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全文: "台湾関係法"
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  • 滝田 賢治
    国際政治
    1997年 1997 巻 115 号 214-216
    発行日: 1997/05/17
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 松田 康博
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 135 号 60-77,L9
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper aims to provide insight into the future security environment in East Asia by examining the PRC-Taiwan relations. In particular, I look at issues involving interaction among the following areas: the deterrence of the PRC's use of force against Taiwan, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions (WMD), and the multilateral security cooperation.
    This paper makes four conclusions: First, the United States deters both the PRC's use of force against Taiwan and Taiwan's “provocative” words and deeds against the PRC. The United States secures deterrence of the PRC's use of force against Taiwan not vis-à-vis international security regimes such as the United Nations, but through domestic legislation, such as the Taiwan Relations Act. On the other hand, the United States persuades the Taiwanese leadership not to provoke Beijing through unofficial bilateral channels.
    Second, the United States tries to control the terms of both nuclear development and non-proliferation in the PRC and Taiwan. Since the PRC firmly sticks to the position that “the Taiwan issue is a domestic issue, ” it is impossible to have bilateral arms control negotiations between the PRC and Taiwan. If Taiwan possesses nuclear weapons, the PRC's use of force will be inevitable. From this viewpoint, the PRC has benefited from the U. S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiatives to let Taiwan have “de facto” involvement in international nonproliferation regimes. The United States has also gained the involvement of the PRC in international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and also has succeeded in making Taiwan follow international norms despite the fact that it is not a formal member of such regimes.
    Third, the United States have made efforts to persuade the PRC and Taiwan to prevent proliferation of materials and technologies related to biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles. However, both the PRC and Taiwan have not participated in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—the reasons for this are different for each. The PRC fears that it will lose certain technology export rights if it is to fully observe international norms of export. Moreover, the PRC believes that by adhering to export control regimes such as the MTCR it may lose significant leverage for keeping U. S. arms sales to Taiwan “in check.” Since Taiwan is under the influence of the United States, Taiwan resigns itself to observe international norms without getting membership in the MTCR. The United States thus continues to encourage both the PRC and Taiwan to obey international norms through bilateral channels rather than through a multilateral framework.
    Fourth, a bilateral framework for promoting confidence-building between the PRC and Taiwan does not exist. Further, Taiwan is eliminated from formal participation in the framework of the multilateral security cooperation. Therefore, there is no official international forum at which discussion takes place on the Taiwan Strait issue and Taiwan's potential international role in the non-proliferation of WMD.
    From the above four points, we can see that the security environment of East Asia, especially in the PRC-Taiwan relations context, is extremely dependent on the United States, while the formal international security regime is completely helpless. Unless the PRC changes its Taiwan policy, this structure will not change. However, the PRC leadership may fear that such policy changes will promote independence of Taiwan. Thus, decisive U. S. influence, not international regimes, will continue to play an important role in the Taiwan Strait for the foreseeable future.
  • 三浦 眞理, 鵜木 奎治郎, 浜野 成生, 松山 信直, 竹中 和郎, 森田 幸夫, 中川 文雄, 伊藤 一男, 猿谷 要, 紀平 英作, 村上 陽介, 小浪 充, 嘉治 元郎, 宇佐美 滋, 滝田 賢治, 高松 基之, 有賀 貞, 荒 このみ, 志村 正雄, 藤倉 皓一郎, 井出 義光
    アメリカ研究
    1983年 1983 巻 17 号 153-163
    発行日: 1983/03/25
    公開日: 2010/10/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 長尾 賢
    アジア研究
    2016年 62 巻 1 号 27-30
    発行日: 2016/01/31
    公開日: 2016/02/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 松田 康博
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 112 号 123-138,L15
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze from a historical viewpoint, the characteristics of China's Taiwan Policy, and its decision-making primarily during the period 1979 to 1987, when the “peaceful unification” and “one country two systems” policies were formulated.
    After Deng Xiao-ping's revival and the normalization of relations between the United States and China, China changed its Taiwan Policy drastically.
    Firstly, China replaced its policy of “liberation” with the “peaceful unification” policy. During the “liberation” period, peaceful measures were the supplement to the use of force, but during the “peaceful unification” period, force became the supplement to peaceful measures.
    Secondly, the “peaceful unification” and “one country two systems” policies were formulated in tandem beside the formulation and implementation of economic reforms. Both were based on similar thoughts, such as “Limited War Theory, ” pragmatism, economy-first, and peaceful coexistence.
    Thirdly, Taiwan Policy began to include some consideration of the Nationalist government and the Taiwanese people. China appealed to Taiwan for the opening of “three direct communications” and the start of Cross-Strait talks with no precoditions. At the same time, China extended the object of the United Front. Some native Taiwanese businessmen were charmed by various business opportunities in mainland China which were carefully created by the Chinese authorities.
    Fourthly, interaction between China's Hong Kong policy and its Taiwan policy was strengthened. China originally planned to take over Taiwan first, however, as Taiwan ignored China's proposal, China could not help taking over Hong Kong first, and using it as a model case of “one country two systems” to let Taiwan see.
    Finally, China's diplomatic struggle against Taiwan was successful. The normalization of relations between the United States and China, and the Joint-Communique issued by both countries successfully isolated Taiwan.
    In conclusion, although China did not have enough power to take over Taiwan though the use of force, she began to offer proposals which seemed to be profitable or acceptable. Taiwan was forced to change its “Three No Policy” cue to China's “peaceful unification” tactics and the subsequent diplomatic struggle.
  • 伊藤 剛
    アジア研究
    2014年 60 巻 1 号 18-22
    発行日: 2014/10/15
    公開日: 2014/10/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 戸﨑 洋史
    国際政治
    2009年 2009 巻 158 号 158_41-56
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Northeast Asia is replete with sources of friction and conflict. The prospect of armed conflict lingers as the issues surrounding Taiwan and the Korean peninsula remain unresolved. Other territorial disputes in the region could also lead to new tensions resulting from mutual suspicions or upsurges of nationalism. In addition, the possible security implications of China's increasing influence owing to its rapidly growing economy have also come to the fore.
    On the other hand, with the exception of the Sino-Soviet border conflict and the Sino-Vietnamese War, there have been no armed conflicts in Northeast Asia since the mid-1950s. One factor that cannot be ignored when considering the military aspects of this state of affairs is the presence of nuclear weapons in this region.
    In Northeast Asia, nuclear weapons have assumed the role of preventing not only attempts to change the status quo in relation to overt and latent sources of conflict, including the highly tense issues surrounding the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, but also arms races between the actors involved. Although the “maintenance of the status quo under nuclear weapons” may be considered as nothing more than a method of containing contentious issues, it remains preferable to possible armed conflict and enables efforts toward resolving the issues. Nevertheless, the “maintenance of the status quo under nuclear weapons” involves a “delicate balance” and inherently entails instability, uncertainty, and even the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used.
    Arms control and non-proliferation based on increased transparency and mutual understanding will likely play an important role in containing factors that could destabilize Northeast Asian security—such as distrust between actors, uncertainty over future developments, and the heightening of security dilemmas—while carefully maintaining the “delicate balance”.
    What is required in tandem with precluding Northeast Asia from falling into instability are efforts to build a stable regional security framework that depends less on military power, including nuclear weapons. The creation of such a framework will demand a substantial amount of time, and the current security environment seems to militate against the possibility of realizing such a goal. However, such endeavors would be consistent with ongoing attempts to modify the Japan-U.S. alliance so as to contribute further to regional and international stability and would also enable U.S. predominance in the Northeast Asian regional security structure in a moderate manner while allowing a “rising China” to assume a key role in the region as “a responsible stakeholder.”
  • 齊藤 孝弘
    国際情報研究
    2015年 12 巻 1 号 3-14
    発行日: 2015/12/25
    公開日: 2015/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper will ask how Japan should go about establishing a favorable national security environment, and Will consider this through an analysis of Japan’s role in the process. First of all, it will focus on the East China Sea’s Senkaku Islands, while examining China’s maritime expansion and shifting American strategies. From there it will analyze the transformation of the security environment. Next, Japan’s response to the changing security environment in East Asia will be considered, along with the government’s approval of recourse to the right of collective defense. And Finally, attention will be paid to the influence Japan has had on setting up the Security Consultative Committee (known as 2-puls-2) with other major world powers, paving the way to establishing a new security environment.
  • 村田 香織, 吉村 輝彦, 渡辺 俊一
    都市計画論文集
    2005年 40.3 巻 541-546
    発行日: 2005/10/25
    公開日: 2017/07/01
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    近年、社区営造(まちづくり)が展開されている台湾においては、まちづくりの人材育成・活動支援システムが整備されつつある。 2002年に台湾全土に8つ設立された「社区営造センター」は、リーダーとなる住民を育成しながら社区(コミュニティー)のまちづくり活動の支援を行う公設民営の新しいシステムである。 2003年には、新たに「県市社造センター」が各県市に設置され始め、「社造センター」は台湾全土に急速に広まっている。本研究では、まず、台湾におけるまちづくりの歴史的展開を整理する。そして、「社造センター」の事例を通して、台湾におけるまちづくりの人材育成・活動支援システムの特徴及び課題を明らかにすることを目的とする。その上で日本のまちづくりへの示唆を行う。日本においてもまちづくりの人材育成・活動支援のあり方は重要な課題であり、相互にまちづくりの経験を学ぶ観点からも意義がある。
  • 伊藤 剛
    国際政治
    2006年 2006 巻 145 号 141-154,L15
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper addresses the changing nature of power (or influence) in the study of Chinese politics and diplomacy, and seeks to clarify the extent to which theoretical approaches in academia can be useful for a fuller understanding of China.
    The discussion has three parts. The first deals with the part of foreign policy, and argues that China's application of the “New Conception of Security” or “Peaceful Rise” has created more stable relationships not only with the United States but with neighboring countries. More specifically, in order to sustain economic development since the 1990's, the creation and the development of “soft power” has produced more benefits to China's interests.
    The second part addresses China's domestic politics. Since the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained the “party state, ” and even after the economic growth started in the early 1990's, the CCP, with its society so far pluralized, has sought to keep its power under control. The emergence of various societal groups, which leads to the application of “corporatism, ” will be addressed.
    The third part seeks to combine both arguments of foreign policy and domestic politics. It argues that, in the face of the rapidly changing politics and society within China that has also affected its foreign policy, various theoretical frameworks such as “second image” and “reversed second-image” could be useful. The Chinese government, trying to maintain its power not only over its society but also vis-à-vis other countries, has created more complicated means to maintain its authority and legitimacy.
    The paper concludes by slightly touching on the brief history of Japan's study on Chinese studies. There, more positive methods and approaches toward the “real” Chinese politics and diplomacy should be examined.
  • 李 鍾元
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 135 号 1-10,L5
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism has emerged as an important trend in many different parts of the world, in the realms of both economy and security. However, the impact of the demise of the Cold War confrontation on the rise of regionalist designs and discussions is not linear. On the one hand, the collapse of the dividing walls between the two “blocs” has definitely precipitated the new dynamics of regional cooperation. The end of bipolar conflict also decreased the influence of super-powers, allowing greater degree of “regional sovereignty, ” as put by Richard Rosecrance.
    But, on the other hand, the end of the global confrontation has brought fundamental transformation to the character and functions of regions. To borrow the terms of Raimo Väyrynen, regions have become “deterritorialized, ” giving increasing importance to “functional regions” vis-à-vis “physical regions.” Thus, region in the geographic sense now becomes less sure and stable, making regionalist projects and discussions more complicated.
    In the region of East Asia, such growing differentiation between physical regions and functional regions is more prominent than others. Among others, intraregional mistrust and antagonism caused by geostrategic structure and historical legacy make regional states to be wary of “closed” regions. As Norman Palmer pointed out, East Asia has witnessed only a series of “imposed regionalisms” so far. And the trends of “new regionalisms” since late 1960s have taken also the form of “open regionalisms, ” preferring “Asia-Pacific” to “East Asia.” And the regional organizations in the region, such as ASEAN and APEC, have shown tendencies toward “flexibility” in their structures and functions. Different from the counterparts in Europe, these regional frameworks have shunned strict rule-making, preferring the consensus-based “soft regionalism.”
    In this context the emergence of “East Asia” since the late 1990s is the second generation of “new regionalism” in this region. Since 2001 ASEAN+3 has advanced visions of “East Asian community, ” with increasing regional exchanges and interdependence among the three Northeast Asian countries; China, Japan, and South Korea.
    In understanding and analyzing the new trends of East Asian regionalism, some theoretical tasks arise: how to define the region and how to make the regionalist visions possible in the domestic political context. In other words, epistemology and politics ask for their respective places in theorizing regionalism in this area of traditional mistrust and antagonism.
    Eight articles in this special issue on East Asian regionalism have in common in their interest in the impact of changing domestic political and epistemic structures on the intraregional relations, while they deal with different cases of mostly bilateral cooperation or conflicts.
  • 島村 直幸
    国際政治
    2003年 2003 巻 133 号 157-170
    発行日: 2003/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 湯浅 成大
    国際政治
    1998年 1998 巻 118 号 46-59,L8
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are two main streams of thought concerning the studies of Sino-American relationship; one argues America's China policy from the context of the U. S. -Soviet-China strategic triangle, the other stresses the importance of America's domestic politics in the formation of its China policy. This article tries to add another perspective on the analysis on Sino-American relationship: the interaction of U. S. China policy and its Taiwan policy.
    In late 1948, the Truman Administration began to re-examine the strategic importance of Taiwan. As NSC37/1 (Jan 19, 1949) noted, the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the basic aim of the U. S. should be to deny Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores to the Communists. However, there was a slight difference between them. The State Department also wanted to deny Taiwan to the Chinese Nationalists in order to keep some options open in the case of a Sino-Soviet split and subsequent Sino-American accommodation in the future, while the military establishment was indifferent to such political implications. The JCS insisted that overt military commitment in Taiwan would be unwise at that time, but the U. S. should bolster the Nationalists forces and collaborate with them if amphibious operations were launched from mainland China.
    When the Korean War broke out, the U. S. Government dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait not only to protect against an attack by the Communists but also to block any Nationalist action in the strait. In this situation, the difference between the State Department and the JCS still continued. Secretary Acheson tried to avoid a deep commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, but the military was establishing a strong relationship through the military aid and advice programs to the Kuomintang Forces. However this difference ceased. The alternative forces to the Nationalists did not emerge in Taiwan, the State Department, therefore, had to commit itself to the Kuomintang government however reluctantly, which was one of the reasons why Sino-American relations were not improved after the Korean War, even though the U. S. Government sought various chances for rapprochement with China.
  • 滝田 賢治
    国際政治
    1998年 1998 巻 118 号 103-117,L13
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It may be safe and fair to say that international relations in East Asia has been influenced to a great extent by the U. S. -China relationship during the 25 years since the rapprochement between them in 1972. This article first divides these years into four periods and then analyzes the characteristics and conditions of the relations in each period. The Four periods are as follows: I. from 1972 when both nations were reconciled to each other to 1979 when they established diplomatic relations. II. from 1979 to 1985 with the end of the new Cold War. III. the period from 1985 to 1991, which witnessed the process of the dismantling of the Cold War. IV. the 1992-97 period that may be characterized by “the world's only remaining superpower American”.
    The U. S. policy toward China during the period I was a very strategic one as it was crafted by Nixon-Kissinger on the basis of U. S. global strategy. U. S. policy became more and more strategic as détente between U. S. and Soviet Union was set back in the second half of the 1970's. During the new Cold War, U. S. -China relations deteriorated and deteriorated solely due to the Reagan Administration's Taiwan-oriented policy. Since China was just going to reconcile itself with Soviet Russia, the U. S. was forced to make great concessions to China and promise it the transfer of military technology.
    The outbreak of the Gulf war compelled the U. S. to make more compromises with China because China's support was indispensable at the UN Security Council in order to impose sanctions upon Iraq and then attack it. The U. S. Congress severely criticized the Bush Administration's conciliatory China policy and began to use China's MFN as a political weapon. As the Clinton Administration has subordinated “human rights” to “economy” in regard to China policy, the U. S. Congress has politicized China's MFN and will continue to adopt the same stance.
  • 阿部 純一
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 112 号 63-83,L10
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to analyze the interrelation of Chinese foreign policy and military strategy, in order to clarify the characteristics of Chinese national security perception. Through this process, we can find several factors inherent in Chinese national security perception which would generate so-called “China Threat” thesis in East Asian countries.
    Under Deng Xiaoping's rule since 1978, China has started the reform and open-up policy for its economic construction, and has seeked for economically prosperous and militarily strong China. For this purpose, China set up the independent diplomacy in 1982 to realize peaceful international envilonment necessary for its economic development and equidistant relations with superpowers. That is to say, China abandoned its long-kept policy of so-called “main enemy” thesis which put either or both the United States or/and the Soviet Union as a main enemy. Under these circumstances China has started its military modernization program.
    In 1985 China declared one million force reduction, which marked the virtual start of its military modernization aiming at restructuring military power matching for limited wars under modern conditions. This military modernization reflectrd the strategic conversion in China; the old thesis of the inevitability of next world war was abandoned. Deng stated that such kind of war could be avoidable because of the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers and the growth of peace oriented power among people in the world. But Deng's military modernization program has been in fact seeking for strengthening both conventional forces and nuclear arsenal, putting special stress on building up naval power.
    As for diplomacy, based on Deng's judgement on war, China has added the word “peace” in its independent diplomacy since 1985. This diplomatic development was to prepare for China to join rising economic circle in East Asian countries. For this purpose, China adopted the strategy of economic development in coastal area in 1987. At the same period, there appeared the concept of “total national power” in Chinese journalism and described international politics as the struggle to enhance total national power. This concept indicates China's belief in power politics, and it actually promoted China for asserting maritime sovereignty over its territorial waters, especially the South China Sea where believed to have abundant natural resources, but in complicated condition over the possession of islands with Southeast Asian countries.
    In the spring of 1988, after the small scale sea battle with the Vietnamese navy in the Spratly area in the South China Sea, China successfully started the effective control over several islands there. In the fall of the year, China officially proposed to set up the “New International Political and Economic Order” based on the Chinese invented “five principles of peaceful coexistence.” This new Chinese proposal was the development of its independent peace diplomacy, but with the exaggeration of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, this proposal put more stress on national sovereignty as the supreme right in traditional nation-state system.
    1989 was an extraordinary year for China. In May, after the thirty years' confrontation, China attained the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. But soon after that, there occured the “Tiananmen Incident” which forced China into international isolation because of the military oppression against student movement for democracy. Against Western countries' economic sanctions, China made a counterattack to them blaming that they tried so-called “Peaceful Evolution” to China, but it never gave up its reform and open-up policy.
    Since the beginning of 1990's, China has made efforts to set up good relations with Southeast Asian countries and joined
  • 玉川 浩紀
    国際政治
    1985年 1985 巻 80 号 96-111,L12
    発行日: 1985/10/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In recent years, a new type of international actor, the pariah state, has entered the consciousness of those in nuclear nonproliferation circles.
    Because of their cumulative isolation in the regional and/or internaitonal political arena, their precarious security position in terms of political or territorial integrity in conventional weaponry, their unfavorable regional military imbalances, and because they have become the targets of censure within international forums, some nations have been deemed deserving of such a label. Some pariah states have had a strong incentive or have been taking the first steps toward nuclear-weapons state status because of their political and military circumstances. Five states-Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Taiwan and Pakistan-feature most prominently in this regard. Each of these five states has been estimated to possess a high degree of nuclear development and South Africa have been said to possess the technological capability to produce their own bombs. Furthermore, the thrust toward nuclear status by pariah states threatens the nonproliferation regime through a chain effect. For all these reasons the pariah-states problem is now considerd to be a linchpin in the nuclear proliferation question.
    Much effort has been made so far to strengthen the NPT regime, the IAEA safeguard systems, the restriction on supplier's export policies for sensitive equipment (INFCE, NNPA, Trigger List by the Zangger Committee or the London Group, etc.), nuclear free zones, limitation of arms transfers, and so on. Many of these constrains, however, have, at best, very limited impact on a pariah state's decision to go nuclear, because it has a perceived security value of national nuclear weapons, which seems directly related to a deterioration in security position.
    In order to halt or control nuclear proliferation in these states, the great powers have a special responsibility-the control of the nuclear impulses of these states is needed. The halting of regional conflicts is especially important in this context. For this purpose, new approaches should be adopted such as the formation of a regionally oriented framework for managing the process of arms sales to the Third World, or a regional security system based on mutual non-intervention, the restriction of military actions that might lead to incidents, and the commitment of the great powers not to intervene in the region, and so on. Through such means, we should build crisis management systems and perform and enlarge confidence building measures without interruption.
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