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  • 鈴木 光
    日本鉱業会誌
    1957年 73 巻 824 号 115-117
    発行日: 1957/02/25
    公開日: 2011/07/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中曾根 康弘
    国際政治
    1957年 1957 巻 2 号 145-152
    発行日: 1957/08/01
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 日本航空学会誌
    1954年 2 巻 12 号 340-346,335
    発行日: 1954/12/31
    公開日: 2009/07/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 宇宙兵器と国際政治
    林 三郎
    国際政治
    1958年 1958 巻 5 号 30-39
    発行日: 1958/06/15
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 池田 哲郎
    英学史研究
    1981年 1982 巻 14 号 37-52
    発行日: 1981年
    公開日: 2009/09/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the days of Tokugawa seclusion we had some relation with the English and Americans but I managed to left greater part of pre-Restoration days to my predecessor's works. After the Restoration in the Meiji days Dr. Chamberlain opened the way of philological study of Loochoo language and Japanese. I am going to relate on the World War II throngh Irnie Pyle and especially after the War under the reign of American officials. How Okinawa people in those days wanted to be reunited with their fatherland Japan! It is true that the road and buildings became splendid after the War by Americans at the sacrifice of Loochoo and the people. They were robbed of their hereditary land and houses and the sea became contaminated always being annoyed by the noises of B29 flying from Kadena air base with atom bomb, sometimes killed on the street by American solders. In 1971 Okinawa returned to Japan mainland but American-Japan Treaty then concluded very ambiguous items allowing America to carry atom bomb into the Japanese air base and naval ports as Dr. Reishower diselosed last summer. Japanese government got the right of administration of Okinawa and also the right of being attacked by atom bomb from other countries. Okinawa people were eager for the days come when they return to their fatherland, peace will reign over them again but in vain. When the peace of Okinawa, Japan and the world will be realized? I wonder.
  • 上沼 八郎
    教育学研究
    1963年 30 巻 1 号 21-33
    発行日: 1963/03/30
    公開日: 2009/01/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 冷戦後世界とアメリカ外交
    吉崎 知典
    国際政治
    2007年 2007 巻 150 号 115-134,L13
    発行日: 2007/11/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Throughout the Cold War, the U. S. regarded NATO as one of the means to contain the Soviet Union in Europe. The formation of the Atlantic Alliance was a Western response to the Soviet threat, which was fully consistent with a “defensive” realist argument. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, NATO not only survived the end of the Cold War but also became enlarged and globalized; it conducted crisis response operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and trained Iraqi military, with its new members of the former Warsaw Pact. The dynamic transformation of NATO constitutes a challenge to a traditional understanding of alliance.
    This article is an attempt to examine how and why NATO has transformed itself into a global “expeditionary force.” The key to unlock the puzzle is alliance's Strategic Concepts (1991/99) and Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006). These strategy documents, decided by consensus of all members, provide a common denominator in alliance management. It contains three important elements. First, alliance's role and mission was redefined. After the Soviet threat vanished, “out-of-area” operations in Bosnia and Kosovo gave NATO a raison d'être. In the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO invoked its collective defense clause, which became a prelude to a historic decision to support the Global War on Terror. Second, alliance's capability was redefined. Even somewhat reluctantly, NATO decided to support the U. S. -led coalitions on a case-by-case basis. This new orientation made it necessary to close the “capabilities gap” between the U. S. and Europe. NATO Response Force, proposed by U. S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, became a stimulus to accelerate the transformation of European forces. Third, a new form of burden-sharing was explored. In the Cold War era, transatlantic “division of labor” was rather simple; while European efforts focused on conventional buildup for the defense of the continent, Americans continued to offer extended deterrence to European allies. Today, efforts on both sides of the Atlantic became more complementary and even mutually enhancing. American “exit strategy” in Bosnia was made possible by handing over command authority from NATO-led to an EU-led force. In Afghanistan, NATO now assumes overall responsibility inclusive of counterinsurgency operations.
    Thus NATO forces have become more agile and deployable in global arena, as stipulated in the strategy documents. NATO is shifting its emphasis from defense of members' territory to defense of common interests worldwide, which corresponds with a prediction of “offensive” realism.
  • 李 鍾元
    アジア太平洋討究
    2022年 44 巻 51-76
    発行日: 2022/03/24
    公開日: 2022/03/29
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー

    This article aims to examine the origins of the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula from a historical perspective. For that purpose, the long process of confrontation between North Korea and the United States during the hot and the cold war in the peninsular is reviewed, with a focus on the role of the nuclear weapons both in the military and political context. The juxtaposition of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and the North-South competition is also given particular attention as a systemic factor that facilitated the nuclear proliferation in the peninsula, first as “atoms for peace” and then for military purpose.

    North Korean nuclear program was launched with the assistance from the Soviet Union. But soon it became an independent and indigenous project, refusing foreign, even Soviet, interference, causing concerns over its secrecy. Even with its advanced intelligence capabilities, such as spy satellites, the U.S. had difficulties in finding out what was happening in Yongbyon. When North Korea seemed to get closer to the weapons program, the Reagan Administration began to take the “modest initiative” offering diplomatic contact as “carrots” for engagement. On the other hand, the following Bush Administration put more emphasis on “sticks” by demanding IAEA inspection as preconditions for bilateral meetings. American “two-track strategy” was met with North Korea’s own “two-track strategy” of multi-directional diplomacy and accelerated nuclearization. The collision of the two dual strategies, exacerbated by mutual distrust and misunderstanding, led to the outbreak of the crisis in the early 1990s.

  • 朝永 良夫, 伊藤 鎮, 村木 晋二, 佐藤 嘉一, 村井 照水, 大島 康次郎, 猪熊 一平, 小田 碧, 前田 禎三, 倉藤 尚雄, 明石 和彦, 太田 信之
    精密機械
    1957年 23 巻 270 号 342-403
    発行日: 1957/08/05
    公開日: 2009/06/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 燃料協会
    燃料協会誌
    1953年 32 巻 3 号 128-170
    発行日: 1953/03/31
    公開日: 2010/06/28
    ジャーナル フリー
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