It is often said that the SNTV that Japan applied for Lower House elections strongly induces LDP Legislators to provide porkbarrel legislation for their constituents in order to win. If this is a unique feature of the system, we should see this phenomenon only among the Legislators but not among the LDP Councilors elected through different systems.
This paper clarifies through game theoretic models the relationship between the electoral systems and the strategies that the candidates should take for winning. The models suggest that providing porkbarrel legislation is the strategy best suited to reach optimal equilibrium under the SNTV, while providing more public interest legislation is the winning strategy under the Upper House electoral systems, i. e., the FPTP and the Party List PR.
The data analysis comparing the involvement of the Legislators and Councilors in the PARC as proxies for their strategies indicates that the Legislators and the Councilors under the Party List PR behave as the models predict. However, the latter under the FPTP behaves differently from what the models lead us to predict: Councilors under the FPTP also provide porkbarrel legislation in order to win.
Although this odd result can possibly be explained within the models, there might be a bug in the logic. We need further development of the models and of the data analysis to grasp the relationship between the electoral systems and the strategies of the candidates.

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In 2002 three books on the modern history of Southeast Asia were published as a part of the Iwanami History of Southeast Asia (published by Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo). Volume 7, Anti-Colonial Resistance and Nationalism (Ikehata Setsuho ed., xii+300p.), covers the period from the end of the 19^th century through the 1930's; Volume 8, The Age of Nation State Building (Goto Ken'ichi ed., x+310p.), covers the period from 1939 through the 1950's. Volume 9, The Age of “Development” and “Exploring” (Suehiro Akira ed., xii+396p.), covers the period from 1960's to the present. This article reviews all three volumes in terms of the study of nationalism.
All three volumes describe the modern history of Southeast Asia from the viewpoint of various actors who had up till now been disregarded in the research. Furuta Motoo (in vol. 8) discusses the role of the Thanh Nghi intellectuals in the Vietnamese August Revolution, while Ikehata Setsuho (in vol. 7) considers the Philippine revolution from the viewpoint of provincial revolutionary leaders on the Visayan Islands.
In Vol. 7, Ino Kenji analyzes the spread of the Hsaya San Rebellion in Burma from the standpoint of Burmese peasants, while Sakurai Yumio also emphasizes the logic of the rural community in understanding people's participation in nation wide movements in his lecture on the Can Vuong Movement in Vietnam.
Hara Fujio (in vol. 8) discusses the role of the Malayan Communist Party in expediting the decolonization process of British Malaya, while Hirosue Masashi (in vol. 7) describes in his lecture, entitled “Jihad in Indonesia, ” the behavior of local officials in the Dutch East Indies in the context of a spreading anti-colonial movement.
Nakano Satoshi presents a new understanding of nation building, using the term of “national sphere” in his lectures about the Philippines under the rule of the United States (in vol. 7) and Japan (in vol. 8). He also re-appraises the “collaborating” elite as a protector of political stability and the welfare of the local people.
After examining each paper in the three volumes, this review article outlines the results being achieved in the contemporary study of Southeast Asian modern history in Japan, especially on the topic of nationalism, and touches upon some problems that still remain.

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This is a study of Philippine presidential appointments to explain in the framework of political clientelism, where appointments to the offices is one of major political resources for the President in the exchanges of support. The examples are intensively drawn from unofficial documents Ramon Magsaysay Presidential Papers and Carlos P. Garcia Presidential Papers, in the days of 1950's, but the offices of middle and lower rank, rather than highest officers like cabinet member rank, are focused.
The purposes are dual. One is the general description of constitutional, legal and institutional aspects, which provide the basic arena for the generation of presidential clientelism, and the other, general argument of traditional political model where Philippine social culture is largely responsible for its basic operational norm.
In Chapter I, it is argued that highly centralized institutions, such as centerlocal relations, the prerogative of Presidential appointing power, wide range of coverage and the numbers of appointees, as well as political effects of electoral system and of the Commission on Appointment in reality assigned intervention and intercession as key concept in the fighting of Filipino's appointive process.
In Chapter II, the authority and role of the Philippine president in traditional society is briefly explored. The expectations of highly personalized, de facto authority but full of legal authority are derived from the role model of traditional patron and political broker in the modern state system. Therefore, appointees, by nature, are allowed submissive sharing of power and influence of president's personal authority from which he draws his own power.
Chapter III illustrates politics of Philippine presidential appointments as patronage process and political instrumental through varieties of examples listed below.
Centralized nature of control over local offices are briefly reviewed and exemplified by Magsaysay's military officer as chief of police of its administative and political effect, and by Garcia's Cebu Vice-Mayor, made out of purely political consideration through the Osmeña, Sr. men.
Beyond qualification, personal loyalty, and contribution, considerations of cultural factor, political utility and constraints weigh in President's making choice. The trustworthy are those who have private ties and direct access, such as patron-client relations, family associations, compadres, professional associates, political party mates, province and town fellows, often being overlapped, but of different professions. By appointing one, the president gains more supports from those who are connected to the appointee. In seeking bureaucratic position, the competitive “palakasan” game of political backing or influence on the part of appointees is inevitable along with logics of exchanges and norms of reciprocity.
An established practice of privilege in recommending successors from the same locality to the unfinished term of higher office is exemplified, to symbolize and to represent pragmatic interests of local and linguistic group; an influential Senator who failed to be reelected, claimed for one higher office as reward and compensation, thus, the logic of party loyalty and sentiments of self-sacrifice prevailed; an UN ambassador appeal to Vice-President Garcia for extension of term of office of an military attaché under him justified his protective measure not only because the man is his compadre and political “lider” but also complexed networks of compadreship obligated him; an example of Garcia's favor for promotion of Mrs. Magsaysay's brother, immediately after he succeeded presidency, illustrates his action as patron and political broker. Even strict Magsaysay pays a little favor to Garcia's brother and to his compadre. Some other cases showed constraints imposed upon the influences and desire of President a

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