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クエリ検索: "四月革命" 韓国
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  • ―アイゼンハワー政権期米韓の為替改革をめぐる協議過程を中心に―
    高 賢来
    国際政治
    2016年 2016 巻 184 号 184_16-184_29
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper examines talks on exchange rate reform between the U.S. and the ROK during the Eisenhower Era (1953–1961). The ROK achieved rapid economic growth through an export-oriented industrialization strategy from the early 1960s onward. Exchange rate reform was a factor in enabling the ROK to begin export-oriented economic growth.

    The 1980s witnessed a reinvigoration of empirical research on ROK politics in the 1950s, yet this research was based on normative thinking that the ROK should achieve an ‘independent national economy’ with a ‘self-sufficient reproduction system’. As a result, it judged the 1950s negatively on account of the perception that this period had increased the subordination of the ROK’s economy to the U.S. and Japan. However, as such empirical research began to amass during the 1990s the question of continuity between the periods before and after the start of export-oriented growth garnered much attention. Arguments that witnessed continuity were primarily based on the critical stance that demanded that the process of the formation of initial conditions of export-oriented growth in the 1950s must be taken into consideration in order to explain which factors enabled the ROK to begin rapid economic growth from the 1960s onward. This paper shares this critical stance, and takes an historical approach and focuses on talks surrounding exchange rate reform between the U.S. and the ROK. By analyzing documents produced by both governments, it attempts to shed light on the process of the formation of the initial conditions.

    In August 1955, the U.S. agreed to adopt a fixed-term fixed exchange rate with the ROK that overestimated the value of the ROK’s local currency in return for the ROK’s pursuance of policies to stabilize prices. Thereafter the US depended on the ROK’s economic development, as a result of which, they recognized a unitary exchange rate to be indispensable. However, since the U.S. valued incentives to institute policies for price stabilization within the ROK’s existing exchange rate system, they did not immediately attempt to carry out exchange rate. In 1959, however, pressure from congress forced the Eisenhower administration to demand exchange rate reforms from the ROK, and in February 1961, the ROK unified plural exchange rates to a single rate and adopted a floating rate system. This paper argues that it was these changes and experiences within U.S. policy that affected the exchange rate reform in the mid-1960s when export-oriented growth started.

  • 梅田 皓士
    法政論叢
    2014年 50 巻 2 号 105-
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 木宮 正史
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 139 号 175-177
    発行日: 2004/11/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 世界史教育研究会, 久田 恵造, 足立 崇, 小森 重喜, 庄 昭, 田代 徹也, 寺田 英夫, 角森 雍次郎, 山口 潤一, 松浦 賢二
    社会科研究
    1982年 30 巻 188-195
    発行日: 1982/03/15
    公開日: 2017/07/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 村田 裕和
    昭和文学研究
    2023年 86 巻 221-223
    発行日: 2023年
    公開日: 2023/11/11
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 柏崎 正憲
    平和研究
    2018年 48 巻 109-126
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2023/11/24
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper provides a historical analysis of the Special Permission for Residence (SPR), a discretionary measure of relief for undocumented immigrants in Japan until the 1970s, the period before the Japanese government signed the Refugee Convention. SPR deserves close attention in the sense that it has served as a strategic measure to make Japanese immigration system work for the authority’s purposes. According to the Immigration Bureau, decisions to grant permission are made from two apparently incompatible points of view, namely,“humanitarian considerations”and“national interests,”although it seems that the latter has always been given priority over the former in actual cases. It needs to be explained how this relief measure was incorporated and utilized in the postwar Japanʼs immigration control system.

    The historical origin of the SPR in Japan was the relief measure during the Allied Occupation granted to illegalized immigrants, Korean in most cases, based on a petition submitted to the General Headquarters. After the restoration of sovereignty, as the South Korean government refused to accept deportees, the Japanese government reintroduced this relief measure, from an allegedly “humanitarian”standpoint, for those to be deported. Thus, the SPR functioned as a complement to postwar Japanʼs foreign policy of reincorporating itself into the international community while avoiding postcolonial responsibilities. On the other hand, the SPR was never applied to political refugees in spite of the existence of those seeking asylum in Japan. It was in this situation that three cases in court filed in the 1960s functioned as challenges to Japanʼs immigration policy. The results of these cases showed that Japanʼs immigration authority was never tolerant of any substantial restrictions to its large discretionary power over immigrants.

    Namely, the authority succeeded in reversing the judgement to restrict its discretionary power by a particular international norm, a political offense exception in extradition, whereas it did not strongly resist the judgement to restrict its discretionary power by an universal but abstract humanitarian principle.

  • 馬渕 貞利
    史学雑誌
    1977年 86 巻 5 号 720-724
    発行日: 1977/05/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
  • -合同経済委員会を中心に-
    林 采成
    歴史と経済
    2016年 58 巻 3 号 28-36
    発行日: 2016/04/30
    公開日: 2018/04/30
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper focuses on the Korea-U.S. Combined Economic Board (CEB), which developed comprehensive policies for the Korean economy after the Korean War, and reconsiders presuppositions about the “development period” by examining economic recovery and stabilization under the American aid program.

    Rehabilitation and stabilization in the Korean economy were achieved through cooperation and opposition between Korea and the U.S. The CEB played a central role in this process. Although it is true that significant differences of opinion occurred over the amount and composition of economic aid, the accumulation and use of counterpart funds, and exchange rates, the MSA programs that integrated economic aid and military assistance ultimately caused more friction than did the philosophies of CEB participants. The result was issues over how Korea and the U.S. would share the economic expenses for post-war rehabilitation.

    Once the exchange rate was adjusted to meet the increase in prices, a system of cooperation between Korea and the U.S. was formulated, including exchanges in manpower, and management of the Korean economy became highly sophisticated. In particular, the Korean government implemented plans that succeeded in stabilizing the economy, enabling long-term maintenance of the exchange rate. In other words, from the mid-1950s on, Korea and the U.S. were able to avoid excessive friction. The introduction of large volumes of aid supplies enabled Korea to implement an array of projects and thereby to return to its prewar production levels, and long-term economic development plans were drawn up with U.S. support with the aim of enhancing Korea’s capacity for economic independence. The Korean government, however, seeking to stay in power, failed to rein in the sharp increase in prices, and was therefore unable to extend exchange-rate adjustments with the U.S. Ultimately, it faced an economic crisis that resulted in the early demise of its long-term economic development plans.

    The above shows that, contrary to the premise of “collapse” and “delay” presented in existing research, the Korean economy of the 1950s did achieve rehabilitation after the war, as well as economic stabilization, and was able to lay the groundwork for the “development period.” Fluctuations in economic aid are not enough to explain the process. That is, the rehabilitation and stabilization of the Korean economy would be impossible without the accumulation of experience and the resulting maturity of administrative capacity.

  • 途上国の経済発展に果たす政府の役割についての考察
    三好 元
    アジア経営研究
    2015年 21 巻 111-124
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2018/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper clarifies what kind of effect SME financial policy brought for the growth of SMEs in a period of the economic growth from 1960s through 1970s of Korea. That is to clarify a role of the government to carry out for economic development of Korea.  The Korean SMEs of the mid-1970s considerably grew up, because the SME financial policy was developed positively. The position of SMEs rose in the number of companies, the number of employees, a production, a value added. Moreover, SMEs greatly contributed to increase in exports. However, SMEs had various structural weakness. For example, SMEs in the processing and assembly industry was a low value-added processing trade enterprise. The technical standards of the SMEs were very low. The financing structure of the SMEs was weak. Therefore, SMEs simply grew up quantitatively. The SME financial policy from the 1960s through the 1970s did not lead to self-sustaining development of SMEs. In other words, the intervention of the Korean government for the growth of the SMEs in this period was inefficient.
  • 長谷川 公一
    社会学研究
    2020年 104 巻 9-36
    発行日: 2020/02/21
    公開日: 2021/09/24
    ジャーナル フリー

     一九六八年と二〇一八年の五〇年間の社会運動の変化と連続性をどのように捉えるべきだろうか。

    韓国
    と台湾の場合には、独裁体制から民主化運動へ、複数回の政権交代へ、近年の脱原発政策への転換の動きなど、きわめてダイナミックな変化が見られる。アメリカ・フランス・ドイツなどでも、一九六八年前後の学生運動は、その後の政治のあり様に大きな政治的影響力を持っている。
     しかし日本の場合には、社会変革的な目標達成を志向するタイプの運動は、政治的機会構造の閉鎖性や社会運動の資源動員力の〈弱さ〉、フレーミングの難しさなどに規定されて、政治的目標達成に成功しえた事例に乏しい。政権交代も少なく、しかも政権交代にあたって社会運動のはたした役割は非常に小さい。社会運動出身者の政治リーダーも乏しい。
     日本の社会運動研究は、このような現実を直視し、いかに克服すべきかを社会学的に提示していく必要がある。

  • 金 成浩
    ロシア史研究
    2015年 96 巻 49-61
    発行日: 2015/06/30
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―北朝鮮帰国事業における総連と北朝鮮ロビーの役割を中心として―
    松浦 正伸
    国際政治
    2017年 2017 巻 187 号 187_80-187_96
    発行日: 2017/03/25
    公開日: 2017/05/23
    ジャーナル フリー

    How do we apply history in politics? The purpose of this paper is to analyze how recognition in civil society, such as perception of history, plays a role in public opinion and parliamentary government. To clarify this research question, incorporating a political concept into the analysis, this paper focused on roles of the General Association of Korean Residents (Chongryon) and the North Korean Lobby and looked into the backgrounds in the repatriation massively expanded between 1959 and 1961.

    Before repatriation movements started, changes of organization structures were observed in the Chongryon and they began to speak in favor of North Korea. Simultaneously, the nature of the Niccho-Kyokai (日朝協会), which had been taking a politically neutral position, also began to change. They began to be a lobbying group in order to support the North Korean foreign diplomacy against Japan.

    Applying a concept of “Pseudo Environment” defined by Walter Lippmann as a subjective, biased, and abridged mental image of the world, this section reflected on influences of the two key players over North Korean residents in Japan and Japanese public opinion. The analysis found a social trend with regards to repatriation issues being manipulated by a correlation of three components in the Pseudo Environment: (1) unified perception of history, (2) motherland-oriented nationalism, and (3) economic rationality.

    Based on a data-mining method, the influences of the Pseudo Environment in the Diet were analyzed. The penetration of such an environment into civil society assisted the Diet members with the repatriation project being recognized ethically and humanitarianly. Therefore, intentions of the North Korean strategies against South Korea were insufficiently discussed.

    The Pseudo Environment lost its effect as (1) demand of mobilization was weakened, (2) activities were diversified among the North Korean Lobby, and (3) information about North Korea was brought by returnees, and gaps were gradually closed between the Pseudo Environment and reality.

    As a result of the Pseudo Environment effectively created by the two players among the North Korean residents in Japan and in the Japanese public opinion, one-sided recognition of North Korean strategies influenced civil society and parliamentary government to bring the mass repatriation out. This analysis also concludes that a nation is capable of controlling a social trend in other countries via intermediaries from outside of its country taking advantage of certain recognition. When we see international relations in East Asia, perception of history is an ongoing issue and has been more complex. This indicates that more case studies will be expected on how history has been utilized in politics.

  • 松本 武祝
    アジア経済
    2022年 63 巻 3 号 2-33
    発行日: 2022/09/15
    公開日: 2022/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー HTML

    太平洋問題調査会(IPR)は,1925年の創設以来,太平洋会議の定期的な開催とともに専門家による調査研究事業を活動の柱としていた。調査研究事業においては,1920年代末以降,土地利用研究が主要課題として取り上げられた。とくに,バック(J.L.Buck)と那須皓によるそれぞれ中国と日本を対象とする研究に重点的に資金支援がなされた。両国との比較という観点から朝鮮も研究対象とされ,李勲求が担当した。

    この論文では,三者による研究プロジェクトの採択過程を,3つのプロジェクト相互の関係性に着目しつつ明らかにした。さらに,三者による研究プロジェクトの実施過程における特徴を,主たるデータ源(官庁統計あるいは農家実態調査),研究実施体制(分業・協業関係)およびプロジェクト実施にともなう次世代研究者育成の実績という観点から比較分析を行った。

    那須は,IPR主要参加国であった日本の地位を背景に,資金支援を長期間にわたって獲得した。そして,独自の農村社会調査を実施して,その機会を次世代の研究者育成にも役立てた。バックは,アメリカ人研究者としての人脈を介して巨額の研究資金を長期間にわたって獲得し,大規模センサスを実施した。それと並行して,アメリカの研究教育システムを導入して中国人研究者を育成した。植民地下の朝鮮人知識人は,李勲求を含めてIPRの意思決定過程から疎外されていた。李勲求の研究プロジェクトは小規模にとどまり,次世代研究者の育成には至らなかった。

  • 河村 又介
    日本學士院紀要
    1971年 29 巻 1 号 25-57
    発行日: 1971年
    公開日: 2007/05/30
    ジャーナル フリー
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