Today, it seems that the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Asia is at a turning point. During the Cold War era, the status gap between the European Community (EC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was quite large. In fact, the EC was considered to be highly institutionalised and the most developed region, while ASEAN was considered as an association of developing countries. However, in the post-Cold War era, the status of Asia as compared to that of Europe has significantly risen. The establishment of Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 among heads of states as ‘equal partners’ is a striking example. In addition, ASEAN will have a community in place by the end of 2015, while Europe has struggled from its sovereign debt crisis to such an extent that it showed its eagerness to learn even from Asian countries. Finally, the EU is now expected to play a role as a ‘soft power’ally with ASEAN.

Based on multiple archives (French, German, and EC archives), this article retraces the course of EC/EU–ASEAN relations, from the origins of ASEAN until the establishment of the Joint Study Group (JSG) of 1975, considered as a formal institutionalisation of EC–ASEAN relations. It aims to clarify why and how this formal institutionalisation occurred. Actually, in 1972, an informal dialogue between the EC and ASEAN began. Thereafter, in June 1975 the regional organisations established JSG between the European Commission and the ASEAN member states. It can be interpreted as a precursor to the EEC-ASEAN cooperation agreement signed in 1980, in that this event is in certain times considered as a ‘turning point’.

EC/EU–ASEAN relations have been widely discussed. The existing research derives mainly from political scientists. Most early research has stressed ASEAN as a ‘stepping stone’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region, in other words, an economic valuation of ASEAN as the reason why the EC deepened its relationship with ASEAN. Other studies have underlined ASEAN’s value as a reliable partner to break an impasse in the North-South negotiations. However, existing literature ignores a strategic aspect. This article establishes the decisive strategic reason for the EC to have chosen a formal relation with ASEAN: to have a substantial presence in a region where US presence declined after the Vietnam War. This viewpoint is especially supported by Sir Christopher Soames, British Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for External Relations. Focusing on this strategic aspect, based on the method of diplomatic history, this article also tries to analyse the impact of international contexts such as the Asian Cold War and North–South affairs on the EC’s decision-making process.

抄録全体を表示

The objective of this article is to examine the influence of cultural factors on systems of democratic control over the intelligence communities of different countries and the light this can shed on the road ahead as Japan develops its own oversight mechanisms.
The intelligence communities of different countries are configured in different forms. In the US, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the IC, while in the UK, the Joint Intelligence Committee which is a part of the Cabinet Office is responsible for directing the IC. This variation reflects not only the different presidential and parliamentary political systems but also the different organizational cultures of intelligence agencies in Britain and the US. For instance, the prevailing characteristics of organizational culture in the British IC are collegiality and collaboration. In the US, divisionism and bureaucracy are predominant. These cultural differences are rooted in the different political, historical and social environments unique to each country.
Systems for democratic control of the ICs also vary in different countries. In the US, congressional committees specialized in intelligence matters in both chambers of Congress exercise oversight and have strong authority over the IC. Although in the UK the Intelligence and Security Committee which directly reports to the Prime Minister is responsible for oversight of the IC, it exercises comparatively moderate control over the IC. Such differences are a reflection of the cultural differences between each country. The US system of oversight by powerful congressional committees reflects the high levels of public distrust in the IC, the result of a litany of intelligence-related scandals. This system also reflects the history of serious power struggles between Congress and the executive. In the UK, however, public trust in the IC, and collaboration between the executive branch and Parliament, has historically been greater than in the US.
Currently, Japan has no organization dedicated to democratic oversight of its intelligence organs. If Japan expands the scope of its intelligence activities, it will be necessary to develop new and enhance existing mechanisms for democratic control. In doing so it will be vital to ensure that they take account of the cultural factors at play in Japanese society rather than to transplant the systems of control in place in foreign countries which reflect their different cultural milieu.
The Japanese cultural factors that systems of control in other countries do not take account of are, firstly, a strong public distrust of intelligence activities, and secondly strong public desire to maintain the political neutrality of intelligence organizations. These cultural characteristics can be attributed to Japan's historical experiences during the Second World War, and are very different from circumstances in other countries. The existing Independent Regulatory Commission system could be a possible foundation on which to build a uniquely Japanese system for democratic oversight of the nation's intelligence activities.

抄録全体を表示