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全文: "一辺一国"
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  • 黄 偉修
    アジア研究
    2016年 62 巻 3 号 113-119
    発行日: 2016/04/30
    公開日: 2016/08/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―大陸政策に関するNSCの役割を中心に―
    黄 偉修
    国際政治
    2014年 2014 巻 177 号 177_26-177_41
    発行日: 2014/10/30
    公開日: 2015/11/13
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper aims to provide insights into the effects about the role of the National Security Council (NSC) from the government change to Taiwan’s foreign and security policy decision-making process.
    The People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a series of missile tests targeting the Taiwan Strait from July 1995 to March 1996 after Lee Teng-hui, President of the Republic of China (ROC), visitedthe United Statesin June 1995. This international security crisis from the missile tests by the PRC is also called “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.” After thecrisis, the cross-Strait relations re-emerged as acritical security issue in East-Asia which might involve the United States and Japan.
    Moreover, Chen Shui-bian, who is a member of the Democratic Progressive Party and declares promotion of Taiwan independence, won the presidential election in 2000. His presidency endedthe Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. The government change is not only marked in the political history of Taiwan or the ROC,but also has its significance in international politics.
    Later, Taiwan has been worried to tend China by the government changeafter 2008, because Ma Yingjeouwon the presidential election in 2008, who is a member of the KMT and is considered “pro-China”.
    However, Chen Shui-bian did not actually declare Taiwan independence during his term of office. The cross-Strait relation has improved at the time under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. Nonetheless,most of the main policy by Ma’s administration is a continuation from Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administration.
    This paper used case study method and analyzed the operations about the NSC in Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. Three major conclusions are as followed. First, the NSC is the only mechanism whichcan coordinates all sectors of the foreign and security policy decision-making process in Taiwan. When the core staffs forthe foreign and security policy around theNSC are stabilized, Taiwan’s foreign and security policy could maintain a critical stability. Second, the operations of the NSC have been over relied on the president’s personal leadership which leads to instability in the operations of the Taiwan’s foreign security policy decision-making process. The operations of the NSC are conducted by informal approaches from Lee Teng-hui to Ma Ying-jeou, while the formal foreign and security policy decision-making process is in the fragmentation. The NSC operations changed when the government changes as well as the presidents changed even though they are from the same party. The changes may lead to political blank or instability on foreign and security policy. Third, President of ROC has strong authority in the foreign security policy decision-making process when he wants to change or promote the policy. However, if President force through his demands, the foreign and security policy decision-making process will become instability because the formal mechanism is in the fragmentation.
  • 宮本 義信
    社会福祉学
    2016年 57 巻 3 号 259-261
    発行日: 2016/11/30
    公開日: 2019/02/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 許 世楷
    法政論叢
    2019年 55 巻 1 号 121-
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2019/04/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 平川 幸子
    国際政治
    2009年 2009 巻 158 号 158_150-164
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Any kind of Asian multilateral or regional framework necessarily faces the unique cross-straits reality. Two governments, China and Taiwan, which are at the same time politically antagonistic but economically interdependent, peacefully co-exist in the global society. How do existing regional institutions deal with the cross-straits controversy and authorize their affiliations? To answer the above question, this article examines the three cases of GATT/WTO, APEC, EAS, by focusing on the historical backgrounds and institutional bases for the participation of China and Taiwan.
    This study argues that conflicting parties within a divided state are able to co-exist in multilateral frameworks by means of adopting an operational name and devising flexible membership criteria. Simultaneous participation, however, remains risky unless the two parties remain disciplined to not bring their local problems into the regional arena.
    Dual and equal membership is most likely to happen in economic and functional organizations, where the rule of “Separation between Politics and Economics” functions. The GATT/WTO is such a case. In addition, throughout the process, the US-led major signatories had informally agreed that the membership question of China and Taiwan would be treated as a package on a equal basis. This “sit in the same bus” formula contributed to avoiding their conventional zero-sum game. Taiwan joined the international economic regime by adopting the status of a “customs territory.”
    The APEC case suggests that an institutionally weak framework is vulnerable to directly fall into the pit of a bilateral political battleground. As the nature of the APEC was shifting from economic to political, Lee Tenghui's “Chinese Taipei,” which was affiliated as an “economy,” aggressively advanced into the APEC with its pragmatic diplomacy. After years of mediation efforts the APEC members recently found the best compromise is to allow Taiwan's participation in the form of “non-governmental” or “private” status in the APEC summits.
    Meanwhile, China has isolated Taiwan from the EAS. Without US presence, China has actively taken initiative in organizing East Asian regionalism with ASEAN by emphasizing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as the central instrument. China actively promotes the core values of the TAC such as sovereignty and non-intervention in order to pursue a non-conciliatory “One China” policy. This adversely affects Taiwan's possible association with the EAS. As long as signing the TAC is required as prerequisite for gaining its membership, the EAS will continue to prevent Taiwan from appearing in both security agenda and membership question.
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