends from May 2001 through 9/11 of the same year to around the outbreak of the Iraq War in March of 2003. Contrary to the prevailing view, Washington's relationship with Moscow had begun to improve prior to 9/11 after President Bush's May 2001 at the War College. It was against this backdrop that the 9/11 attacks took place and the two nations closely cooperated with the Islamic radicalism as their common adversary. The third phase, i. e., “the period of the Cold Peace, ” started in the fall, 2003 after the end of the Iraq War. In 2006, the bilateral relationship deteriorated sharply after the rise of Russia's clout and the implementation of Moscow's high-handed diplomacy, particularly in its neighboring states. The United States has been apprehensive of Russia steadfastly tilting toward an authoritarian regime. Interestingly, President Bush's stance vis-à-vis Russia appears to be not as tough as the U. S. Congress wants.
    U. S. policy toward the Baltic States, Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia's response after 9/11 will also be discussed in details. A special reference is made to illustrate the U. S. efforts to enhance its influence in Central Asia after the 2005 Andijan uprising in Uzbekistan; since then, Washington has tried to enhance its influence in Central Asia without pressing hard for the democratization of the existing regimes.
    Since the disintegration of the USSR, the United States has been pursuing a policy to consolidate the independence of the states in the post-Soviet space. In contrast, the Russian side continuously regards it as its own sphere of influence. Russia contends that the United States has been trying to secure its own hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Although the Cold War is over, mutual suspicion remains.
    There is no question that the U. S. -Russian relationship is at the lowest point in the past 20 years. Yet it is an exaggeration to insist that a new Cold War has arrived. For example, a selective partnership between the U. S. and Russia exists in the war on terrorism, the diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issue of Iran and North Korea as well as the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction.
  • 蓮見 雄
    日本EU学会年報
    2015年 2015 巻 35 号 103-136
    発行日: 2015/05/25
    公開日: 2017/05/25
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper explains how the EU has strengthened energy policy based on “solidarity” with the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes in 2006, 2009 and Ukraine Crisis. The European Commission succeeded in framing gas disputes as an urgent issue requiring an EU-level solution. As a result, energy solidarity has been one of the fundamental principles in the article 194 of the TFEU and the energy policy has been shared competence between the EU and Member States. European Energy Security Strategy made with Ukraine Crisis in 2014 proposes Energy Union that will pool resources, connect energy networks and unite negotiating power with one voice.

    But there must be a long way to achieve intended objectives of Energy Union, because creating Energy Union is related to restructuring institutions that had supported stable energy relations between the EU and Russia for more than 40 years. Energy infrastructures (pipelines, storage utilities and so on) and the price formula (long-term contracts, destination clauses, take-or-pay clauses, gas prices linked to oil prices and so on) were the common institutions between two regions. The stable relations have deteriorated by institutional changes in the energy market. The EU promotes internal energy market integration through unbundling and mandatory third party access by the Third Energy Package and the Competition law. The EU’s new liberalised market model with diversification of energy suppliers and energy mix is no longer the one that Russia used to share with the EU. Internal energy market integration reinforced by the energy solidarity principle improves the EU negotiating power with energy suppliers. The EU is building a “wider regulated area” by “exporting” the EU energy regulations and directives to neighbouring countries and even to Russia. Russia is forced to abolish destination clauses, reduce prices and loosen take-or-pay clauses to keep its market share in Europe, although she, depending on the vertically integrated energy companies such as Gazprom, is reluctant to adapt to conditions changing in the European energy market.

    Ukraine Crisis is often recognised as the issue of energy security, because Ukraine monopolised pipelines between the EU and Russia. Since 2006, the European Commission has been using Ukraine Crisis to enhance energy security policies of the EU and competence creep in the energy policy. Now Energy Union is officially one of the priorities of the new Commission.

    But the EU will be confronted with difficulties in and out. First, creating Energy Union may be with creeping competence of the Commission in the energy policy and may cause dissatisfaction, even opposition to integration from Member States with different energy mix. Second, there are problems of external dimensions of Energy Union. It is difficult to ensure consistency between the energy policy and the external policy of Member States, because they are different both in energy mix and energy suppliers. And Energy Union must set a stable framework to enable the project finances to develop energy resources in Russia and so on, because most of Member States depend on imported energy from them. Energy Solidarity is crucial to overcome these difficulties.

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