Naval questions were one of the major issues at the heart of Anglo-American relations of the interwar years. Although eclipsed by the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and the London Naval Conference of 1930, the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 was ‘one of the most dramatically unsuccessful international gatherings of the twentieth century.’ Its breakdown marked the beginning of the most strained period of Anglo-American relations of the interwar years, which reached its nadir the following year with the Anglo-French Naval Compromise incident.
The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was an unprecedented success in the field of limitation of naval armaments. The Five Power Treaty established the famous 5-5-3 ratio in the strengths of capital ships between Britain, the United States and Japan, the three major naval powers at the time. Contrary to common belief, however, it did not grant the US Navy parity with the Royal Navy in real terms. The agreement only specified that the two navies should reach parity in the category of capital ships over a period of twenty years. The Royal Navy thus retained superiority in this category as well as keeping her naval bases, second-to-none merchant fleets and considerable predominance in cruisers.
After the Washington Conference the Americans sought to extend the Washington ratio to auxiliary vessels, a category not covered by the Treaty, establishing parity with the British in all naval ships. The British, meanwhile, desired to have their superiority in cruisers recognised by other Powers, specifically the United States, the only country financially capable of outbuilding Britain. To protect her world-wide trade routes and communication with imperial outposts, the Royal Navy deemed it necessary to possess seventy cruisers. The US Navy, on the other hand, did not specify figures but calculated its needs relative to the British total, for reasons as much political as strategic. These two conflicting agendas clashed in Geneva in 1927 and led to the stalemate, since the Americans did not accept anything less than ‘a navy second to none’, while the British refused to acknowledge that their strategic needs would be satisfied by what the Americans deemed sufficient. For them there could ‘really be no parity between a Power whose Navy is its life and a Power whose Navy is only for prestige’.
Three years later the London Naval Conference of 1930 finally resolved the issue, which had plagued Anglo-American relations throughout the 1920s. By focusing on naval questions this paper examines a facet of Anglo-American relations in the interwar years which was characterised by mistrust and conflicting interests.
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