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全文: "参謀"
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  • 尾留川 正之
    地図
    2010年 48 巻 2 号 2_11-2_18
    発行日: 2010年
    公開日: 2015/11/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 細井 将右
    地図
    2009年 47 巻 Supplement 号 60-61
    発行日: 2009/07/31
    公開日: 2017/12/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 松平 和也, 小久保 幹紀
    情報システム学会 全国大会論文集
    2011年 7 巻 2-2
    発行日: 2011年
    公開日: 2020/05/25
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
    日本には情報参謀が育たなかったと信じられている。直近の太平洋戦争での情報戦は戦争開始前から負けていた。情報という言葉が明治初年に軍事用語として使われ始めた。そのため、一般の日本人にはなじみがないというのかもしれない。確かに太平洋戦争において、情報の活用は未熟であった。そのため、真珠湾奇襲からして、その奇襲により米国民の意欲を挫いてしまうという目的を達成できなかった。逆にルーズベルト大統領に外交暗号を解読されていて、“リメンバー・パールハーバー”という合言葉で、米国国民の日本への憎しみをあおられ、米国国民一丸となった参戦をはたした。しかも、“日本人はずるい”という言葉が戦争中流布された。誇り高い山本五十六大将は、この戦争開始時の米国への情報伝達について大変気にしていた。不思議なことに、山本大将自身は、司令部に情報参謀を配置しなかった。しかも、自分自身が米国の傍受網にかかり乗機が撃墜されて戦死した。戦後、米軍は日本の諜報技術をつぶさに調べて、陸海軍の一部情報参謀の優秀性を評価している。日本の陸海軍の情報参謀は、情報の無視と軽視の環境下でも地道に努力を継続し、劣勢の中で独特の工夫をしていた[1]。しかしながら、指導者に影響を与えられるだけの知識を有した国家的参謀を育てられなかったので戦争に負けたといえる。現在に至るまで、国家情報参謀は育てられていない。本論文では、日本人の情報活用能力が諸外国に比して遅れていたわけではないことを主張する。と同時に、日本の歴史上国家に貢献した参謀を見出し、彼らが如何に国家情報参謀足りえたかを、彼らの知識獲得の仕方、獲得した知識の分野などから学ぶ。これにより、今後、国家参謀を育成する上で、不足している教育分野を明らかにした。本論から、国家情報参謀育成の知識モデルを示す。国家が、進化的変革を達成しつつ持続的成長を実現するためには優れた人材を育て、その知識資源の有効活用によって、日本国家リーダが正しい意思決定を行うことで日本の政治経済力の一歩前進を期待するのである。
  • 細井 将右
    地図
    2006年 44 巻 Supplement 号 92-93
    発行日: 2006/09/30
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 清水 靖夫
    地図
    1967年 5 巻 2 号 37-40
    発行日: 1967/06/30
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 参謀局の設置から陸地測量部の発足まで
    佐藤 光
    地図
    1991年 29 巻 1 号 19-24
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 新井 博
    日本体育学会大会号
    2003年 54 巻
    発行日: 2003/08/26
    公開日: 2017/08/25
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
  • 加藤 陽子
    史学雑誌
    1987年 96 巻 8 号 1257-1291,1407-
    発行日: 1987/08/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    Dai Hon'ei 大本営 (Imperial Military Headquarters) refers to the highest office organizing wartime military operations. This office was set up in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War with China which extended into the Pacific War. This paper deals with Dai Hon'ei established at the beginning of the War with China in November, 1937. It has been said that the Dai Hon'ei was very much the same in function as its Russo-Japanese War counterpart, or that it was merely a kind of the General Staff Office whose function was reorganized to meet the demands the war. World War I, as the first total war in human history, however, must have greatly influenced Japanese military authorities and stimulated them to study seriously the war tactics and the wartime systems of the participating countories. We may therefore conclude that the Japanese military authorities took into consideration the results of this careful study when establishing the third Dai Hon'ei. Based on this assumption, this paper discusses the formation process and characteristics of the Dai Hon'ei during the Japan-China War. The first chapter discusses the great changes which took place in the Dai Hon'ei set up in the Japan-China War in comparison with its predecessors. At the time of establishment it increased the authority of such military administrative authorities as the army minister, the vice minister, the director and the chief of military affairs, and the military chief, vis-a-vis the supreme command authorities. The Dai Hon'ei's functional emphasis on the military administrative authorities theoretically should have caused the Prime Minister to be concerned with the Dai Hon'ei, since the army minister was also Minister of State. What leads us to believe that more emphasis was now being placed on the minltary administration is the recognition that in the case of total war the administration and the supreme command should not be separated, but unified in terms of policy and strategy. The second chapter examines the fact that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei was not an isolated decision, but was made in relation with the Councillor System (Shangi-Sei 参議制), which was created by the government during roughly the same period, and was regarded as a cause of those government reforms which went as far as to totally revamp the cabinet system. Therefore it becomes clear that Konoe Fumimaro and the military authorities attemped to reform the government at the time of the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei, out of consideration that any dualism between state affiars and the military command would cause severe limitations on war mobilization efforts. While the move to the separate the Ministry of State from the Director of the Administrative Affairs was not realized, the successful establishment of the Sangi-Sei, was significant in empowering a minister without portfolio (Muninsho-Daijin-Sei 無任所大臣制). By including the unrealized cabinet reformation plan in the discussion, this paper emphsizes that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei in the Japan-China War played a number of important roles not only in improving the capabilities for meeting the war demands, but also by being part of the reform plan for a wartime government system.
  • 関 誠
    国際政治
    2008年 2008 巻 154 号 154_12-154_28
    発行日: 2008/12/30
    公開日: 2011/01/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1873, Imperial Japanese Army started intelligence activity in China under the tensions preceding Taiwan Expedition of 1874. But this attempt was almost slumbered by the confusion of Japanese civil wars.
    When the General Staff (GS) was founded in 1878, they restarted the intelligence activity. GS dispatched 12 officers to China for information-gathering for three years. They collected military and topographical information all over the China. Also GS sent staff officers to the short trips for strategic reconnaissance. By these activities, GS could lay out a war plan against China and military review about neighboring powers. But GS was not satisfied with intelligence reports at the earlier date.
    Against Russia, GS started intelligence activity in 1880. But GS disposed only 2 officers in Siberia in 1882. GS tried to focus on China, shelving Russia matters.
    In 1882, GS was surprised by China's dispatch of troops to Korea. In China, GS was obliged to improve their intelligence apparatus and increased the number of officers from 12 to 16. Captain FUKUSHIMA Yasumasa, Military Attaché in Peking, employed informers in the Chinese Department of Military Affairs and obtained confidential papers from them. Based on the information, he realized that Chinese military modernization would fail and criticized the Japanese diplomatic policy to concert with China.
    In Russia, GS reduced the number of intelligence officer to only 1. In 1885, GS's intelligence in Russia was stagnant.
    But then GS was shocked by the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and started to pay attention to British-Russian relations. In 1886, GS reduced personnel in China and sent staff officers to Siberia and India for strategic reconnaissance. In 1887, GS appointed Fukusima to Military Attaché in Berlin. He collected information on Russia, especially the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway. Finally, in 1892, he carried out the Trans-Siberian expedition on horseback. He concluded that the Trans-Siberian railway would be completed in 10 years and after the completion Japan would be in difficult position. He insisted that Japan should make a strategic plan against Russia as soon as possible. GS also made a report estimating about transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway.
    In 1892, GS reinforced intelligence apparatus in Russia sending Military Attaché and 3 intelligence officers to Saint Petersburg. Adding to the officer in Siberia, GS deployed 5 officers in Russia. In China, GS disposed only just 3 officers at the end of 1893. By the First Sino-Japanese war, GS intelligence placed more emphasis on Russia rather than China.
    In these years, GS started the intelligence from scratch, and accommodated it to international situation. The GS intelligence activities anticipated the future situation and preceded Japanese diplomacy.
  • 新井 博
    体育学研究
    2004年 49 巻 6 号 573-582
    発行日: 2004/11/10
    公開日: 2017/09/27
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper was to clarify the situation in the Department of Defense of Austro-Hungary, which dispatched Major Theodor von Lerch to Japan in 1910. The historical materials referred to were the official documents saved at the General Staff Office in Vienna and the articles left in Japan by von Lerch. The results of this study can be summarized as follows: (1) As a task in the General Staff Office in Vienna, von Lerch had started to study the conditions of the Army in the Far East from 1906. (2) The General Staff Office in Vienna attempted his dispatch to investigate the conditions of the army in three countries on the eve of World War I. (3) The Ministry of Defense in Austro-Hungary decided to dispatch von Lerch to Japan for the benefit of the army and his advantage in carrying out the assigned tasks. However, von Lerch himself had an interest in Japan. (4) The Ministry of Defense in Austro-Hungary communicated with the Ministry of Foreign affairs and its military attache in Japan and China, requesting that it enter into negotiations to accomplish the dispatch of von Lerch. (5) von Lerch's wish to be allowed to study on an assignment with the Japanese Army was accepted by both the Japanese and Chinese governments as a result of ten months of negotiations.
  • 佐藤 守男
    史学雑誌
    1999年 108 巻 12 号 2166-
    発行日: 1999/12/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 塩出 浩之
    史学雑誌
    1999年 108 巻 12 号 2166-
    発行日: 1999/12/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 参謀局の設置から陸地測量部の発足まで
    佐藤 光
    地図
    1992年 30 巻 4 号 15-26
    発行日: 1992/12/30
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 細井 將右
    地図
    2014年 52 巻 Supplement 号 32-33
    発行日: 2014/08/06
    公開日: 2020/10/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 参謀局の設置から陸地測量部の発足まで
    佐藤 光
    地図
    1991年 29 巻 3 号 27-33
    発行日: 1991/09/30
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大山 梓
    国際政治
    1966年 1966 巻 31 号 117-118
    発行日: 1966/10/16
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 伊能忠敬から近代測量の確立まで2
    佐藤 光, 師橋 辰夫
    地図
    1978年 16 巻 1 号 34-40
    発行日: 1978/03/31
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 参謀局の設置から陸地測量部の発足まで (最終回)
    佐藤 光
    地図
    1993年 31 巻 2 号 28-46
    発行日: 1993/06/30
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 参謀局の設置から陸地測量部の発足まで
    佐藤 光
    地図
    1992年 30 巻 1 号 37-44
    発行日: 1992/03/31
    公開日: 2011/07/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • -アメリカ議会図書館所蔵図の検討-
    渡辺 理絵, 山近 久美子, 小林 茂
    地図
    2009年 47 巻 4 号 4_1-4_16
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2015/11/07
    ジャーナル フリー
    A number of draft maps of East Asia prepared by Japanese army officers during 1880s were found in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The Korean Peninsula was one of the focuses of these maps, because Japan competed with China for the control of Korea in this period. Although the Japanese military had tried to survey the areas of the prospected operations after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876, the activity of Japanese army officers was strictly limited. However the additional provision of the Treaty of Kanghwa, which was made along with the Treaty of Chemulp’o after the Korean Soldiers Riot in 1885, extended the mapping area throughout Korean territory.
    Several Japanese army officers traveled main roads of Korea as diplomatic officials and surveyed their routes with compass and pacing. On the section papers they brought, the azimuth and the distance of the routes were recorded. As the result of their survey, the roadmaps covered the whole Korean Peninsula.
    These draft maps were compiled into two series of maps in 1894, when the Sino-Japanese War was started. One is on the scale of 1:200,000 and the other is on the scale of 1:1,000,000. The maps of the former series were utilized by military units in the front line. Those of the latter series were opened for popular use and referred in German and French maps as up-to-date geographic information of East Asia.
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