Since the 1970's the concept of bui (武威 martial splendor/military might) has been discussed as one of the characteristics of Japan's foreign relations during the early modern period. In this essay, the author makes use of the results of this discussion and concentrates on the period between Kan'ei 15 (寛永 1638) and Manji 1 (万治 1658), or the latter part of the reign of Tokugawa Iemitsu and the first years of the reign of his son Tokugawa Ietsuna. He looks at Bakufu policy on foreign shipping, what this policy was meant to achieve, how it was structured, how the different domains (han 藩) charged with the surveillance of the coast of Japan put this policy into practice, and how this was done in Nagasaki under the direct supervision of the Bakufu. The results of his analysis are the following. Although the Bakufu during the latter part of Iemitsu's reign made sure everyone, both inside and outside Japan, know its uncompromising stance on Portuguese shipping to Japan, it left its final decision open on whether or not to allow foreign ships to come to Japan until such ships actually arrived. On the other hand, the domains along the coastline of japan competed with each other in setting up an early warning system able to spot foreign shipping as soon as it approached Japan. Against this background, the Bakufu was required to make a decision on each individual case of foreign ships coming to Japan or planning to come to Japan, and so resolve the different problems arising from the arrival of Dutch and other ships. Because the shogun was too young to make his own decisions during the first years of Iemitsu's reign, there was nothing that the Bakufu officials could do but continue the policy put in place during Iemitsu's reign. In this way, Japan's foreign policy lost its fluidity, and it gradually became clear that the matter had been settled. The issues to be settled in the Bakufu's policy on foreign shipping were 1) the management and control of Dutch trading factory ; 2) the manner in which negotiations with foreign ships were to be conducted at Nagasaki ; 3) hostilities between Portuguese ships and coast guards looking out for missionaries coming ashore ; and 4) the arrest of those missionaries who tried to come ashore surreptitiously. In response to these issues the structure of the Bakufu had to be changed, and from Kan'ei 18 (1641) onwards, the ometsuke (大目付) Inoue Masashige was given the post of Nagasaki Shioki (長崎仕置 discipinarian). During the first years of Iemitsu's reign Inoue's position as Nagasaki Shioki became less important within the structure of the Bakufu, and it was the Nagasaki-bugyo (長崎奉行) and the roju (老中) who became the prominent links in the chain of command.

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