Ujina Arc de Museum, was built in Hiroshima Ujina Port as facilities for the farewell welcome Ian soldiers since during the day the war.
Construction when the construction committee at the center of the TOMITA Aijiro Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture at the time has been formed, and called for donations across the country.
February 1938 to groundbreaking, completion ceremony is celebration in April 1939, and than is being donated to the Army.

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The Hamaguchi Cabinet which was formed in July of 1929 made fiscal retrenchment a major pillar in their political program. Ugaki Kazushige assumed the post of Army Minister, and Hamaguchi demanded wide scale reductions in army expenditures. In response to this, Ugaki found money for the consolidation of the army, and in addition to drawing up plans for finishing equipping the army, he tried to restore some of the unspent money to the National Treasury. This was the beginning of the army reroganization issue. However, Ugaki's ideas met resistance from the very beginning by members of the Army Ministry. This was because of the fear that curtailment of expenses meant disarmament. Or perhaps it was because they worried that this was but a tool of Ugaki's political ambition. Nevertheless, finishing equipping was necessary from the point of view of the army and gradually research and preparation for the reorganization of the army moved forward. There were, nevertheless, differences of opinion between the Army Ministry and the General Staff Office. Furthermore, while this plan was being considered, Ugaki fell ill. During his illness, Ugaki considered resigning but finally appointed a temporary substitute. Behind all of this was the government's reluctance to let Ugaki resign in the midst of the chaos over the London Conference. During this time, the preparations for the army reorganization proposal went forward, and according to financial retrenchment plans, a considerable amount in army expenditures was reduced. Ugaki returned to his post in December of 1930. At that time the only means left for him in terms of reorganizing the army was by concentrating on reducing the number of men in order to finish equipping the army. However, there was a great deal of resistance from within the Army Ministry and confusion over restoring money to the National Treasury. It was at this time that Hamaguchi was shot, and it was thought that Ugaki would serve as a substitute or as Hamaguchi's successor. However, neither came to pass, and Ugaki was not able to achieve his difficult goal of reorganizing the army within the narrow confines of the army budget. Instead, when the Hamaguchi Cabinet resigned, Ugaki too handed in his resignation. Thus, he did not have to execute the army reorganization plan which did not receive favorable comments from within the government and which was criticized by many members of the Army Ministry itself.

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In 1933 the Imperial Japanese Navy went through a comprehensive restructuring of its organization, through the process of revising its Naval General Staff Regulations and Protocol for Naval Ministry-Staff Liaison Affairs. What these revisions amounted to was the Naval General Staff attaining autonomy from a system formerly dominated by the Naval Ministry. Although we find some mention of these revisions in the research to date on the Imperial Navy, the relative inavailability of source materials has hindered any full-scale, detailed treatment of the subject. Here the author attempts to fill the existing gaps by offering a more detailed account of the response of the Navy's top mind's in an analysis of the information offered by the diary of Iwamura Seiichi, then senior adjutant in the Naval Ministry. In time of war with the establishment of Imperial Headquarters, the Naval General Staff was to be the agency for implementing IH's naval functions, while during peacetime, the Ministry was in charge of naval affairs. Although there was dissatisfaction within the ranks concerning such an arrangement, the Ministry refused to address the problem, thus maintaining the status quo. However, the situation began to change surrounding the issue of supreme command raised at the first London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930. Over the issue of troop strength, the Naval General Staff demanded that the Ministry make concessions, resulting in the implementation in 1933 of measures expanding the authority of the Naval General Staff. These revisions were particularly important for the issues of troop strength and who controlled the flow of military developments. The former issue, which was the source of attacks on the government from the Seiyukai Party and right-wing organization, had not been provided for in the existing Liaison Affairs Protocol; however, provisions were made as the result of a proposal submitted by the Chief of Staff and successful negotiations with the Minister of the Navy. Control over the flow of military developments had been in peacetime part of the Naval General Staff's regimental command authority. For example, when the need arose to protect Japanese citizens residing abroad, the Naval Minister would request the despatch of troops and after cabinet approval, the Naval General Staff would begin strategy planning under the leadership of the Naval Minister. However, following the Protocol revisions, the Naval General Staff was permitted to propose troop deployment independently. In other words, within the revision process, the Naval General Staff was able for the first time to establish autonomous authority over naval affairs.

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In modern times, especially after the Russio-Japanese War, how to deal with China was one of the most important problems for Japan. It was not just as a common diplomatic problem, but also was closely related to Japan's secuity-its independence and national security-and also to matters influencing daily life in Japan, such as resources, population, provisions, and foreign trade. Most of the research so far on the history of Sino-Japanese relations has focused on the antagonism between the Japanese Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Navy's policy towards China has been almost neglected. In order to grasp the whole image of this history, however, it is necessary to restudy it from the viewpoint of the Navy by examining the role it played in Japan's policy-making towards China. Because Japan's policy towards China, as above mentioned, bore great in those days, the Navy also had to grapple with the China problem after the Russio-Japanese War, the Navy had foresaw that the outbreak of a Japanese-American War could be caused by the China question, Modern Japan's diplomatic policy was mostly decided in the tripartite meeting by the Army, the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is the matter to be examined in the present article which focuses on the Navy's activities before and after the time when Japan made its North China maneuver which led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. After the Manchurian Incident, the Army had an increasingly powerful voice on the issue of China, and "the policy towards China" began to become a "synonym of the policy towards the Army." It has been said that the Navy function-d as "a brake" to control the Army, but recent studies, mainly of the Meiji and Taisho eras, have begun to focuson the cooperative relations between the Army and the Navy on the China problem. This matter is taken up here by considering the aspect not only of the Navy's role of slowing the Army down, but also of advancing into China under the cooperation with the Army.After 1935, the Navy shifted its policy towards China to a more moderate one. Up to 1935, it had proceeded with the "South China maneuver" that aimed to make that region's local governments pro-Japanese, just like the Army had done in Manchuria and North China. The Navy forcefully urged the Kuomintang government to adopt a pro-Japanese attitude by using the pressure of the North and South China maneuvers, since they had already planned a Sino-Japanese united front against the United States in the midst of friction over naval disarmament. On the other hand, after the Second London Naval Conferenceof 1935, the Navy began to grope for detente with the U.S. and they suspended its plan to partition of China. It can be said, however, that the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War meant that the Navy failed to moderate Japan's policy towards China. Considering also that up to 1935 the Navy had carried out a China partition policy like the Army, its role did not serve as a brake on Japan's hardline measures, but rather accelerated them. And, in the view of China, the Navy's policy constantly forced China to take stronger measures against Japan before and after 1935. This is because the Navy had up to 1935 caused anti-Japanese sentiment in China by carrying out the partition policy, while after 1935 it encouraged the Kuomintang govern-ment to unify China.

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