本稿では、日本外交史研究で「新外交」呼応策として言及されながら実証の不十分だった外務省による「宣伝外交」の実態を、ワシントン会議［華府会議］を例に解明する。そして、第一次世界大戦期から華府会議期に至る対外宣伝の展開を、日本外交史の中に位置づける。
第一章では前史として第一次世界大戦中の対中国宣伝を述べる。在上海総領事により創設された「東方通信社」［東方］は、反帝制運動に乗じて中国での宣伝基盤を作った。だが内政干渉政策と密接する漢字新聞中心の宣伝は大戦後に裏目に出た。
第二章ではパリ講和会議後の対外宣伝を見る。外務省は、日本の「公明正大」な対中政策をどう米国に示し、他方「誤解」の源とされる中国内の報道にどう対抗するかという観点で宣伝策を再検討した。1920年4月発足の情報部は、在中国の米国人経営紙に対抗するべく英字新聞を強化し、「東方」を直轄化した。一方ドイツによる戦時「プロパガンダ」の記憶が色濃い米国では、原敬首相の対米外交を支えるや幣原喜重郎が現地宣伝機関設置案を却けた。この対照的な対中・対米宣伝方針は華府会議でも継承された。
第三章では華府会議期の宣伝を、情報部・「東方」・日本全権［全権］に着目して論じる。日本の一般方針は国際的信望の増進で、情報部第一課は｢東方｣支社発の中国関連情報を全権へ提供した。また「東方」華府特派員は在中国支社へ会議の模様を伝え、「東方」調査部は同特派員の取材をもとに雑誌を刊行した。また情報部第二課は政府首脳と欧米人記者の会見を所管した。一方全権は、東京との電信遅延や、会議の開放性を求める米国輿論に応じるため、主体的に欧米人記者へ会談・会見を開いた。
以上より当該期の外務省は、対中宣伝では「東方」の機能を拡充し、一方米国では期待された公明な情報発信を行うことで、中国での排日情勢の抑制と、米国が抱く「旧外交」的な日本像の刷新を図ったといえる。

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In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was “welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage.” His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt “who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant.” It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, “the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism.”
The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled “The United States Looking Outward, ” published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that “the United States is woefully unready” and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire “a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America.” Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of “the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)” against the day when China “expand her barriers eastward” in “a wave of barbaric invasion.” Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and “your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific”. He instructed “much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man”. Then in September, he wrote article “A Twentieth Century Outlook”, in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the “Yellow Peril.” But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the “Yellow Peril” was not Japan but China.
However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the “Yellow Peril” changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote “The Problem of Asia.” In this article, he saw the most pressing “problem” as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four “Maritime States” of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that

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This article reconsiders Japanese diplomacy towards China during the period of the initial establishment of the Hara Takashi cabinet, concentrating on the problem of having industrial loans included in the formation of the “New Four-Power Consortium”.

Previous research has concentrated on the transition from “Old Diplomacy” to “New Diplomacy”, and has stated that the Hara cabinet altered the policy of the previous Terauchi Masatake cabinet. Compared with the old consortium, the new consortium is characterised by the inclusion of industrial loans in its scope of business. However, this has only been pointed out by a few researchers, who have clarified the relationship between this problem and “New Diplomacy”. My research concentrates on the domestic preparation for participating in the new consortium, and the changes it brought to Anglo-Japanese relations.

In October 1918, the Hara cabinet decided not to supply loans that would pose an obstacle to North-South peace in China, such as the “Nishihara Loans”. This decision was certainly ground-breaking, but the Army Ministry demanded certain exceptions.

The US government tried to restrain Japanese economic influence on the Chinese government and proposed forming a new consortium. The US State Department insisted that the new consortium should include not only administrative loans, but industrial loans. The British government and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation had been opposed to including industrial loans when the Six-Power Consortium was formed in 1912. The Japanese government expected that the British government and bankers would be opposed to including industrial loans this time as well. However, the British government pledged “exclusive support” to the British syndicate to unify British banks connected to China. Therefore, the Japanese government could not expect the British party to state its opposition.

J. J. Abbott, an American banker who had visited Japan, had held talks with Prime Minister Hara and Deputy Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro. Abbott and the State Department were optimistic that Japan would want to include industrial loans. T. W. Lamont, representing the American syndicate, suggested in the inter-group conference in Paris that the new consortium should include not only administrative loans but industrial loans. Yokohama Specie Bank, representing the Japanese syndicate, agreed to his proposal. However, the bank’s stance did not represent all Japanese banks closely related to China. These banks could not fully agree to his proposal because the Hara cabinet had not yet made preparations to organize a syndicate formed of multiple banks. It was only after the Paris conference that the Hara cabinet assembled eighteen banks in Tokyo and Osaka to let them participate in the new consortium.

In conclusion, it was not difficult for the Hara cabinet to agree to include industrial loans in the process of forming the new consortium. However, the Hara cabinet had not been able to organize the Japanese syndicate. The argument is also advanced that the Japanese syndicate formed by the Hara cabinet had its origins in the syndicate under the Terauchi cabinet.

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The Anti-Japanese Immigration Act which the Congress of the United States of America passed in May, 1924, shocked the Japanese very much. There was a strong possibility that it might cause the Japanese, who believed that they had been one of the five big powers in the world since the first World War, to get rid of the attitude of “Leaving Asia and Identifying with Europe” which they had taken since they opened up their country to the world; in other words, it could possibly shake the basis of the Japanese national identity. This identity crisis could be understood from various public opinions expressed after the establishment of the Anti-Japanese Immigration Act, that is to say, the arguments for reconsidering the meaning of the relationship between Japan and the United States of America which had been continuing since Perry's visit to Japan, the arguments for close relations with other Asian countries, and the arguments for emigration to the Asian Continent which was said to be impossible because of historical reasons.
It should be understood that these opinions were expressed on the basis of the very sense of crisis over national identity and the foundation of the Japanese existence and from the point of view that it would be possible to overcome the crisis by identifying with Asia. After all, however, the arguments were gradually absorbed into the insistence that Japan should advance upon China.

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近年日本の伝統様式の庭園が諸外国で築造せられ, 高い評価を受けている。 これについては, 長い間の書籍, 見聞記, 広報, 写真, 映画等の情報の集積によるものであるが, 国際的評価を得る主な原因は, 彼等が実際に造られた日本造園を自分の国で実際に見る機会を得ることである。 本稿は, 諸外国で行なわれた万国博等に我国が出展した庭園及び日本に旅行滞在した外国人が自らの庭に作った初期のものを考察するものである。

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Dr. Kan'ichi Asakawa (1873-1948), Professor at Yale University, had studied in Japan and the United States and graduated from Yale University. His speciality was comparative legal history, especially in the medieval era. But other than his special studies he had a positive interest in modern East Asian international relations and its relations with United States.
He published in English his book “Russo-Japanese Conflict” in 1904. He criticised Russian expansionism in East Asia, especially in Manchuria and toward Korea and supported the Japanese stand in the Russo-Japanese War. But, on the other hand, he criticised Japanese diplomacy in East Asia after the war and he wrote his Japanese book “Indication of Japan's Disaster” in 1909. He stressed two principles relative to China, principles of territorial integration and open door (or “equal oppotunity”) which were advocated by Secretary Hay in 1889 and 1990, as the stand of “new diplomacy”. “Old diplomacy” is the expansive and imperialistic diplomacy. He asserts that Japan took the stand of “new diplomacy” against Russian “old diplomacy” at the Russo-Japanese War. But, he asserts, Japan took the policy of “old diplomacy” after the war. And this change promoted American antithapy toward Japan and he surmised even the possibility of Japan-U. S. War in the future. He inspected various elements in Japanese action in Manchuria and especially advocated the retrocession of leased territory in China.
In spite of his criticism Japan magnified its imperialistic policy in China. He wrote many letters to his seniors and friends, such as Shigenobu Okuma, Soho Tokutomi, Yasaka Takagi and others, and appealed for change to Japanese foreign policy. Concerning the Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915 he warned the Shantung problem might be the turning point to determine Japan's destiny. In the letter of April 29, 1917 to Tokutomi he requested the concert of the three nations, Japan, China and the United States. Concerning the Washington Conference he asserted that Japan should take positive action and he hoped Japan would initiate discussion on the problem of the agenda of the Conference.
Concerning the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War he rejected Japan's policy of relying on military power. He foresaw the isolation of Nazi-Germany and predicted German defeat and Hitler's suicide in the letter of March 6, 1938 to his friend. Accordingly he was opposed to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. He expected change in Japan's foreign policy before the catastrophe but the prosect was very poor. So Asakawa joined the movement to dispatch a letter from President Roosevelt to Japan's Emperor. He, with his collaborators, wrote the draft of Roosevelt's letter to the Emperor. In fact the President sent his letter to the Emperor immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. But the contents of the letter were very different from Asakawa's draft and he expressed his disappointment in a letter to his friend.

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