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  • 加地 直紀
    法政論叢
    1994年 30 巻 102-111
    発行日: 1994/05/15
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    1.Introduction 2.Change of Koizumi's words and deeds by the prewar situation 3.Koizumi's change to anti-American argument 4.Koizumi's anti-American argument 5.Conclusion This paper makes clear that even Sinzo Koizumi converted his pro-American theory into violent anti-American argument at the end of the Pacific War, by investigating the changing process of Koizumi's opinion in the period concerned.
  • 臼井 雅美, 趙 無名, Joshua P. Dale, Patrick O'Brien, 大西 直樹, David Zmijewski, 石田 依子, 石山 徳子, 明石 紀雄, 盛 香織, 大八木 豪, 小林 宏美, 菅原 和行, 平田 美和子, 清原 聖子, 山岸 敬和, 天野 拓, 湯浅 成大, 黒沢 眞里子, 田中 景, 鈴木 透, 田中 きく代, 李 鍾元, 乗 浩子, 西谷 修, 松本 礼二, 藤田 文子, 生井 英考, 西崎 文子, 松本 悠子, 遠藤 泰生, 油井 大三郎, 小塩 和人, 有賀 夏紀, 久田 由佳子, 佐藤 千登勢, 大辻 千恵子, 秋元 英一, 管 啓次郎, 荒 このみ, 宮本 陽一郎, 小林 憲二, 松下 洋, 蓮見 博昭, 竹中 亨, 岡山 裕, 横山 良, Carla Kaplan, 片桐 康宏, Min-Jung Kim, 杉山 直子, 馬場 美奈子, Ramón Saldivar, 蓑原 俊洋, 矢口 祐人, 松田 武
    アメリカ研究
    2004年 2004 巻 38 号 237-258
    発行日: 2004/03/25
    公開日: 2010/10/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • Ali al-Kahtani
    日本中東学会年報
    2006年 22 巻 1 号 147-158
    発行日: 2006/08/08
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    近年、アラブ世界ではアメリカ合衆国に対する敵対感情が広まる傾向が見られる。特に2001年9月11日にニューヨークとワシントンを襲ったテロは、アラブ世界に存在する反米感情を強烈に印象づけた。この事件はアメリカ合衆国の歴史のなかでもっとも大勢の犠牲者をだした「アメリカ本土への攻撃」であったが、この事件の遠因となったアラブ世界における反米感情はどこからきたのか、また、事件後にその動向に変化はあるのか。アラブ世界における反米感情の原因の追究は、現在の国際関係研究の重要なテーマとなっている。反米感情が生まれた理由としては、文化や宗教や文明の違いによるものであるとする説や、政治体制や教育制度に関係しているという考えもある。しかしながら、このテーマの本格的な解明のためには、アラブ地域の国々が有する固有の論理から理解していく必要がある。また、反米感情の推移は、現地の世論の動向により把握されなくてならない。著者は、湾岸諸国会議(GCC)加盟国に含まれる9つの都市でアンケート調査を実施し、人々がアメリカ合衆国をどのように見ているか、反米的な感情が存在するのか否かのデータを収集した。その結果をふまえ、反米感情の背後にある理由を考察することが、本研究ノートの目的である。合衆国の中東政策の分析だけを重視し、アラブ諸国の人々の「感情」に踏み入ることのなかったこれまでの研究の欠落を埋めるのが、本稿の目的である。
  • 安田 次郎
    史学雑誌
    1983年 92 巻 1 号 66-90,132-131
    発行日: 1983/01/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    Essentially the Buddhist term, kanjin 勧進 refers to the fact of "pointing the human race into the direction of Good by encouraging the people to follow the way of the Buddha." However, in Japan from the 12th century, this same term came to signify more and more "the solicitation of donations in the form of money and goods for the construction and repair of religious buildings and images on the premise that such works are the root of Good and the source of Grace." At first, such soliciting was carried out by certain holy men (hijiri 聖) or saints (shonin 上人), buddhist monks who would either canvass door to door or accost travellers on the highways and byways in their efforts to amass funds and convert the people to the Way. However, by the end of the 13th century such solicitation came to be collected forcibly through permits issued by the Imperial Court and warrior governments in such forms a hut taxes, docking fees and barrier tolls ; that is, kanjin became a part of the medieval system of tax assessment. In this essay, the author takes up the problem of a Yamato provincial tax levy called tsuchiuchi-yaku 土打役, originally corvee donated or levied for preparing clay used in the production of temple roof tiles, and is able to clarify the following two points : 1)that this tax levy originated with the religious donation soliciting carried out by monks of the Ritsu 律 sect who had been in close contact with the common people of Yamato, and in and around 1280 this levy became a tax uniformally imposed throughout the province. 2)that those of yeoman commoner status (hyakusho 百姓), who came to share the burden of this land-based tax with shoen proprietors (jishu 地主), were actually the cultivation right holders (sakushu-shiki shoyusha 作主職所有者) of the land subject to that levy. The widespread use of the more bureaucratic sounding term, sakushu-shiki (ownership of the rights to cultivation), in place of the simple term for cultivator, Sakute (作手), occurs in the historical literature just after the establishment of that provincial levy called tsuchiuchi-yaku. This fact, when juxtaposed to the previous two points, leads one to believe that there existed a close relationship between the institutionalization of religious donation solicitation, that is, its establishment as a uniform provincial tax levy, and the widespread use of the bureaucratic term for the ownership of cultivation rights (sakushu-shiki). In other words, the medieval state, through the custom of religious solicitation, was able to place within its public taxation system those holding cultivatorships (sakute) under the status of yeoman commoner (hyakusho), and it is because of this fact that cultivators came to take on the more official sounding title of holder of the right to land cultivation.
  • 槍杉四
    林業経済
    2003年 56 巻 9 号 i
    発行日: 2003/12/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 上村 威
    国際政治
    2017年 2017 巻 187 号 187_174-187_177
    発行日: 2017/03/25
    公開日: 2017/05/23
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 荒 哲
    アジア研究
    2008年 54 巻 1 号 62-77
    発行日: 2008/01/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    Of all the Filipino revolutionaries, the historical figure most familiar to the Japanese is General Artemio Ricarte (1866–1945). Recent research raises the issue of his anti-American thoughts, which are frequently mentioned in his autobiography. This study concentrates on the formation of his pro-Japanese thoughts after the Filipino revolution against Spain, the Philippine–American war, and the period of his exile in Japan. Previous research has reported his “stubborn” national¬ism and his fluctuating anti-American thoughts, but did not succeed in clarifying the process of formation of his pro-Japanese nationalism, which might be, to some degree, different from that of any other Filipino revolutionary. This nationalism eventually led to his collaboration with the Japanese during their occupation of the Philippines. This paper furthers my previous analysis regarding the formation of his nationalism, which has not yet been studied in depth. My current analysis also extends to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines when the general envisaged his original dictatorial government, called in the Tagalog language, or in Filipino, “Pamahalaang Magulang.”
    The characteristics of his thoughts as a Filipino nationalist in the context of Philippine history are pointed out in the conclusion. Unlike the other Filipino elites studying abroad in Europe dur¬ing the second half of the nineteenth century, Ricarte did not leave the country in order to become involved in the education of youths. Being an educator, he truly felt the necessity for education of the Filipinos in terms of the revolutionary movement against the Spanish administration. After much deliberation, he took part in the Katipunan movement led by Andres Bonifacio. The political philosophy of Bonifacio might form a sound basis for Ricarte’s nationalistic ideas of Philippine independence. The outbreaks of the Sino-Japanese War (1894) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904) also exerted a great influence on the mind of Ricarte. After mingling with a Japanese ultra-nationalist (Onkihiko Usa) in Hong Kong, who eventually extended assistance to him when he sought political exile in Japan in 1915, Ricarte manifested a strong inclination for the ultra-nationalist thought of the Japanese being favorable to the expansionism of Japan toward Asia. While acknowledging a sound American colonial regime established in the Philippines, Ricarte lamented the ongoing “Americanization” of the country, and at the same time expected a charismatic Filipino politician, such as Manuel L. Quezon, to pursue immediate Philippine independence.
    However, Ricarte blamed Quezon entirely for not having succeeded in obtaining the immediate independence that was superseded by the independence act (the Tydings McDuffie Act) with the provision of a “ten-year transitional period,” the so-called Commonwealth proclaimed in Novem¬ber 1935. This certainly caused his adamant refusal to return to the Philippines from Japan before the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. After the outbreak of the war between Japan and the USA, Ricarte went back home to the Philippines with the Japanese Imperial Forces. As soon as the Japanese Military Administration was proclaimed in January 1942, Ricarte submitted to the authorities his written proposal for the establishment of a dictatorial government, Pamahalaang Magulang. Ricarte wanted to reactivate the Katipunan spirit of the Filipino revolution against Spain while stressing the necessity of pagkakaisa (spirit of solidarity) for the independence movement. In drawing up the outline for a government, Ricarte tried to blend the spirit of Katipunan with the Asiatic principle of Japan that should have been understood by the Filipinos. However, the Filipinos were too “Americanized” at that time to understand his thoughts.
  • 泉 淳
    国際政治
    2014年 2014 巻 178 号 178_15-178_27
    発行日: 2014/11/10
    公開日: 2015/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The recent peoples’ movements seeking democracy throughout the Middle East, often referred to as “The Arab Spring”, are a direct form of public protest against the authoritarian regimes in the region. Although the contexts of the movements differ among the countries, their spillover nature strongly implies that the protests are essentially challenging to the regional order, in which authoritarianism has been so prevalent for decades.
    The U.S., since the inception of the Cold War, has been deeply involved in regional politics by establishing patron-client relationships with local authoritarians to safeguard its own security and strategic interests in the region. This policy has often been conducted at the expense of democratic ideals and caused an accumulation of frustration among local people to this day. This conflict between America’s security norm and its democratic norm lies deep in the U.S. Middle East policy and has been the subject of academic debates.
    This paper, along with the most of the preceding analyses, supports the argument that the U.S. has prioritized the security norm in its Middle East policy, but pays legitimate attention to how the U.S. has been shaped by the democratic norm. A general preference for democracy could not be easily abandoned in U.S. political discourse, as it tries to maintain legitimacy and integrity in its policy towards the region. Employing a simple matrix chart, this paper presents a macro view of the relationship between U.S. policy preferences and the past regime transformation in the region, with particular reference to the U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes. Provided here is an assumption and its fulfillment that the U.S. has been unwilling to take strong measures to democratize friendly authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for fear that the regimes might lose their pro-U.S. orientation and the regional stability might be put at risk. At the same time, the U.S., mindful of sacrificing its democratic norm and the peoples’ aspiration for freedom, devised a policy of applying gradual reforms to friendly authoritarian regimes. This policy has two apparently opposing features with respect to the same friendly authoritarian clients: on one hand calling for reforms with new institutions (such as MEPI) and increased funding, and on the other, providing substantial military and economic aid or selling arms in huge quantities. This policy mix is effective in maintaining the security interests provided by the friendly authoritarians and, at the same time, satisfying the democratic ideal of the U.S. and the local people to a certain extent, thus giving the U.S. Middle East policy more legitimacy and integrity.
    This trend of U.S. policy is also noticeable in Obama administration, which is trying to avoid rapid revolution, especially in the pro-U.S. Gulf states. As a result, the democratic movements in the Middle East could not expect much support from the U.S. for transforming the current regional order in the foreseeable future.
  • 酒井 啓子
    国際政治
    2005年 2005 巻 141 号 10-24,L6
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Iraq War was a typical case of military intervention aimed at bringing about a regime change in a hostile state. The Bush administration had regarded Saddam's regime in Iraq as a threat to US security since 2001 and decided to bring about a regime change by force in 2003, with the collaboration of Iraqis expatriates. The US was neither the first nor the only foreign power to be invited to intervene in Iraqi domestic political rivalry. Opposition groups such as the Islamists and Arab Nationalists who had been sponsored in Iran and Syria, had a long history of making use of their host states' desire to interfere in Iraqi domestic politics. In contrast, the US administration after the Gulf War, was reluctant to recruit from existing Iraqi opposition groups in Iraq as agents of intervention; instead the US explored new sources of collaborators from independent Iraqis in exile, such as Ahmad al-Chalabi of the INC.
    After the INC failed to unite the whole opposition movement abroad, the Bush administration renewed its efforts to support Iraqi opposition groups by passing the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. On the basis of provisions set out in this Act, the US started to openly finance Iraqi opposition groups including the SCIRI-hardline Islamists hosted by Iran since 1982. It was clear that the SCIRI and other political opposition groups with a domestic power base played a more crucial role inside Iraq in putting pressure on the regime, than the expatriates groups which had no power base in Iraq. Rivalry between expatriate and domestic-based Islamists intensified when the Pentagon simply decided to make al-Chalabi the post-War Iraqi leader, abandoning the idea of setting up a government-in-exile in preparation for the post-Saddam era. SCIRI and other Islamists in exile, such as the al-Da'wa Party overtly criticised the US military occupation, and reestablished their power bases by means of their religious networks in Iraq. They also had to compete for popular support with the indigenous Islamic movements led by Muqtada al-Sadr and the followers of Ali al-Sistani.
    In due course the SCIRI and al-Da'wa started to split from other pro-US political groups when they took part in the first election for the National Assembly in 2005. They broke with the post-war strategy planned by the US by forming a Shiite coalition under the auspices of al-Sistani. For them the US military intervention was nothing more than a tool to topple Saddam's regime, and it was they who had accomplished the final stages of regime change-not as the US had intended but in a way consistent with their own political aims.
  • 宮田 律
    国際政治
    1989年 1989 巻 92 号 158-170,L16
    発行日: 1989/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The coup backed by the CIA which toppled the Mussadiq's government in 1953 and the failure of the popular uprising led by Khumeini initiated and developed the anti-US feeling in Iran. This fact can be proved because Khumeini's “struggle” against “American imperialism” led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the successive US hostage incident in Iran (November 1979-January 1981).
    After the uprising in 1963, the U. S. government gradually got on closer terms with the Shah's regime. Such U. S. support for the corrupt and repressive government of the Shah had close connections with important American industries, such as munitions production, electric power generation and communication industry. In addition, the clash of interests and competition of these industries in Iran were carried out by bribes and a huge commission system. Furthermore, in 1977, about 70% of the national budget was spent on military affairs, so it was evident to many Iranians that the Iranian policies were determined by the interest of these American enterprises.
    After the 1963 uprising was quelled, Khumeini formed strong attachments with the purpose of overthrowing the Shah's regime. He believed that the Shah was selling the spirit of Iran to the U. S. and propagating corruption, immorality and repression. In addition, Khumeini blamed the U. S. for making the Shah carry out the “White Revolution”, so it was responsible for the tragedy that occurred in that uprising. Khumeini also declared that the U. S. government compelled the “Puppet Shah” to give Americans extraterritorial rights. Up until the revolution in 1979, he had condemned the Shah and admired the people who were engaged in the anti-establishment movement, and he denounced the U. S. government for supporting the corrupt and repressive Shah's government. Thus, Khumeini and his followers became the background of anti-US ideology of the Iran-Islam government which has endured till the present.
    This paper traces the formation and development of anti-American feeling in Iran. This anti-US feeling has formed the basis of diplomatic policies of the Iranian government since the revolution. Needless to say, Iranians have various feelings about the U. S. In fact, while freedom and democracy have been questioned in Iran since the revolution, some Iranians have discovered the merits of American democracy. This influence of democracy had penetrated the public as well as the private sector, because it is known that some Iranian government officials secretly negotiated with the U. S. government in the Iran-Contra incident. Furthermore, Rafsanjani's more realistic government might change its policies against the U. S.; however, it is certain that the Iranian government will follow Khumeini's line for the present. Needless to say, the U. S. learned a great lesson about its relations with the Third World from Iran-a lesson that should be remembered when dealing with these countries in the future.
  • 青山 瑠妙
    アジア研究
    2007年 53 巻 2 号 91-94
    発行日: 2007/04/30
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 荒 哲
    アジア研究
    2018年 64 巻 3 号 33-59
    発行日: 2018/07/31
    公開日: 2018/08/28
    ジャーナル フリー

    This study is intended to answer the following questions: what caused some of the Filipino masses to collaborate with the Japanese?; and why did their collaboration for the Japanese bring about severe violence?

    Over seventy years or so since the end of the Asia-Pacific War in Asia, numerous academic works have been discussing so far the subject matters on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. However, only a few of them have discussed the issues of the collaboration with the perspectives from “below.” Even though there have been published numerous studies on the Filipino popular history, very few historians have examined the nature of collaborationism transpired in the local setting of the Philippines with such perspectives.

    This paper aims to shed light on rampant severe violence frequently happened among the masses or locals in Leyte Island of the Philippines, one of the rural areas of the country, during the Japanese occupation, that have not yet been thoroughly examined in Philippine historiography. Applying theoretical frameworks of Ranajit Guha (2007) dealing with the historical study on the mass movement in India, this study tries to clarify the characteristics of the mass violence by focusing on the actuations of a number of actors, most of whom belonged to low middle class including some local governmental officials (municipal mayors, treasurers, or chieftains of small villages in the province), local small merchants or landless peasants with a scant educational background. These kind of people tended to be treated as minor actors in “periphery” in the Philippine society when describing the history of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some of them were said to be involved in severe violence during the time of their organizing some paramilitary groups for the Japanese such as the Home Guard in Ormoc or Jutai in Abuyog. Being minor one in Philippine historiography, the significance of mass violence have had been ignored, and these violent incidents were considered nothing but black side of patriotic movements against the Japanese initiated by the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. Therefore, their involvement in the local history have been forgotten on the minds of locals and local historians as well.

    Discussing several cases presented in this paper, the author tries to posit that such minor actors in “periphery” of the Philippine society tried to delineate themselves in the elite-dominated society like Leyte Province by collaborating with the Japanese. Unfortunately, their activities were too sporadic to unite other minor elements toward the unified movement as the Sakdal Movement or Hukbalahap Movement in Luzon Island did during that time.

  • チョン ヒジュン, トンプソン リー
    スポーツ社会学研究
    2007年 15 巻 17-24
    発行日: 2007/03/20
    公開日: 2011/05/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿は、2002年サッカーワールドカップが韓国社会にもたらした劇的な社会政治的影響を分析し、それに基づいて2006年大会を考察する。
    2002年ワールドカップ大会は保守的な影響と進歩的な影響、という両方の逆説的影響があった。韓国代表チームの成功とその結果として生まれた応援は、長らく権威主義と家父長制的保守主義に支配されていた韓国に、革新的政権が誕生する決定的な要因であった。ワールドカップは階級や地域や性別などに分裂していた韓国社会を統合することができた。しかし、その統合はナショナリズムによるものであった。韓国代表の勝利によって引き起こされた狂気は、一部の知識人にはファシズムの現れとみなされた。レッドデビル現象の特徴は盲目的な愛国主義と歪曲されたナショナリズムが、政治的無関心を煽り個人の主体性を抑制する群集心理であった。それに加え、開催期間中に起こった多くの重要な政治的社会的出来事は、メディアによって無視され、忘れられたりもした。
    2002年に比べて2006年ワールドカップは、それと違う体験を韓国の人々に与えた。代表チームが勝ち進むにつれて国中が次第に熱狂していった2002年に対して、2006年には開催の数ヶ月前から様々な問題が出始めた。特に、民間放送局による全面的放送はチャネルを選ぶ権利を視聴者から奪った。メディアと資本とスポーツの三角同盟には研究しなければならない問題がたくさんある。
  • 荒 哲
    国際政治
    1999年 1999 巻 120 号 210-229,L19
    発行日: 1999/02/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    General Artemio Ricarte, “Vibora, ” is said to be one of the most stubborn Filipino heroes in Philippine history. He never swore allegiance to the United States after he was arrested by the American authorities in February 1899 during the Philippine-American War. Most Filipino historians have not paid much attention to his role in Philippine history because some of them are still suspicious of his nationalistic heroism. His collaboration with the Japanese Army during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines still causes doubt as to whether he was nationalistic or not. This paper is trying to discover if his anti-Americanism was still based on his hopes for Philippine independence by examining the time period between 1915 when he made his personal exile to Japan and 1945 when he died in the Philippines.
    Having read his correspondences written in Tagalog (one of the Filipino languages) with his friend in the Philippines, Jose P. Santos, the distinguished Filipino historian, and having examined his political statements regarding the issue of Philippine independence from 1915 to 1941, the author finds that the “stubborness” in his nationalism against the United States changed noticeably over time. It is observed that it changed with times of persons to whom he talked and met. For example, in 1917 when the Jones Act (Philippine Independence Act) was approved by the US Congress, he became sympathetic to the political scene in the United States and praised the political elites of the Philippines such as Manuel I. Quezon of Sergio Osmeña. However, he again became anti-American when he talked to Japanese officials or Japanese police authorities in Yokohama where he lived at that time. Indeed, he supported the anti-American movement in Luzon led by Benigno Ramos, the so-called “Sakdal Movement” in the nineteen thirties. But, even though Ricarte and Ramos held the same position for “immediate, absolute, and complete” independence of the Philippines, he was nevertheless ultimately a “Quzonista” in the sense that he was never opposed the way in which the independence movement led by the Filipino elites such as Quezon was waged. That is, even though he was originally opposed to the ten-year probational independence term, the so-called Commonwealth, he finally came to accept the Commonwealth idea, and government, led by Quezon.
    During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he again became anti-American. He was not satisfied with a principle policy of the Japanese authorities in which most members of the former Philippine Commonwealth government were again put in important positions in the Philippine Executive Commission governed directly by the Japanese Military Administration. This situation awakened his political aspiration of becoming a dictator. With some Filipino collaborators led by Benigno Ramos and Ganap, Ricarte tried to make a coup attempt against the Laurel government in 1943. But he realized that the government was so stable that they could not do anything against its authority.
    Unlike Benigno Ramos, Ricarte was not aggressive in the movement for Philippine independence, where Ramos still had political aspirations to become the new leader. To the end of the war, he was still not satisfied with the political situation where many, so-called, “pro-American” cabinet memebers occupied the Laurel government. But Ricarte did not like to cooperate with Ramos in, for example, the Makapili movement in 1944. Instead, Ricarte organized his own army, the “Peace Army”, for the defense of the Philippine government against the United States.
  • 佐渡谷 重信
    比較文学
    1975年 18 巻 69-71
    発行日: 1975/10/31
    公開日: 2017/07/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 水鳥川 和夫
    社会経済史学
    2012年 78 巻 1 号 99-118
    発行日: 2012/05/25
    公開日: 2017/06/10
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    本稿は前稿で明らかにした畿内・西日本に引き続き,中世東日本で標準的に使われた升の成立と変遷及び使用升の容積を明らかにしようとするものである。15世紀に西日本で標準升であった讃岐斗は,さらに東北日本でも標準升として見出され,畿内でもこれとほとんど同じ畿内本斗が標準升であったから,日本列島の過半をカバーする広域的な標準升が存在したと考えられる。一方,15〜16世紀に畿内から山陽道にかけて売升が市場升として普及していたが,東日本では15世紀に南関東,東海,伊勢にかけて市場京升と等量の下方升を使用する市場圏が存在した。この下方升市場圏は16世紀初頭には近江国を,天文年間には京都を組み込み,京都において市場京升を成立させたと考えられる。この京升は,後に公定升となり,全国に普及した。しかし,民間市場取引では,天下統一が進むにつれて讃岐斗またはこれとほぼ等量の畿内本斗が標準升となり,近世初頭には全国をカバーする標準升となった。讃岐斗と畿内本斗は1%程度の違いがあったが,寛文頃に畿内本斗へと統一されていったと考えられる。
  • 山根 聡
    アジア研究
    2015年 61 巻 3 号 1-17
    発行日: 2015/07/31
    公開日: 2015/08/11
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article discusses how Pakistani society has clearly distanced itself from terrorism. On 6th January 2015, the 21st Amendment Bill passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan has officially changed the constitutional definition of “Muslim terrorist(s)” into “terrorist(s) using the name of religion”. Pakistan has been called a hub of terrorists ever since several active terrorist groups are known to be based in Pakistan – such as the Sunni extremists Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement, TTP) or Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Some of these groups are said to be supported by the Pakistani military and claim they will establish an Islamic order in society. However, Pakistani society itself has been suffering from terror and has been mobilized in the war on terror. This paper shows the transformation of Pakistani society concerning the concept of “Islamic-ness”.

    Pakistan has been a frontline state in conflicts such as, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, or the war on terror after 9/11. During the anti-Soviet war, Pakistan received huge financial and military assistance from both Western and Islamic countries. The Western countries supported Pakistan in the Cold War proxy war against the USSR, and Islamic countries provided assistance in the name of jihad against the Communists. In the 1980s, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’s military regime promoted Islamization of society, a process which was never criticized by the international community which needed the Pakistani military regime’s cooperation in the war.

    Needless to say, Islam is the national religion of Pakistan and 95% of the total population of Pakistan belongs to Islam. Although the peoples of Pakistan may have different religious practices in their everyday life, all of them are attached to a firmly based monotheistic faith, and regard Muhammad as the last Prophet. However, there has generally been widespread reluctance to criticize Islamization or even Islamic extremists who kill in the name of religion. Also, terrorists often expressed their disapproval of the Pakistani government as not being “Islamic” or being a “puppet of the US”. As a result, Pakistani society has often been confused concerning the “Islamic-ness” of its own governments. This may be one of the reasons why there was not much criticism of the extremists even if they killed in the name of Allah.

    Since the tragic attack on a Peshawar school in December 2014, Pakistani society has evolved radically on that issue. Even Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who originally supported the idea of negotiating with the terrorists, has now approved an amendment to the Constitution establishing special military courts which are to be active for a two-year period only and designed to be rapidly dealing with crimes related to terrorism. The amendment states that Pakistan is willing to permanently wipe out and eradicate terrorism from the country. This decision shows not only the firm intention of the government on its war on terror, but also the decisive break with the terrorists who monopolize the cause of religion in Pakistani society. For Pakistan, it could be said that the consequence of voting such an amendment represents the greatest social transformation ever experimented since the Islamization of the 1980s.
  • 吉見 俊哉
    アメリカ研究
    2005年 2005 巻 39 号 85-103
    発行日: 2005/03/25
    公開日: 2010/10/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 城島 正祥
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    1964年 29 巻 4-5 号 318-339
    発行日: 1964/09/25
    公開日: 2017/08/10
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 鈴木 静夫
    東南アジア研究
    1987年 25 巻 2 号 297-298
    発行日: 1987/09/30
    公開日: 2018/02/28
    ジャーナル フリー
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