Military-level mutual cooperation between Japan and U.S. in the field of disaster relief in Japan germinated since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. After the earthquake, some of local authorities hosting U.S. Force Japan(USFJ) started to build a cooperation with USFJ for disaster relief. The Great East Japan Earthquake accelerated and expanded these relationships. At present, contribution of USFJ to disaster relief in Japan is incorporated with institution for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation and local authorities not hosting USFJ also start to building a disaster relief cooperation with USFJ. Major challenges of the cooperation today are solving institutional ambiguity (e.g. conditions for disaster relief by USFJ) and expanding opportunities for cooperation between local authorities and USFJ such as joint expertise.
After Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, some of local authorities hosting U.S. Force Japan(USFJ) started to build a cooperation with USFJ for disaster relief. The Great East Japan Earthquake accelerated and expanded these relationships. With examination of questionair investigation to local authorities, this study tried to draw landscapeand question of the cooperation between local authority and USFJ and examin forsight for solving the question and incleasign the cooperation.
This article aims at reconsidering the decision making process of the Eisenhower administration on the revisions to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 as part of the policy for the U.S. oversea bases. The previous studies have argued the treaty revisions as part of American policy toward Japan with a motive to prevent her from neutralization. But so-called “New Look”, the cold war strategy of the Eisenhower’s administration which depended on nuclear weapon capability, built in the presence of oversea bases all over the world. Therefore, the U.S. government addressed lessening the complaint of the host nations to maintain the oversea bases. This article discusses the treaty revisions from the point of its relations with the Nash Report, the survey and recommendation on the situation and issues surrounding U.S. oversea bases, to point out how the treaty revisions have a close link with the comprehensive U.S. oversea-bases policy. Furthermore, my analysis focuses on the attitude of the U.S. military including the Pentagon. The previous studies have ignored the role of the U.S. military in terms of the treaty revisions, but they are a key actor as well as the Department of State and the American embassy in Japan because the U.S. military has a veto of security policies.
During the period of the Eisenhower’s administration, the USSR’s success in hydrogen-bomb test and appeal for change for peace after death of Stalin escalated fear of entrapment and demand of reducing U.S.-Soviet tension among the U.S. allies. In addition, the success of the USSR in development of ICBM missiles and Sputnik I launching in 1957, persuaded the host nations to limit their alliance commitment to the United States. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military forces for a long time and criminal jurisdiction procedures involving U.S. military personnel unfair to the host nations also led to public protest against the security policy of their government. As for Japan in 1950s, the presence of U.S. military bases was considered as an ongoing symbol of the “U.S. occupation”. What is more, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment everywhere in Japan strengthened the public’s fear of entrapment. The neutralists in Japan succeeded in propagating the idea that the U.S. military presence would increase the risk of entrapping Japan into unwanted nuclear wars after so-called “Sputnik shock”.
Reflecting such a situation, the Nash Report recommended that the U.S. should examine alternatives to their base system in Far East. This recommendation became discussed seriously by the Operation Coordinating Board in spite of the opposition by the U.S. military. These altered the negative attitude of the U.S. military toward the treaty revisions.
This thesis proves the details about the U.S.–Japan defense cooperation before the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the U.S. and Japan (1978) were created. Japan and the U.S. periodically made CJOEPs (Combined Joint Outline Emergency Plan, before 1964/Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan, after 1964) and contingency plans (including “Hakone” between the U.S. Navy in Japan and the Maritime Self Defense Force). The contents of the CJOEPs and the details about how to make the plans are successfully shown in this thesis. Accordingly, the draft of the CJOEP in 1955 mentioned that “unified command, under a Combined Force Commander, will be established over all U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan. The Combined Force Commander… will exercise command through a combined and joint command structure.” Considering the U.S.–Japan relationship at that time, the Combined Force Commander was assumed to be an American. However, it was finally changed without mentioning the Combined Force Commander. This means that Japan finally succeeded in avoiding the apparent mention of a “secret agreement” in the CJOEP. From this, we can see Japan’s strong will to retain its own sovereignty and independence. The Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) not only made those plans but also conducted map exercises so that they could examine the plans and reflect the results of the exercises in the next year’s plans. This thesis shows the details of the exercises called “FUJI” in 1957 and “MAPLE LEAF” in 1958, and how the JSDF and USFJ conducted them. The joint exercises between the JSDF and the USFJ that took place before the Guidelines are also shown. The fact that the Japan Ground SDF and Air SDF engaged in them with their counterparts should be especially emphasized, because existing studies have not proven this with first-hand materials yet. In addition, this thesis could prove the fact that there were some institutions for defense cooperation between the JSDF and the USFJ at various levels including the Combined Planning Committee, which was established for making the CJOEPs and Combined Planning Groups that were in each service, and set up for making contingency plans based on the CJOEPs. This result means that the defense cooperation during this period was greater than previously thought. Moreover, this leads to two implications: first, the aspect of “symmetric alliance” in the U.S.–Japan Security Arrangement existed earlier and was more substantial; second, the institutionalization of the arrangement was more developed than previous studies have indicated.