This article attempts to provide as much detail as possible about the background, process, and end of Khruba Srivichai’s second house arrest in Bangkok (November 1935–May 1936), while clearly indicating the sources of the documents. Most of the articles related to Srivichai in The Srikrung Daily News and Krungdeb Varasab Daily News, two Thai-language daily newspapers, used in this study have not been cited in existing studies.

For more than six months, from early November 1935 to mid-May 1936, Khruba Srivichai was recalled to Bangkok, far from Chiang Mai, and placed under house arrest at Wat Benchamabophit by the existing Sangha. During this period, in Northern Thailand (Phayap Region), where Srivichai was no longer in existence, the existing Sangha thoroughly suppressed Srivichai sect’s temples and ordained monks who had broken away from the existing Sangha and tried to follow the “ancient customs” with Srivichai as the head of the sect. The existing Sanga also forced Srivichai in Bangkok to sign a written pledge to abide by the Sangha’s Governing Law and the Sangha’s rules and regulations.

As a result, the Srivichai sect temples in Northern Thailand (937 Buddhist temples existed in Chiang Mai Province in 1935, of which about 90 temples belonged to the Srivichai sect) and their monks were extinguished, and Srivichai was completely bound hand and foot, making it impossible for him to act independently of the existing Sangha after that.

Srivichai and his disciples belonged to the existing Sangha until 1934. It was around April 1935, when the Doi Suthep mountain road, which Srivichai had proposed to construct, was nearing completion, that Srivichai sect became clearly independent from the existing Sangha. The enthusiastic devotion to Srivichai shown by many people in Northern Thailand during the construction of this road must have given the Srivichai sect a great deal of confidence in their ability to break away from the Sangha and become independent.

After the 1932 Constitutional Revolution, the People’s Party, which came to power in 1932, made the spread of primary education one of its major policies and opened private primary schools (Prachaban schools) throughout the country to provide uniform education in standard Thai language. Standard Thai texts were also used in the education of monks, novices and others by the Sangha. This was a cultural invasion and forced Thaification of Northern Thailand, which had its own Lanna Thai script and language by Bangkok. This was unacceptable to the Srivichai people, who valued the “ancient customs” of the Lanna Thai.

The suppression of the Srivichai sect was carried out in cold blood by the existing Sangha’s bureaucratic elite, most notably Somdet Phra Phutthakhosachan (Charoen Yanawaro, 1872–1951), head of the Supreme Sangha Council, and Phrathamkosachan (Plot Kittisophano 1889–1962,the Supreme Patriarch of Thailand from 1960 to 1962), a member of the Supreme Sangha Council and head of the Phayap Regional Sangha. On the other hand, the secular government cooperated to some extent with the Sangha elite’s suppression of the Srivichai sect, but not as forcefully as the Sangha. The Sangha belonged to the Ministry of Education, which could consult with and advise the Sangha but did not have the final authority to command and control it.

Whether the Sangha or the secular authorities, the basis for their suppression of the Srivichai sect is probably the traditional principle that, while freedom of religion is allowed in Thailand, Buddhism, in particular, must be the State Religion with the King as its patron, and therefore the Sangha must be a single entity.

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In this paper, by focusing upon three Cabinets-the first Okuma Cabinet (the first party Cabinet in Japan), the second Yamagata Cabinet and the fourth Itoh Cabinet, the author attempts to examine how the relationship between the politico-bureaucracy and the cabinets changed. Though many historians have focused on the same era, they give less attention to this change than is warranted. By discovering a new source material related to the Rinji Seimu Chosakai (Special commission for policy affairs research), the author has paved the way to examining such change. He makes the following three points. The first deals with the Kenseito party and its internal conflict. While the Shinpo faction intended to intervene structurally in the bureaucracy, the Jiyu faction intended to cooperate with the bureaucrats to extend its power. This confliction ultimately led up to the collapse of the Okuma Cabinet. Secondly, the second Yamagata Cabinet managed to get along with the Jiyu faction, compromising with them even about the blueprint for a government. Finally, such change in the relationship between the cabinets and the bureaucracy led to the restructuralizing of the Seiyukai party, which was made up of the the Itoh and Jiyu factions and shifted in the relation to bureaucracy. The Seiyukai party tried to wield its influence upon bureaucrats and tried to implants partisan spirit among them. Later on, this effort led to the participation of bureaucrats in party affairs.

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On the 2nd of July 1883, "Kanpou" (the Official Gazette) was began publishing. Within the same year, for the convenience of government officers, Dajoukan Bunshokyoku (The Great Council of State Printing Bureau) decided to publish the monthly slip of Tassi (circulars) and Kokuji (notices).
Based on the monthly slip, in 1884, Dajoukan Bunshokyoku was planning to publish "Tassi Kokuji Zenshuu" (The Collection of Circulars and Notices) and "Hukohu Hutatsu Zenshuu" (The Collection of Proclamations and Departmental Proclamations). This was a burdensome and far-reaching project. Because "Tassi Kokuji Zenshuu" would consist of the monthly slip of Tassi and Kokuji, the 3-month edition with the cumulated index and the annual edition with the cumulated index. Similarly, "Hukoku Hutatsu Zenshuu" was planning to be composed of the 3-month edition with the cumulated index and annual edition with the cumulated index. According to this project, Dajoukan Bunshokyoku had to edit and print 5 different editions simultaneously as chronological editions. At the same time, Dajoukan Bunshokyoku was planning to bring out a retrospective edition which would cover from 1867 (just before the foundation of Meiji Govt.) to 1884 (the chronological edition would cover from 1885).
Compared with the editing and printing efficiency of Dajoukan Bunshokyoku at that time, it was almost impossible to publish 6 different editions at the same time besides daily "Kanpou". So, the publication project had to be altered. Dajoukan Bunshokyoku researched the systems for the collection of laws and regulations in European countries. So, it decided to reform the publication system of "Tassi Kokuji Zenshuu" and "Hukoku Hutatsu Zenshuu" before publishing any edition. This reformed new collection of laws and regulations was named "Hourei Zensho" (The Complete Collection of Laws and Regulations). This collection was also divided into two categories: The chronological edition which consisted of monthly slips from 1885, and the retrospective edition from 1867 (referred above) to 1884.
Although "Hourei Zensho" was also divided into a chronological edition and a retrospective edition, two big differences existed between the publication project of "Hourei Zensho" and that of "Tassi Kokuji Zenshuu" and "Hukoku Hutatsu Zenshuu". First of all, "Hourei Zensho" contained every form of laws and regulations; Hukoku and Hutatsu as well as Tassi and Kokuji. Secondly, the chronological edition of "Hourei Zensho" did not have the 3-month edition nor the annual edition. It only had monthly slips. Readers by themselves were supposed to compile 12 monthly slips and the index to the year into an annual bound volume. Much labor and trouble could be saved by publishing only the monthly slips and the retrospective edition.

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Actual state of Japan-Thai relations under the Pact of Alliance between the two countries during the Second World War is a theme of seemingly great interest in both modern Thai and Japanese history, but very little specific research on the subject exists today. This is because it is impossible to draw a detailed picture of the situation by using only Japanese materials, since there exists almost nothing. As to the Thai materials, there are plenty of diplomatic records, which, unfortunately, have yet to be examined thoroughly.
This study is an attempt to clarify some aspects of the real conditions o Thai-Japan relations under the Alliance Pact through investigating these dipf lomatic documents, especially those concerning military expenditures for the Japanese forces.
From the start of the war, the Japanese Government, relying on the Alliance Pact, demanded that the Thai Government supply baht funds to cover the military expenditures by the Japanese forces stationed in Thailand. Such expenditures included not only every cost of maintaining Japanese soldiers and sailors physically, but also the total cost of constructing military railways, strategical roads, aerodromes, wooden ships, military positions, and so on. Therefore, whether it was supplied fully or not was a matter of life and death for the Japanese forces. The amount was agreed to after negotiations between the Japanese Embassy in Thailand and the Thai Government conducted every 6 months. A mere 15 million baht were paid for the first half of 1942, but the amount increased to 470 million baht for the first half of 1945. To meet the Japanese request, the Bank of Thailand, which was established according to demands made by the Japanese Government in late 1942, issued baht notes against “special yen” as reserves. In addition to imported goods shortage during wartime, issuing unlimited amounts of baht notes caused a deteriorating inflationary effect on the Thai economy. The amount of notes in circulation increased form 275 million baht at the end of Nov. 1941 to 1, 993 million baht at the end of Aug. 1945. The consumer price index in Bangkok increased more than three times within the 2 years following the beginning of the War.
The first agreement for the first half of 1942 signed on 20 Dec. 1941 took the form of a loan which would be repayed in gold. Thereafter, on 21 April 1942 the Wanit economic misson visited Japan and agreed that all payments, including both commercial and non-commercial, between Japan and Thailand were to be made in special yen. Relying on this agreement, a system of granting reciprocal credit was adopted. The Japanese Government expected to get baht funds in exchange for special yen without repaying in gold. In spite of such expectetions, however, the Thai Finance Minister urged Japan to sell gold against special yen up to 50 percent of the baht funds supplyed by the Thai Government in order to stabilize its currency, and they finally succeeded in obtaining that amount of gold. They continued to insist on purchasing gold against special yen in the negotiation concerning military expenditure for the first 6 months of 1943.

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本稿の目的は,労働者年金保険法案の第76回帝国議会への提出そのものを当時の社会情勢や,それを受けた議会や政府の動きのなかに位置づけて把握することで状況を描き出し,同法案提出の経緯を明らかにすることである。その際に用いたのは新聞記事,帝国議会議事録,国立公文書館所蔵の行政文書等の一次資料である。その結果,次の3つが明らかとなった。第1に議会を短縮するために,政府は同法案を一旦提出未定としていた。つまり,同法案の提出は,政府全体から戦時体制強化のために要請されたのではなかった。第2に,提出には大蔵省,財界,軍部,商工大臣等の閣僚が反対していた。しかし,保険料負担の過重に反対した財界を除き,軍部や閣僚の反対は速やかに議事運営できなくなるからであり,同法案そのものへの反対ではなかった。第3に,同法案の提出は,閣僚らの反対で閣議を通らなかったにもかかわらず,なお諦めない厚生省によって遂行されていた。

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