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  • ─傷痍軍人とその妻に求められていたもの─
    高安 桃子
    ジェンダー史学
    2009年 5 巻 51-65
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2010/11/02
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper discusses the measures taken to assist disabled soldiers in finding marriage partners from the outbreak of the war between Japan and China to the Pacific War. I will also consider the role that disabled soldiers and their wives were expected to play during wartime. During the war years, the numbers of disabled soldiers increased dramatically, and measures were taken to help these disabled soldiers find marriage partners.
    This program to aid disabled soldiers began in 1938 when an organization of women took the lead in efforts to introduce future partners to disabled soldiers. In response to a request from the government, the activities were extended to the whole country in 1941.
    A number of goals lay behind the program including: a desire to assist in the rehabilitation of disabled soldiers so that they might comeback to serve the nation; a desire to secure manpower; and bestowing honor on the soldiers. Disabled soldiers needed a strong commitment if they were to complete rehabilitation, and also needed to have a sense of their own identity as disabled soldiers. Thus it was important to draw a distinction between those with congenital disabilities, and the disabilities of the soldiers who were wounded in combat.
    The movement sought Japanese woman who were willing to marry disabled soldiers. Women did not normally join the military services, but marrying a disabled soldier and relieving him of despair was promoted as a way for a woman to serve the nation. In the training schools set up to support the brides of disabled soldiers, women were taught useful vocations so that they would be able to earn a living instead of their husbands.
    The disabled soldier's wife was also expected to be a caregiver. The wife's most important role was to support the rehabilitation of her husband so that he could again serve the nation. She was supposed to be strong enough to bear the burden in her marriage. We can imagine that it must have taken a very strong resolve for a woman to decide to marry a disabled soldier.
  • システム要因と戦争の因果分析
    野口 和彦
    アジア研究
    2007年 53 巻 4 号 37-55
    発行日: 2007/10/31
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.
    According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.
    The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.
    The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.
    This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.
  • 池内 一
    社会学評論
    1951年 2 巻 2 号 30-42
    発行日: 1951/08/30
    公開日: 2009/11/11
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 終戦外交と戦後構想
    北岡 伸一
    国際政治
    1995年 1995 巻 109 号 1-5
    発行日: 1995/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 長 志珠絵
    学術の動向
    2016年 21 巻 5 号 5_37-5_42
    発行日: 2016/05/01
    公開日: 2016/09/02
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 三枝 幹雄
    電気学会誌
    2015年 135 巻 5 号 315
    発行日: 2015/05/01
    公開日: 2015/05/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    茨城支所は,
    太平洋戦争
    のさなか1944年7月7日に開設され,2014年7月で70年の歴史を有する支所である。また,2014年6月23日 (月) 現在1 218名の会員が所属し
  • 柳平 丈志
    電気学会誌
    2018年 138 巻 12 号 825
    発行日: 2018/12/01
    公開日: 2018/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー

    茨城支所は,

    太平洋戦争
    のさなか1944年7月7日に開設され,2018年7月で74年の歴史を有する支所である。2018年9月現在の会員数は1,129名となっている。毎年の活

  • 「回教政策」・反ソ戦略の視点から
    シナン レヴェント
    アジア研究
    2012年 58 巻 1.2 号 69-88
    発行日: 2012/04/30
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    The term Eurasia is more than just a geographical statement; it acquired political meaning in the first half of the 20th century. As the term is capable of various definitions, here we restrict the meaning to former-Soviet lands. This paper examines the political intentions of imperial Japan towards the region in the interwar period in terms of Japanese policy towards Islamic populations and the Axis allies, especially German–Japanese military co-operation. The sources are mainly those that relate to questions about Islam and anti-Soviet feelings during this period.
    The strategy of supporting those who opposed the regime in Russia dates back to the Russo-Japanese war. Based on this experience, Japan, in an attempt to play a more important role in international issues after the Paris Conference in 1919, tried to make Tokyo an émigré-center, like Berlin, Paris, and Istanbul at the time. From early 1920s Turkic-Muslim people were recruited and formed a community in Japan under the leadership of the influential Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali. Subsequently, Abdurresid Ibrahim arrived in 1933 and took the initiative by replacing Kurbanali in 1938. It was assumed that Japan was utilizing these anti-Bolshevik Muslim factions to foster the anti-Sovietism adopted by the military; this explains the infiltration of Japanese influence into the Muslim groups, especially those suppressed by Soviet Russia.
    As is well known, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed the Anti-Commintern Pact in November 1936 against international communism in name, but in fact against Soviet Russia. Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese military attaché to Germany at the time, made an agreement with Wilhelm Canaris on behalf of the German army covering two areas: (i) anti-Soviet intelligence co-operation; and (ii) aid to support propaganda of anti-regime minorities based on an order from the Chief of the Army General Staff of imperial Japan. To summarize the agreement: ‘To collaborate with the German army concerning the intelligence of the Soviet Union so that the independence movements of minorities in the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda can be easily supported. This would assist the Japanese army to understand the deficiencies of Soviet Russia and move accordingly in the case of war between Japan and Russia’.
    Finally, the plans mentioned above did not bear fruit in terms of putting Eurasia under Japanese influence due to the fact that Japanese military operations on the Asian mainland and the German invasion in Russia ultimately ended in failure.
  • 柳平 丈志
    電気学会誌
    2020年 140 巻 9 号 612
    発行日: 2020/09/01
    公開日: 2020/09/01
    ジャーナル 認証あり

    茨城支所は,

    太平洋戦争
    のさなか1944年7月7日に開設され,2020年7月で76年の歴史を有する支所である。現在の茨城支所の会員数は1,045名となっている。県内には,(株)日

  • 「戦争体験」に着目して
    鈴木 秀人
    体育学研究
    2021年 66 巻 409-427
    発行日: 2021年
    公開日: 2021/06/16
    [早期公開] 公開日: 2021/04/06
    ジャーナル フリー
     Hirobumi Daimatsu was a legendary sports coach in Japan, especially after coaching the Japanese women’s national volleyball team (“the Oriental Witches”) that won the World Championship in 1962 and the gold medal in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games.
     He was famous for his extreme training methods and had a great influence on coaching methodologies for Japanese sports as a whole. Although many studies have examined his way of thinking from various perspectives, the relationship between his war experiences and his approach to coaching has not been analyzed sufficiently. The present study aimed to examine how Daimatsu’s first-hand war experiences (“keiken”) developed into his coaching beliefs (“taiken”), focusing specifically on a theory created by Yoshida that war veterans’ understanding of their experiences had been changing over time from when they re-entered society and grew older. Yoshida made this transformation clear by referring to 5 periods since the end of the Second World War in 1945.
     Firstly, many demobilized soldiers including Daimatsu had to face civilians who hated the Japanese military just after defeat. They lost their morale, from 1945 to around 1950 could not talk about the military or the War. Secondly, even after former professional officers and wartime politicians had been rehabilitated, the veterans themselves still found it difficult to positively address some topics related to the War in the 1950s.
     Thirdly, the generation that had experienced the War who shouldered the responsibility of reconstruction from the destruction and devastation gradually gained confidence and became able to talk about their wartime experiences. Some of them discovered a positive meaning in their own experiences on the battlefield from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. Daimatsu was a typical example of the third period because he spoke clearly about the positive meaning of his war experiences.
     Penultimately, in the 1970s and 1980s, that generation of Japanese became able to accept the responsibility for the War, especially in Asia, and to gradually acknowledge the negative aspects of their experiences. Finally, in the 1990s, a small number of survivors chose to disclose tragic stories that had not come to light previously.
     Thus, Daimatsu was only one of a generation that had experienced the War and who became recognized as a spokesman for many of that generation who held common feelings.
  • 森 秀夫
    日本教科教育学会誌
    1978年 3 巻 3 号 95-100
    発行日: 1978/10/31
    公開日: 2018/01/07
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿は明治以降,
    太平洋戦争
    の終結に至るまでの憲法教育について,その体制を中心に史的経過を探り,今日の憲法教育の在り方に資するものである。
  • 工藤 洋三, 佐野 修
    土木史研究
    1999年 19 巻 109-116
    発行日: 1999/05/01
    公開日: 2010/06/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    Production of cement had declined steadily throughout the Pacific War. The decrease had been slow at first and had quickened its pace since 1942. This study aims to explain the reasons why the cement industry declined during wartime even though Japan had enough raw materials, like limestone and clay. From this angle of study, the records based on questionnaire and interrogation conducted by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey just after the war were used to explain the discrepancies between the required production and the actual production. There are many possible causes for such decline of production, e.g. lack of skilled labor, fuel, transportation to consumers, and bomb damages to plants, etc. Throughout discussion, it is concluded that one of the most important factors of rapid decline of cement production was the failure of machinery which were irreplaceable during the war. Because most cement plants used imported machinery, replacement parts could not be imported after the war had begun, hence many plants had to close down until the end of the war.
  • 山本 善之
    Techno marine 日本造船学会誌
    2002年 866 巻 98-103
    発行日: 2002/03/10
    公開日: 2018/03/28
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー
  • 浅野 俊和
    人間教育の探究
    2011年 23 巻 23-43
    発行日: 2011/05/31
    公開日: 2023/01/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小長谷 大介
    大学の物理教育
    2018年 24 巻 1 号 36
    発行日: 2018/03/15
    公開日: 2018/04/15
    ジャーナル フリー

    2017年末,マスメディアの一部で湯川秀樹の日記が話題となった.湯川日記にはいくつか種類があり,公開された日記は主に1940年代に彼が記した『研究室日誌』の1945年分である.話題の理由は,1945年という

    太平洋戦争
    の終戦時期

  • その考え方に対する革新を提唱したい!
    和栗 明
    工業教育
    1977年 25 巻 1 号 51-53
    発行日: 1977/08/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 第二次大戦前夜-1939年夏の国際関係-
    三宅 正樹
    国際政治
    1982年 1982 巻 72 号 102-119,L10
    発行日: 1982/10/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This essay examines the relations between the Western Powers and Japan in the summer of 1939. Japanese diplomacy in this period was strongly characterized by the intervention of the military. To review the situation of those days, it is necessary to look back into the situation of 1938.
    It is often insisted that one of the first motives on the Japanese side that spurred Japan into negotiations with Germany for the purpose of “strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact (November 25, 1936)” lay in the Japanese army's desire to check the Soviet Union and Britain from aiding Chiang Kai-shek's China in the Sino-Japanese Conflict. For example, the document “The Army's Hopes Regarding Current Foreign Policies” (Deterrent Diplomacy. Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935-1940, edited by James William Morley, New York, 1976, pp. 268-272), which was proposed by the War Minister Itagaki to the Konoe Cabinet on July 3, 1938, shows the army's fear for both the Soviet Union and Britain. On July 19, the Five Ministers Conference adopted a “Draft Policy for Strengthening Political Ties with Germany and Italy” (Ibid., p. 55). It is an interesting fact that both the “Hopes” and “Draft” aimed at concluding a pact with Germany to check the Soviet Union and making a secret agreement with Italy to check Britain respectively. Since the acceptance of Ribbentrop's proposal on August 5, 1938, which was brought to Tokyo by General Yukio Kasahara, the Japanese army changed its view immediately and eagerly followed Ribbentrop's idea to combine these two agreements. The move to the Tripartite Pact thus began in the summer of 1938.
    It was very much embarassing for the Japanese army that Germany started in the spring of 1939 to make contact with the Soviet Union which had been thought by the Japanese army to be the common enemy of both Germany and Japan. The Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, General Hiroshi Oshima, cabled the Foreign Minister Arita on April 21, 1939, indicating Ribbentrop's intention to bring about better relations between Moscow and Berlin. On July 19, Uzuhiko Usami, councilor of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, raised objection against the German access to the Soviet Union which was becoming more and more evident at that time (Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie D, Band VI, Nr. 688).
    The Japanese army started a local war with the Soviet Union in Nomonhan in May, 1939. This war turned out to be a total defeat of Japan at the end of August. It is a noteworthy fact that the staff of the Kwantung Army which waged this war were fully conscious of the interrelationship between the outcome of this war and the so-called Arita-Craigie talks which were to begin in Tokyo on July 15. Colonel Masao Terada, Chief of the Operation Section of the Kwantung Army, was hesitant to widen the war because he feared that this war would deter the talks. Major Masanobu Tsuji argued that Japan's coup in the battlefield of Nomonhan would strengthen Japan's position toward Britain in the talks and Tsuji persuaded the whole section in this regard. This operation conference on June 19, 1939, was recorded in the secret diary of the Nomonhan Incident (Gendaishi shiryo or the Source Materials of Contemporary History of Japan, vol. 10, Tokyo: Misuzu-shobo, 1963, pp. 74-75).
    Recent studies by Klaus Hildebrand and Wolfgang Michalka show that the foreign policy of the Third Reich possessed a stratified structure consisting of the core, i. e. Hitler's pro-British and anti-Russian policy, and the overstructure represented by Ribbentrop's anti-British and pro-Russian policy which was supported by the German Foreign Ministry, Navy and Big Business. The Japanese army and Japan as a whole was perplexed by this structure of German foreign policy which was regarded as enigmatic.
  • 終戦外交と戦後構想
    加藤 陽子
    国際政治
    1995年 1995 巻 109 号 110-125,L12
    発行日: 1995/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    At the end of the Pacific War, there were more than 6 million Japanese (this figure includes not only military and naval personnel but olso civilians) scattered in overseas theaters; Korea, Manchuria, China, the Philippine islands, and the islands of the Western Pacific. At that moment, there was no one who dared imagine that Japanese nationals overseas could get back home safely and smoothly.
    But in fact, 90 percent of them were repatriated by the end of 1949. In particular, 80 percent of the Japanese in former Japanese occupied territory in China, could return by May 1946.
    This paper focuses on how the disarmament and repatriation policies for the Japanese overseas were made, and why they could be repatriated so quickly.
    Who had the supreme responsibility to accomplish the disarmament of Japanese nationals and to provide for their repatriation? The Chinese National government troops under Chiang Kai-shek's rule could not carry out this mission. During the anti-Japanese War, the Nationalist government moved into the western regions, far from the coastal araes, so it took time for them to reach Japanese occupied territory.
    Only the United States had the power and will to govern all the processes of repatriation. But at the same time, she had to solve other problems. First, she was supposed to maintain the pace of her own demobilization. There was strong pressure to bring Americans out of China. Second, she had to consider Manchurian problems. Generalissimo Chiang asked United States to transfer his army to the northern part of China, as quickly as possible, or the Soviet and Chinese Communist Party would have enterd into the vacuum.
    In short, the repatriation of Japanese, demobilization of Americans, and transportation of Chinese were absolutely necessary for Washington. In order to carry out all these programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff mapped out detailed plans for navigating large numbers of LST and Liberty vessels in December 1945.
  • 鎌田 真弓
    オーストラリア研究
    2006年 19 巻 12-13
    発行日: 2006/12/25
    公開日: 2017/05/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • —「薬学雑誌」「科学」「医学のあゆみ」を中心に—
    小林 力
    薬学図書館
    2020年 65 巻 4 号 140-147
    発行日: 2020/10/31
    公開日: 2022/04/13
    ジャーナル フリー

    太平洋戦争
    中,雑誌は経済統制と物資不足で統廃合,廃刊が続いた。「薬学雑誌」は抄録だけのものが定期発行を許され,昭和20年にはガリ版刷りとなり,戦後の発行もなかなか正常化しなかった。「科学」は,戦争が終わると原爆,原子力の時代を告げる一方,登呂遺跡や昭和新山など戦時中の発見を遅れて掲載している。そしてローマ字書きの巻頭言が現れ,国語はなるべく簡潔にしようという運動を支持する。また,戦後すぐに創刊された「医学のあゆみ」は海外雑誌の翻訳記事が主体で,紙不足に苦しみながらも,戦争中に進展したサルファ剤の研究,また新たに発見されたペニシリン,ストレプトマイシンの情報を,世界から取り残されていた我が国の読者に紹介していた。

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