(1) Israel is not a militaristic state although she is a model of ‘nation-in- arms’ in the sense that military defense occupies the center of her people's life.
(2) The reason why Israel is ‘nation-in-arms’ is due to the fact that she was surrounded by hostile countries which do not recognize her legitimacy as a state, and that she has actually fought four times with them in the past. In addition to this, holocaust analogy and ‘Masada complex’ which are latent in the psychology of Israelis, highten terror in their heart.
(3) But, up to now, Israel has never faced the critical situation in which she could be actually annihilated. Rather, she has always won overwhelming victory in the past wars, with the only exception of the Yom Kippur War. At the same time, it is an undeniable fact that the terror of annihilation has been utilized for the justification of her intransigent policy.
(4) Israel has tried to persuade the Arab states for their recognition of Israeli's legitimacy as a state, while totally rejecting the wish of Palestinians for the establishment of their independent state. After the end of Six-Day-War, Israel has made every efforts to secure her security on the basis of tei ritorialism by bringing out the conception of ‘defensible borders’.
(5) If Israel wishes to secure the true security, it might be indispensable for her to recognize the Palestinians' legitimate rights of self-determination through peaceful settlement, in stead of insisting the conception of security on the basis of territorialism.

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Korea, whose independence was promised by the Allied Powers during World War II., witnessed the division of the country into two as a result of American-Soviet disagreement. Moreover, in 1948, each section took necessary steps for independence while the country remained disunited.
Japan formally recognized Korea's independence when the Peace Treaty became effective. She had, however, acknowledged the existence of independent Korea even before the Peace Treaty was concluded. Furthermore, the Japanese Government was ready to accept the government of the Republic of Korea as the legitimate regime in Korea in view of American wishes and the resolution adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations. Subsequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the government of Japan entered into negotiations with the Korean Government on various problems which would arise when the treaty became effective.
The talks, however, brought about no result, and without any agreements between the two governments, the Peace Treaty went into effect. Since then, six sessions of intermittent talks were held between the two governments during the past eleven years. There are many reasons for the prolongation of the talks. These include, emotionalism among the peoples of Japan and Korea, as well as the extreme anti-Japanese sentiment which prevailed in Korea during the Rhee administration. Concrete causes for the failure, however, have been, among others, the questions of property settlement and fishery in which the fundamental differences of opinion of both parties have been evident.
The ROK government regarded the question of property as vital, and maintained the attitude that without the settlement of this issue other problems existing between Japan and Korea would remain unsolved. In the face of such a stiff argument of the ROK government, the Japanese Government made significant concessions on two occasions. The first was the withdrawal of the six-year old Japanese demand, in late 1957, for compensation for the property previously owned by the Japanese nationals in Korea. The second concession involved Japan's modification regarding her demand for property compensation based on legal principle. The new Foreign Minister Ohira hoped to settle this issue on the basis of political expediency rather than on legal basis. These concessions brought about a basic agreement regarding the property question which had been one of the greatest obstacles in the talks. This being accomplished, hopes for the conclusion of talks brightened.
Be that as it may, the future of the talks seems to depend on the degree of the concessions by the ROK government on the question of fishery (the removal of the Rhee Line) which the Japanese Government consider important.

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Japan is one of the largest arms importers in the world. On the other hand, it severely restricts the export of weapons. Namely, the Japanese Government carries out the most extraordinary policy that it bans the export of any kinds of weapons abroad, while Japan has developed and produced highly sophisticated weapons for the Self Defence Forces and also it has extremely high capability in terms of military technology.
It was in April 1967 that the principles on arms export were incorporated into national policy by former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato for the first time. It was called the three principles on arms exports, by which Japan refrained from the export of weapons to such countries as (1) communist nations, (2) countries on which were imposed arms embargoes by the UN resolutions and (3) parties to international conflicts or nations which were likely to become parties. Several years later, the Japanese Government revised the principles by enlarging the areas to which they were applied. Namely, in February 1976 the Cabinet lead by former Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the unified government guideline that Japan refrained from exporting any weapons to every area in the world. Also, at the same time, the Cabinet defined weapons prohibited from exporting under the guideline as one which was used directly for battle by military forces. Thus the Japanese Government shaped the strict policy on arms exports.
In January 1981, however, the scandal that gun barrels had been smuggled to South Korea by some company was brought to the public. It was called the Hotta Steel Scandal. As a result of it, the effectiveness of the policy on arms export came into question. In March 1981, both Houses of the Diet adopted the resolution on the ban on arms exports, which requested the Government to respond to the acts whcih had violated the principles with strictness and discretion, and also required it to take effective measures to improve the condition. Accordingly, the policy of the Japanese Government on the arms export was substantially reinforced.
At the end of June 1981, the United States requested Japan to start the mutual exchange of arms technology between the two countries. At that time, it had been understood in the Japanese Government that the arms on which the principles were applied included every arms technology except widely used ones whcih were applicable for both military and non-military use. The United Sates took notice of the excellent arms technology that Japan, especially Japanese private companies, had developed so far. The United States has dissatisfaction with the unfair transfer of arms technology between Japan and the United States, because Japanese companies and other entities were not permitted to export such technology to the United Stats by the policy of the Government, while the United States had provided arms technology for Japan through licenced production and other means. The request from the United States purported to make the flow of arms technology between the two countries both ways. Actually there was a great controversy in the Japanese Government on whether it was consistent with the established principles on arms exports to accept it. Thus the Japanese Government had much difficulty in responding to the request from the United States.
Through the discussion in the Japanese Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency were in favor for the request, and on the contrary, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was relucfant to accept it. Finally in January 1983, the Cabinet lead by former Prime Mimister Yasuhiro Nakasone determined to accept it and start the transfer of arms technology to the United States as a exception to the principles. In the process of discussion, a opinion that it is the obligation imposed on Japan under Japan-U. S. Security Treaty and other arrangements between the two countries for Japan to provide arms technology for the

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Japan's so-called three non-nuclear principles-of not possessing, not manufacturing, and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons-express its independent and characteristic position in the disarmament policy as well as its determined principle that it shall never become a military power threatening other nations. This paper tries, primarily through the Diet debates, to review how the Japanese disarmament policy with such non-nuclear principles as its basis has evolved in the face of reality.
The three non-nuclear principles were set up by the then Prime Minister Sato, first in December 1967 and again in January 1968 in the form of the answer to the question in the Diet debates. However, these principles were originally considered to constitute “the four nuclear policies.” In fact, the government and the ruling party decided to keep the three non-nuclear principles only if the Japanese national security is insured by the U. S. nuclear deterrence. This is how the Japanese disarmament policy started to evolve under the strange combination of the opposing policies, which adheres to the three non-nuclear principles on the one hand and continues to rely on the U. S. nuclear deterrence on the other.
At first the dilemma showed itself when ratification of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was put on the agenda of the Diet debates. The government made it clear to the ruling party to continue its reliance on the U. S. nuclear deterrence, but it also stressed to the opposition parties its adherence to the non-nuclear principles as well. And the second occation appeared at the first and second U. N. Special Sessions on Disarmament. While the Japanese government proclaimed to the international community that it would continue to keep the three non-nuclear principles, it declined, from the standpoint of nuclear balances, to support the U. N. resolutions on no use and no deployment of nuclear weapons.
The gap between its pursuit of the ideal of non-nuclear policy and its real course of action has increasingly widened particulary after the Afgan incident. The way Japan acted itself in the Williamsburg summit of May 1983, in connection with the INF negociations between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. made it clear that Japan stood on the side of the West in the field of the nuclear disarmament. Since then, the effectiveness of the nuclear deferrence and nuclear balances has been stressed much strongly, and it seems that the Japanese non-nuclear policy based on the three non-nuclear principles has declined in its importance.
It is also true that recently, out of deep concern for such trend, there has been voices to call out the danger of being rested on the nuclear balances and stress the importance of bringing down the nuclear balances to much lower level. What Japan needs to do now is to clarify once again its position as the only country which suffered atomic explosion, and establish an independent nuclear disarmament policy which clearly sees to the starting point of the non-nuclear policy, and promote the nuclear disarmament diplomacy which is firmly based on that policy.

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How do we apply history in politics? The purpose of this paper is to analyze how recognition in civil society, such as perception of history, plays a role in public opinion and parliamentary government. To clarify this research question, incorporating a political concept into the analysis, this paper focused on roles of the General Association of Korean Residents (Chongryon) and the North Korean Lobby and looked into the backgrounds in the repatriation massively expanded between 1959 and 1961.

Before repatriation movements started, changes of organization structures were observed in the Chongryon and they began to speak in favor of North Korea. Simultaneously, the nature of the Niccho-Kyokai (日朝協会), which had been taking a politically neutral position, also began to change. They began to be a lobbying group in order to support the North Korean foreign diplomacy against Japan.

Applying a concept of “Pseudo Environment” defined by Walter Lippmann as a subjective, biased, and abridged mental image of the world, this section reflected on influences of the two key players over North Korean residents in Japan and Japanese public opinion. The analysis found a social trend with regards to repatriation issues being manipulated by a correlation of three components in the Pseudo Environment: (1) unified perception of history, (2) motherland-oriented nationalism, and (3) economic rationality.

Based on a data-mining method, the influences of the Pseudo Environment in the Diet were analyzed. The penetration of such an environment into civil society assisted the Diet members with the repatriation project being recognized ethically and humanitarianly. Therefore, intentions of the North Korean strategies against South Korea were insufficiently discussed.

The Pseudo Environment lost its effect as (1) demand of mobilization was weakened, (2) activities were diversified among the North Korean Lobby, and (3) information about North Korea was brought by returnees, and gaps were gradually closed between the Pseudo Environment and reality.

As a result of the Pseudo Environment effectively created by the two players among the North Korean residents in Japan and in the Japanese public opinion, one-sided recognition of North Korean strategies influenced civil society and parliamentary government to bring the mass repatriation out. This analysis also concludes that a nation is capable of controlling a social trend in other countries via intermediaries from outside of its country taking advantage of certain recognition. When we see international relations in East Asia, perception of history is an ongoing issue and has been more complex. This indicates that more case studies will be expected on how history has been utilized in politics.

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The ODA charter was enacted in 1992. This document provided a fundamental view of the Japanese ODA policy. The factors which led to this charter's enactment are various. However, the influence of the deliberations on ODA, especially in the House of Councilors, was large. The research committee of the House of Councilors is a committee for investigating. The results of the activities of this committee were summarized in a report, and, as a result, the resolution was passed. Moreover, considerable legislation was also proposed by the members of the House of Councilors about ODA in the meantime. The establishment of the ODA charter can be regarded as a response by the administration to these activities. Thus, it is thought that the activities of the Diet greatly influenced the establishment of the ODA charter. Such activities of the Diet will become a model case for policy making by the Diet. It also became easy for the Diet to control Japanese ODA policy by having made the charter.

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The article attempts to treat both the ‘Okinawa problem’, implying its pending territorial status until the Ryukyus reversion, and the ongoing Russo-Japanese dispute over the ‘Northern territories’ as interdependent political issues. Entertaining no doubts about the term ‘residual’ as it was commonly a pplied to the issue of Okinawa's ‘sovereignty’, this article suggests to interpret the ‘Okinawa problem’ as a ‘residual’ territorial dispute. A ‘territorial dispute’ is seen as occurring, according to Paul Huth's definition, when “both governments seek control of and sovereign rights over the same territory”.
Both territorial issues are rooted in the post-World war II rivalry of two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for the control of geopolitical space. The two issues are unique, however, since they represent territorial disputes, actual and potential, respectively, between both superpowers and a single foreign power, Japan. Moreover, their very existence as the disputes was largely sustained by the continuous rivalry of the superpowers, thus forming a peculiar ‘balance of power’. Hence, in view of a broad range of the research subject and its so far unexplored quality, the primary goal of the article is to pose a scholarly problem rather than draw any immediate conclusions.
Emphasizing their differences from the legal standpoint, the two territorial issues were dealt with in separate Articles, namely 2 (c) and 3, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to the treaty's principal author, John Foster Dulles, Article 26 provided for the possibility of the United States' gaining “full sovereignty over the Ryukyus”, in case “Japan recognized that the Soviet Union was entitled to full sovereignty over the Kuriles”.
It is this particular interpretation, personally given by Dulles to Japan's Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru in August 1956, which makes it possible to regard the ‘Okinawa issue’ as a residual territorial dispute. Conveyed inn the course of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks, this statement served to intensify the interdependence of both territorial issues and to confirm the US position of a concerned ‘third power’. The subsequent application of the ‘Okinawa-Kuriles’ linkage by both the Japanese and the Soviet negotiators, namely Mono Ichiro and Nikita Khruschev, in October 1956 testify to the political uses of international law on their part.
The article's concluding section draws critical attention to post-Cold war efforts to employ the ‘Okinawa reversion’ model for the purpose of resolving the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute in a way presumably identical to the Cold war approach. The Appendix contains a unique document which was found in the US National Archives. Dated August 8, 1967, it is a ‘secret memorandum’ written by Legal Advisor Mark Feldman to Richard Sneider, the US Department of State country director for Japan. This document, in particular, addressed the issue of possible Ryukyus reversion “by executive agreement without formal congressional action”. As such, it is presumed to be directly applicable in terms of modeling the ‘Kuriles issue’ resolution on the ‘Okinawa reversion’ in the context of foreign policy prerogatives of the President and the Diet in post-Soviet Russia.

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本稿は集団的自衛権が1945年から今日まで行使されたことがないのか検証することを目的とする。また、本稿は日本を取り巻く国際環境が刻々と変化し、従来の考え方が国際社会において通用しにくくなってきている今日、安全保障環境を憲法解釈というレンズを通して判断することは非常に重要であると考えたことを問題意識としている。

2015年に成立した安全保障関連法案は限定的な集団的自衛権の行使を認めるものであり、国際環境の変化を如実に示すものであった。この法案が審議されている間、国会近辺等では学生団体まで巻き込んだ反対運動が展開され、テレビや新聞もこれを大々的に喧伝した。この時に反対する勢力が口を揃えて言ったのはこれまで1人も戦死者を出していない自衛隊が集団的自衛権の行使容認によって戦死者が出るような組織になってしまうのではないかという危惧であった。

では、これまで、本当に戦後日本は集団的自衛権を一度も行使したことはなかったのであろうか。このことについて研究を始めた際、偶然、朝鮮戦争時に日本が朝鮮海域に「日本特別掃海隊」を派遣していたことを知った。そして、そこでは若い隊員が「戦死」していたのである。

朝鮮戦争はどのような経緯で始まり、どのような経過を辿ったかについて、国際環境や戦局を概観し、当時組織された国連軍がどのような状況にあり、日本の助けを必要としていたかについて考える。

そして、この戦争において日本は自国の領域内外においていかなる協力を行ったのか。占領期であったとはいえ、日本国憲法が施行されて5年経つ日本が行った協力について考える。日本が行った協力には現在の法制ではとても考えられないような協力を行っている場合もあり、これについては政治的判断以上の解釈を行うことは難しい。

その様々な協力を踏まえた上で、現在、日本国憲法下において国防任務にあたっている自衛隊の成立過程と変化してきた憲法解釈についても考え、どのような解釈が時代の変化とともに採られるようになってきたのかを併せて考える。

日本の憲法解釈の変遷に基づいて、PKO協力法、周辺事態法、イラク特措法、そして平和安全法制について、成立の経緯や歴史、当時の国際環境等を勘案し、述べていく。

そして最後に、日本の集団的自衛権行使を限定的ながら認めるという新しい憲法解釈が政治的判断を狭めるものであり、時代に適したものであるのか、そうでないのかについても判断する。

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　正力大臣車中談（案）という風変わりな標題の史料がある。昭和31年の原子力委員会で諮られている。正力は東京から選挙区富山に電車でお国入りする車中で，随行記者団にさまざまな真情を披瀝した。同年1月中旬のお国入りの際には，原子力委員会発足直後の声明書の内容に関して談じた。原子力委員の湯川は，新聞紙面に踊った正力の車中談に接し，困惑と憤りを露にした。そんな背景に湯川ら物理学者と正力ら政治家の思惑の違いが根強くあった。それが，結果的に原子力ムラと御用学者を生む発端になったのではないか。史料をもとに論考する。

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