大矢根 聡 (1)
新井 郁男 (1)
村田 晃嗣 (1)
永田 伸吾 (1)
関下 稔 (1)
1978 年 (1)
1984 年 (1)
1994 年 (1)
1998 年 (1)
2001 年 (1)
ダニエル・Ｊ・サージェント著『変容した超大国―一九七〇年代における米国外交の刷新』（Daniel J. Sargent,
A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s
, Oxford University Press, 2015, 432 pp.）
2017年 2017 巻 187 号 187_171-187_174
1978年 33 巻 33-44,en210
The present article first analyses the roles that contemporary schools in Japan are expected to play by parents. One of the most important roles that parents expect is the intellectual development of children. But the intellectual development that parents have in mind is one that can contribute to enabling their children to pass the entrance examinations of prestigeous schools and colleges. This is reflected in the gradual decrease in enrollment from lower grade to upper grade which is generally observed in “Japanese schools” for those Japanese school children who are outside of Japan
This article proposes in the second place a community-wide team teaching as the system which can make it possible for schools to fulfill the intellectual development. Such a system must be developed as part of the educational planning on a community basis. It is to be envisaged in such a way that all community resources can be utilized for the intellectual development of children. If schools are to function as an agency for intellectual development, they should be so organized as to provide an adequate climate or culture for that purpose. The community-wide team teaching may contribute to realizing this.
2001年 2001 巻 52 号 7-29
Beginning with the 1989 end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of communism, it focuses on globalization and rapid technological change and covers a broad sweep of economic developments and political cultures.U.S.economy is rapidly increasing its economic power and continuing a consecutive long growth in the 1990s. Now U.S.is the unipolar in the world.American economic success in the 1990s is a product of a recently fashioned New American Economy based on globalization, the computer, and corporate dynamism.Deregulation, privatization, and securitization have paved the way for a unprecedented prosperity of American economy.However it is very fragile of a global and integrated economy in the world and has some difficulty on everlasting prosperity of U.S.economy. If the United States does not resume its leadership role, the Great Age of global capitalism is likely to disappear.
1998年 1998 巻 119 号 95-112,L13
Undoubtedly, firms are actors in international relations. However, the degree of their presence as actors is not clear. The problem is how much impact firms have on the central actor, government or state, and how much influence they exert on international phenomena. This paper analyses this question through a case study of the semiconductor trade conflicts, especially the Japan-U. S. frictions. That is, it examines how Japanese and American firms-government relationships have shifted and influenced international governance over the semiconductor trade.
The semiconductor trade developed under the GATT regime. The GATT regime was “embedded liberalism” and under common liberalism it approved some different firms-government relations of each nation. American firms and the government strongly supported free trade, which made their relationship weak. However, the Japanese firms-government relations were though their support for free trade was soft.
In the late 1970s, when the Japanese semiconductor export to America had expanded rapidly, some American firms began to criticize Japan not only for the quantity of her export but also for its industrial policy assisted by the Japanese firms-government connection. Their influence increased by traditional coalition-building, lobbying, and offering of the new idea, the structural impediments in Japanese markets. This idea questioned the availability of the GATT regime. Then it increasingly penetrated into/through the American government, and the Department of Commerce connected it with the orthodox liberalism and convinced the free traders. In Japan, the power of the firms were restrictive, which permitted the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to lead them. To solve the struggle, MITI attempted to respond to the demands of the American side, by using the industrial policy type intervention. However, faced with opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government adopted more moderate intervention. Consequently, in July 1986 both governments introduced voluntary import expansion (VIE) as a “numerical target” and export price restraints (VER), and solved the conflict through the governmental interventions.
These measures were also adopted between South Korea and the U. S., as well as Japan and EC, which was developed into sub-regimes. Thus, consequently, the composite trade governance was established in which the GATT regime and the sub-regimes coexisted. It at least had capabilities to keep the order in the semiconductor trades, with some managed outcomes, though partially.
The Japan-U. S. conflicts recurred, disputing the extension of the agreements. As some Japanese and American firms were dissatisfied with the governmental interventions, both governments modified the agreements. VIE·VER sub-regimes were stabilized by the modification.
In 1995, the issue of the renewal of the agreement arose again. With this background, the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime was created to strengthen liberalism, which dramatically enlarged firm-level cooperation between Japan and U. S. Japanese firms were willing to respond to this trend and suggested an idea of a new regime, “World Semiconductor Council”, which they attempted to achieve through a private diplomacy. MITI accepted the idea. It didn't mean that the government resigned its role, but instead it proposed a new governmental regime, “Global Government Forum”. In America, though firms maintained their power, the structural change fragmented their standpoints. As a result, the government could not take a clear stand. Accordingly, WSC·GGF sub-regimes based Japanese idea was constructed and the international trade governance was reorganized. The bilateral framework was practically diminished.
The conclusion is that: in the field of high technology, firms' political influence, which made government policy and international governance chang
1994年 1994 巻 107 号 115-130,L13
In early 1977, U. S. President Jimmy Carter announced that U. S. ground combat forces would be carefully withdrawn from South Korea within a few years. His decision, however, was soon faced with strong resistance from the military and Congress. Officially because of a new intelligence estimate on North Korea's military capability, in June 1979, President Carter postponed immplementing his withdrawal plan till after the next presidential election in which he was severely defeated by Ronald Reagan.
This failed attempt has been often regarded as a typical example of Carter's amateurish diplomacy. History tells us, however, that U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea has frequently fluctuated between the two extremes of intervention and withdrawal. This fluctuation seems to result from a dilemma in U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea: the United States has to provide enough credibility to maintain a favorable military balance in Northeast Asia without being too deeply involved in the defense of South Korea, which is not necessarily of vital interest for the United States.
It is far from an easy task for Washington to escape from this dilemma. First of all, it is extremely hard to evaluate the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula in the context of U. S. global, regional and local strategies. Secondly, given the relatively decreasing U. S. economic capability and the diversified public opinion on foreign policy, a domestic consensus on a desirable degree of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea cannot be easily obtained. Thirdly, regardless of changes in international and domestic situations, due to their vested interest in maintaining the U. S. presence in South Korea, the Army and the State Department bureaucracies tend to be opposed to reducing the defense commitment.
After briefly reviewing the history of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea, this paper intends to analyze how the Carter Administration tried to overcome the dilemma in U. S. defense commitment toward South Korea but was unsuccessful through the examination of the policy process of its withdrawal plan with available written materials and interviews with key participants.
1984年 1984 巻 35 号 37-58