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全文: "奥田正香"
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  • 松下 義弘
    繊維学会誌
    2018年 74 巻 9 号 P-461-P-467
    発行日: 2018/09/10
    公開日: 2018/09/30
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 千野 信浩
    情報管理
    2007年 50 巻 8 号 530-532
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2007/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 村上 はつ
    経営史学
    1979年 14 巻 3 号 71-86
    発行日: 1980/02/29
    公開日: 2010/11/18
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 堤 一郎, 梶 信藤
    日本機械学会関東支部総会講演会講演論文集
    2006年 2006.12 巻 20810
    発行日: 2006/03/09
    公開日: 2017/06/19
    会議録・要旨集 認証あり
    In the early Showa era, the Nippon Sharyo Seizo at Nagoya in Japan designed new smallish rail-cars. These rail-cars had light weight small bodies and were using imported low power gasoline engines, as well known as Ford type T made by the Ford Motor Co. in the USA. The characteristics of these kinds of rail-cars are as follows: 1) The weight of these rail-cars body was very light. Because, the steel-made main frame and body structure were made of parts with small section area and thin plates. 2) The imported low power gasoline engine was mounted in front of the operator's seat and the driving apparatus were mounted under the main frame of the rail-car. 3) Most of these rail-cars had two-axles and rear shaft driving method. A worm and worm gear system was mounted for the rear shaft drive. 4) The operation cost of these rail-cars was cheaper than steam locomotive train operation cost. This report introduced the outline of these rail-cars.
  • 橋口 勝利
    経営史学
    2013年 47 巻 4 号 4_3-4_24
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2016/01/27
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper aims to examine the factors of the merger between the local cotton-spinning companies in the late Meiji era.
    Ichinomiya Spinning Company was founded in 1895 by local and Nagoya wealthy persons, and produced gas-thread as its core product. However, its business activity deteriorated because of the depression after the Russo-Japanese War, so Ichinomiya Spinning Company came to depend the debt much more than before. As a result, a large amount of the stocks of Ichinomiya Spinning Company were sold by major stockholders who lived outside the Ichinomiya area.
    Since the Meiji government recommended the business combination, Masaka Okuda, who was the then president of Owari Spinning Company, formed Bisei-Rengo which was composed of the cotton spinning companies in the Chukyo area, and promoted the mergers. Okuda negotiated with Shinichiro Saburi, who was the then president of Ichinomiya Spinning Company, about the merger plan, and Saburi decided to merge with Mie Spinning Company. At the same time, Mie Spinning Company tried to acquire Chita Spinning Company.
    However, the merger terms for Ichinomiya Spinning Company were inferior to those for Chita Spinning Company. Therefore, the stockholders of Ichinomiya Spinning Company fiercely opposed to merge with Mie Spinning Company. In the end, the merger negotiations between Ichinomiya Spinning Company and Mie Spinning Company broke down, and Ichinomiya Spinning Company merged with Nihon Spinning Company.
    In short, the stockholders' will of the merged company played an important role in the merger negotiations between spinning companies. In addition, the corporate merger between Ichinomiya Spinning Company and Nihon Spinning Company helped to control the capital concentration on the big spinning companies and to intensify the competition among spinning companies.
  • 松村 隆
    経営史学
    1996年 31 巻 2 号 1-30
    発行日: 1996/07/30
    公開日: 2009/11/06
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper intends to make an analysis of management of a timber merchant in the period of industrialization from 1880s to 1920s in Japan. As the target of a case study, the management of Zaisou, a famous timber merchant in Nagoya is chosen. Zaisou has maintained its predominant position in the lumber industry since Edo era. In Meiji and Taisho period, Zaisou started to develop its business of finance, securities, and real estates in addition to the lumber industry.
    In parallel with the industrialization, the demand of timber, sleepers and wooden boxes were greatly expanded. As a result, Zaisou could not afford to continue its traditional business, namely investment in forests in Kiso district. Under such a business climate, two goals for the growth of the enterprise emerged : acquisition of suitable wood for various kinds of demand, and making steady profits.
    In order to achieve the former goal, Zaisou diversified the purchasing routes of wood. In the field of wood needed a high quality, for example, such as sleepers, wooden boxes and luxury timber, Zaisou continued to invest in forests as in Edo period. Concerning to the latter target, Zaisou firstly diversified ways of the use of funds, secondly enlarged means of purchasing. It was effective for Zaisou to buy timber in large amount in the shortening turnover of funds and elaboration of inventory management.
  • 山根 巌
    土木史研究
    1997年 17 巻 175-185
    発行日: 1997/06/05
    公開日: 2010/06/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    1891年 (明治24) 5月、京都市蹴上水力発電所の成功以後、これに刺戟されて国内各地で小規模の水力発電所が多数建設された。
    明治末期には岐阜県下で、当時としては比較的大規模な2つの水路式水力発電所が建設されて、名古屋へ高圧、遠距離送電が行はれた。
    名古屋電燈株式会社は、1910年 (明治43) 長良川水力発電所を建設し、導水路には湯之洞水路橋が、煉瓦構造5径間連続アーチ橋として架設された。
    一方、名古屋電力株式会社 (工事途中の1910年名古屋電燈に吸収合併) は、1911年 (明治44) 木曽川水力発電所を建設したが、導水路には旅足川水路橋として鉄筋コンクリート構造、最大径間23.6mのアーチ橋を完成させた。
    長良川水力発電所は現在も稼働中であり、古いドイツのジーメンス社製の発電機が保存され、水路橋も補修して利用されている。
    一方、本曽川水力発電所は1917年 (大正6) に、「八百津水力発電所」と改称きれ、1974年 (昭和49) まで稼働した。
    旧八百津発電所の建物は、県の文化財に指定されて保存されているが、旅足川水路橋は1954年 (昭和29) の丸山ダム建設に伴い湖底に水没している。
    これ等の水路橋は、明治末期沼本の構道物が煉瓦構造から鉄筋コンクリート構造への変換の過渡期に建設された。この報文では、これ等の水路橋が略同時期に、相異なる構造で競争して建設された歴史的背景と意義について調査結果を報告する。
  • 浅井 良夫
    社会経済史学
    1985年 50 巻 6 号 655-678,777-77
    発行日: 1985/03/20
    公開日: 2017/11/22
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    The purpose of this paper is to clarify the method by which Japan introduced foreign capital during the period of industrialization. During this period the introduction of foreign capital into Japan was characterized by the following three aspects : (1) shift from of the period during which new technology and knowledge were introduced i.e. shokusan kogyo ki (the period of promotion of industrial activities, 1870-1885) to the period of capital introduction which started after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) ; (2) foreign capital was introduced mostly through the issue of national bonds while direct investment by foreigners were rare ; (3) foreign capital was mostly used for the administration of the colonies. These three chracteristics are deeply related to the fact that in Japan the industrial revolution proceeded simultaneously with the formation of world imperialism. Since under the international conditions of those days, the import of foreign capital was directly linked with the danger of being colonized or semicolonized, the goverment of Japan, in contrast with Russia and Italy, did not welcome the introduction of foreign capital. By 1984, when Japan obtained the revision of the uneaqual treaty with the United Kingdom and thus became able to establish diplomatic relations on an equal footing with the weatern countries, the government of Japan had prohibited the import of foreign capital. (Though from the last years of the Edo period until the first years of Meiji, a considerable amount of foreign capital had activly been introduced, after 1881 its introduction was completely prohibited.) Following the Sino-Japanese War, capital became scarce as economic development accelerated. Further, the preparation of the Russo-Japanese War required large amount of expenses. Such financtal difficulties made both the bourgeaisie and the bureaucrats eager to obtain foreign capital. However at this time, the government believed that disorderly import of foreign capital by Japanese capitalists could be harmful. The government intended to regulate and control the import of foreign capital. Kentaro Kaneko, a leading bureaucrat, thought that the government should establish a bank which could introduce foreign capital and invest it in projects deemed indispensable for the industrialization. He also believed that the bank could prevent Japanese companies from being dominated by foreign capital. On the basis of Kaneko's plan, the Industrial Bank of Japan was established in 1900. As the project of introducing foreign capital from Morgan & Co. failed, the financial situation of this bank became shaky. Meanwhile, the government adopted the gold standard in 1899, thus facilitating the inflow of foreign capital. Following the adoption of the gold standard, the government began to raise funds from foreign countries. At that time the government tried to raise funds directly on the London market, without the assistance of the trading companies or banks which had branches in Japan. After having been granted the privitedge to handle foreign loans, the Yokohama Specie Bank developed its activities under the protection of the government. In this way, by giving special protection to the Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan suceeded in keeping independence from the foreign trading companies and banks. Kentaro Kaneko and his partners wanted to make the Industrial Bank of Japan the exclusive importer of foreign capital, but this plan failed because of the opposition of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, with the law of 1905, the Industrial Bank of Japan was granted the exclusive right to handle loans by local governments and private debentures. As a result, around 1905, the system of introduction of foreign capital through the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank of Jaban was firmly established.
  • 伊牟田 敏充
    社会経済史学
    1969年 35 巻 2 号 160-183,236-23
    発行日: 1969/06/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス

    In spite of the great role of business corporations in the economic growth of modern Japan, little attempt has been made to analyze quantitatively the structure of these corporations. In this report we try to analyze the control and financial structure of mid-Meiji business corporations utilizing data found in Nihon Teikoku Tokei Nenkan, Noshomu Tokei, Cinko Eigyo Hokoku and in the various company annual reports. Analyzing corporation statistics for 1889, we can discern four business types : 1.) small scale business with few investors; this type was common in traditional industries, e. g. manufacture of tobacco, soap, matches, soy, miso, lamps, and fans ; 2.) large scale operations with few investors ; these were the zaibatsu controlled industries, e. g. mining, ship-building, and foreign trade ; 3.) small scale business with many investors ; This type was found in agriculture, in particular in the reclamtion of waste-land, cultivation, sericulture, bamboo work and tea manufacture ; 4.) large scale business with many investors ; these predominated the non-zaibatsu modern industries, e. g. railways, shipping, cotton spinning, electric lighting and insurance. These four types suggest a dualistic structure among the business corporations. This in turn reflects the immaturity of Japanese capitalism in this period. The control structure of joint stock companies (a component of the fourth category) is next considered. Following Professor K. Yamaguchi's survey, we inquire into the control structure of cotton spinning companies in 1898. We find that holding ratios of the largest stockholders were under 10% in almost all companies. The companies whose largest ten stockholders' holding ratio was under 35% occupied over 70% of surveyed companies. Thus control by a majority holding was not typical at that time. In mid Meiji cotton spinning companies co-operational control by larger stockholders was the dominant form. The system of co-operational control had three elements : 1.) chief stock holders in one company belonging to different families and groups ; 2.) individual capitalists seeking diversified investmnent ;3.) a voting system which restricted large shareholder rights. Statistical data showing the capital composition of companies in the Meiji era are not readily available. We do have N. Takamura's survey showing the capital composition of 52 cotton spinning companies in 1898. This survey presented the following interesting figures : the average ratio of paid-in capital to total capital was 57.5%, the ratio of net worth to total capital was 67.8% and the ratio of debt (excluding trade debt) to total capital was 16.4%. For cotton spinning companies, net worth was the most important source of funds and debt (including bankers' loans) was not nearly so important as has been previously imagined. Similar results have been found for various companies in other industries (railways, shipping, and electric light). On the other hand, according to Ginko Eigyo Hokoku company shares to client composition of national bank loans was under 10% in 1890-96. This means companies did not depend directly on bankers' loans. Note, however, that 40% of national bank loans during this period has as their mortgage company stock. This suggests that many stockholders often invested with borrowed money and that joint stock companies therefore depended indirectly upon bankers' credit. Moreover, the central bank supplied money to commercial banks (including national banks) by discounting bills with mortgage (of course, including motgage on stocks). Commercial banks could not supply money to debtors without the central bank's credit because they were typically overloaned. In this manner central bank-commercial banks→stockholders→joint stock companies were stock issues by companies supported. The various structure characteristics of Meiji period corporations outlined above are

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  • 工業化学雑誌
    1910年 13 巻 8 号 910-924
    発行日: 1910/08/05
    公開日: 2011/09/02
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐藤 俊一
    選挙研究
    1992年 7 巻 117-133
    発行日: 1992/04/30
    公開日: 2009/01/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 吉原 精行
    日本釀造協會雜誌
    1961年 56 巻 8 号 776-782
    発行日: 1961/08/15
    公開日: 2011/11/04
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 吉原 精行
    日本釀造協會雜誌
    1961年 56 巻 6 号 586-592
    発行日: 1961/06/15
    公開日: 2011/11/04
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 燃料協會
    燃料協会誌
    1937年 16 巻 6 号 597-619
    発行日: 1937年
    公開日: 2010/06/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 梶川 勇作
    経済地理学年報
    1970年 15 巻 2 号 56-63
    発行日: 1970年
    公開日: 2017/05/19
    ジャーナル フリー
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