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全文: "在日米軍"
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  • 太田 弘, 長谷川 祐子, 大島 英幹
    地図
    2011年 49 巻 Supplement 号 42-43
    発行日: 2011/08/05
    公開日: 2017/12/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中林 啓修
    地域安全学会論文集
    2017年 30 巻 77-86
    発行日: 2017/03/24
    公開日: 2018/04/27
    ジャーナル フリー

    Military-level mutual cooperation between Japan and U.S. in the field of disaster relief in Japan germinated since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. After the earthquake, some of local authorities hosting U.S. Force Japan(USFJ) started to build a cooperation with USFJ for disaster relief. The Great East Japan Earthquake accelerated and expanded these relationships. At present, contribution of USFJ to disaster relief in Japan is incorporated with institution for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation and local authorities not hosting USFJ also start to building a disaster relief cooperation with USFJ. Major challenges of the cooperation today are solving institutional ambiguity (e.g. conditions for disaster relief by USFJ) and expanding opportunities for cooperation between local authorities and USFJ such as joint expertise.

  • 岡部 寿男
    電子情報通信学会 通信ソサイエティマガジン
    2015年 8 巻 4 号 280b
    発行日: 2015/03/01
    公開日: 2015/03/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 野波 寬, 土屋 博樹, 桜井 国俊
    実験社会心理学研究
    2014年 54 巻 1 号 40-54
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2014/08/29
    [早期公開] 公開日: 2014/03/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    正当性とは,公共政策に対する自他の決定権について,人々が何らかの理由・価値をもとに評価する承認可能性と定義される。本研究では沖縄県における在日米軍基地政策を取り上げ,これに深く関わる当事者と関与の浅い非当事者との間で,NIMBY問題における政策の決定権をめぐる多様なアクターの正当性とその規定因を検討した。正当性の規定因としては信頼性と法規性に焦点を当てた。当事者は精密な情報処理への動機づけが高いため,信頼性から正当性評価への影響は,評価対象のアクターごとに変化すると考えられる。これに対して非当事者は,各アクターの正当性を周辺的手がかりにもとづいて判断するため,一律的に信頼性と法規性が規定因になると仮定された。これらの仮説は支持されたが,その一方で非当事者ではNIMBY構造に関する情報の獲得により,自己利益の維持を目指して特定アクターの正当性を承認する戦略的思考の発生が指摘された。以上を踏まえ,公共政策をめぐるアクター間の合意形成を権利構造のフレームから検証する理論的視点について論じた。
  • 我部 政明
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 135 号 43-59,L8
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article analyzes and focuses on how Japan-U. S. alliance was constructed. The process and products of the alliance are examined by using declassified records of the U. S. State Department, the U. S. Pacific Command, and the U. S. Forces in Japan.
    As the Cold War entered a détente resulting in the signing of ABM Treaty and the US-China normalization, some Japanese conservative and influential politicians proposed an idea, that is, the so-called YUJI CHURYU, which would allow US forces to station in Japan only in case of contingency of Japan. The U. S. Embassy in Tokyo paid attention to such arguments emerging in Japan after the Reversion of Okinawa and made a recommendation to have candid dialogues with Japanese officials and thus review carefully the U. S. -Japan security relations. A telegram sent to the State Department from Tokyo in November 1972 points out that the trends of arguments were based on “uselessness” of the U. S. forces in Japan even though the United States succeeded in extending MST in 1970.
    This review was a starting point from where Japan-U. S. security relations evolved into an alliance that share equipments, roles, and missions based on mutual understanding and threat perception. The Japan-U. S. dialogues at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Subcommittee (SSC) that were the highest level of communication channel were a driving force to build up such an alliance. The committees established at several levels under the SCC were to share values and methods for estimating and evaluating international issues. These committees are, for instance, the Security Consultative Group (SCG) to promote mutual understanding on security matters, the Defense Study Group (DSG) functioning as a secret channel at military-military relations, and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) that became an organ that legitimized well-prepared military-military relations publicly and formally.
    A series of U. S.-Japan joint exercises that started in 1978 and 1980 were the products of the discussions at several committees that established joint military operational plans such as Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan (CJOEP) and Joint Operation Plan System (JOPS). Along with joint exercises at each service level, U. S. Army-GSDF, USMC-GSDF, U. S. Air Force-ASDF, and U. S. Navy-MSDF, three joint-operational plans such as DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5051, DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5052, and DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5053 were studied at the military-military level.
  • 岩田 修一郎
    国際政治
    1997年 1997 巻 115 号 110-125,L14
    発行日: 1997/05/17
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the wake of the Cold War, the largest security challenges are dangers posed by regional powers, and dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At this time of uncertainty, US leadership is essential for world peace.
    For the US, East Asia is a region of growing importance. The Pacific Rim countries are collectively America's largest trading partner. The confrontation and conflict that are recurrent reality in the region, however, make US military presence an essential element of regional stability. And for both regional security and US glogal interests, an alliance with Japan is necessary.
    The presence of US forces in Japan affords their rapid deployment to trouble spots in East Asia and as far as the Persian Gulf in the event of a variety of contingencies. Their stationing here is also cost-effective, thanks to Japanese financial support.
    The counterproliferation initiative of the Clinton Administration may have made Japan the most important ally of the US. The two countries must work in tandem to strengthen the present non-proliferation regime. Japan could make important contributions to the Theater Missile Defence project of the united States. The context for the Japan-US connection also includes North Korea's nuclear development and exports of missile technology to ‘rogue states’ in the Middle East, which are serious threat to Asian and global security.
    The bilateral alliance was reaffirmed with the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security announced in April 1996. Close cooperation between the two countries, it was agreed by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, is the most effective framework for the defense of Japan. The Declaration also clarified that Japan would not seek sutonomous defense capabilities. Further, the continued commitment to the alliance was reiterated at a time of debate over Okinawa, with Japan pledging its continued contribution for maintenance of US forces in Japan. The adjustment and realignment of US bases that is now underway will not result in any substantial change in overall US force structure.
    The redefined alliance includes one important change, being a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation by both countries. The development of contingency plans for future military conflicts in East Asia is now a key security agenda in the bilateral cooperation. The controversial issue here is Japan's military support of US forces in regional crises. Japanese government policy has been one in which the Self Defense Forces might be used only in the event of a direct attack on Japan.
  • 山本 章子
    国際政治
    2015年 2015 巻 182 号 182_111-182_124
    発行日: 2015/11/05
    公開日: 2016/08/04
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article aims at reconsidering the decision making process of the Eisenhower administration on the revisions to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 as part of the policy for the U.S. oversea bases. The previous studies have argued the treaty revisions as part of American policy toward Japan with a motive to prevent her from neutralization. But so-called “New Look”, the cold war strategy of the Eisenhower’s administration which depended on nuclear weapon capability, built in the presence of oversea bases all over the world. Therefore, the U.S. government addressed lessening the complaint of the host nations to maintain the oversea bases. This article discusses the treaty revisions from the point of its relations with the Nash Report, the survey and recommendation on the situation and issues surrounding U.S. oversea bases, to point out how the treaty revisions have a close link with the comprehensive U.S. oversea-bases policy. Furthermore, my analysis focuses on the attitude of the U.S. military including the Pentagon. The previous studies have ignored the role of the U.S. military in terms of the treaty revisions, but they are a key actor as well as the Department of State and the American embassy in Japan because the U.S. military has a veto of security policies.

    During the period of the Eisenhower’s administration, the USSR’s success in hydrogen-bomb test and appeal for change for peace after death of Stalin escalated fear of entrapment and demand of reducing U.S.-Soviet tension among the U.S. allies. In addition, the success of the USSR in development of ICBM missiles and Sputnik I launching in 1957, persuaded the host nations to limit their alliance commitment to the United States. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military forces for a long time and criminal jurisdiction procedures involving U.S. military personnel unfair to the host nations also led to public protest against the security policy of their government. As for Japan in 1950s, the presence of U.S. military bases was considered as an ongoing symbol of the “U.S. occupation”. What is more, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment everywhere in Japan strengthened the public’s fear of entrapment. The neutralists in Japan succeeded in propagating the idea that the U.S. military presence would increase the risk of entrapping Japan into unwanted nuclear wars after so-called “Sputnik shock”.

    Reflecting such a situation, the Nash Report recommended that the U.S. should examine alternatives to their base system in Far East. This recommendation became discussed seriously by the Operation Coordinating Board in spite of the opposition by the U.S. military. These altered the negative attitude of the U.S. military toward the treaty revisions.

  • 清 ルミ
    時事英語学研究
    1990年 1990 巻 29 号 13-31
    発行日: 1990/09/01
    公開日: 2012/11/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川上 高司
    国際政治
    2007年 2007 巻 148 号 143-146
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 新井 智一
    地学雑誌
    2005年 114 巻 5 号 767-790
    発行日: 2005/12/25
    公開日: 2009/11/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study examines the interaction between the politics in Fussa City and the Yokota Air Force Base, that is “the politics of place, ” from a range of political, economic, and cultural processes which maintain the existence of the base.
    Military bases are generally established for global geopolitical purposes. However, the establishment of a military base has cultural implications for the local communities where the base is located, i.e., increased concerns about crimes committed by seavicepersons and noise by aircrafts. Although these military bases have some serious impacts, especially in Japan, geographers have not yet examined the issues regarding a particular military base and the resultant politics in the city.
    On the contrary, since the 1980s, Anglo-American political geographers have paid more attention to “the politics of place” This refers to the local politics that occur due to the interaction between a structural constraint and the individuality of a particular place.
    Therefore, this study examines “the politics of place” on the Yokota Air Base in Fussa City, Tokyo, by using resources from the local newspapers, novels, magazine articles, and council proceedings.
    The results are as follows : (1) Owing to the independence between the U.S. Air Force and local political and economic actors, an urban structure and local economy that depended on the Yokota Air Force Base were constructed in Fussa Town after the establishment of the base in 1945; (2) because of this structure, the local economy became to depend on Air Force personnel as consumers; (3) however, due to a shift to the floating exchanging rate and a reduction in the population of the base in the first half of the 1970s, there was a decrease in the influence that Air Force personnel had on the local economy; (4) since the 1980s, an economic agent utilized the “atmosphere” and “image” adjacent to the base to revitalize the local economy; (5) furthermore, the mass media represented Fussa City as a “base town” and conducted a review of the city in the 1960s, thus contributing to its revitalization; (6) during the economic slump in the 1970s, some local political agents were against the existence of the base. However, successive mayors of Fussa City have accepted the existence of the base, and utilized the subsidies it receives from the national government in order to construct the urban infrastructure.
  • 脇長 真文, 山中 崇史, 金子 純一郎
    騒音制御
    2006年 30 巻 2 号 141-146
    発行日: 2006/04/01
    公開日: 2009/10/06
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 新崎 盛暉
    国際政治
    1999年 1999 巻 120 号 109-119,L12
    発行日: 1999/02/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Japan's postwar security policy has developed as a derivative of US global strategy, and has served to complement that strategy. Okinawa has served as the military foundation of that policy. The San Francisco Preace Treaty was influenced by events on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, in April 1952, the US-Japan alliance was concluded, and the US military viewed Okinawa as the “cornerstone” of its Pacific strategy. Not only did Okinawa occupy a geographical vantage point for the US to oversee East Asia, but it also provided the means for linking the US with its military allies in the region.
    The anti-base movement in Okinawa began to advocate a “return to Japan and its peace constitution” before the San Fracisco Peace Treaty was concluded. After the Treaty was ratified in April 1952, US military authorities in Okinawa clearly viewed the anti-base movement as a tool of international communism, and sought to repress it. But the “shimagurumi toso” (the island-wide protest) against US policy towards expropriated land in Okinawa in the 1950s reinvigorated the anti-base movement, and led to the formation in 1960 of the Council on the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to Japan. The anti-base movement in Okinawa intensified with US militaly intervention in Vietnam in 1965, and Okinawan activists joined others around the globe in protest of US strategy. Faced not only with domestic protest but also with a global anti-Vietnam war movement, the US found it increasingly difficult to execise powar over Okinawa.
    The reversion of Okinawa negotiated by the US and Japanese governments, however, was seen as a means of reorganizing and strengthening the US-Japan military alliance. The Japanese government used the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to consolidate US military bases. During the 1970s' US military bases on the main Japanese islands were reduced by one-third, but the US bases on Okinawa went virtually untouched. Today, the concentration of 75% of US military forces stationed in Japan on Okinawa, which has only 0.06% of Japan's total land area, is the result of an international policy of transferring the burden of these bases to Okinawa.
    Again, in the 1990s' the anti-base movement in Okinawa that emerged after the rape issue in the fall of 1995, was a direct challenge to US and Japanese government efforts to redefine the US-Japan alliance. By redefining the alliance, the US aimed to ensure Japan's support, as a subordinate military partner, in a strategy of joint global hegemony. Japan's military cooperation and rear-area support for US military actions in the vicinity of Japan, and the strengthening and consolidation of US bases on Okinawa, was required.
    The 1990s anti-base movement in Okinawa has provided the opportunity for greater cooperation between the Okinawa and Korean anti-base movements. New avenues of cooperation are possible. The peaceful unification of North and South Korea would be extremely advantageous for the reduction and withdrawal of US military bases in Okinawa and Korea. But, the call for the reduction and withdrawal of US military bases has yet to resound broadly among the public, and any real path towards peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula, and peace among the countries of Asia, will depend upon broad popular support.
  • 薬剤学
    2018年 78 巻 2 号 e2
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2018/03/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 田村 俊作
    日本図書館情報学会誌
    2004年 50 巻 2 号 79-82
    発行日: 2004/08/10
    公開日: 2017/05/04
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 月岡 秀文, 信太 正志
    騒音制御
    2007年 31 巻 2 号 144-147
    発行日: 2007/04/01
    公開日: 2010/02/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ジョンソン グレゴリー
    日本オーラル・ヒストリー研究
    2013年 9 巻 185-
    発行日: 2013/09/11
    公開日: 2018/12/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山村 淑子
    日本オーラル・ヒストリー研究
    2013年 9 巻 185-
    発行日: 2013/09/11
    公開日: 2018/12/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 池田 直隆
    国際政治
    2002年 2002 巻 129 号 173-185,L20
    発行日: 2002/02/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In January 1955, Prime Minister HATOYAMA Ichiro emphasized that Japan's primary objective is to attain for Japan full independence and self-reliance by pursuing as “independent diplomacy”, while at the same time Japan will adhere its basic principle of close cooperation with the United States. And HATOYAMA sought to adjust its relations with countries with which Japan still does not have diplomatic relations. So, He began Japanese-Soviet negotiations. U. S. Government took the position with the Japanese Government that the United States did not oppose establishment of diplomatic ralations with USSR, because they thought Japan was already an independent nation.
    But, U. S government feared that Japan chose the Neutral policy or Anti-American policy. And they are discontented with Japan's attitude toward the national security problems. They thought that Japan did not regard the threat of communism as seriously as did the United States and NATO countries. U. S. Government was irritated by the fact that Japan lacked self-knowledge of their position and responsibility.
    U. S. Government suspected whether HATOYAMA cabinet understood the importance and significance of mutual security systems or not. Moreover, they understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was so weak that difference of foreign policy between HATOYAMA and the Foreign ministry became very serious. HATOYAMA's directions to the Foreign ministry was sometimes not transmitted, and HATOYAMA's action did not sometimes coincide with the policy of Foreign ministry.
    There were two typical examples. One is Japanese-Soviet negotiations, and the other is Japanese-SouthKorea negotiations. Japanese Government and LDP also understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was very weak and unreliable.
    But, U. S. Government could not censure HATOYAMA publicly for his independent diplomacy, because in Japan, the anti-American feeling was growing rapidly by reason of U. S. troops and bases. In March 1956, when Secretary John F. Dulles visited Tokyo, MIKI Bukichi, who was the member of proxy committee of Liberal Democratic Party, said to Dulles, “even a mountain can be undermined and crumble because of ant holes”. MIKI warned Dulles against Japanese anti-American feeling. Indeed, HATOYAMA's independent diplomacy came to a deadlock. Japan failed to negotiate with USSR, South korea. The abuse of veto by USSR and Chinese Taipei prevented Japan from admitting to the United Nations in the 10th session, December 1955.
    So, it was very important for the U. S. Government to make HATOYAMA succeed in his Independent diplomacy. U. S. Government thought that HATOYAMA should resign honourably when Japanese-Soviet negotiation was concluded. It was called “Hanamichiron” in LDP. MIKI Bukichi once said to KISHI Nobusuke, who became Prime Minister in 1957, as follows.
    “What is most important is to make HATOAMA resign without injuring his political reputation”.
    The cognition of U. S Government was coincided with Japanese one.
  • 神谷 不二
    国際政治
    1986年 1986 巻 Special 号 32-66,L7
    発行日: 1986/10/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This is a memoir-typed essay rather than a monogragh which discusses the Japan-U. S. security system.
    The first chapter tittled the total reassessment of postwar security problem focuses on the process in which how the ‘security’ problem in Japan---one of the most important political issues during the ‘postwar’ period---has become an almost uncontrovertial issue among Japanese people in the 1980's. Taking a general view of the process, I think that the ‘final liquidation of the postwar period’ can be referred to, in a sense, as the ‘final liquidation of the postwar security problem’ in Japan. And I wonder what kind of factors have brought about the ‘final liquidation?’
    The question over the revision of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty in 1960 is discussed in the chapter two. As I was in the U. S. in 1960, when political uproar caused by this question occurred in Japan, I found it extremely difficult to understand the true state of the things because of lack of information on it. I especially got confused to see the fact that the target of the political movement in Japan had quickly changed, in a certain point of time, from ‘anti-Security Treaty’ to ‘anti-Kishi administration’ or ‘a defense of democratic parliamentary politics.’ It can be said in the final analysis that Japanese nationalism which had been tangibly or intangibly accumlated since occupation years flared up into such a chaotic movement with no clear-cut political goal on the occasion of the revision of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty in 1960.
    In the chapters three and four, I focused on the question of ‘free ride’ of Japan, and the question of reciprocality between the both countries in our Security Treaty. Controversies over the Japan's free ride regarding her peace and security were heavily discussed in the U. S. for ten odd years after the last half of 1960s. Certainly some people in Japan still have a deep-rooted view which goes along with the free rider's line of thought, however, my interpretation is that Japan and the U. S. are maintaining reciprocality in the security system, playing different type of roles each other. I find that not a few people in Japan tend to discuss the security problem existing between the two nations, without a clear understanding of its precise structure in this reciprocal mechanism. Therefore, I clarifies its basic structure in this chapter.
    In the chapter five, I insert my dialogue with Mr. Hiroharu Seki which originally appeared in the ‘Shokun’ managine January 1970 issue. It goes without saying that Mr. Seki maintained that the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty had to be abolished, and that I was an advocate for the treaty. I would be appreciated if the debate make you realize how the countroversies over security of Japan were going at that time.
    Finally I make a brief review, in the chapter six, as to how the policies of the Opposition parties regarding security of Japan have changed. The reason why controversies over the security problem have virtually faded away in Japan is due to the fact that the anti-Security Treaty forces have changed their basic stance with regard to security and that we have come to have a wider and solid acceptance of the Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces among the Japanese people. Since the establishment of the ‘Guidelines’ for Japan-U. S. defense cooperation in 1978, our security system has stepped into a new stage with a particular and concrete cooperative relationship between the two countries from the stage of general and abstract cooperation.
  • 野波 寛, 大友 章司, 坂本 剛, 田代 豊
    人間環境学研究
    2015年 13 巻 2 号 153-162
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2015/12/27
    ジャーナル フリー
    Legitimacy is defined as perceived approvability of others' or one's own rights to decide public policies on the basis of some reasons or values. The present study assumed integrated administrations of a large region or local region as authority holding rights to decide the propriety of troublesome facility, and examined approval processes for legitimacy of these two authorities among people in located or outside area. Effects of troublesome facility on personal interests of people in located area are direct and visible, whereas those on interests of people in outside area are indirect and invisible. In case that information about interests of people in located or outside area are insufficient, people in outside area will consider propriety of troublesome facility as a public decision which is irrelevant to themselves, and to approve the legitimacy of people in located area. Therefore, they are hypothesized to evaluate the legitimacy of administrations of a local region more highly. On the other hand, they will estimate the legitimacy of administrations of a large region highly when the information about interests of people in located or outside area are sufficient, because they aid to acquire their own interests. The results of an experiment employing a scenario method supported the hypothesis. These results suggest that people in outside area holding sufficient information evoke elaborative processing in consideration of various cues concurrently.
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